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ABSTRACT 
When the Indonesian New Order regime fell in 1998, regional politics with strong 
ethnic content resurged across the country. This trend of local politics was enhanced by the 
promulgation of the Decentralisation Law in 1999 which transferred greater autonomy to 
the regions. Since the fall of the New Order, West Kalimantan has experienced strong 
ethnic politics, particularly relating to the Dayaks. 
Strong Dayak politics in West Kalimantan after the fall of the New Order was not 
unprecedented. After centuries of occupying a subordinate place in the political and social 
hierarchy under the nominal rule of the Malay sultanates, Dayaks had begun an enthusiastic 
political emancipation movement in 1945. It was quite successful and led to the installation 
of some Dayak elite in the executive council in the provincial and district (kabupaten) 
governments. Dayaks had an insignificant political role at the provincial level in the early 
1950s as a result of their support of the pro-Dutch DIKB. However, when the Partai Dayak, 
the only Dayak political party, contested the general election in 1955 and the local elections 
in 1958, it was able to obtain a significant number of votes. Very soon after the election in 
1958, four Dayaks were elected as district heads (bupati) and one as governor of the 
province. The Dayak leadership was replaced after the coming of the New Order because of 
their association with the leftist Partindo. The Dayaks did not regain their pre-1965 political 
status until after the regime change in 1998, when Soeharto was forced to resign. 
This thesis examines the determinants of ethnic politics through an analysis of the 
case of the Dayaks of West Kalimantan. It asks how and why Dayak politics have 
experienced drastic changes since 1945. This thesis argues that the oscillations of Dayak 
politics have been determined largely by events outside the control of Dayak elites, 
particularly changes in the regime and policies in Jakarta. Some changes restricted Dayak 
opportunities for political participation, while other changes opened up opportunities. 
Marginalisation, which has been a strong propeller for ethnic movements elsewhere, has 
been particularly important in the case of the Dayaks of West Kalimantan. When the 
opportunities have arisen, the Dayaks have used the issue of marginalisation to pursue their 
ethnic goals, both in politics and in other sectors. Ethnic identity formation has also 
determined the course of Dayak politics, particularly during the 1940s and 1950s. Finally, 
this study finds that the resurgence of Dayak politics after the fall of the New Order was 
also influenced by the two massive ethnic conflicts in 1997 and 1999. The causes of these 
vi 
and other previous conflicts involving the Madurese were non-political. This thesis finds 
that historical, cultural, ethnic geographical factors as well as Dayak marginalisation are the 
most important underlying causes for conflict. 
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1.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The sudden fall of the centralistic and authoritarian New Order in May 1998 
drastically changed the landscape of Indonesian local politics. Newly found political 
freedom as well as opportunities made available by decentralisation policies generated 
strong political and social dynamics in the regions. Ethnic politics, the struggle for power 
allocation among ethnic groups, is no longer considered as treacherous as it was under the 
New Order, and in fact, has become increasingly visible at local levels. Demands from 
indigenous peoples to take over local leadership positions have become common during 
district and provincial elections. This dynamic is in stark contrast to previously passive 
local societies which knew that they had no choice but to accept the appointment of mostly 
Javanese officials or military officers to head strategic posts in their region. 
West Kalimantan has witnessed a sudden surge of Dayak political activity following 
the fall of the New Order. The pressures from the Dayak elites and their supporters started 
in district head elections in Sanggau and Pontianak during the transition period between 
1998-9. The central government eventually acquiesced to their demands and appointed 
Dayaks on both occasions. Apparently these appointments were attempts to appease 
alienated and aggressive Dayaks who had just waged ethnic war against the Madurese 
minority in 1997. The Malays, the other large ethnic group in the province, on the other 
hand, were relatively quiet initially and only became involved in the competition for power 
as a response to mounting Dayak pressure. By mid-2006 Dayaks occupied top executive 
positions in districts where they were a majority, a phenomenon not seen since the New 
Order came to power. As will be explained later, for a short period from the end of the 
1950s Dayak leaders had assumed some of the most strategic posts in the province. 
However, they were relieved from their jobs when the New Order came to power in the 
mid-l 960s. The causes of their recent political resurgence and their past political struggles 
can only be comprehended by examining the fateful political history of the Dayak 
community. 
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The history of Dayak politics in West Kalimantan is relatively short, traceable from 
1945. During the colonial era, the majority of Dayaks lived under the nominal rule of the 
Malay sultanates where they occupied a subordinate place in the political and social 
hierarchy. Before the introduction of Catholic schools in the interior region, Dayaks had 
very limited access to formal education compared to other ethnic groups in the province. 
Education is an important prerequisite for political awakening, a process which had taken 
place in various parts oflndonesia since the beginning of the 20th century. Dayaks also had 
no or very limited access to work for the Islamic sultanate administration because of their 
different religion and low social status. These conditions made them the least emancipated 
ethnic group compared to the Malays, Bugis, 1 and Chinese,2 the other ethnic groups in the 
province. The Dayaks were no more than passive observers - and in many cases not even 
aware of the nationalist movements unfolding in the Netherlands Indies. 
The conclusion of the Second World War (hereafter WWII) changed Dayak 
political fortunes. In order to get support from the Dayaks, the largest ethnic group in the 
province at this time, the newly restored pro-Dutch federal government of West Kalimantan 
(named DIKB in 1947) opened opportunities for Dayaks to organise politically. The 
government accommodated their political aspirations by ensuring Dayak representation in 
government bodies, unprecedented in the province's history. It established a council to look 
after Dayak affairs and allowed Dayaks to form a political party. It also helped Dayaks to 
get a better bargaining position vis-a-vis their former masters, the Malay sultanates. As a 
1The Bugis of West Kalimantan were important in the past as they had their own sultanate in Mempawah. 
One of the founders of Mempawah sultanate, Opu Daeng Manambon, had fan1i ly links to other sultanates in 
the province: Pontianak, Sambas, and Tanjungpura (Lontaan 1975:121-4). 
2The Chinese, the third largest ethnic group in the province until the 1970s, had maintained an important 
economic role since colonial times. Their political role, however, fluctuated. Chinese political influence in the 
province was important in the 19th century during the era of kongsi (organisations based upon trade links often 
mirroring clan organisations). At their peak time, the kongsi were outside the control of native sultans and the 
Dutch colonial government. Through a series of wars, the Dutch was able to subdue the kongsi which later 
disbanded (Jackson 1970; Yuan 2000; Heidhues 2003). The Chinese were officially represented in the post-
WWII West Kalimantan government between 1945 and 1949. Like the Dayaks, the Chinese were also 
allocated a special office to deal with their issues (i.e. Chinese Affairs Office). The formal representation of 
the Chinese in the West Kalimantan government was abolished together with the ethnic office in 1950. Their 
political role reduced rapidly after 1949 as many of them were alien residents. Like other Chinese in 
Indonesia, their political role was marginal during the New Order. There were signs of improvement after the 
fall of the New Order, with the appointment of Y ansen Akun Effendi as district head of Sanggau (2003), 
Hasan Karman as major of Singkawang (2007) and Christiandy Sanj aya as deputy governor (2007). However, 
the economic and political role of the Chinese in the province is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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result, many Dayak leaders looked to the pro-Dutch government rather than joining the 
nationalists in Java, who were in revolt against Dutch rule. 
The transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the new Indonesian Republic 
transformed the context in which politics developed in West Kalimantan. The DIKB, which 
had aligned with the Dutch-sponsored federal government, was forced to dissolve itself and 
was replaced by a new nationalist government. The Dayaks were accused by the 
nationalists of being traitors because of the support given by Dayak leaders to DIKB, and 
the Dayaks who held positions with the DIKB lost their jobs. As a result, the Dayak leaders 
disappeared from the top layers of the provincial government. They quickly adjusted to the 
new circumstances, however. A Dayak political party, Persatuan Dayak (PD), survived the 
transition and participated in the general election in 1955 and local elections in 1958. In 
both rounds of elections, PD was able to obtain a significant vote and became one of the 
most important political parties in West Kalimantan. With this new political legitimacy, 
four Dayaks were elected as district heads and one as governor of the province from 1958 
to 1959. 
But West Kalimantan, like the rest of Indonesia, was not immune to the political 
struggles at the national level that witnessed a series of regional rebellions in Sumatra and 
Sulawesi that led to the collapse of constitutional democracy and the establishment of 
President Soekarno's authoritarian and centralised Guided Democracy. As part of his plan 
to rebuild the Indonesian political system, Soekarno issued regulations that greatly curbed 
the activities of political parties and restricted their number. Although the PD had become a 
major force in West Kalimantan politics, its popular support in national terms was 
insignificant and it was in no position to resist the new rules emanating from Jakarta. The 
PD was not a major target of these measures but it was one of the many small parties that 
were forced to disband themselves and left with no choice but to merge with one of the nine 
surviving ' national' parties. 
The larger portion of the former PD under the leadership of the Dayak Governor, 
Oevang Oeray, joined the leftist-nationalist Partindo, while the others, led by another 
Dayak leader, Palaunsoeka, joined Partai Katolik (PK). Although Dayak officials continued 
to be appointed occasionally as sub-district heads, the Dayak political movement lost much 
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of its cohesion and its Dayak quality was diluted through affiliation with national parties. 
Guided Democracy had allowed Dayak leaders to occupy prominent positions in the 
provincial government but had undermined their capacity to mobilise ethnic support 
through a Dayak party. 
The sudden change in national politics after the attempted coup in 1965 reversed 
Dayak political fortunes once again. Many Dayak political leaders were members of 
Partindo, a national left party which was close to Soekarno and was accused of involvement 
in the coup attempt. The anti-leftist movement that eventually deposed President Soekarno 
also resulted in the Dayak governor of West Kalirnantan and four Dayak district heads 
being removed from their positions. The ex-PD politicians, who had joined Partindo simply 
because they needed a party because their own party had been disbanded, now found 
themselves under threat as a result of the dramatic events in Jakarta in which they had 
played no part. 
The military-backed New Order regime imposed further restrictions on existing 
political parties and established Golkar as its own electoral vehicle. Dayaks who had joined 
Partindo desperately searched for a safer home in another party and found IPKI, a party 
closely aligned with retired military officers. But their respite was brief. Significant 
numbers of ex-Partindo Dayaks were "persuaded" to switch to Golkar during the 1971 
election. In 1973 the government again reduced the number of parties - this time to three -
with the result that IPKI was forced to merge with other non-Islamic parties in the new 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI). While Dayaks were significantly represented in the 
West Kalimantan PDI, it was the smallest party with no access to the government. Most of 
the Dayak elite turned to Golkar which at least gave them better access to the government. 
The proportion of Dayaks in the provincial and district legislatures declined from 1966 and 
did not recover before 1977. No Dayaks were appointed again as district heads until three 
years before the regime fall. The share of Dayak sub-district heads also dropped. From the 
non-political perspective, the New Order's rapid development policies had started to show 
their effects from the beginning of the 1980s but not always to the benefit of Dayaks. 
Activists and segments of Dayak communities claimed that logging, plantations and 
transmigration had not benefited the Dayak communities while many aspects of Dayak 
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culture waned. The regime disparaged some of their cultural practices as primitive, leading 
to their near extinction. The anti-SARA policies during the New Order had made demands 
for affirmative action to improve the Dayak conditions impossible.3 The marginalisation of 
the Dayaks, and in fact many peripheral ethnic groups, continued until the fall of the New 
Order regime. 
Dayak politics was again transformed after 1998 by developments which Dayaks 
had not initiated but to which they reacted. In many parts of Indonesia, the unexpected fall 
of the New Order regime in May 1998 opened the way for the revival of ethnic politics that 
had been repressed. In West Kalimantan Dayaks took advantage of the new political 
freedom and the restored democratic institutions. They were able to pressure the 
government into appointing Dayaks as district heads in Sanggau and Pontianak between 
1998 and 1999. The Dayak elite warned the central government of possible political chaos 
if their demands for better political status were ignored. They referred to the recent massive 
ethnic conflict in 1997 in the province. The influence of Dayak political manoeuvres did 
not stop at the election of executive heads, but extended to other strategic positions, such as 
regional representatives (utusan daerah) in the National Assembly, executive caretakers of 
newly-formed districts, and heads of local religious affairs departments. In every election of 
a district head in predominantly Dayak districts after 2000 until recent times (May 2006), 
Dayak candidates were successful. The proportion of Dayak legislators at the district level 
had reached a thirty-year record high after the 1999 election. 
This thesis will examine the course of Dayak politics in West Kalimantan from the 
1940s to the early 2000s. It argues that the politics of the Dayaks of West Kalimantan has 
always been constrained by the nature of the regime. All the drastic shifts in Dayak politics 
corresponded with the frequent political changes at the national level throughout the 
nation's post-independence history. The thesis will show that regime changes in the 
national capital had substantial consequences for the course of local politics, in this case 
Dayak politics. Some changes at the national level brought political opportunities for the 
Dayaks while others were perilous. The study acknowledges the important role ethnic 
3The New Order regime banned the raising of sensitive issues related to ethnicity, religion, race, and other 
inter-group relations (collectively known as SARA). 
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leaders and organisations have played in Dayak politics. It argues, however, that the extent 
of their role was heavily dependent on the nature of the regime. The same Dayak elite and 
organisations which were politically active after 1998 were quite subservient observers 
during the previous authoritarian regime. Similarly, the marginalisation that had provoked 
resentment and despair among Dayak communities only become effective rallying points 
after the fall of the New Order, that is, after the new political circumstances allowed their 
concerns to be addressed. There are two sub arguments, firstly, the particular path of Dayak 
identity formation as well as their past (and continuing) marginalisation shaped their ethnic 
politics after independence that are different from the other important ethnic group, the 
Malays. The second sub argument is that ethnic conflict has arisen from a combination of 
underlying conditions including past conflict, cultural stereotyping, marginalisation of the 
Dayaks as well ethnic geography. 
Dayak politics has been entwined with those of other ethnic communities, 
particularly the Malays. During the pre-colonial and colonial periods, Dayaks were 
subservient to Malay sultans. Although small numbers of Dayaks were gradually absorbed 
into the Muslim Malay community, most Dayaks retained their distinctive identity into the 
post-independence period when they were at times political allies and at other times rivals 
of Malays. At the beginning of the New Order, Dayaks in one part of West Kalimantan 
launched attacks on rural Chinese thought to be sympathetic to communist rebels. From the 
1950s to 1990s Dayaks clashed on several occasions with the small Madurese minority. 
The thesis will therefore contribute to the discussion of ethnic conflict, which has occurred 
many times in this region. In the case of Dayak-Madurese conflict, it will seek to find the 
main causes of conflict and its relationship with Dayak politics. It argues that the primary 
underlying factors for the recent conflicts between Dayaks and Madurese are to be found in 
their strained relations arising from cultural/perceptual factors with roots in history. It 
accepts that the last two large-scale conflicts contributed to the political strengthening of 
the Dayak community, they were not a result of premeditated political calculations or 
manoeuvres. 
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1.2 Studies ofDayak Politics in West Kalimantan 
A quite substantial body of study of ethnic and regional politics covers the first two 
decades after Indonesian independence but this research dropped markedly during the New 
Order period. 4 Since 1998, however, greater interest has been shown in regional 
developments. 
Many studies have been done on regional politics between 1945 and the early New 
Order after 1965. The fast-changing political scene during the revolutionary period at the 
end of the 1940s, the dynamics of local politics during the 1950s to 1960s, and the political 
transition after the abortive coup in 1965 were some of the foci of scholars. William Liddle, 
for example, closely examined the ethnic and local politics in North Sumatra from the 
1950s to mid-1960s (Liddle 1970). Bigalke wrote about the social history of the Toraja 
people in South Sulawesi from the times of Dutch colonial rule up to the 1960s (Bigalke 
1981; Bigalke 2005), whereas Ichlasul Amal discussed regional politics in West Sumatra 
and South Sulawesi in 1949-1979 (Amal 1992). Audrey Kahin analysed political 
developments in pre-New Order West Sumatra (Kahin 1999) and several chapters of her 
edited book discussed the experiences of eight different regions during the revolution at the 
end of 1940s (Kahin 1985). Referring specifically to Kalimantan, Burhan Magenda wrote 
about the politics of the local aristocrats in East Kalimantan after independence, and how 
some of them had managed to survive politically to the 1970s (Magenda 1991). Earlier 
Douglas Miles (1976) devoted several chapters to the genesis of Dayak politics in 
Central/South Kalimantan from the early 20th century up to the early 1960s and to the 
Dayak contribution to the formation of the Central Kalimantan province in 1950s. Very 
little of those studies, except Miles (1976), discussed the politics of the marginalised ethnic 
groups. 
In contrast, local ethnic politics attracted less scholarly interest during the 
centralised New Order era when the national government encouraged a high level of 
political homogeneity between the centre and the periphery. The apparent political calm at 
the regional and local levels from the 1970s until the end of 1990s as a consequence of 
40ne exception was the continuing research interests on the Chinese minority in lndonesia, however, the 
politics of the migrant groups is not the focus of this study. 
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strong authoritarian regime also discouraged scholars. The lack of interest in local or ethnic 
politics under the New Order was commonly observed except for troubled regions such as 
Aceh (Sjamsuddin 1984a; Hiorth 1986; Kell 1995; Robinson 1998b), West Papua (Savage 
1978; Osborne 1985; Bell, Feith et al. 1986; Smith 1991), Maluku (Meulen 1981; Chauvel 
1990; Christie 1996; Steijlen 1996), and the East Timor (Jolliffe 1978; Dunn 1983; 
Budiardjo and Liem 1984; Cox and Carey 1995; Pinto and Matthew 1996). In these regions 
studies focussed mainly on the past or ongoing struggles for independence and the human 
rights issues. 5 
The fall of the New Order regime reversed the trend. After May 1998, Indonesia 
was rapidly transformed from a highly centralised country to one of the most decentralised. 
Democratisation and decentralisation unleashed political dynamics at local and regional 
levels which had never been seen since the 1950s. These new developments have attracted 
academic attention and have contributed to a burgeoning literature on regional and ethnic 
issues since the 2000s. Indonesian scholars, whose research was severely constrained 
during the New Order, have contributed significantly to this growing literature.6 
Some of these trends were reflected in literature on West Kalimantan. Despite lively 
Dayak politics, particularly in the first three decades after the end of WWII, very few 
studies were published until recently. As mentioned above, scholarly writings on this 
period are mostly on events occurring in Java, Sumatra or Sulawesi. West Kalimantan 
received little or no attention at all. Worse still, West Kalimantan local newspapers during 
this era, which should be an important source for academic writing, were also lost.7 As a 
consequence, work on West Kalimantan in the 1950s and 1960s will require an extensive 
search for primary documents and heavy reliance on interviews. 
5The "ongoing" movements here refer to both limited armed attacks by the separatists in the region (e.g. in the 
case of Aceh and East Timor) as well as campaigns by their overseas campatriots or representatives. The Free 
Aceh Movemenets has headquarters in Sweden, the Free Papua Movement has representatives in Australia, 
while the Republic of South Maluku has signi ficant supporters in the Netherlands. 
6Take the case of publication on conflict or decentralisation related issues in Maluku. From 77 recently 
published books (1999-2006) on the issues, 65 of them (86%) were written by local writers and published 
locally. This statistic is a result of search in the largest network of Australian libraries 
(http://librariesaustralia.nla.gov .au). 
71 was only able to recover several issues of local newspapers published during the 1940s and 1950s. I was 
lucky to find several months of a local newspaper in 1960s, including some which covered stories of the 1967 
conflict, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Most of the modem literature on the Dayaks of West Kalimantan published up to 
the end of the 1990s focussed on their social-anthropological or economic aspects (often 
relying on material published in the colonial era to describe social conditions) and did very 
little to address the political journey of the Dayaks. 8 Those who examined political 
concerns limited their discussions to events during the colonial era, and ignored 
developments after the 1950s (e.g. Bohm 1986). Only a few scholars mentioned in passing 
important moments in Dayak politics in the 1950s (e.g. Feith 1957; FEER 1968; Lontaan 
1975; Riwut 1979; Alqadrie 1990). A rare exception is Roekaerts who published in 1985 a 
manuscript on the plight of the Dayaks of Sin tang and the issues of Dayak marginalisation 
(Roekaerts 1985). The remaining material was in the form of documents, typescripts or 
memoirs by Dayak politicians or religious workers. 
The massive conflicts in 1997 and 1999 in the province and the fall of the New 
Order changed the research direction of studies of West Kalimantan's Dayaks. Scholarly 
works on Dayaks published after this time included a political perspective which have been 
largely left out before. Most of these studies, however, focussed on ethnic conflict. At least 
four theses on ethnic conflict have been produced (Arafat 1998; Abas 2002; Davidson 2002; 
Giring 2003), in addition to dozens of books and articles on similar nature (e.g. Human 
Rights Watch 1997; Davidson 2000; Heidhues 2001; Peluso and Harwell 2001; Alqadrie 
2002b; Hawkins 2002; Davidson 2003; Purwana 2003; Saad 2003; Bertrand 2004; Peluso 
2006; Smith and Bouvier 2006a). So far only the works of Davidson have given significant 
attention to the political history of the Dayaks in the province, although most of his works 
are geared to explaining ethnic conflict in the province. This study, however, is not 
primarily about ethnic conflict, and therefore will move away from a "conflict-centric" 
approach by examining broader aspects ofDayak politics from a historical perspective. 
This thesis will contribute to the study of political history of the peripheral regions, 
and the politics of marginalised ethnic groups and their relations with the central state, by 
examining the case of the Dayaks of West Kalimantan, Indonesia. 
8Two of the most cited works are Enthoven (1903) and Veth (1854). 
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1.3 Methodology - Technical Notes 
Most data presented in this thesis were gathered during two periods of fieldwork in 
the province between 2003 and 2005, which together lasted almost a year. As a "local" 
from West Kalimantan myself, I was able to locate and establish contact with informants 
rather easily. I interviewed dozens of local informants (their names is listed in Appendix), 
mostly Dayaks who were, or still are, high ranking officials in the provincial and district 
governments. Only a few former Dayak officials in the 1940s-1950s are still alive in West 
Kalimantan while some passed away before the thesis was completed. They gave valuable 
insights into past Dayak political activities. Besides the Dayaks, I interviewed other 
officials or former officials from different ethnic backgrounds. I interviewed officials and 
former officials at provincial (including governor and deputy governor), district (including 
district head and deputy district head) and sub-district levels. I also interviewed leaders and 
activists of the Dayak and Malay organisations. 
The interviews usually took place during several visits, which normally last for 
about two hours each. The subsequent interviews were usually to mine more details and to 
clarify points which were unclear in the previous interview. On some controversial issues, 
the interviews involved government officials and informants from both sides of the political 
and ethnic divide. Names of the interviewees are listed in the bibliographical section, 
however, only their initials will appear in the body of this thesis. 
Besides interviews, this thesis also makes use of primary materials, such as official 
or private political correspondence, government documents, personal diaries, and political 
party documents. A significant number of these sources had never been used before. I was 
very fortunate to discover a significant number of documents related to West Kalimantan 
Partindo, into which many Dayak political leaders joined in the early 1960s. The Dayak 
chairman of the party had kept those documents in the dark due to unfavourable political 
conditions under the New Order. The Catholic Church at the provincial level was also very 
helpful sharing some of its valuable archives. It provided me with document and 
correspondence related to local politics and the establishment of PD. I also obtained 
clippings from local newspapers published in 1967 on the conflict between the Dayak and 
Chinese in the same year. This is a valuable source of information as it was "local" news, in 
addition to news on the same incidents published by Kompas. At the offices of the governor 
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and district heads I found documents, such as government reports and "confidential" human 
resources data. Jamie Davidson, a scholar who had spent a significant time in the province, 
directed me to the most complete collection of Akcaya, a local newspaper from the late 
1970s, at the governor's office. The library at the governor's office and the regional 
archival office held some rare materials, such as proceedings of local parliament meetings 
and the records of district head election in the 1950s. Other than those sources, I have also 
consulted archival materials deposited at Arsip Nasional Indonesia (Jakarta), Cornell 
University (Ithaca), Library of Congress (Washington), National Library of Australia 
(Canberra), and Australian War Memorial (Canberra). Search for Dutch sources in the 
Netherlands was not conducted due to my limited understanding of the language. I, 
however, was able to establish a link with the wife of the late Dr A.H. Bohm, who played a 
significant role in West Kalimantan politics after WWII. With her information I was able to 
locate some ofBohm' s notes and documents which were illuminative of the events related 
to Dayak political activities in the 1940s to the early 1950s, as alternative sources were rare. 
Other Dutch sources mentioned in this thesis were mainly from libraries held in Australian 
institutions and universities. I was indebted to Dr Edwin Jurriens and Dr Henk Eijkman, my 
colleagues at ADF A, who had helped me to translate and discuss the related Dutch texts. 
This thesis also benefited from the growing literature on the Dayaks of West 
Kalimantan written by both local and foreign scholars, particularly studies related to recent 
conflicts. However, with the exception of Jamie Davidson's work, they are less helpful in 
establishing what occurred from the 1950s to 1960s. The discussion of more recent events 
in this study profited from a series of articles in the Kalimantan Review published by a 
Dayak NGO. These articles surveyed and reported events, particularly those related to 
Dayak interests in the province since the late 1990s, and served as a "guide" for my 
interviews and research on contemporary issues. 
Lastly, this thesis made the good use oflndonesian census data to extract ethnicity 
information. This "raw" census data, still coded in the form of computer files, was provided 
to the author by the Australian Social Science Data Archive at the ANU. Based on this data, 
the thesis is able to produce ethnic-related analysis and tables, which are not available in 
official publications and have not been used by other scholars previously. 
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Notes on Population Data 
All population data for 1980, 1990, and 2000 are taken from the ten-yearly 
Indonesia census for the corresponding years. Detailed ethnic data down to village level is 
only available in the 2000 census. The ethnic data for 1980 and 1990 are extracted from a 
question in the censuses which asked for the respondent's mother tongue. Respondents of 
mixed parentage and who lived in urban areas where they spoke Indonesian at home might 
easily have answered the question with "Indonesian". However, most Madurese and 
Chinese would speak their own ethnic language at home. This was also true to some extent 
for Dayaks, the majority of whom still lived in rural areas. This was quite different in the 
case of Malays, who might answer "Indonesian" as their mother tongue because of the 
close resemblance between the Malay and Indonesian languages. The numbers and 
percentages of Dayaks and Malays in 1980 and 1990 should therefore be considered as 
indicators rather than precise figures. 
Population data from 1995 are taken from the 2000 census, mainly to show the 
numbers of Madurese at the sub-district and village levels in districts not affected by 
conflicts in 1997 and 1999. The data are extracted from answers to a question on place of 
residence five years previously. In order to get data "close" to conditions in 1995, the data 
had excluded those who lived in other districts five years previously. One weakness of this 
data is its assumption that the population had lived in the same village for the five years 
leading to the census. 
By 2005 West Kalimantan had four new districts (Landak, Bengkayang, Sekadau 
and Melawi), and one new municipality (Singkawang). In many cases, for consistency, the 
thesis still uses the previous district structure. For example, population data for Landak 
district, in some instances, is included in the data for Pontianak district. 
For consistency, this thesis intentionalJy groups all non-Muslim natives of West 
Kalimantan into the Dayak category. A small number of "Dayak" Muslims, therefore, are 
not treated as Dayak in the statistics in this thesis. As a consequence, the percentage of the 
Dayaks at the provincial and district level in this thesis is slightly lower than the official 
result in the 2000 census. 
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On Newspaper/Magazine 
In most cases references to newspapers and magazines give only the date or volume 
number. Akcaya newspaper changed to Pontianak Post on 14 September 1998, but this 
thesis uses "Akcaya" throughout. KR stands for Kalimantan Review, a magazine published 
by the Institut Dayakologi. A list of newspapers and magazines cited in the thesis can be 
found in the bibliography. 
On District and Municipalities 
In almost all cases, the reference to "districts" covers municipalities (kotamadya) as 
well as district (kabupaten) below the provincial level. Two municipalities existed in the 
province in 2005: Pontianak and Singkawang municipalities. Pontianak municipality in this 
thesis will be mostly referred to as Pontianak city, the capital of the province, to distinguish 
it from the Pontianak district, of which Mempawah is its capital. 
1.3 Thesis Organisation 
This thesis will explore the causes of the drastic changes experienced by the Dayaks 
of West Kalimantan in the political world since Indonesia's independence in 1945. To 
identify the main causes of the changes, this thesis will examine Dayak political history 
since the time of the Malay sultanates up to the present time. 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters. The present chapter introduces the 
research background and arguments together with notes on earlier studies on West 
Kalimantan Dayaks, methodology and some technical notes. 
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical perspectives designed to explain the determinant of 
Dayak politics. It looks at the effects of national political changes, identity formation and 
marginalisation, and ethnic conflicts on Dayak politics. 
Chapter 3 overviews the conditions for the construction of Dayak ethnic identity 
during the time of the Malay sultanates and colonial rule. It discusses the conditions of the 
Dayaks during these periods and records gradual improvements in their situation from the 
early twentieth century until the post-WWII period. 
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Chapter 4 examines the start of Dayak political involvement after WWII, that is, the 
role of Dayak institutions, Dayak leaders, and governments in the ascent of the Dayak 
political profile. It then follows Dayak political developments from the dissolution of the 
West Kalimantan pro-federal government in 1950 to the Dayak achievements in the 
elections of 1955 and 1958. 
Chapter 5 discusses Dayak politics from 1960 to 1971. It examines events which 
forced Dayak politics to change in order to survive because of the changing political 
environment. The Dayak Unity Party merged into Partindo when the regime effectively 
banned the regional parties. When the Old Order government fell, Partindo merged into 
IPKI. This chapter also examines the causes of Dayak conflict with the communists in 1967. 
The chapter ends with discussion on the Dayak political decline after the installation of the 
authoritarian New Order regime. 
Chapter 6 shows cases of Dayak marginalisation during the New Order, from the 
political, economic, and cultural perspectives. The marginalisation is one significant 
contributor to conflict that occurs quite frequently in the province. 
Chapter 7 examines the causes of the ethnic conflict that erupted in 1997 and 1999. 
It will first look at the historical, marginalisation and cultural contribution to the conflict. 
Then it will examine the ethnic geography factors as well as other potential causes. Finally, 
it analyses relations between ethnic conflicts and Dayak political lobbies. 
Chapter 8 discusses cases of Dayak ethnic politics after the fall of the New Order. It 
looks at political lobbying, particularly those outside parliament, and government responses. 
Then it will look at the role of Dayak NGOs in the political awakening. Finally, it will look 
at the impact of institutionalised politics and the decline of open inter-ethnic strife. 
Chapter 9 is the conclusion of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ETHNICITY AND POLITICS 
This chapter provides some theoretical perspectives to support the arguments of this 
thesis. First it examines concepts which link political change at national level and ethnic 
politics to support the main argument that the politics of the Dayaks of West Kalimantan 
have always been constrained by the nature of the regime. The other sections provide 
perspectives for the sub-argument of this thesis. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 provide perspectives 
for sub-arguments that the particular path taken in the formation of ethnic identity of the 
Dayak, as well as their past marginalisation, had shaped the particular nature of Dayak 
politics that are quite different from those of the Malays, the other dominant ethnic group. 
The last section before the conclusion explores related theories of ethnic conflict as a 
framework for the sub-arguments that the massive conflict between the Dayaks and 
Madurese were non-political, although at the end they strengthened Dayak politics. 
2.1 Political Changes and Ethnic Politics 
Discussions of the ethnic politics of the Dayaks should be traced back at least to the 
sultanates and colonial times, when they had little or no political role. This condition 
changed after WWII when the post-war pro-Dutch government allocated the Dayak 
important political roles in the province. From that time onwards, the course of Dayak 
politics has experienced changes correspondent with political transformation at the national 
level throughout the nation's post independence history. To what extent does the 
transformation at national level influence political changes at local or regional level, or to 
be more specific, Dayak politics? 
Prior to colonial power, political structures in Asia and Africa had a stratified social 
and political system.9 In such a structure, the ruler and family occupy the top level followed 
immediately by other members of the aristocracy and government officials. This top layer 
of social class enjoyes many privileges. At the bottom level usually sit commoners or even 
9It is well known that many past sultanates and kingdoms in parts of the world had a stratified social and 
political system. Reminiscent of such social stratification in contemporary societies is the use of aristocratic 
titles among the descendants of aristocratic families. In West Kalimantan, some individuals still retain such 
titles such as syarif, gusti, uray, abang, and uti. 
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slaves who had the fewest number of rights but many obligations. This hierarchy persisted 
after the colonial power took charge. 
The colonial powers were aware of the negative effects of social stratification but 
might not be interested in rectifying the problems. Such interventions could undermine the 
legitimacy of loyal local rulers and upset existing social conditions, thereby destabilising 
the colony. The colonial masters wanted stable colonies, and would avoid intervention 
which could upset the tranquillity. Also, for some colonial powers who implemented racial 
segregation policies, such conditions were hardly a problem. In fact, some colonial policies, 
such as favouritism (§2.3), further entrenched the division between the ruler and the ruled 
among natives in their colonies. 
The majority of Dayaks in West Kalimantan who lived under the rule of Malay 
sultanates largely lived in marginalised conditions. The discriminatory policies of 
sultanates and the low social status of the Dayaks made their progress fall behind that of 
other ethnic groups. As many Dayaks were non-Muslim, the chances of their recruitment 
into the Islamic sultanates bureaucracy were remote. The highest position a Dayak could 
attain in the sultanates' political structure was the village chief.10 Since most of them were 
uneducated and illiterate the Dayaks therefore were not qualified to work in the colonial 
office. 11 Under such circumstances, opportunities for upward social mobility were bleak. A 
few Dayak revolts launched against the sultanates, were suppressed with the help of the 
Dutch military. 
From the tum of the 191h century, Catholic missions started to set up schools in the 
interior intended for Dayaks. Prior to that, Dayak access to basic education was very 
limited as there were only a few schools and these were usually reserved for the aristocrats 
and only accessible for those who had means. Another discouraging factor for Dayaks was 
10A few smaller sultanates in upper Kapuas were under the leaders of more recent Dayak converts to Islam, 
who had become Malay. Section 2.2 will discuss on this identity change. 
11Most civil servants in the colonial offices come from Java and Sumatra, and also from Christian regions, 
such as Minahasa, Ambon and Batak. The governance and administration of the sultanates was under the 
Malay sultans and aristocrats. In general, Minahasa and Arnbon had been a significant source of civil servants 
and army recruits during the Dutch colonial era (Jaspan 1959:7; Kahin 1964:197). Education also had arrived 
much earlier in these regions (see Jones 1977:8; Lundstrom-Burghoom 1981:24) which made them more 
prepared to take on white collar jobs when they became available. For an indication of the role of these non-
native civil servants in West Kalimantan see the name and ethnic origin of the victims of Japanese atrocities 
in 1943-1944 published in the province official newspaper, Borneo Shinbun 1-7-1944. 
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the distance to schools, which were usually established in sultanate capitals and in towns. 12 
Although the Dayaks were luke-warm about the schools initially, they nevertheless started 
to have better access to education provided by the missions. Through education, Dayaks 
began to have access to and to digest print materials, an important channel for political 
awakening.13 Education is also an important channel for vertical social mobilisation, as the 
Dayaks started to find white collar jobs, such as teachers, nurses or mission workers. Work 
in the sultanate administration was still closed to them, because of its religious convictions. 
The political result of the mission schools only became evident after WWII when the 
government allowed Dayaks to play a role in the political process in the province. The 
former students of the mission schools were the first to be appointed to serve that role. 
The change of colonial masters in 1942 from the Dutch to the Japanese had 
implications which were important for Dayaks. As each colonial master had particular 
values and interests (as noted by Rothermund 1995:3), the Japanese occupation brought 
changes to Indonesia which was then knovm as the Netherlands Indies.14 One important 
change brought by the Japanese was the reversal of racial classification which existed 
during the Dutch colonial period.15 The Europeans and the Ducth language which had been 
12 Horowitz mentioned that the colonial government decided on the location of facilities such schools, 
transport ports, and business centres. Ethnic groups who lived nearby would take full advantage of these 
facilities (Horowitz 1985:151-3). In a similar path, Hechter argued that the uneven wave of modernisation (in 
this case the availability of modern facilities such as schools, road, seaports, etc.) could increase the gap 
between advanced and less advanced groups (or between the core and peripheral area). The lack of 
modernisation would relegate the less advanced group into an inferior position (Hechter 1975:9, 39-40). 
13The importance of education in the rise of nationalism, a form of political awakening, has been noted in 
many parts of the world (Anderson 1991:71,116; Rejai 1995:42; Tennesson and Antlov 2000:872; Kahati 
2003). 
14Scholars have found that colonial powers tend to have different policies and attitudes towards the colonies 
(Rothermund 1995:3; Souffrant 2000:138; Young 2001:17; Lane and Ersson 2005:216). Depending on many 
factors, even the same colonial power might act differently in different colonies (Rothermund 1995:3; Young 
2001: 17). As will be discuss later (see footnote 55), the Dutch divided the governance of the Netherlands 
Indies into direct and indirectly ruled regions. The Japanese occupation had army and navy administration. 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other eastern regions were under the navy administration, while Java and Sumatra 
was under the army. Both administrations had slightly different approaches, attitudes and policies towards the 
regions and their population (Joint Publications Research Service 1968). 
15The Dutch stratified social classes in the Netherlands Indies into three. The first class was occupied by 
European, Japanese, Turks and other "elevated" individuals from other ethnic groups. This was the highest 
social class with the highest number of privileges. The Asian Far East (vreemde oosterlingen) such as the 
Chinese, Indian and Arab occupied the second class. The third and the lowest social class with the fewest 
privileges was the native population (in/anders) . For the racial classification in the Netherlands Indies, see for 
example Cribb and Kahin (2004:362-4) and Zainuddin (1970:157). 
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signs of superiority for so long had become symbols of the pariah.16 On the contrary, the 
status of native Indonesians had been elevated from the lowest to the highest social stratum, 
below the Japanese (Wertheim 1955:42-3). Another related contribution of the Japanese 
occupation was the dismantling of special prerogative to the aristocratic group (Wertheim 
1955:44) which further eroded the sultanates authority in some regions. In Kalimantan, 
specific regulation of the sultanates, which were maintained during the Dutch colonial 
period, were abolished (Kementerian Penerangan 1953: 102). All sultans and large numbers 
of native aristocrats and intellectuals, Chinese merchants and influential figures were killed 
between 1943 and 1944 (Borneo Shinbun, 1-7-1944). The Japanese occupation also 
contributed to the creation of more egalitarian masses through intensive mass mobilisation 
(Wertheim 1955:44), and this together with the weakening of the sultanates system was 
psychologically important for the Dayaks, who had been always in the lowest layer of 
racial stratification in many parts of the province. 
The defeat of the Japanese in the WWII opened up the return of the old colonial 
powers in Southeast Asia. In some places, their return faced resistance from the population 
of their former colonies, some of whom had been offered, and even granted, 
independence. 17 It was in this context the former colonial powers needed even more 
cooperation from segments of the community to support their smooth return, similar to 
what they had done when they first came into contact with these regions centuries ago. In 
Indonesia, the returning Dutch sought support from the peripheral groups, aristocrats and 
sultans who were anxious about their future as the nationalist movements had grown strong 
across the nation.18 In West Kalimantan, beside the newly installed sultans, representatives 
of the Malays and Chinese, the Dayaks were included in the executive board at the 
provincial and district levels of government. This was the first time for Dayaks were 
16Dutch and English language had been banned, and because of the Japanese was little known, Indonesian 
language had been become the major language used for government propaganda, and the main language in the 
school (Joint Publications Research Service 1968:218-9). The Japanese also interned all Europeans, except 
nationals of Japan's allies (Ricklefs 2001 :248,251). 
17The British resumed their rule in Malaya and Burma, France in Indochina, the US in the Philippines, and the 
Dutch in the Netherlands Indies. Previously, the Japanese had granted Bunna and the Philippines nominal 
independence in 1943, and promised that Indonesia would gain independence in 1945 (Kratoska 2001:4-5). 
18During this time conflicts between the aristocrats and nationalist elements had occurred in some places. The 
sultans in East Sumatra as well as ulebalang in Aceh, both were known to have been supporters of the Dutch 
in the past, had become victims (Reid 1979). There were also anti-Chinese riots in several places in Indonesia 
after WWII (Mozingo 1976:40). 
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involved in the political process. Prior to that the governance was under the sultans with the 
supervision of the Dutch colonial government. The Dutch support of the Dayaks was 
unprecedented, but the Dutch needed them to back its scheme to tum Indonesia into a 
federal state, in which it could maintain its influence. The result was apparent as the 
Dayaks became one of the staunchest supporters of the Dutch for the federal states. 
All of these colonial powers managed to return to their colonies, but in some cases 
their stay was brief. In the Philippines, Burma and Indonesia colonial masters departed 
before 1950, Indochina in 1954, and the Malaya Federation in 1957. Some of these new 
governments, particularly those which had fought a series of wars with the returning 
colonial masters, had anti-colonial outlooks. It is not uncommon for such new governments 
to exclude former collaborators of the colonial government from playing an important role 
in the government. In Indonesia, after fighting a few years of war and failing to effectively 
re-occupy its colony, the Dutch finally recognised Indonesia's sovereignty in 1949. The 
new anti-Dutch government had adversely affected the political fortunes of many 
prominent Indonesians who formerly supported the Dutch. 19 Those who were associated 
closely with the now defunct member states of federal Indonesia (RIS) and were hostile to 
nationalist ideas were out of the scene of regional and national politics (see Feith 
1962:74).20 
The fate of many individuals in the West Kalimantan Special Region Government 
(DIKB) was no different. Sultan Hamid II, the head of the DIKB and one of the staunchest 
supporters of the Dutch federal concept, was arrested in April 1950 because of his role in a 
190ne indication of such sentiment was the discontinuation of the Dutch language in the school system. After 
1950 the second language in Indonesian school system was English, not Dutch (Reid 2005:70). Another 
indication was the nationalisation of Dutch enterprises in 1958. This was partly a result of the Netherlands' 
refusal to settle the status of West Papua as mandated by the 1949 agreement between the two countries 
(Ricklefs 2001:316-7). Continuing repatriation of Dutch nationals from Indonesia also indicated certain 
hostility towards the Dutch. Between 1945 and 1964, about 250,000 Dutch had been repatriated. The peak 
was in 195711958 when about 40,000 Dutch were repatriated from Indonesia, mostly against their will 
(Ohliger 2005:49). 
20Some officials who showed nationalist attitude or who had helped the final departure of the Dutch were able 
to stay. One example is Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, the former primer minister of the State of East 
Indonesia (NIT) whose role was split between supporting the Dutch federalist idea and helping the creation of 
the sovereign Indonesia (Agung 1996; Robinson 1998a: 103). He was made ambassador to a few European 
countries and then foreign minister in the 1950s (Roeder 1971 :18). Other exceptions were those who served 
as members of the national legislature between 1945 and 1949, as their memberships were extended up until 
1956, when new members were sworn in after the 1955 election. 
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coup plan.21 Dayak officials in the DIKB who were also ardent supporters of the Dutch 
federal state idea, vanished from provincial politics. With the exception of two Dayak 
figures who were members of national legislature at the time of DIKB dissolution and who 
continued to serve in those positions until 1956, other Dayak figures in the DIKB went 
back to their home region and assumed lower positions. The new government discontinued 
ethnic representation in the government and also abolished ethnic institutions set up by the 
Dutch, such as offices of Dayak Affairs and Chinese Affairs. Such ethnic politics was seen 
as a remnant of colonial policies of divide and rule and was highly unpopular during the 
peak time of nationalism in the early 1950s.22 Although there was animosity to the Dayaks, 
as was evidenced in intense polemics in 1950 over political issues after the Dutch departure 
(Keadilan 5-5-1950; Suar 5-5-1950), Dayak civil servants, whose numbers were still small, 
continued to serve in the bureaucracy. The Dayak Unity Party (PD), a political party which 
was established after WWII, survived during this high tide of nationalism and would soon 
play an important role for the comeback of Dayak politics in the government. 
Indonesia experienced a period of liberal democracy between 1950 and 1957. The 
national politics of this period was characterised by the increased role of political parties 
and the extensive role of parliament, and regional politics were relatively free from 
interference from central government. It was during this period of liberal democracy that 
the first general election and local elections were held in the mid-l 950s to elect members 
for the national and local legislature. The liberal system allowed ethnic and regional 
political parties, and even individuals, to contest the election (Feith 1957:61-2). National 
politics at this time were unstable because of the frequent changing of the government (for 
a summary of the causes, see Hadiwinata 2003:50). The discussion of the future of the 
constitution of the nation was stalled in Konstituante (Constituent Assembly) between 
members who wanted to strengthen the influence of Islam in the constitution versus those 
21For the attempted coup and Hamid's role, see Persadja (1955). At the time of the arrest, he was a state 
minister of Republic of the United State oflndonesia (RIS), which was formed in December 1949. He was 
not given any formal political positions until his death at the end of 1970s. 
22Feith (1962:74) observed that nationalism was at its zenith in 1950 and such ethnic group feeling was not 
popular. Such sentiments reappeared from the mid-1950s when the regions felt they had been ignored by the 
central government. 
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who opposed such a proposal.23 Regional politics were unsettling as rebellions erupted in 
several regions because of the rebels dissatisfaction with central government. Supported by 
the military, President Soekamo took the initiative in July 1959 and announced the 
dissolution of Konstituante and the return to the 1945 Constitution, which returned 
governing power to the president (Liddle 1999:58).24 A year later, Soekarno abolished the 
existing parliament and established a new one whose members were appointed by the 
president, and not elected. 
Such political changes at the national level have again affected Dayak politics in 
West Kalimantan. The abolition of the DIKB in 1950 excluded Dayaks from politics but 
they had gained prominence by the end of 1950s. The Dayak Unity Party (PD) which 
survived the political transition contested in both general and local elections in the province 
where they outperformed most of the big national parties. These successes paved the way 
for the return of Dayaks to the legislative and executive bodies in West Kalimantan. With 
its significant representation (and therefore significant voting power) in the legislature, and 
helped by the fragmentation of politics of the Malays (the other important ethnic group),25 
and the support of central government over native rule, Dayaks were able to win several 
executive posts: four Dayaks were elected as district heads and one as a governor. Without 
a democratic election and conditions mentioned above, it would be very difficult for the 
Dayak to attain such positions. Remember, the Dayaks ardent support for the pro-Dutch 
DIKB was still fresh in the minds of the other opposing local leaders, who were now part of 
the provincial government. Under normal circumstances they would try to limit the entry of 
the Dayaks into politics. 
Rising regional revolts in parts of Sumatra, Sulawesi, West and East Java, as well as 
South Kalimantan at the end of the 1950s made the government tighten control over 
23 Konstituante was a body established in 1955 to formulate a new constitution to replace the provisional 1950 
Constitution. It never completed its task and was dissolved in 1959 because of disagreement among its 
members over the issue of foundation of the state (Cribb and Kah in 2004:90). 
24In the previous constitution, the head of government was the prime minister, while the president was only a 
titular head of the state with little direct influence on the work of the government (cabinet). For the support of 
the military see Feith (1994:23), Ricklefs (2001:320) and Hefner (2000:45). 
25The Malays were represented in all other national and Islamic parties. They were competing with each other 
for political positions. 
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regional politics. 26 The central government announced a regulation in 1959 requmng 
political party to have branches in at least a quarter of the province. This regulation was 
particularly adverse to the regional political parties which only had limited branches.27 The 
Dayak Unity Party (PD) which had headquarters in Pontianak, failed to satisfy the new 
regulation requirements and had to disband. The dissolution of PD significantly affected the 
course ofDayak politics, as it was their main political machinery. The dissolution ended the 
relatively solid and united Dayak politics under the umbrella of PD. The majority of its 
members joined the nationalist Partindo, while the rest joined the Catholic and other 
political parties. By merging with a national and open party, they no longer had their own 
"independent" ethnic voice. Dayak political influence was also weakened as their 
representation in the parliament and other political bodies was reduced. They had to forgo 
some of their seats to the communists when the government introduced the concept of 
Nasakom.28 Fortunately, the central government continued to support Dayak leadership in 
the province. However, their political luck did not last Jong as the following will tell. 
From the beginning of the 1960s, politics at the national level had grown left as the 
president's relations with PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) and leftist elements 
moved closer (Crouch 1978:51-68; Rfoklefs 2001 :327-341 ).29 As a result of penetration of 
national politics into the region this leftist and revolutionary outlook was emulated by 
leaders of the region.30 The alleged communist coup in September 1965, which eventually 
brought down Soekamo, swung the political tide to the right. Supported by the army, the 
26Some of these rebellions are the Darul Islam (House of Islam) which started first in West Java in 1948, but 
then spread to Central Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan; the South Maluku Republic (RMS) 
in 1950; and the PRRI/Permesta revolts in parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1958 (see for example Ricklefs 
2001 :Chapter 19-20). These rebellions were effectively defeated by mid-1958 although some of their leaders 
evaded the capture. S.M. Kartosuwiryo, the leader of Darul Islam in West Java, was captured in 1962, and 
Kahar Muzakkar the leader of similar rebellion in South Sulawesi was shot dead in 1965 (Ricklefs 
2001 :319,326-7). 
27In Apri l 1961, the government ordered the dissolution of all but ten political parties (Feith 1962:593). 
28The concept required every important government body to have elements of Nationalist, Religious, and 
Communist, abbreviated as Nasakom. As Partindo usually had the largest representation in the legislative or 
executive bodies, it was usually the first to give up some of its seats to the communist element when the 
~overnment implemented the concept. 
9 Soekarno's close relationship to the PKI was a consequence of its enthusiastic support for his ideas. 
Soekarno also needed a strong PKI to balance the influence of the army on the national political front (see for 
example Feith 1964). 
30In this process, which is also called nationalisation of local politics, the cleavages in diverse localities 
becoming more uniform and congruent with the cleavages at the national level (Kesselman 1974:364). 
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anti-communist religious groups and masses initiated extreme drives against the 
communists and their sympathisers. Millions suspected of links with communists across the 
country were either killed or detained without trial (see, for example, Cribb 1990). The 
victims included important figures in the government such as ministers, members of 
parliament, and military generals. 
Such drastic change at the national level again came to play at regional level. The 
drive against communists was particularly murderous in areas where communist activities 
were strong such as in East and Central Java, Bali, and North Sumatra (Crouch 
1978:64,155). It was true that some regions were headed by officials who were sympathetic 
to or even members of PK.1.31 However, many other officials were simply following or 
implementing pro-left policies directed from Jakarta. Still many who fell in this later group 
were swept from power because the new regime doubted their loyalty. 
Dayaks' political role in West Kalimantan was adversely affected by such change as 
most of its government elite had links with Partindo, which at the national and the local 
level was known to be close to PK.I (Rocamora 1970:229,412; van der Kroef 1971: 123,219; 
Robinson 1998a:21 l). Dayaks joining Partindo was, as previously explained, a result of a 
new government regulation on political parties. The roots of Partindo in West Kalimantan, 
therefore, were quite different from the party at the national level which had started with 
some leftist or radical roots.32 Nevertheless, as was the case in other regions, leaders in 
West Kalimantan, including those Dayaks who held top jobs, followed the trend to left 
national politics or at least did not resist the left-swing.33 Unfortunately, the New Order 
31Listed as communist allies were governors of Bali and North Sumatra, deputy governors of Jakarta, West, 
Central and East Java. Six out of 39 district heads and mayors in Central Java and Yogyakarta; eight of 37 in 
East Java; and two of 23 were from PKI (Crouch 1978:77-8). According to a foreign office evaluation, in 
Kalimantan, the East Kalimantan Governor A. Pranoto and Central Kalimantan Tjilik Riwut were categorist:<l 
as PK.l sympathisers, while West Kalimantan Governor Oevaang Oeray was a member of Partindo but 
categorised as a non-PK.l sympathiser (Poulgrain 1998:262). 
32Rocamora mentioned that Partindo was formed by members of PNI who were dissatisfied with the soft 
approach of the PNI leaders (Rocamora 1975 :229). In its 1962 leadership structure, National Partindo had LR. 
Lebo, K. Werdojo, A.M. Hanafi, Armunanto, Adisumarto, Oei Tjoe Tat (Bintang Timur, 30-12-1961). These 
individuals were incriminated by the New Order regime for their alleged leftist activities. 
33Many regional leaders who were very anti-PKI were replaced after 1962 by those who were either close to 
PK.l or at least who were less belligerent toward PK.l (Feith 1964). Sometimes, it was the local legislature who 
decided to elect a leftward leaning figure to head their regions. In Tana Toraja, Parkindo (Indonesian 
Protestant Party) which dominated local DPR decided to elect a local Partindo leader as district head in 1964, 
in the hope that such political compatibility with the leftward central government would benefit Toraja 
(Bigalke 2005:268). 
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regime suspected their loyalty and removed all the Dayak district heads and the Dayak 
governor in 1966. The majority of native leadership in West Kalimantan was soon replaced 
by non-native leadership. While there were only one or two native district heads, none of 
them were Dayaks. This trend of appointing non-locals to head the strategic positions was 
not only confined to West Kalimantan but also occurred in other regions. In politics, the 
Dayak would continue to be marginalised until the end of the New Order. It seemed that 
most positions available to locals would eventually fall to Malay bureaucrats, the more 
advanced ethnic group. 34 The Dayaks were generally silent about this marginalisation 
fearing of retribution from the regime. The majority of ethnic activities during this time 
were, therefore, non-political. They usually concentrated on cultural, social or educational 
programs, such as those conducted by a few Dayak NGOs under Pancur Kasih since the 
1980s. 
An authoritarian regime, such as Indonesia's New Order and Soekamo's Guided 
Democracy, is characterised by limited or no political pluralism and repression to 
opposition or challenges.35 Under such a regime, ethnic politics, which were often linked 
with regional politics or even separatist movements, cannot flourish because it is perceived 
as a threat to national unity. In such cases, the regime controls and monitors ethnic 
activities to ensure they will not endanger country unity and challenge the regime. It 
appoints trusted, reliable and often non-local officials to head all strategic and important 
positions at the local level, to ensure subordination. It was not uncommon for the regime to 
rotate or circulate the leadership to prevent such leaders building a local power base. 
Repression and punishment from the regime will keep challenges and opposition to a 
minimum. 
Under these repressive regimes, most ethnic groups and their elites have no other 
options except pledging loyalty to the regimes. Other possible options, "flight" and "voice" 
are either not practical or too risky. Flight is not a practical option because migrating to 
34 According to Horowitz {1985: 147) an advanced group usually "disproportionately well educated and 
represented in the civil service and the independent professions, or disproportionately wealthy and well 
represented in business". Advanced ethnic groups may be a minority that dominate the government, such as 
the White under the apartheid regime of South Africa. Such a minority-ruled government often restricts the 
emancipation of the majority so that they will not challenge the supremacy of the minority. 
35Detailed characteristic of authoritarianism under the New Order, labelled as bureaucractic-authoritarianism, 
see King (1982:109-12). 
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other countries is becoming more difficult due to the rigidity of state boundaries, while 
avoiding state power by fleeing to interior areas is possible but impractical. Voicing one's 
concerns is risky because the regimes usually punish those who challenge their policies 
(further discussion on these three options see Eriksen 1993: 123; Gurr 1993). As a 
consequence, large-scale and serious ethnic activities challenging the New Order regime 
are not known, except in cases of ongoing separatist movements in Aceh, East Timor, or 
Papua. Discourses on ethnic, religious and other primordial issues were controlled tightly 
by the New Order, and those who raised the issues ran the risk of being charged with 
sedition. Similarly, there were no fresh regional rebellions during the last years of 
authoritarian Guided Democracy. Most regional revolts which started during the liberal era 
or earlier had been largely subdued by the early 1960s (see footnote 26). Existing ethnic 
activities were more of a social and cultural nature which seemed to be safe as they posed 
no threat to the regime. The 'voice' option usually becomes possible after the authoritarian 
regime falls and is replaced by more democratic governments, as can be seen from the 
surge of regional and ethnic political dynamics after 1998 Indonesia. 
The fall of the New Order in May 1998 signified the beginning of the 
democratisation and decentralisation process in Indonesia. Freedom House, a recognised 
non-governmental organisation that keeps track of countries' freedoms, had noted the 
continuous increased of political freedom and civil liberty in Indonesia since 1998 
(Freedom House 2006).36 Fair and free multi-parties elections were held after more than 
forty years, the constitution which entrenched executive power was changed, the role of the 
military was gradually reduced, and many other democratic measures were implemented. 
The country has also been transformed from the most centralised to one of the most 
decentralised countries in a relatively short time (Aspinall and Fealy 2003:3; Bell 
2003b: 117; Charras 2005:87). 
Established democratic government's views on ethnic issues or ethnic movements 
are quite different from those of centralised and authoritarian regimes. Such governments 
generally no longer see the ethnic differences as threat to national unity and therefore are 
36The Freedom House changed the status of Indonesia from "not free" to "partly free" in 1998/1999, and 
"free" beginning from 2006. During the partly free period between 1998 and 2005, it observed the continuing 
improvement of the political rights and civil liberty in the country (Freedom House 2006). 
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not obsessed with integrating or co-opting ethnic voices like the centralised and 
authoritarian countries. Governments allow ethnic movements to grow, and some 
governments even permit those with separatist goals to operate. 37 They also celebrate the 
differences by adopting multi-cultural ism, an ideology which allows coexistence of diverse 
cultural and ethnical groups within a nation (Cashmore 2004:289-90). The Indonesian 
government after 1998 has been very relaxed on the rise of local politics, which was 
commonly intertwined with ethnic or religious interests. The government, however, has 
remained prohibitive toward ethnic organisations or activities that aimed for political 
separation.38 Looking at the result of the local elections in West Kalimantan and election 
trends in other regions since the fall of the New Order, it can be safely said that the 
majority if not all top jobs at the local or regional level such as governor and district head, 
have been returned to the local people or putra daerah. Under the New Order regime such 
extreme trends would have been inconceivable. 
Democratisation provides space for elite political manoeuvring at the national as 
well as regional and local level. The elite of regions which have been subjected to heavy 
control from the central government in the past, use their newly found political freedom to 
push for autonomy or even independence. Leaders of ethnic groups demand cultural 
recognition, better economic entitlement, greater autonomy or independence (Kellas 
1991:57-60). The new democratic regime which tries to satisfy demands, for example by 
implementing decentralisation, giving greater autonomy to the regions, may have to face 
greater demands with more serious implications (Kellas 1991 :58). Some countries, which 
experience rapid democratisation after sudden regime change, face some serious political 
consequences including the break-up of the country or civil wars (this will be discussed in 
§2.4). An example was what had occurred after the 1989 democratisation in the former 
Soviet Union to the rest of the Eastern Europe. It did not only bring down the communist 
37The federal government of Canada, for example, allows political parties that strive for Quebec independence 
to conduct their activities. It has permitted several referenda for independence in Quebec to take place 
(Joireman 2003: Chapter 5). For further discussions on the views of democratic states towards the minority 
rights or minority nationalism see Kymlicka (2004:26-7). 
380n this position, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a political scientist who was working as the spokeswoman for 
President Habibie argued that " ... the 26 provinces of Indonesia including Aceh and Irian Jaya are fully 
integrated into Indonesia, and are recognised by the whole world and have been recognised by the United 
Nations. So it is not really to be expected that Indonesia as it stands will tolerate insurgency movements in 
other parts of the country." (http://news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/talking_point/forum/443600.stm). 
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regimes in Eastern Europe, but also triggered unprecedented regional and ethno-nationalist 
movements in the region. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia disintegrated 
into almost two dozen new sovereign states.39 Ethnic conflicts also occurred in some part of 
these regions. Like the case of Eastern Europe after the fall of the communist regime in 
1989, the unexpected fall of the New Order regime in 1998 changed the political landscape 
at the central and regional level. Some peripheral regions asked for better deals from the 
central governments. Some of the rich regions, such as Aceh, Papua, Riau, and East 
Kalimantan, even threatened to take the independence road if the situation did not improve 
(Emmerson 2005:26-7). Local bureaucrats or politicians who had been sidelined by 
Jakarta's preference over the non-local leadership in the past also had moved to reclaim 
their political rights as putra daerah (Sukma 2003:70). Elements of communities which had 
been disadvantaged by the previous regime, including marginalised ethnic groups and 
minorities, demanded the government rectify problems. Internal conflicts also erupted in 
some regions. In West Kalimantan, local politics first featured energetic Dayak political 
lobbies in 1998 and 1999 which resulted in the appointment of two Dayaks as district heads. 
The province also suffered a serious ethnic conflict in 1999, after the one which had 
occurred two years previously. 
Examined above is the significant influence of changes of national politics to 
politics at the regional level. However, which direction will ethnic group be heading 
towards? The following sections (§2.2 and §2.3) will examine concepts which explain 
reasons behind particular politics pursued by certain ethnic groups. The last section (§2.4) 
will discuss theoretical perspectives on the causes of ethnic conflict in West Kalimantan, as 
well as examine the relationship between ethnic conflict and ethnic politics. 
2.2 The Formation of Ethnic Identity 
The literature on identity formation contain three main approaches: primordialism, 
instrumentalism, constructivism (Yang 2000; Fenton 2003:88; Joireman 2003). 
Primordialism understands ethnicity as ascribed; ethnic boundaries are fixed or immutable 
39Fifteen new sovereign states appeared out of the former of Soviet Union, five from former Yugoslavia, and 
two from Czechoslovakia. East and West Germany was integrated by the same wave of democratisation 
which began in the Soviet Union. 
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and determined by common ancestry (Yang 2000:42). According to Geertz, the main 
markers of ethnicity are blood ties, race, language, region, religion and custom (in Eller 
1999:73).4° Constructivism, on the other hand, argues that ethnicity is not permanently 
determined but socially constructed; ethnic boundaries are flexible and can change over 
time according to historical and structural circumstances (Yang 2000:44-6). 
Instrumentalism stresses the ways in which ethnicity can be used as an instrument or 
strategic tool to achieve certain goals. People become ethnic and remain ethnic when their 
ethnicity generates substantial benefits to them. Ethnicity, like class and nationality, is also 
a means of political mobilisation for advancing group interests (Yang 2000:46). Ethnicity, 
in this perspective, becomes relevant and important as a result of political and sometimes 
economic processes, and not as a result of deeply rooted or primordial ties (Spencer and 
Wollman 2002:69).41 
None of these approaches can independently explain all ethnic phenomena. It 
became obvious that one approach may be more powerful in explaining ethnic phenomena 
in certain societies, era, and conditions, but had less explanatory power in other 
circumstances. Primordialism cannot explain the phenomenon of identity change, or the 
emergence and disappearance of ethnic identities (Cornell and Hartmann 1998:50; Yang 
2000:43). While most researchers now find that constructivist and instrumentalist 
approaches are more convincing (Laitin 1998: 11-2), both approaches also have limitations 
400ther scholars gave more detailed markers. Keyes identified kinship, descent, birthplace, and race as the 
most common primordial elements; and identified language and religion as secondary elements (in Nagata 
1981 :92). Harold Isaacs provided an extensive list of primordial elements: physical appearance (including 
size, shape, skin colour); a person's name; the history and origins of the group one is born into; one's 
nationality or other group affiliation; the language one first learns to speak; the religion one is born into; the 
culture one is born into; and the geography and topography of the place of birth (in Cornell and Hartmann 
1998:48). 
41The last two approaches, constructivism and instrumentalism, are closely linked (e.g. Cornell and Hartmann 
1998:59; Wright 2000:60). Some experts did not make a clear-cut differentiation between the two; some even 
put them in one camp (Nagata 1981:89; Kipp 1993; Williams 1994:57; Cornell and Hartmann 1998:59; Eller 
1999:78; Bellamy 2003:7). 
28 
because of their disregard for primordial ties.42 This led to formulation of combined or 
integrated approaches. One of these integrated approaches recognised ethnicity as "socially 
constructed partly on the basis of ancestry or presumed ancestry and more importantly by 
society, that the interests of ethnic groups also partly determine ethnic affiliations, and that 
ethnic boundaries are relatively stable but undergo changes from time to time." (Yang 
2000:48). 
The integrative approach above seems to better explain many aspects of the identity 
formation of the Dayaks and their politics in West Kalimantan. Dayak identity has a 
primordial foundation in that many members of the Dayak ethnic group share relatively 
similar characteristics. However, the Dayak identity is not a fixed and ascribed identity; its 
boundary is also not permanent. Native Punan, who inhabit north-eastern West Kalimantan, 
is now widely recognised as a part of the Dayak ethnic group, although originally they were 
not. The Dayak themselves can "change" their identity to Malay if they convert to Islam. 
The Dayak was a result of social construction as there was no "Dayak" ethnic group several 
hundred years ago. The invention of such a term by outsiders and their continuing use of 
the term influenced the creation of the Dayak as a new ethnic group, although the natives 
themselves were initially reluctant to accept such identity. It was only after the post WWII 
government started to give a political role to the Dayaks that the association with the Dayak 
increased among natives. The increase of such association shows that ethnicity also has an 
element of instrumentalism.43 The other influence of instrumentalism also could be found 
in the process of Dayaks becoming Malays after converting to Islam, where the benefits of 
42Social construction of ethnicity cannot occur without some references to primordial elements. The formation 
of Japanese-American identity, for example, is unlikely without the trait of Japanese ancestry. Social 
construction is also constrained by observable primordial traits such as skin colour or physical appearance. 
Pure Chinese descent, with Chinese features, cannot be easily constructed into White, Black, or Latino (Yang 
2000:49). Instrumentalism has limitations because not everyone can freely choose their ethnic identity since 
identity is subject to ancestral constraints (Yang 2000:47). Also, not all ethnic choices are based on rational 
and materialistic calculation. Psychological satisfaction, which is usually linked to emotional attachments (i.e. 
primordialism), also contributes to decision-making. Instrumentalism cannot explain why people persevere 
and keep their association with a particular ethnicity, although such identification had made them suffer (Eller 
1999:79). This irrationality is better explained by primordialism (Scott in Eller 1999:79). 
43This identity re-association is not uncommon in the study of ethnicity. Since the 1960s, there has been a 
trend in democratic countries to take affirmative action to improve the conditions of the indigenes or 
minorities. The status of being minorities or indigenous, therefore, becomes advantageous. In the United 
States, there increases of "White" American claims to their indigenous status since 1960s. Previously, Whites 
with native-Indian ancestry were unwilling to claim their native heritage because the social stigma and 
disadvantages of associating with natives (Nagel cited in Yang 2000:52-3). 
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conversion partly contributed to the conversion. The following will discuss the formation of 
Dayak identity in more detail. 
The Dayak as an ethnic group was an external construction. The term "Dayak" was 
first used by the Bornean Malays to describe hundreds of native tribes of Kalimantan, 
except the nomadic Punan. It was then popularised by the European explorers through their 
writings (Lumholtz 1920:1,23). The term had already been used by the Dutch as far back as 
the mid-eighteenth century (Pringle in King 1993:30). For these outsiders the native had 
similarities which justified such a label. The natives had symbols and characteristics which 
were strikingly different from the Malays and other non-Kalimantan natives. Many of them 
share some similarities in clothing attire, body arts (i.e. tattoo and long earlobes), festivities 
and customs. They lived on swidden culture, dwelt in interior region in longhouses 
although some were nomadic, and practised headhunting. They initially practised 
traditional religion, but later on, also became Catholics and Protestants. Not being a 
Muslim used to be one of the most significant determinants of Dayak identity, at least in 
West Kalimantan. 
Such an "umbrella" ethnic label was non existent for the native. For some of them 
"Dayak" was just another word in their vocabularies, which means "interior" or "people".44 
Some of these natives might have close genealogy but they initially did not see themselves 
belonging to the same ethnic group. Some of the closest natives, such as Iban and Kantuk, 
had even been at war in the past. The bad connotation associated with the term "Dayak", 
such as savagery, backwardness, destitution, and stupidity as noted by Bamba (2002b), 
discouraged the native to accept such categorisation.45 
Scholars have confirmed the significant role of the colonial governments and their 
officials, religious workers and others in the construction of ethnic identity (Enloe 
44The native Iban, for example, used the term to mean human being, while other natives, such as Tunjung, 
Benuaq, and Kenyah, understood it to mean interior or upstream (Whittier 1973:12-3; Lahajir M.S.Z., Mering 
et al. 1993:4; Asyarie 2004:11-2). Some experts claim that the term as an ethnic label can be found in Lun 
Daye Dayaks in East Kalimantan, and in Bidayuh Dayaks in Northwest Kalimantan. Further etymological 
study is needed to verify their link to "Dayak". More discussions on the meaning and origin of the term can be 
found in Maxwell (1984) and Eggan (1984:37). These natives already had ethnic labelling or identification. 
One compilation shows the native had identified more than 400 ethnic identities (Riwut 1958: 182-206). 
45In the past, insulting terms deriving from ''Dayak" were common, such as "Dayak kera" (Dayak monkey) or 
"dayak-dayakan" (mimicking a Dayak) (KR 1992/01). The term "Dayak kera" was a mutation from a Dutch 
word Dajakker, which means Dayak person. Jn the "dayak-dayakan" play in Java, children would dress and 
act like the "wild" Dayaks (Soedjito 2005: 16). 
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1980:348; Brass 1991:50; Eriksen 1993:56; Kipp 1993:68; Glickman and Furia 1995: 10). 
They construct new ethnic groups by inventing new labels or promoting existing labels to 
represent new identities. These new labels were not known previously by the locals, or if 
known, were not prominent before being "patented" through publications, censuses and 
policies. These labels reorganised existing ethnic memberships into members of new 
categories. The Torajanese of Sulawesi, and some groups in Africa, such as the Yoruba, 
Zulu and Tswana emerged or became prominent only during the colonial period (cf. 
Eriksen 1993:94-5, Volkman, 1987 #492; Cornell and Hartmann 1998:51). 46 Distinct 
natives of Kalimantan such as Iban, Kayan, and Mal oh accepted that they were Dayaks due 
to similar process. 
The persistent use of this new categorisation might have influenced some natives to 
accept the label. Some who found the term unacceptable took a longer time to actually use 
the label themselves, such as in the case of the Dayak in West Kalimantan. As one 
indication of their reluctance, there were no known organisations in the province that used 
the name "Dayak" until the end of WWII. In Central Kalimantan where the Dayak 
condition was relatively better, the natives were more ready to assume the "Dayak" label. 
There, ethnic association using the "Dayak" had appeared as early as in 1919 when the 
Sarekat Dayak was established.47 In West Kalimantan, the label became more attractive to 
the native after the post WWH government gave a political role to the Dayaks. The 
establishment of institutions that bore the term such as Dayak Affairs Office and Dayak 
Unity Party had strengthened the native association to the Dayak. Despite their enmity in 
the past, the bond among the natives had strengthened as a result of identity construction, 
their similar experience of marginalisation and their common political goals. 
While the colonial government and its officials were influential in the formation of 
Dayak identity, they were less successful in incorporating the Dayaks of West Kalimantan 
46Not all such processes were successful. The Alufuru, several tribes in Central Sulawesi, refused the use of 
the term "Toraja" introduced by a Protestant missionary for their identification. Although the term to refer to 
the tribal group in Central Sulawesi started to gain popularity in academic writings and government reports, 
the local population continued to refuse to be associated with it. To them, the Toraja was meant to refer to an 
ethnic group in the north of South Sulawesi province (Hasan, Darwis et al. 2004:124). 
47The Sarekat Dayak was renamed Pakat Dayak in 1926. It was involved in political lobbying in Volksraad, 
the Netherlands-Indies legislative body, to improve the political rights of the Dayaks (Riwut 1958: 175-8; 
Lontaan 1985: 171-2; Usop 1994:55-6). 
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into greater journeys of "Indonesian nation" creation experienced by some major ethnic 
groups in the Netherlands Indies. Benedict Anderson believed that many former colonies 
were bound emotionally through a series of internal nation creation journeys produced 
during the colonial government. He argued that the colonial government's uniform 
regulations and standards set fixed journeys to be followed by the populations of the colony. 
One journey was through standardised education where students within the colony learnt 
from the same material and through the same language of instruction. Common meeting 
places, such as school and government offices, provided a place where ethnic groups from 
diverse backgrounds could interact with each other. As a consequence of these journeys, by 
the end of the colonial period, most major ethnic groups were accustomed to the idea that 
they had parts to play in the whole colony, and that they shared the same destiny (Anderson 
1991:115-6, 121, 132). However, not all ethnic groups within the same colonial 
administration experienced the same quality of "nation creation" joumeys.48 The Dayaks of 
West Kalimantan, who were treated as second-class citizens and even slaves in the 
sultanate governments, were a good example. The Dayaks had little or no access to 
education and office employment compared to other natives, the Malays, although both 
were in the native group (see footnote 55). The print-nationalism suggested by Anderson 
(1991 :44-6) had little effect on the Dayaks because of their illiteracy and lack of social and 
political encounters with the rest of the nation. Also, only a few Dayaks enjoyed the "nation 
creation" journey outside Kalimantan. Warnaen (2002:17) listed only 86 Dayaks who lived 
in Java by 1930 census, the second lowest after Torajanese (23). This number was very 
small compared to other ethnic groups.49 As a consequence, the majority of Dayaks were 
48People from regions later incorporated later into the colony or state (after independence) also did not 
experience a similar quality of nation creation or nation building journeys. In some cases, these ethnic groups 
did not fit well into the new nation. The case of the East Timorese and the Papuans are illustrative of this idea 
(Drake 1989:55). East Timor was not a part ofindonesia until 1976, while Papua was under the Dutch until 
1962. 
49The census showed numbers of Acehnese in Java was 919, Balinese 993, Palembang 2,190, Makassarese 
2,198, Bataknese 2,459, Banjarese 3,286, Bugis 4,593, Minangkabauan 5,117, Malays 17,329 (Wamaen 
2002:17). From the 86 Dayak there was no breakdown of how many of them were from West Kalimantan. It 
is very likely that many of them were from Central Kalimantan due to the more advanced ofDayak education 
there. The zending works (i.e. the Protestant missions) in Central Kalimantan had begun more than a century 
earlier than the Catholic mission in West Kalimantan. The zending schools for the Dayaks there were set up 
more than sixty years earlier than those in West Kalimantan. Several Dayak political elite in West Kalimantan 
in the 1960s (see Chapter 5 and 6) came from Central Kalimantan: Hugo Mungok, H.G. Mihing, and E.0. 
Tundang. For the zending and education for the Dayaks in Central Kalimantan see Ukur {1971) also Balunus 
(n.d.-a). 
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less aware of the growing nationalist movements in Java and Sumatra which emerged from 
the early 20th century. 
Dayaks in the province did not experience the same "nation creation" journeys as 
the Javanese, Bataknese, Minangkabauan, Minahasan and some other indigenous 
Indonesians who had travelled widely during the colonial time.so At the national level other 
ethnic groups might also have had fewer opportunities than those "advanced" ethnic groups, 
but some of them still had opportunities to contribute to the governance in their regions.s1 
The Dayaks lacked this opportunity, as most political rule was in the hands of the Malay 
aristocrats and native officials from Java and elsewhere. 
Religion is discussed above as an important determinant of Dayak identity.52 Kipp 
(1993:75) observed that for ethnic communities whose religious differences coincide with 
ethnic differences, religion is equivalent to ethnicity and the change of religion entails 
change of ethnicity. For ethnic groups that treat religion as an incidental and not essential 
ethnic attribute, a religion can be abandoned without any implications for ethnic status (see 
Nagata 1981:92). Changing religion for Mollucans or Javanese, for example, will not 
require the converts to relinquish their ethnic identity, nor will the community oblige them 
to do so. 
For many Dayaks, at least as campaigned by their leaders, the Dayak identity was 
extended only to those who kept their traditional religion or embraced Christianity, and 
excluded those who have converted to Islam. The reason for excluding Muslim Dayaks was 
that very often converts renounced their original identity and became Malays (turun Melayu) 
or branched off to become a "new" ethnic group known as Senganan, Orang Laut, or 
5
°Drake (1989:54) noted that Bataknese, Minangkabauan, Minahasan, and to some extend the Ambonese were 
some ethnic groups outside from Java which had provided national leaders far out of proportion to their 
numbers. 
51 The Torajan traditional leaders, for example, were in charge of their regions and could keep their traditional 
religion and culture, despite the regions being surrounded by more powerful lowland Islamic sultanates 
(Bigalke 2005). 
52Religion is also an important differentiating factor for the peoples of Bosnia (Duijzings 2000:10), Northern 
Ireland, Lebanon and India (Enloe 1980:248); for Jews and Arabs in North Africa and Israel; and for Malays 
in Malaysia and southern Philippines (cf. Keyes 1981 :7-8). Besides religion, language can become a crucial 
ethnic emblem, particularly in countries with significant language politics, such as in Belgium (between the 
French-speaking Wallons and Netherlandic-speaking Flemings) and in Canada (between the French-speaking 
Quebecois and the English-speaking rest). Language is also important for many ethnic groups in India, states 
of the former USSR, and Sri Lanka (Brass 1991: chapter 8; Wright 2000). Some minority enclaves who have 
a distinct language -such as Basques in both France and Spain, or Catalonians in Spain- take language as 
an important ethnic symbol (Nagata 1981 :93). Language is not an essential ethnic attribute for the Dayak. 
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Pekaki. 53 Such differentiation influenced Dayak politics after WWII. In the 1940s, the 
Dayak leaders of West Kalimantan rejected Muslim Dayaks to represent the Dayaks in 
government, as they doubted the commitment of such converts to the Dayak cause. This 
shifted in the 1950s, when they started to accept a few Muslim Dayak leaders. After the fall 
of the New Order, the issue of Muslim Dayaks resurfaced coinciding with the rising Dayak 
political profile. Dayak leaders once again rejected a Dayak-Muslim to represent the Dayak 
in the National Assembly (MPR). In order not to disadvantage themselves politically by 
excluding converts who chose to retain their identities, the Dayak Customary Council 
(MAD) in 1999 recognised Muslim Dayaks as Dayaks if they recognised and practised 
Dayak culture. In 2003 many Dayak organisations were involved in a series of street 
protests when the government planned to change the education system which was thought 
would bring adverse consequences to the Christian schools. Still in 2003, the Dayaks of 
Landak district protested the appointment of a Moslem to head the religious affairs bureau 
(kakandepag) as the majority of the population were Christians. In 2004 they protested 
when the recruitment of the teachers of Christian/Catholicism was much smaller despite 
their needs. These issues will be revisited in Chapter 8. 
The identity formation of the Dayaks which was different from other major ethnic 
groups including the Malays of the province and their lack of incorporation into the journey 
of Indonesian nation creation, resulted in their taking a quite different political path after 
WWII. As will be shown in Chapter 4, a majority if not all Dayak politicians supported the 
Dutch. On the contrary, many Malay politicians outside the government, who had been 
influenced by nationalist movements, supported the new Republic led by Soekarno-Hatta. 
Also, as a result of identity construction where religion has become an essential attribute, 
religious issues will continue to feature in Dayak politics. 
53Scholars reported similar trends of becoming Malay after converting to Islam for the Dayaks in other parts 
of Kalimantan (Ukur 1971; Miles 1976:93; Riwut 1993: 19 J; Hawkins 2000:32), the Bataknese of Sumatra 
(Kipp 1993:29,33; Dahm 2000: 18-9), and few other natives of Sumatra (Marsden 1811 :26-7). 
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2.3 Disadvantaged Past and Continuing Marginalisation 
The issue of the Dayak as a marginalised ethnic group will come up throughout this 
thesis, as it has clouded Dayak politics since independence. 54 The marginalisation of the 
Dayaks, like the marginalisation experienced by other communities, can be traced back to 
the colonial period. Colonial governments sometime intentionally assigned certain ethnic 
groups certain jobs - a labour division which often survived long after the colonial power 
left. Often they gave preferential treatment to certain ethnic groups to access education and 
the civil service. These practices, the labour division and preferential treatment, resulted in 
certain groups advancing while the others remained backward (Horowitz 1985: 151-66; 
Bowen 1996; Eller 1999:33-5; Blanton, Mason et al. 2001). In the case of West Kalimantan 
Dayaks, it was the local sultanates who govern the region on behalf of the Dutch 
colonials.55 Some policies of these sultanates were discriminatory against the Dayaks. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 3, the Dayaks generally had low social status and had to pay 
more tax. They also had fewer or no opportunities to work for the Islamic sultanates 
administration because of their non-Moslem status. Because of their lack of education, the 
Dayaks also had very slim opportunities to work for colonial offices. 
After the end of WWIT, in order to gain support from the ethnic minority, the pro-
Dutch government started to give a political role to the Dayaks. The first was to appoint 
several Dayaks as members of executive board of DIKB, then to appoint Dayaks to head 
the Dayak Affairs Office at the provincial and district level. A few Dayaks started to enter 
the bureaucracy as a result of the more inclusive policies of the government. Apart from 
those appointed positions the Dayak opportunities to join the bureaucracy remained slim. 
The reason is, first, as in many other regions, except in areas where social revolution had 
disrupted the existing traditional rule such as in Aceh and East Sumatra, the majority of the 
civil servants (pegawai) of the colonial period in West Kalimantan continued to work for 
the new republic. Secondly, Dayaks' chances of filling vacant higher positions left by the 
54According to Gurr (1993:35) backwardness is the result of four historical processes: colonialism, state-
building, migration, and economic development. This section will follow these processes in order to explain 
the process of marginalisation of the West Kalimantan Dayaks. 
55Dutch colonial rule is divided into two: the direct and indirect rule. In the directly ruled region, the 
governance of the region was directly under the colonial Dutch. The governance of the indirectly ruled region 
was under the native sultanates. All regions in West Kalimantan, except Boven Kapuas, Pinohlanden and 
Meliau, were indirectly ruled by the sultanates. This will be discussed in §3.2. 
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Dutch administrators were nil, as they had no experience nor qualifications. Furthermore, 
the bureaucracy was dominated by Malays and civil servants from elsewhere who were 
unfriendly towards the Dayaks. Those in the bureaucracy could decide to block the entry of 
the Dayaks, whom they thought unsuited for the jobs, socially and intellectually.56 
The problems of unequal access and marginalisation persisted after independence as 
the government ignored the problems, did not undertake any affirmative action to uplift the 
marginalised ethnic groups, and there were no strong challenges to the conditions. Post-
independence governments usually embark on nation building, a process which aims to 
integrate and harmonise the regional, social, political and institutional divisions of people 
within one community (Kuzio 1998: 119). This process is required for nations which have 
the characteristic of "plural societies" to be viable as a state and not disintegrate.57 The 
process of nation building tends to emphasise national unity and homogeneity at the 
expense of regional particulars, needs and identities. This nation building process, which is 
usually led by the majority using the majority point of view, tends to disadvantage 
peripheral ethnic groups (Kymlicka 2004: 19,29).58 
Disappointed regions or ethnic groups who do not feel they fit into the current state 
often demand autonomy or independence from the central government. Facing such a 
demand, the central government could offer wider autonomy or repress the movements 
militarily if a peaceful solution could not be reached. Meanwhile, the government continues 
the nation building aimed at reducing such problems, for example by tightening control 
over the region or implementing programs to integrate the problematic groups into the 
mainstream through population resettlement. 
56 Such practice was common in a divided community as the dominant group wanted to maintain their 
privilege and dominant status (Hechter 1975:9). Such scornful views towards the Dayaks were common (see 
§3.2.3). 
57The concept of plural societies first introduced by Fumivall (1948). This concept refer to groups which were 
socially and culturally discrete, which were integrated through economic symbiosis (or mutual 
interdependence) and the political domination of one group (colonial masters). The groups were held together 
in a political system by the coercive force of the state, the police and the military, and there were no shared 
values in these societies. When the strong colonial government departed, such plural societies could break 
apart (cited in Eriksen 1993:49). The break up of British India into India, Pakistan, and later Bangladesh is 
one example. Another example following the same argument but which took place in different political 
setting was the break up Soviet Union and some countries in the Eastern Europe when the authoritarian 
communist regimes collapsed. 
58Kymlicka {2004:24) mentioned three options for the minority: accept the integration into the majority 
culture, seek self government, or accept permanent marginalisation. 
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Politically, regional Indonesia had received little autonomy since independence until 
the fall of the New Order in 1998, with the exception of the first part of 1950s. In 1950, 
Indonesia inherited a decentralised political system from the former federal government. 
Despite decentralisation containing the detested influence of a federal system, both political 
parties in the parliament and the government recognised the importance of decentralisation 
for the region (Maryanov 1958: 13-6). However, a few problems started to appear as a result 
of regions' dissatisfaction over the lack of implementation of decentralisation programs. 
They felt there was a trend of Javanisation of the leadership in the region. Other issues 
included the unclear division of authority (pembagian kekuasaan) between the central and 
regional government, and uneven development where the interests of the regions had been 
ignored by the central government (Maryanov 1958:38-40ff). Such dissatisfaction had led 
to several regional rebellions in the 1950s as explained above. At the end of 1950s, 
government counter-measures reversed decentralisation that was previously enjoyed by the 
regions to a certain degree. Central government regained control over the appointment of 
regional executives, such as governor and bupati, although it continued to support loyal 
local leaderships.59 
The New Order regime tightly controlled regional politics and limited regional 
autonomy as one way to keep unity and discourage separatism. To ensure loyalty of the 
region, the central government hand-picked its loyalists to head the strategic posts in the 
region and filled the local legislature with Golkar and military officers. In some regions, 
local bureaucrats were left with second tier leadership positions. In the case of West 
Kalimantan, with the exception of the top jobs which usually were reserved for the 
Javanese and or non-locals who usually had military background, the bureaucracy was 
under the domination of the Malays. 60 The Dayaks were minimally represented in the 
bureaucracy and leadership. For these discontented ethnic groups, a better way was not 
easy as voicing concerns was punishable by the regime. 
59Jn September 1959, Soekarno rescinded the UU No. 1 1957, which allowed regional DPR to elect the 
governor and bupati, and returned such right to central government (Anderson 1990:49; also Mackie 
1999:206; Cribb and Kahin 2004:109). 
~he domination of military officers who were usually non-local in the top leadership at the local level also 
occurred elsewhere (Bertrand 2004:116; Sukma 2005:12). 
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Under such political condition, the regime would not implement affirmative policies 
to help the politically backward ethnic groups achieve equal standing with the more 
advanced ethnic groups. 61 The New Order regime should have realised the political 
marginalisation of the Dayaks, but did not rectify this for thirty years. The local 
government, which had small representation of Dayaks, also continued to ignore the 
problems. In fact, there were beliefs among the Dayaks, that the dominant Malays in the 
bureaucracy had prioritised their own ethnic groups during recruitment and promotion, and 
therefore, limited the Dayaks entry to and rise in the bureaucracy.62 The only affirmative 
policies towards the Dayaks by the post WWII government between 1945 and 1950 had 
been long discontinued as they were seen as remnants of colonial policies of divide and rule. 
From the mid 1950s to mid 1960s, Dayak leaders in the executive had tried to recruit more 
Dayak civil servants, but it only resulted in a minor improvement to the Dayaks in the 
bureaucracy. 
Small growth of the region's economy was also apparent as a result of neglect and 
uneven development. 63 The regions had complained during the 1950s that regional 
development had not improved (see Maryanov 1958), probably because of the wars and 
political instability from 1945 to the end of 1950s. The national economy received little 
attention during Guided Democracy and when Soekarno lost power in 1966, the country's 
economy was on the brink of bankruptcy (Agung 1990:647; Vatikiotis 1998:33), so were 
the regional economy. 
The new regime embarked on rapid economic development, but its highly 
centralised development strategy had kept the marginalisation of the peripheral region. The 
central government was over-enthusiastic about exploiting the region's natural resources, 
61Affirmative policy gives preferential treatment to disadvantaged ethnic groups with the aim of creating a 
more egalitarian society. This was contrary to "negative" discriminatory policy which denied opportunities on 
account of ethnic identity, ranging from informally to formally sponsored (Kellas 1991 :64). 
62This shows that despite government disapproval of ethnic politics, local leaders could still play the ethnic 
card to benefit their ethnic group. Bertrand gave an example of a Muslim governor in Maluku who tried to 
improve the portion of Muslim civil servants in the Christian dominated bureaucracy in MaJuku during 1990s 
(Bertrand 2003b). 
63Internal colonialism theorists propose that the uneven development between regions is state-induced and 
that ethnic groups who live on the periphery are uniquely disadvantaged (Hechter 1975). However, critics of 
internal colonialism argue that uneven economic development within a state may not be the result of state 
discriminatory policies but due to natural economic forces. For example, the region was poor in natural 
resources or located in a Jess strategic position geographically for rapid economic growth (Kellas 199 J :62; 
Connor 1994:149-50). 
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but was slow in developing their regions. Also, the development in Indonesia had been 
concentrated mostly in western parts of the country, particularly in Java. The development 
in the eastern part of the country, such as the Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, Papua, had 
been very slow. 64 This uneven development was one of the reasons regions strongly 
supported full decentralisation after the fall of the New Order. Some, including leaders of 
Dayak NGOs of West Kalimantan, even supported the federal system as a solution. They 
also opposed the government development programs, such as logging and plantations, 
which they thought were only gratifying the central government but detrimental to the local. 
Socially and culturally, it is also common for governments, at least in Southeast 
Asia, to develop indigenous minorities and incorporate them into the nation-state. This is an 
important nation-building project as governments often see these peripheral groups as a 
hindrance to national progress and a threat to national security (also Li 1999; Duncan 
2004c: 1-2). 65 In order to end the backwardness of these indigenous minorities, the 
government decided to resettle them to areas close to the general population so that they 
could be "developed" and be integrated into the mainstream in the nation. There these 
minorities are led to join the mainstream community: they go to school to learn the national 
language, convert to a recognised world religion, and enter the cash economy (see Duncan 
2004c:3). 
Sometimes instead of removing the indigenous group, the government sent migrants 
to live near the indigenous population, so they could learn and benefit from the more 
"civilised" migrants. This program usually also aim at enhancing national unity and 
reducing the risk of separatism (see the discussions in Duncan 2004c: 11-3).66 In Indonesia 
the population resettlement program is known as transmigrasi, where population from 
64 The Integrated Economic Development Zone (KAPET, Kawasan Pengembangan Ekonomi Terpadu) 
designed to accelerate development in East Indonesia, was only introduced in 1996. The government has 
established twelve KAPETs since the concept was introduced. As intended, they are all located in Eastern 
Indonesia: four in Kalimantan, four in Sulawesi, two in Nusa Tenggara, one in Maluku and Papua (Soenandar 
2005:182). For indicators of the uneven development between the Western and Eastern Indonesia see Akita 
(I 995; 2002), Garcia (1998), Sjafrizal (1997), and Soenandar (2005: 182). 
65The term for these minorities usually contains backward and primitive connotations such as Orang Asli 
(original People) in Malaysia, or chaaw haw (hill tribes) in Thailand, masyarakat /erasing (isolated tribes) in 
Indonesia (Duncan 2004c: 1; Duncan 2004b:86) 
66Some regimes, such as China and the Soviet Union in the recent past, even forcibly resettled some ethnic 
groups far from their homeland for a similar objective (Bookman 2002:143-6; Polian 2004). 
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densely populated Java, Madura, and Bali are resettled to the sparsely populated regions.67 
Problematic regions such as Aceh, erstwhile East Timor, Papua, as well as regions with 
international borders have received significant numbers of migrants in the past. The interior 
region of West Kalimantan, home region of the Dayaks, had become the target of 
government-sponsored transmigration since the 1970s. The program which had started 
since the colonial times, had resumed after 1950s, but only intensified during the New 
Order regime. 
While such moves are aimed at fostering national unity, frictions between locals and 
migrants are often because of cultural differences, land disputes, economic competition, 
and other issues (see Otten 1986:147-184). There have been reports oflocal disappointment 
over the small financial compensation over appropriated land and lack of economic benefits 
to the local population (Roekaerts 1985:29; Sapardi 1992:130; Djuweng 1996:93). The 
Dayaks were involved in several conflicts with the Madurese migrants, who mostly came to 
the region through spontaneous transmigration (see Chapter 7). 
These efforts may result in the assimilation of indigenous minorities into the 
mainstream, such as in some Southeast Asian countries (Duncan 2004a). Significant 
assimilation to the Malay society has occurred to many indigenes who lived under the 
influence of Malay culture (Benjamin 2002:50-4). For the Dayaks of West Kalimantan such 
treatment was not foreign. The New Order had once put almost half of the Dayaks into the 
category of "isolated" ethnic groups (masyarakat or suku !erasing) which required 
resettlement so they could become more like the mainstream population of Indonesia. Their 
shifting cultivation system, communal living in longhouses, and some traditional arts were 
considered dangerous, unhealthy, or too primitive and required a change (see §6.3.2). Such 
negative outlook towards their culture and traditions inflicted social and cultural stress. 
They also had lost dignity because their tradition and culture was considered of no value 
(see Eriksen 1993:123). 
The marginalisation caused resentment and despair in the affected regions and 
peripheral groups. For those who had no means to fight or to voice their concerns, the fall 
67This could be in the form of sponsored or spontaneous transmigrations. Unlike the sponsored transmigration 
where the government covers significant establishment costs, those who chose the path of spontaneous 
transmigration would receive no financial support from the government. 
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of such authoritarian regime will see a sudden appearance of such voices. Such voices are 
usually quite united, despite the possibility of previous internal friction, as the 
marginalisation to the group as a whole tend to foment ethnic solidarity and to blur intra-
ethnic friction. The marginalised status offered as explanation of the sudden surge of 
energetic and relatively united Dayak politics in the 1940s, 1950s, and in the 1990s. 
Marginalisation also can intensify conflict when it erupted, as will be shown in §2.4 below. 
2.4 Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Politics 
The starting point of this thesis is that ethnic conflicts are potent in any multi-ethnic 
society. This is so because, borrowing Horowitz' argument, ethnic groups have a natural 
tendency to cleave, compare and compete with each other (Horowitz 1985:144-5). They 
also tend to cleave and favour their own kind, and negatively stereotype, distrust and do 
disservice to other ethnic groups.68 However, despite the enmity of inter-ethnic relations, 
not all ethnic groups are in conflict. There should be a more specific explanation as to what 
conditions make certain ethnic groups prone to conflict. To answer this question, I will 
adopt Michael Brown's model to explain why internal conflict occurs. 
Brown (2001 :5) differentiates two categories of causes of conflicts: the underlying 
and proximate causes. The underlying causes or permissive conditions refer to necessary 
conditions for conflicts to develop and explain why certain areas or ethnic groups are 
conflict-prone. Brown categorises four main clusters of factors that make some places or 
ethnic groups more prone to violence than others: structural, political, economic/social, and 
cultural/perceptual factors (Table 2-1). The second category is proximate causes or triggers 
referring to factors that cause a conflict to escalate. 69 They are rapid and unexpected 
changes in any of the underlying causes which ignite the violent conflict. Corresponding to 
the underlying factors, Brown (200I:13-15) also differentiates four proximate causes 
(Table 2-2). 
68Lijphart (1995:853) even included those "who tend to harbor negative and hostile feelings towards members 
of other groups" into his definition of an ethnic group. 
69 Another quite similar model is from Michael Lund (I 996), which categorised causes into structural and 
dynamic factors. The structural factors remotely and indirectly affect the conflict, while the dynamics factors 
are more direct and immediate. 
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Table 2-1 Underlying Causes of Internal Conflict 
1) Structural Factors 3) Economic/Social Factors 
Weak states Economic problems 
Intra-state security concerns Discriminatory economic systems 
Ethnic geography Economic development and modernisation 
2) Political Factors 4) Cultural/Perceptual Factors 
Discriminatory political institutions Patterns of cultural discrimination 
Exclusionary national ideologies Problematic group histories 
Inter-group politics 
Elite politics 
Source: Brown (200 I :5). 
Table 2-2 Proximate Causes oflnternal Conflict 
1) Structural Factors 3) Economic/Social Factors 
collapsing states mounting economic problems 
changing intra-state military balances growing economic inequities 
changing demographic patterns fast-paced development and modernisation 
2) Political Factors 4) Cultural/Perceptual Factors 
political transition, increasingly influential intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination, 
exclusionary ideologies, growing inter-group ethnic bashing and propagandising 
competitions, intensifying leadership struggles 
Source: Brown (2001: 13-5). 
This thesis will look into the underlying conditions and triggers of conflicts between 
the Dayaks and Madurese of West Kalimantan. It will not follow all factors examined by 
Brown, but only will look into factors which are more pertinent to the conflicts. Brown 
(2001 :4) himself believes that it is futile to search for a single factor or a set of factors that 
can explain all internal conflicts because there are many different types of internal conflicts, 
each with different set of causes. 
Antagonistic group history (Brown 2001 :20) seems to be an important determinant 
of ethnic conflict. It has been noted above that ethnic groups tend to be hostile to the others, 
but in reality not al I ethnic groups are involved in open conflict. Examination of some 
major ethnic conflicts in recent times will show that the warring parties have a history of 
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conflict or tense relations in the not too distant past. 7° Conflicts in former states of 
Yugoslavia, for example, dated back to at least to the WWII (Daalder 1996:38-41). Conflict 
between the Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi can be traced back at least to the early 
1950s when they were still under the colonial rule (Human Rights Watch 1998:11). The 
Dayaks and Madurese also have antagonistic group history since they have been involved 
in about a dozen conflicts since the 1950s. Such conflict history has strained the relations 
between the two more than their relations with the other ethnic groups. The strained 
relations gave every small tension among the Dayak and Madurese the potential to develop 
into an open conflict. 
Ethnic geography, concentration or spread of ethnic group, is an important 
contributor to ethnic conflicts. Brown mentioned that states with ethnic minorities and with 
certain ethnic spreads are more prone to conflicts. The potential for conflicts are greater if 
ethnic groups who were historically antagonistic live close to each other. Some countries 
have a complex ethnic geography because their country' s boundaries were established by 
the colonial powers without conforming to traditional ethnic boundaries, or because of 
some population policies in the past where the regime forcefully mixed their population 
(Brown 2001:6-7). The complex ethnic geography has partly caused ethnic conflicts in 
post-colonial Africa (Routledge 1998:247), in the Caucasus region in Russia and in the 
former Yugoslavia (Koehler and Zurcher 2003:243-4).71 
Ethnic geography seems to be pertinent to conflicts in West Kalimantan, although 
no studies have cogently argued such a case before. Almost all conflicts between the 
Dayaks and Madurese occurred in the north-western part of the province: Sambas and 
Pontianak districts. As will be detailed in Chapter 7, the population of the Madurese in 
these two districts was the highest in the province, and was rapidly on the rise prior to the 
70Whi!e the roots of some conflicts can be traced back to century or millennium antagonism (Horowitz 
1985:98), many contemporary conflicts have more direct connection to the colonial or post-colonial period. 
The colonial preference treatment and their ignoring the ethnic lines when establishing the colonies were 
some factors that breed post-colonial conflicts. Examining various conflicts in many parts of the world, 
Fearon and Laitin (2003:88) concluded that there are positive connections between past and recent conflicts. 
The study concludes that prevalent internal conflicts in the 1990s were the result of accumulation of 
protracted conflicts since 1950s, and were not due to the end of Cold War, as generally believed. 
71 In the Caucasus conflicts or tensions occurred in Nagomo-Karabakh, Chechnya, Abkhazia and South-
Ossetia. In former Yugoslavia conflicts had occurred in regions which have now become independent states 
(Koehler and Zurcher 2003:243). 
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conflicts in 1997 and 1999. The population of the Madurese in these two districts was 
highly concentrated and quite separated from other ethnic groups. Because of such a 
settlement trend it was not difficult to find the "Madurese" villages, where the Madurese 
continuing living in their distinctive way. The population of the Dayaks in these regions 
was also high. Considering their strained relations and conflict history, their population 
concentration close to each other only increased the potential for conflict between them. 
Ongoing marginalisation and discrimination suffered by an ethnic group is another 
underlying condition for conflict (also Yang 2000: 193; Stewart 2002: 112-3). An element of 
marginalisation is found in some major ethnic conflicts such as between Hutu and Tutsi in 
Burundi and Rwanda, between the Bosnian and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, between 
ethnic groups in Russia's Transcaucasia (in Stewart 2002:112-3). In Indonesia, repeated 
anti-Chinese riots from the early 201h century were partly a result of the relatively more 
dominant position of the Chinese over the local population in the local economy (see the 
chronology of such riots in Setiono 2003). Marginalisation also contributed to some more 
recent communal conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan (Human Rights Watch 1997:9-
11; ICG 2001:13; Peluso and Harwell 2001:93; Rabasa and Chalk 2001:45; Bertrand 
2004:58; Smith and Bouvier 2006b:209-IO), Maluku (van Klinken 2001:18-9; Bertrand 
2003a: 187), as well as conflicts with separatist goals in Papua, Aceh, and erstwhile East 
Timor (for example Bourchier and Hadiz 2003:256; Collins 2003:47). The suspicion that 
marginalisation caused conflict in West Kalimantan is also strong as it always involve 
Dayaks, the long-term marginalised natives of the province. Growing grievances and 
frustration because of their disadvantaged conditions make both the Dayak elite and 
grassroots easily provoked to conflicts.72 The marginalisation experienced by the Dayaks, 
both elite and commoners and from different sub-ethnic groups, also strengthened ethnic 
solidarity among the Dayaks which contributed to the spread and severity of the conflict. 
The ethnic institutions and their leaders can have a role in the conflicts. Ethnic 
leaders and institutions can serve the role of brokerage and information diffusion, two 
72Scholars have frequently quoted grievances and frustrations as sources of conflicts. Grievance is a result of 
unjust treatment. The hostility as a result of grievance is usually aimed at specific group who have caused the 
injustice. Frustration is a result of one being blocked from one's goals. Frustrated persons may vent their 
anger at anyone or any groups, even if they are not the source of their frustration (for further discussion see 
Bartos and Wehr 2002:73-4). 
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elements important in conflict escalation (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001:333). 73 Ethnic 
leaders are able to construct valid reasons for conflict and use their influence to mobilise 
masses against the enemy (Arfi 1998: 153).74 Ethnic organisation makes possible collective 
action on a large scale because it provides organisational infrastructures, network links, and 
leadership (Olzak 2004:671). 75 Armed ethnic organisations have a role in initiating 
conflicts in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Chechnya, and Kosovo. In some other cases, the role of 
ethnic organisations in initiating conflict is less evident, although they still can have a role 
in its escalation. In the case of conflicts in West Kalimantan between the Dayaks and 
Madurese the initial triggers seem to be spontaneous, although there were suspicions of the 
involvement of military, ethnic leaders and organisation. 
Proximate causes are the triggers for the conflicts. Systemic changes such as rapid 
democratisation from the previously authoritarian regime are potential triggers for 
conflicts. 76 Such transformation require the change of the rules of the game, where 
elements in the community, the political elite included, needs to readjust to the new 
73This thesis believes that these t\lvo factors are pertinent in conflict escalation particularly when taking into 
account advance technology in telecommunication and transportation. The advances of communication and 
transportation make possible the participation of more people, involving larger areas, and inflicting greater 
casualties. Nowadays, news on the conflicts, whether rumoured or true, travels instantly and is uncensored. 
Requests for help even from the remotest areas to friends in the region or international sympathisers can be 
made almost immediately. News from radio, television, and newspapers, although sometimes screened or 
neutralised by the broadcasters to cool the situation down, still gives out information on the conflicting parties 
and can contribute to the escalation. The news creates insecurity and provokes the ethnic solidarity of the 
members of conflicting parties who do not necessarily live adjacent to the conflict areas. They can initiate the 
attack in their areas because of fear of attack from their enemies or because of moral obligation to help their 
ethnic brethren. Better means of transportation makes possible rapid movements for those involved in 
conflicts. 
74Unfortunately, members of the elite often manipulate ethnic movements to extract concessions from the 
state for their own benefit: to improve their political position or to better their social or economic status. Some 
other elites become involved in ethnic activities to pursue their idealistic interests. They continue to be 
involved in the activities despite the hostile political environment. Martin Luther King of the US and Nelson 
Mandela of South Africa are knovm for their unreserved endeavours to bring equality to the "Blacks" in their 
countries. Religious leaders, such as Bishops Desmond Tutu of South Africa and Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo 
of East Timer, are also known for their outspoken stance against the unfair and repressive ethnic policies of 
the regimes. 
75Ethnic organisations provide resources and networks, and prepare and coordinate the ethnic members in 
order to reach a better result in the conflict. Activities by ethnic organisations are usually better organised and 
prepared compared to spontaneous ones. An organised demonstration will equip its participants with 
pamphlets or leaflets, ethnic attributes, and with written demands. The possibility of success for such 
activities by ethnic organisations is greater because of their consistency, ability to follow up and also because 
they are identifiable for possible negotiation. 
76Every change in the political environment, such as a regime change, releases expectations and capabilities, 
or causes frustrations and resistance (Kellas 1991 :60), which provide openings for conflicts to develop. 
45 
environment and to reconsider their position toward their political rivals and partners.77 
Conflicts are not unusual during this uncertain transitional period. Ted Gurr (in Snyder 
2000:29) concluded that while democratic consolidation reduced ethnic conflict, the first 
steps in the shaky transition to democracy increased the potential for strife, particularly in 
new states. Snyder and Mansfield (2007:5) noted that countries taking early steps on the 
journey from dictatorship toward democracy are especially prone to conflict and violence.7s 
Similarly, Lund (2002) saw that the democratisation has created opportunities for internal 
conflict, particularly if the countries are not ready to embrace liberal democracy. 
Democratisation opens up political participation which has been tightly controlled.79 
Struggle for power among national or local elites across ethnic and interest groups 
intensifies because political vacancies are no longer kept only for those who are loyal and 
close to the regime. It is not uncommon that elite competition results in conflict at the 
grassroots level (for example Rinakit 2005:52). Demands for greater autonomy or even 
independence from the regions are usual where the previous governments had been highly 
centralised and authoritarian. The democratisation also gives opportunities for the members 
of formerly disenfranchised or oppressed groups, for example the minority, to lobby or 
mobilise to demand the government redress their problems.so Such conditions might lead to 
conflict as the dominant ethnic group might want to keep its influence or the new 
government might not be able or ready to cope with the intense demand.s1 
77Many elites are less ideological but of"rational choice" and will always try to maximise gains and minimise 
costs of their actions. They are pragmatic and may adjust their political attitude according to the environment. 
The rational elite change their attitudes when the regimes change. During the political transition in the mid-
1960s in Indonesia, those who were linked to the leftist party tried to seek refuge in Golkar, a government 
political party (Ward 1974:177; Bigalke 2005:276). Post-1998 Indonesia has seen many examples of such 
rational actors. Members of the elite, who collaborated closely with the former regime, have detached 
themselves from it, and become champions ofreform (Elson 2001:291-2; O'Rourke 2003:Chapter 8). 
78 Previously both have jointly investigated the connection between democratisation and war-proneness 
(Mansfield and Synder 1995; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Another scholar who has tried to establish the 
connection is Michael Mann (2005). 
79Democratisation enabled more people to play a larger role in politics, a potential source of ethnic conflict 
(Snyder 2000:27). 
80 Minority groups may benefit from goods traditionally associated with democracy, such as greater 
opportunities for political participation, greater respect for civil liberties, although democratisation in some 
cases may also harm minority groups (Bell 2003a:38). 
81 For example, the new government may give wider autonomy but reject claim to independence. When the 
central government is unwilling to compromise on independence option, continuing to pursue such a goal will 
invite armed repression from the central government. 
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The weakening regime and the subsequent collapse of the New Order, as well as 
rapid democratisation, are linked to conflict, as numbers of conflicts increased over time. 
Indonesia had started to experience increased social conflict from the mid-1990s as the 
New Order regime weakened. It suffered a series of massive conflicts in many regions after 
the sudden regime change in 1998 and rapid democratisation (for statistic Tadjoeddin 
2002:35; Agustino 2005:83-92). Nevertheless, such conditions did not themselves cause 
conflicts, but they provided conditions for conflict to develop. For Brown (2001 :6) and 
Bertrand (2003a: 178), it was the release and the interplay of forces previously repressed by 
the strong authoritarian regime that caused conflict. In the case of Dayak-Madurese 
conflicts in West Kalimantan, democratisation and political transition contributed to the 
conflict, although they had occurred many times before in periods of high political and 
economic stability in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Other triggers for ethnic conflict include incidents or policy changes that tip the 
ethnic political balance or upset ethnic relations. The unexpected appointment of a district 
head from a certain ethnic (or religious) background could have resulted in a high level of 
ethnic polarisation and a potential trigger for ethnic conflict. 82 The failure of Dayak 
candidates in the 1994 election in Sintang, the removal of Comelis as a candidate in the 
district head election in Pontianak in 1999, for example, had resulted in angry Dayak mobs 
going on a rampage.83 The announcement of affirmative actions might create opposition 
from the other ethnic groups whose interest would be negatively affected. Kidnapping, 
arrest, or murder of ethnic or community leaders could set off conflicts between opponent 
groups. 
Besides systemic triggers, sometimes there are also more immediate but trivial 
triggers such as verbal arguments or street fights between members of ethnic groups. These 
incidents have a greater potential to evolve into large-scale conflicts if they occurred 
between members of antagonistic ethnic groups. There are still many other factors that 
could contribute to the transformation of a common incident to open conflict, for example 
the timing and venue of the incidence. 
82Ethnic polarisation is when political and social space of competing ethnic groups widens (McAdam, Tarrow 
et al. 2001 :322). 
83These and other related conflicts will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 8. 
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Overall, this chapter has showed the dependency of local or regional politics on the 
nature of the regime and the effect of changing of such regimes, with reference to Dayak 
politics in West Kalimantan. It also had argued for the role of the ethnic identity formation 
and marginalisation as well as ethnic conflicts in shaping ethnic politics of the Dayaks. The 
next chapters will examine such effects in detail. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DAY AKS PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE (Up to 1945) 
" ... we ... asked the [Dayak] headman, whether the 
Dayaks ... would send their children to us, provided 
we opened a school in Sambas to teach them. His reply 
was 'that he did not know, it must be just as the sultan 
said." (Doty and Pohlmann 1839:286) 
This chapter will examine conditions prevailing prior to independence in the region 
that later became West Kalimantan. We shall see how those conditions prevented the 
emergence of Dayaks in the colonial-era government and contributed to the challenges that 
they faced after independence. The small advances in education that Dayaks experienced in 
the last years of colonial rule, however, helped to shape the role they would play in post-
independence politics. 
The first section of this chapter will examine the roots of ethnic identity of the two 
major native groups of West Kalimantan: the Dayaks and Malays. Understanding these 
roots is important as issues of identity, and especially the politics of identity, are central to 
this thesis. It will show that Dayaks and most Malays descended from the same ancestors 
and became differentiated by religion following the spread of Islam. Dayaks who had 
converted to Islam transformed their identity into Malays and abandoned many of the 
practices and customs that had previously identified them as Dayaks. 
The second section will examine the backward conditions of Dayaks in the pre-
independence era, particularly the discriminatory administration of the Malay sultanates 
and the uncaring approach of the Dutch colonial regime. However, the Dayaks in areas 
directly ruled by the Dutch experienced slightly better conditions without the burden of 
Malay sultanates rule. History will show that those Dayaks from direct-rule areas were 
more advanced than their counterparts who lived under the sultanates. 
The third section will examine the conditions which were instrumental in preparing 
the Dayaks to take the opportunities that arose after WWII. One important factor was 
education provided by the Catholic mission to the Dayaks. The short period of Japanese 
occupation also made an important contribution to Dayak emancipation by brutally 
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eliminating much of the previously dominant Malay aristocracy that had obstructed Dayak 
advancement. Dayak political leaders began to emerge for the first time following the end 
of the Second World War (WWII). 
3.1 The Dayaks and Malays of West Kalimantan 
Like many other provinces in Indonesia, West Kalimantan has a diverse ethnic 
population. Based on the 2000 population census, the two largest ethnic groups were the 
Dayaks and Malays, followed by the Javanese, Chinese, Madurese, and Bugis (Table 3-1 ). 
Muslim Malays made up about thirty-five percent of West Kalimantan's population of 3.7 
million, largely non-Muslim Dayaks were about thirty percent, Javanese and Chinese each 
about ten percent, followed by smaller migrant communities from other parts of Indonesia 
including Madurese, Bugis and others. 
Table 3-1 Ethnic Population in West Kalimantan (1930, 1971, 2000, %) 
Ethnicity 1930 1971 2000 
Davaks 48.9* 41 30.0 
Mala vs 28.5 39 34.7# 
Javanese 1.2 2 10.4 
Chinese 13.5 12 9.5 
Madurese 0.8 0.6 5.5 
Bugis 6.6 5 3.2 
Source: Nederlandsch-Indie (1930), Riwut (1979:49); Census 2000. 
Note: 
*The Dayak figure in 1930 was a combination of the Dayaks and "unknown" categories (onbekend), which 
were mostly "Dayaks". 
#Official source (BPS Kali man tan Barat 2001 :34) gives the percentage of the Dayaks at 33.1 %, and the 
Malays at 32.4%. 
West Kalimantan's post-independence history has seen considerable conflict 
between Dayaks and Madurese, but also outbreaks involving Chinese and the Malay 
communities. This chapter will focus on the origins and development of distinctive ethnic 
identities within the indigenous population of the region - the Dayaks and the Malays. 
3.1.1 The Dayaks 
The Dayak peoples were the original inhabitants of the island of Kalimantan. 
However, in the contemporary political discourse in the province, the Malays, and 
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sometimes, the Chinese and Bugis, are considered "natives" because they have long and 
significant associations with the province. In this thesis, the terms native or indigenous 
mostly refer to the Dayaks, except in some contexts (as will be indicated) the terms will 
also include the Malays. 
The Dayaks have at least 400 sub-tribes (Riwut 1958: 182-206). These sub-tribes 
were usually classified into several larger groups (see Figure 3-1). 84 Recent 2000 
population census listed at least 130 sub-tribes living in West Kalimantan. Some of the 
main groups of West Kalimantan are Kanayatn, Darat, Ketungau, Desa, and Mualang. The 
population of others sub-tribes including the better known Iban, Kantuk, Kayan, and 
Kenyah is rather small, less than 2% each of the Dayak population in the province. 
Majority of them lived in the interior districts and mostly lived on swidden agriculture. 
These natives shared many social and cultural similarities. In the past, most Dayaks 
lived in interior regions, dwelled in longhouses and practised headhunting. 85 They lived on 
swidden agriculture or were hunter-gatherers. Despite these similarities, they were not 
exactly the same. For example, not all Dayaks practised headhunting, such as the native 
Jelai ofKetapang (Bamba 2003:21). The Aoheng and Punan also did not initially headhunt, 
but they learnt it from their belligerent neighbours (Sellato 1994: 141 ). While it is true that 
majority of Dayaks lived on swidden culture in the interior region, many Iban Dayaks 
adapted to coastal living (hence they were also known as Sea Dayaks). Social systems also 
varied among the Dayak sub-tribes in the past. Some were more or less egalitarian in their 
social organisation such as Iban, Kantuk, Desa and Punan, whereas other like Kayan, 
Taman, Kenyah, Mualang were more stratified (see for example Rousseau 1990; King 1993; 
Sellato 2002). The difference in the social categorisation brought further differences in 
social and cultural practices. 
Majority of Dayaks who lived in the interior professed to Christianity. The 2000 
census showed that 65% of Dayaks professed to Catholicism and 30% to Protestantism. 
84Although they aware that Dayaks have many sub-groups, the majority of scholars who examined ethnic 
conflict in the province treated Dayaks as a single ethnic group. Scholars who researched anthropological and 
sociological aspects of the group tended to view the Dayaks as a heterogenous group. 
85Headhunting was not exclusive to Dayaks. Other ethnic groups such as those from Siberut, Nias, Sulawesi, 
Sumba, and Timor who were also known to have headhunting pasts (Hoskins 1996; Colombijn 2001:27; 
Hasan, Darwis et al. 2004:135,140). The practice had been common in many parts of the world (see 
http://wv.rw.britannica.com/eb/article-9039696/headhunting). 
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Many Dayaks who converted to Islam usually changed their identity and became Malays 
(this will be discussed in § 3.1.3). Prior to the coming of these modem religions to 
Kalimantan, the Dayaks were animists. Based on population census in 2000, about 1.5% of 
Dayak in the province still retained their traditional beliefs. 
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Figure 3-1 Ethnic Groups of Kalimantan 
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Source: Sellato (1992:7). 
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3.1.2 The Malays 
Unlike the external-imposed word "Dayak'', the term "Malay" was already known 
before the arrival of Europeans. Local written references to "Malay" can be found from the 
seventh, eleventh, and mid-fourteenth centuries (Andaya 2004:66). The Malay language 
was already a lingua franca in inter-islands trading long before the Europeans arrived. One 
scholar concluded that the Proto-Malay language was spoken at least 2000 years ago from 
west Borneo to southeast Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula (Andaya 2004:66). 
Malay became closely linked to Islam, when the religion came to the region. The 
earliest Islamic sultanates, Perlak (840 AD) and Pasai (1042 AD), were established in Aceh, 
on the eastern tip of Sumatra. Perlak was the first Islamic sultanate in the archipelago and 
in the whole of Southeast Asia. The Malays were believed to have originated from 
Southeast Sumatra (Andaya 2004:58). The Malays were one of the first peoples to adopt 
Islam in the archipelago, and probably were among the first natives who spread the new 
religion. It is not surprising, therefore, that Islam became identified with the Malays. 
Marsden (1811:26-7), for example, wrote that when the natives of Sumatra embraced Islam, 
they often said they had "become Malay" (masuk Melayu) rather than embraced Islam 
(masuk Islam) . 86 Through religious conversion, the number of Malays increased 
exponentially. 
Such conversion was also found in West Kalimantan. The term "Malay" was not 
only used to designate peoples from Sumatra and the Malayan peninsula who came to the 
region for trading and religious proselytising, but also referred to the natives who had 
converted to Islam. The conversion of the natives increased rapidly after the local rulers 
were converted. Royal conversion was usually made through marriage between religious 
leaders and members of noble families, or through family connections between Islamic 
sultanates and other sultanates.87 In West Kalimantan, the first ruler to convert to Islam was 
86There were a few exceptions. Kipp noted that in North Sumatra, Mandailing Bataks and Angkola Bataks did 
not describe themselves as Malays after conversion to Islam. They would retain their Mandailing and 
Angkola labels, but would drop the term Batak (Kipp 1993:39). Marsden (1811:27) also mentioned U1e 
example of a native ruler who refused to be called Malay after his conversion to Islam. 
87 For example, descendants of the sultan of Tanjungpura in the eighteenth centu1y established Simpang, 
Tayan, and Meliau sultanates (Lontaan 1975:106,163). 
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the ruler of Tanjungpura m Ketapang, Panembahan Giri Kusuma, m the mid-sixteenth 
century. 
In recent times, the term "Malay" in West Kalimantan has encompassed not only 
Muslim Dayaks but also other minority Muslims, such as Bugis and Banjarese. At certain 
times, the Bugis and Banjarese identify themselves as Malays to take advantages of being 
part of the politically more influential Malay community. 
3.1.3 Senganan 
In West Kalimantan, Dayaks who have converted to Islam are also known as 
Senganan. 88 The word Senganan, according to a Dayak source, came from two Dayak 
words "Sanggak Nuan", which can be freely translated as "our family relations end after 
your conversion to Islam" (Kadir 1993:8).89 A contemporary Senganan source has tried 
somewhat unconvincingly to justify their conversion by claiming that the term came from 
the words sing kanan, which broadly means "following the right path by converting to 
Islam" (interview Als).90 
The "message" behind these interpretations rather than their veracity is the main 
concern here. The impression from the first source (i.e. the Dayak source) indicates the 
Dayak unwillingness to maintain relations with those who had converted. On the contrary, 
the impression from the Senganan source is the opposite as the source believes that 
conversion to Islam was a positive decision which could elevate the converts from the low 
status of the Dayaks to the better position enjoyed by the Malays. 
The Dayaks hostility was very likely caused by the unfriendly change of habits and 
outlook of the converts, who were often antagonistic to the Dayaks. Various sources 
confirmed that after their conversion, the Senganans resettled in the Malay community, and 
88 Another spelling variant for Senganan is Singanan. These terms were used in upper Kapuas regions, 
particularly north of Sintang and Kapuas Hulu. In the Landak or Sambas area, the term for Senganan was 
Orang Laut (Sea People); while non-Muslim Dayaks referred to themselves as Orang Darat (Land people). 
The "sea" referred to the Malays who tended to live near the coast, while the "land" referred to the Dayaks 
who tended to live in interior or upriver areas. These two terms should not be confused with the terms Sea or 
Land Dayaks, which had been used in Sarawak in the past. Sea Dayak was a European term for Iban Dayak, 
while Land Dayak was used to refer to Bidayuh Dayak. 
89 According to the source, sanggak=till, nuan=you, and could be interpreted as "sampai kamulah hubungan 
keluarga kita" (Kadir 1993 :8). 
90The source claimed that Islam tended to treat right (kanan) better than left (kiri). Some Muslim colleagues 
also confirmed such practices. Muslims, for example, were advised to use the right hand when eating, or put 
the right foot first when entering Mosques or houses. 
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assumed Malay identity by changing their names and following the Malay way of life. By 
doing that they were renouncing their Dayak identity and severing their social ties with the 
Dayak community. They claimed themselves to be Malay (cf. Ukur 1971:183; King 
1985:57-9; Riwut 1993:191). The Senganan's positive interpretation was also 
understandable because they tried to distinguish themselves from the Dayaks. For them, 
being a Dayak was associated with unbelief (kafir), uncleanliness (najis), and lack of 
civility. Being a Senganan meant that they had departed from those conditions. 
The existence of "Senganan" as new identity was usually acknowledged by both the 
sending Dayak community and the accepting Malay community. Just as the formation of 
the Dayak identity was a result of social construction, the Senganan was also socially 
constructed. These phenomena show that while some primordial aspects were important 
base for ethnic identification in West Kalimantan, both Dayaks and Malays treated identity 
as flexible rather than fixed.91 
Dayak conversion to Islam occurred for various reasons. The attraction or benefits 
of conversion appeared to be strong. In instrumentalist terms, being a Malay was apparently 
more advantageous and prestigious than being a Dayak. As explained earlier, the Dayak 
was associated with savagery, backwardness and inferiority. The benefits after conversion 
included access to education and better chances for office employment (e.g. work in the 
sultanates' administration or as teachers at government schools), both of which were 
important venues for upward social mobility. The converts did not have to pay for certain 
services and taxes that applied only to Dayaks. They would be accepted to participate in 
Malay community activities and would suffer less social vilification than they would have 
experienced if they were still Dayaks. For instance, a Dayak scholar wrote that Dayak 
children who wanted to go to school needed to convert to Islam to avoid being ridiculed as 
heathens or head-hunters (Anyang 1998: 105).92 Syahzaman and Hasanuddin (2003:44-67) 
listed examples of disadvantages of being a Dayak in the Sintang sultanate (see §3.2.3). 
91 There are three main approaches on ethnic identity formation. Primordialism, constructivism and 
instrumentalism. For further discussion, see Chapter Two. 
92 Djeranding Abdurahman, a well known convert of Dayak descent, became Senganan for this reason 
(Anyang 1998:105). 
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The rate of conversion was linked to the level of the influence of the sultanate and 
the pull factors (i.e. benefits) of becoming a Malay. Conversion seemed more common in 
areas where sultanate influences were strong, the proselytising was passionate or the 
benefits of being a Malay were more pronounced. It was not a coincidence that most 
Senganans lived in clusters around the sultanate capitals and other districts inhabited by the 
Malays. On the contrary, if the benefits of being a Malay were less obvious, the influence 
of the sultanates more limited, and serious proselytising efforts were lacking, conversion 
appeared to be slow. In certain cases the process would take longer to be completed, hence 
there were "transitional" Malays, who still retained some traits of their Dayak culture.93 
Proselytising by the Malay rulers in several areas also contributed to conversion 
(King 1985:60,132; Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003:34). Rulers in Melawi were known 
for their fervent proselytising efforts in the nineteenth century. Conversion of the Dayaks 
was very common, as indicated by the high number of Malays in these predominantly 
Dayak regions in the interior, such as Melawi, Semitau and Boven Kapuas onder-
afdeeling. 94 In contrast, the number of Dayaks in some "coastal" sultanates, such as 
Mempawah and Landak, remained high. This could have been an indication of weaker 
pressure to convert in Mempawah, Landak, and Bengkayang regions (Table 3-2).95 
The incentives for proselytisation by the sultans were probably less strong in some 
areas because the sultans did not want to lose the potential economic income to be derived 
from their Dayak population. The number of Dayaks under a sultanate's control was the 
main symbol of the prestige and importance of the sultanate, rather than the vastness of its 
territory or the fertility of its land. Because of the "value" of the Dayaks, the sultanates tried 
93 After conversion to Islam, the Pekaki people in the Selimbau area, for example, continued to live in long-
houses, and follow Dayak customs, such as drinking rice wine and eating pork (King 1993:132). 
94Under the Dutch administration the whole of West Kalimantan was named residentie Westerafdeeling van 
Borneo, which was headed by a resident. The residentie had four afdeeling: Singkawang, Pontianak, 
Ketapang, and Sintang, each of which was headed by an assistant resident. The administrative level below 
afdeeling was onderafdeeling, which was headed by either a controleur or a gezaghebber. There were at least 
fifteen onderafdeeling in West Kalimantan (see Table 3-2). The boundaries of many onderafdeeling coincided 
with the sultanate boundaries. The administrative unit below onderafdeeling was the district (headed by 
demang) and onderdistrict (headed by assistant demang). The top positions at onderafdeeling level and above 
were usually reserved for Dutch officials. Positions immediately below them were usually occupied by native 
officials from Java or personnel from other more "advanced" regions. 
95However, at the end, the decision whether to convert or not, rested much on the native themselves and their 
own calculations, and was not a simple result of coercion or positive proselytising by Malay rulers (King 
1993:133). 
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to increase Dayak numbers in their territory or at least prevent Dayaks from leaving 
(Harwell 2000:29). As a result, the Dayak issue had engendered disputes among the 
sultanates. In the mid-nineteenth century, Sintang and Selimbau rulers had disputed over 
who would have control over Seberuang Dayaks (King 1976c: 96).96 In a border agreement 
in 1886, Landak and Pontianak sultanates clarified which Dayaks should pay taxes to which 
sultanates (Rahman, Achmad et al. 2000: 130-7). Proselytising among Dayaks would also 
reduce the income of the sultanates, because after conversion the Dayaks would become 
Malays, and as Malays they would not pay Dayak-related taxes. In short, proselytising 
meant a significant loss of income and prestige for the sultanates (see van Hulten 1992:83). 
The relatively low numbers of Malays in some areas mentioned above could be one 
indication. 
Table 3-2 Dayak and Malay Population by Onder-afdeeling and City (1930) 
Onder-af dee ling Dayaks Malays %Dayaks % Malays 
Sambas 9,971 22,540 30.7 69.3 
Singkawang 8,825 19,890 30.7 69.3 
Bengkayang 11,574 832 93.3 6.7 
Mempawah 24,407 14,759 62.3 37.7 
Pontianak 5.443 24,485 18.2 81.8 
Landak 54.497 6,868 88.8 11.2 
SantH?:au 58,406 18,031 76.4 23.6 
Sekadau 22,165 11,575 65.7 34.3 
Sukadana 6,518 13,903 31.9 68.l 
Beneden Matan 1,091 14,825 6.9 93.2 
Boven Matan 27,878 9,721 74.2 25.9 
Melawi 43,021 21,972 66.2 33.8 
Sintang 31,806 3,622 89.8 10.2 
Semi tau 14,889 13,418 52.6 47.4 
Boven-Kapuas 13,377 9,346 58.9 41.1 
Pemangkat 1,579 0.0 100.0 
Singkawang 42 1,166 3.5 96.5 ;>., 
.~ Pontianak 40 16,327 0.2 99.8 u 
Ketapang 76 3,325 2.2 97.8 
Sin tang 3,563 0.0 100.0 
Total 334,026 231 ,747 59.0 41.0 
Source: Nederlandsch-Indie (1930). 
96Tromp wrote that possibly to escape economic obligations, the Seberuang Dayaks moved out of their 
homelands even before the 1850s, and were found scattered along various tributaries of the Kapuas. In the 
1870s, the Seberuangs had abandoned some of their traditional ways and many had adopted Malay dress 
(cited in King 1993:131·2). 
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The lack of statistics makes it difficult to determine the exact number of Dayak 
converts. The number of Dayak converts might have been significant in some regions. One 
important indication was the number of Malays in interior Dayak regions: Melawi, Semitau 
and Kapuas Hulu (Table 3-2). The number of Malays in Melawi was unusually high, even 
higher than in some "Malay" coastal regions. These remote regions were not safe enough at 
this time to attract significant Malay traders or settlers. 97 It would appear to be more 
rational for the Malays to populate other areas closer to the coast or relatively stable regions 
such as Sanggau or Sintang but in fact these regions had relatively low percentage of 
Malays compared to the previously mentioned Melawi, Semitau, and Boven Kapuas. The 
majority of Malays in these interior regions was very likely Dayaks who had converted to 
Islam and become Malays. This conclusion is backed by observations from colonial period. 
Enthoven and Schuiling indicated that most of the 400 or so Malays in the Putussibau and 
Mandai areas in the 1890s were Dayak converts. Bouman recorded that in the early 
nineteenth century, Bunut's capital was mainly comprised oflslamised Embau and Bunut 
Dayaks. Enthoven indicated that part of the population in Jongkong sultanate comprised 
Dayak converts (in King 1985:59-60). Thus a large number of Malays in West Kalimantan 
could have had Dayak ancestry because of the phenomenon of masuk Melayu (cf. Sellato 
1986:58; King 1993:125). 
3.2 Effects of the Malay Sultanates and Dutch Colonisation 
3.2.1 The Malay Sultanates and Indirect Rule 
Throughout the Dutch rule, most parts of West Kalimantan were indirectly ruled 
through the Malay sultanates. This was not unusual since more than half of the regions 
outside Java were also indirectly ruled. In Java where the Dutch presence was the strongest, 
most of the regions were under direct rule, and only 7% under native rule (Vandenbosch 
1941: 147). Ranawidjaja has argued that there were four reasons behind the Dutch colonial 
97These interior regions were areas of Iban, Kenyah, and Kayan who were known for their headhunting 
practices. There were still reports of tribal wars in these regions up to 1930s (for example King 1976:105-7; 
Kadir 1995:6). An interview in the Sydney Morning Herald (8-2-1997) of the local population in Melawi who 
confirmed that headhunting still took place in this area up to the 1930s. 
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preference for indirect rule: the colonial government had limited financial and human 
resources to control the vast colony; the population could be more effectively controlled by 
their own rulers; the local people could be given the impression that they were not being 
colonised by the Dutch; and there was concern that the abolition of the sultanates could 
lead to a popular revolt led by the deposed sultans (Ranawidjaja 1955:4-5)' 
Of the dozens of sultanates in West Kalimantan, the three most important were all 
located on the coasts of upper West Kalimantan: the Sambas, Mempawah, and Pontianak 
sultanates.98 Other less important sultanates were Kubu on the coast south of Pontianak; 
Landak, Tayan, Sanggau, Meliau, Sekadau, and Sintang in middle and upper Kapuas river; 
Matan, Simpang, and Sukadana in the current Ketapang district, in the south of West 
Kalimantan (Figure 3-2). There were also several "mini"-sultanates, which were established 
later in the nineteenth century in the Semitau area of Kapuas Hulu, i.e. Silat, Suhaid, 
Selimbau, Piasa, Jongkong, and Bunut. Probably referring to them, King claimed that often 
they were not states at all and were little more than stratified, small-scale societies, usually 
with a recognised hereditary chief or leader having authority over a federation of village 
communities (King 1993:126). 
98The Sambas sultanate occupied roughly the area of the current Sambas and Bengkayang districts. The 
Mempawah and Pontianak sultanates shared the area of the current Pontianak district. 
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Figure 3-2 Malay Sultanates of West Kalimantan 
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Prior to Dutch rule, many of those sultanates were independent entities, although 
some were under the vassalage or influence of more powerful sultanates. For example, 
Sukadana and Landak sultanates were once under the Javanese sultanate of Bantam prior to 
the Dutch period (Rahman, Achmad et al. 2000:89). The majority of the sultanates in the 
Semitau area, before they were abolished by the Dutch colonial government at the 
beginning of twentieth century, were under the influence of Sintang sultanate (Syahzaman 
and Hasanuddin 2003:102). In the final year of the eighteenth century, the sultanates of 
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Sanggau, Landak, Matan and Tayan were claimed by Pontianak as its vassals (Cribb 
2000: 101 ). These sultanates started to lose their sovereignty when they signed agreements 
with the Dutch colonial government, which subsequently put them under the protection of 
the Dutch.99 They submitted to the Dutch because they needed protection from attacks by 
other sultanates and threats of domestic rebellion. In some cases, the incumbent sultan 
invited the Dutch to protect his rule which was threatened by internal court struggles. 
Sometimes, the Dutch pressed the sultans to sign agreements so that the Dutch could 
establish control or increase their control so that could deter other foreign interests on the 
region. Such agreements naturally restricted the sultanates' autonomy. In many cases, the 
sultanates could not even choose the sultan' s heir without approval from the Dutch colonial 
government. The sultanates became weak and were at the disposal of the Dutch, who could 
abolish sultanates that were of no use or were problematic (§3.2.2). By the time of the 
Japanese occupation, these sultanates had been transformed from relatively independent 
entities to mere executors of Dutch policies.100 
The remaining authority and prestige of the sultans were completely wiped out 
during the Japanese military occupation. The Japanese military accused the sultans of 
organising rebellions against the Japanese, and summarily executed all the sultans and 
many of their immediate families. 
After the end of WWII, the Netherlands-Indies Civil Administration (NICA) 
"revived" twelve sultanates to participate in a temporary government, which was 
established in 1946. They were the Pontianak, Mempawah, Sambas, Landak, Sanggau, 
Sintang, Sekadau, Tayan, Matan, Sukadana, Simpang, and Kubu sultanates. The other 
sultanates, which had been abolished or incorporated into direct-rule areas by the Dutch 
prior to the Japanese occupation, were not revived. 
99There were two types of agreement, long contract (fang contract) and short declaration (korte verklaring). 
The long contract was more prestigious for the sultanates, because it mentioned the obligations of both the 
sultanates and the Dutch government. In the short contract, the sultanates declared their acceptance of the 
Dutch authorities, that they would not establish relations with other countries, and that they promised to 
follow regulations made by the Dutch. The Dutch had more power over those sultanates held under the short 
agreement (Ranawidjaja 1955:6). By the 1920s West Kalimantan had only two sultanates under long contract: 
Mempawah and Pontianak (Ranawidjaja 1955:41). 
100The details of contracts between the Dutch and the sultan of Pontianak (Rahman, Achmad et al. 2000) and 
the sultan of Sintang (Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003) indicated that the sultans were being gradually 
deprived of their power. 
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Many Dayaks who lived under sultanate rule were not "free". Like many other 
kingships in other parts of the world in the past, the social system under sultanate rule was 
hierarchical and stratified. Through interviews with elderly Dayaks about their memories 
and by examining written sources, it was quite evident that many Dayaks who lived under 
the sultanates rule occupied the lowest strata with the least privileges compared to the other 
ethnic groups. The Regulation of Sintang sultanate of 1867 provides an example of such 
social stratification. The population of the sultanate was divided into three social strata. At 
the highest stratum were Sintang and Dayak-Fourteen people who were citizens of the 
sultanate. The people of Sintang were Malays, while the Dayak-Fourteen consisted of 
fourteen Dayak sub-tribes, i.e.: Payak, Tebidah, Kayan, Papak, Goneh, Kebahan, Kubin, 
Pangin, Limbai, Ransa, Uddanum, Keninjal, Serawai, and Muntak. Although both the 
Malays and Dayak-Fourteen were considered citizens, the Dayak-Fourteen were required to 
pay a special tax called dagang adat to the sultan, whereas the Malays were exempted. 
(Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003:51-2). At the second layer were Dayak-Thirteen people, 
who were slaves of the sultan. The sultan had the rights to the produce of these Dayaks. 
The Dayak-Thirteen consisted of thirteen Dayak sub-tribes, i.e.: Ketungau, Seberuang, 
Desa, Lebang, Kebahan, Jungkau, Kantuk, Linoh, Sekujam, Sekubang, Barai (Syahzaman 
and Hasanuddin 2003:51-2). The lowest level was palace servants (orang dalam), who 
were basically slaves working inside the sultan's palace. The majority of the servants were 
from Dayak-Thirteen, who had converted to Islam, or Dayaks who could not pay debts or 
could not feed themselves and had become slaves (see Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 
2003 :44-65).101 A Dayak who had lived in Sintang during the sultanate era confirmed that 
the social system under the Sintang sultanate stratified the population into three classes: the 
ruling or aristocratic class, citizens (anak negeri), and subjugated people or slaves. The 
Dayaks generally fell into the latter group and have very small opportunities for upward 
social mobilisation (interview Djg). 
101 According to Yuan, the most common way of acquiring Dayak slaves was by enticing them into debt which 
they could not repay (Yuan 2000:21). Besides the Dayaks, other ethnic groups which often became targets of 
slavery were Torajanese, Bataknese, Balinese, Nias, and others. For the overview of the slave trade in 
Indonesia and reasons for its decline see Reid (1993) 
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Another example of such categorisation was found in the Sanggau sultanate, where 
the population was divided into four categories. The first, apparently the highest, was Suku 
Anak Raja or Dara Raja, which consisted of royal family members, but excluded the ruler, 
the royal administrator, and the children and siblings of the ruler. The second was Suku 
Sanggau, which was comprised "free Malays" who were engaged mainly in trade. The third 
was Suku Orang Bumi or Orang Dalam which included Malays who were believed to be of 
noble descent, most of whom were recently-converted Dayaks. The last group was Suku 
Dara! or Dayak (Kustanto 2002:67-8). 
Why wouJd the Dayaks want to stay in such an unfavourable situation? Some 
Dayaks who lived under effective control of the sultanates had become over-dependent on 
the sultanates and were not prepared to move away. Moving out from the sultanates' 
jurisdiction, for those who had particularly sought protection from the sultanate, could 
mean exposing themselves to the immediate danger that they had tried to avoid - being 
headhunted by rival Dayaks (cf. King 1985:59). Moving out could also result in difficulty 
in obtaining goods such as salt, sugar, tobacco, and highly prized beads. All trading posts 
along the Kapuas and Landak rivers and areas surrounding them were under the control of 
Malay rulers (cf. King 1993:128). Another option, fighting the sultanates, was not 
promising as will be discussed soon below. 
On top of that, the Dayaks had economic value for the sultanates which would try to 
prevent the Dayaks from leaving by making the move more difficult. 102 Those who wanted 
to move out needed to obtain approval from Dutch officials, and would be required to pay 
compensation to the sultan. One example is an ancestor of the current Dayak deputy 
governor of the province. Salun, a leader of the Kantuk tribe in Empanang, and his 
followers were able to resettle in government-ruled areas after obtaining approval from the 
102Above has mentioned the discriminatory tax system in Sintang sultanate. In Tajan sultanate, the Dayaks 
were burdened by various taxes. There were taxes on natural produce, taxes to upkeep the sultan's family 
members. There were also taxes when members of the sultanate died; to celebrate festivals, and on entering 
the fasting month. On top of these taxes, Dayaks were required to do corvee labour for 12 days a year. Malays 
by contrast were required to pay fewer taxes and undertake less corvee labour (for the details see Afdeeling 
Bestuurszaken der Buitengewesten 1929:337-8). 
64 
assistant resident in Sintang in 1881 and after paying an amount of money to the Selimbau 
sultan (see the official document in Kadir 1993).103 
The Dutch government, which held the ultimate power and was able to make 
changes, seemed have done nothing to improve the conditions of the Dayaks. Miles argued 
that the lack of initiative from the Dutch administration was first caused by it having no real 
control over the region. The Dutch control over this peripheral region was nominal through 
the 18th and most 19th century.104 Also, the Dutch spent most of its resources to administer 
Java in the first decade of 19th century. The governor general forbade the officials in 
Borneo to travel to interior to prevent expense and put obstacles in the way of missionaries. 
It was not only the ascent of the liberal government in the Netherlands in the mid-19th 
century that the colonial government started to think about efforts to solve the problems of 
"the Malay tyranny over the Dayaks" (Miles 1976:103-4).105 In 1907 Governor General van 
Heutsz issued a policy that required the government to take action in local affairs if the 
existing circumstances were a hindrance to welfare, civilisation, and freedom. 106 The policy 
required the native states in the Netherland Indies to work for social welfare and improve 
the economic conditions of their people; the government was also required to establish 
direct rule in an area if requested by the chiefs and people concerned, or if the interests of 
the people made such direct rule unavoidable (Vandenbosch 1941: 149). Even then, the 
benefits of those policies for the West Kalimantan Dayaks were negligible and conditions 
of the Dayaks did not improve. 
3.2.2 Direct Rule and Free Dayaks 
West Kalimantan had several government-ruled areas (gouvernementsgebied), 
where the Dutch exercised direct control: Pinohlanden, Meliau, and Boven Kapuas (Figure 
103Reasons they moved out varied. One being the ruler becoming too oppressive (King 1985:59). The current 
Dayak deputy governor of the province whose ancestors moved out, learnt that it was the heavy tax under the 
sultanate and better opportunities in the direct-control areas that had prompted migration (Kadir 1993:64-67). 
104The Dutch had its first contract drawn with the local West Kalimantan sultanates at the end of the 18'h 
century. The fi rst agreement was with sultanates of Pontianak and Sanggau in 1779 followed by Mempawah 
sultanate (1787) (Rahman, Achmad et al. 2000:8-9). The contracts with other sultanates were signed later. 
Cribb concluded that in 1800 Borneo was almost free from Western influence (Cribb 2000:118). 
105Miles' arguments were about Central Kalimantan, but also suited the case of West Kalimantan. 
106 With this policy the government reconsidered its abstention policy (onthoudings-pollitiek) - which 
opposed the expansion of direct colonial rule to the so-called Outer Territories. Reasons behind government 
interference were the need for more effective control in several prosperous regions, fear of foreign 
intervention, and ethical policy (Vandenbosch 1941 :65). 
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3-2). 107 Pinohlanden was an area formerly under the sultan of Banjarmasin that was 
transferred to the Dutch in the 1826 agreement, and put under the "supervision" of the 
Sintang sultanate. In 1913 eight "states" in Pinohlanden were annexed and put under direct 
rule. Meliau and the mini-sultanates in Semitau area (eastern half of Boven Kapuas) were 
annexed by the Dutch before 1917 (cf. Cribb 2000: 118). Boven Kapuas (or Kapuas Hulu) 
was not put under sultanate supervision because it was too distant and out-of-reach to 
attract the main sultanates. Furthermore, headhunting troubles made the region less 
attractive to the sultanates.108 Overall, the areas could be placed under direct rule because 
they were not under the effective control of any sultanate or were not the subject of 
unsettled disputes between the Malay rulers (King 1993:157). 
There were other motives behind the annexation or abolition of those sultanates. 
The annexation of Meliau and the sultanates in the Semitau area seemed related politically 
to the growing influence of the British in North Borneo (Sarawak) since the nineteenth 
century.109 Irwin reported that in order to contain the British, in 1846 the Dutch reorganised 
Borneo into a new province with its new capital in Sintang, near the border with the British 
colony (cf. Irwin 1955:158-9). 110 The Dutch were possibly anxious about potential 
domestic problems, such as the case of Meliau which had been without rulers for sometime. 
Domestic problems could send the wrong signal to the British that the Dutch were unable to 
control their colony. Weak and minor sultanates in frontline Semitau also concerned the 
Dutch (cf. Irwin 1955:159). 
In these directly ruled areas (i.e. Meliau, Pinohlanden, Semitau, Boven Kapuas), 
lived the free Dayaks - Dayaks who were not under the jurisdiction of the Malay sultanates. 
107 Another area which could be considered government-ruled was Vierkantepaa/, locally known as Tanah 
Seribu or "thousand land". This was a small piece of land in Pontianak city, which was granted by the sultan 
of Pontianak to the Dutch in 1779 to allow the latter to set up a trading post and a fort (cf. Rahman, Achmad 
et al. 2000:90-1 ). 
108Before peace talks were held in the 1880s, there were reports of repeated raids by Iban on other Dayak 
villages (King 1985:65). Other sub-ethnic groups in the area, such as Kenyah and Kayan, were also known for 
their headhunting practices, but were less notorious than the Iban (cf. Hose and McDougall 1912: Vol. I: 187). 
109The presence of the British in Sarawak renewed Dutch interests in the island because, as Irwin explained, 
until James Brooke established himself as Sarawak Rajah, the Dutch did not attempt to exercise more control 
over Dutch Kalimantan. The island was perceived as difficult to develop easily and quickly (Irwin 1955:151). 
On the Anglo-Dutch rivalries see also Tarling (1963). 
110 By 1848 however, the Dutch abandoned the idea of making Sintang the capital of the newly created 
administration province, because it was too isolated for effective coordination. The Dutch decided to divide 
Borneo into two administrations, the Western Division with its capital in Pontianak, and the South-Eastern 
Division with its capital in Banjarmasin (Irwin 1955:159). 
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Other Dayaks who legally lived in sultanates jurisdiction but who lived in areas where the 
sultanates had no effective control, such as the case of Dayaks in some areas within Bunut 
sultanate, might be considered "free" too. 111 Similarly, the Dayaks who lived beyond 
Nanga Pinoh were also "free" until the mid-nineteenth century, because that area was not 
under the jurisdiction of the Sintang sultanate (Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003 :42). 
3.2.3 Consequences for the Dayaks 
Direct and indirect-rule systems had different consequences for the Dayaks. The 
populations in the government-controlled area were subject to the Dutch colonial legal 
system. The social system was based on the three-tiered strata that existed in many other 
parts of the Dutch East Indies: European, Far Eastern, and Indigenous peoples. With the 
exception of aristocratic families and a few other natives whose legal status had been 
elevated to the level of the Europeans, there were no further legal divisions in the 
indigenous group. All native ethnic groups, both Dayaks and Malays, had the same legal 
status before colonial law. The Dayaks lived in less oppressed conditions under this system 
than did those Dayaks who lived in the Malay sultanates. 
The absence of the discriminatory sultanate ruling system had a significant impact 
on the political awareness of the Dayaks in direct-rule areas, particularly in Kapuas Hulu. 112 
In later interviews many former Dayak politicians said they were convinced that the 
mentality of the Dayaks who lived under the sultanates was rather fatalistic and subservient, 
whereas Dayaks from directly ruled Kapuas Hulu were more independent and emancipated 
(interview Bln, Djg, Kls). Herman van Hulten, a Dutch missionary who had worked with 
the Dayaks in several regions during Dutch rule, made the same observation. He believed 
that the Dayaks in Kapuas Hulu were one generation more "advanced" compared to Dayaks 
from other areas. He noted that many Dayak-awakening initiatives came from the Dayaks 
of Kapuas Hulu (van Hulten 1992:64-5). The most prominent Dayak political leaders 
111 Enthoven suggested in a 1903 publication that even Dayaks who were fonnally within the Bunut 
sultanate's jurisdiction did not appear to pay tribute to the sultan (in King 1985:60). 
112The relatively better Dayak conditions in Central Kalimantan (see footnote 47 and 49), a directly-ruled 
region, was another indication. Cribb noted that there were only two sultanates in this region , the Kota 
Waringin and Banjar sultanates. The influential Banjar sultanate was abolished 1857 and its territory was put 
under the direct rule. The vast central region of the Central Kalimantan had been under Dutch direct rule since 
1817 (Cribb 2000: 118), except a small western part of the region, which was under the control of sultanate of 
Kota Waringin. For further discussion on these two sultanates see Lontaan (1985: 145-154,84-138). 
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between the 1950s and 1960s came from this region, such as J.C. Oevaang Oeray, F.C. 
Palaunsoeka, and many others. The first influential Dayak political organisation in the 
1950s traced its origin to Kapuas Hulu. The impacts of these two different systems were 
still felt in recent times. Kadir calculates that the descendants of Kantuk Dayaks who 
decided to resettle into direct-rule areas in the beginning of 19th century are generally more 
successful than descendants of those who chose to stay under the sultanate's rule (Kadir 
1993:67). 
Under the indirect or sultanate rule, all native populations, with a few exceptions, 
were discriminatory sultanate regulations. 113 Many earlier publications confirmed the 
practices of slavery, corvee labour, additional taxes, and other types of discrimination 
imposed exclusively on the Dayaks by the Malay sultans.114 Stories about the maltreatment 
and slavery of the Dayaks can be heard in many parts of West Kalimantan (interviews Djg, 
Kls, Bin). A Dayak elder described the Dayak conditions as "the true native . . . [who] 
became guest in their own home, became beggar in their own region, lived in destitution 
and humiliation . . . was not given important position ... , and continuously being looked 
down as infidels .... "115 
Under the sultanate system the Dayaks occupied the bottom of the social hierarchy, 
and were usually seen as social outcasts by the other ethnic groups, including even the 
Senganan, their former kin. 116 The Malays felt superior to the Dayaks, because they 
enjoyed certain privileges unavailable to the Dayaks (see Riwut 1993 :266). In the mid-
113Natives who were not subject to local sultanate rules were: those from outside West Kalimantan who 
worked for the central government but were temporarily sojourning within the state, or who had entered into a 
labour contract (Vandenbosch 1941:153). Specific contracts made between the Dutch and the sultanates 
usually vvould include these exceptions. 
ll
4Some of the works of Veth, Lijnden, Enthoven, and Bouman corroborated the mistreatment. Works by 
Lumholtz (1920: Vol.. 1:18-19), Cator (1936:152-5), van Hutten (1992), King (1993:128-9), Harwell 
(2000:29) also noted the same oppression. King rightly argued that inequality and oppression were also 
present among the Dayaks (King 1985:58-59), however he failed to recognise that it was discriminatory 
practices by the Malay sultanates that had prevented Dayak access to modem education and other 
opportunities. 
115The original read "penduduk yang sejati ... menjadi penumpang di rumah sendiri, menjadi pengemis di 
negeri sendiri, hid up papa-sengsara dan hina-dina ... , tan pa diberi kedudukan pen ting ... , tetap di pan dang 
rendah sebagai orang kafir .... " (Balunus n.d.-a:8) 
116Some sources even trace these unequal relations to the inception of the earlier sultanates in the region. The 
Dayaks and the Malays in Landak and Sintang believe they have the same ancestors but they later split with 
the Malays becoming the rulers; whereas the Dayaks became the ruled (KR 1999/51, Lontaan 1975:141-54, 
182-202; Kadir 1993:37-54). 
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nineteenth century, English missionaries travelling in Sambas region observed that the 
Malays regarded the Daya.ks as inferior, and that they were held in "a state of service 
subjection by the Malays" (Doty and Pohlmann 1839:285-6). Van Hulten described how 
the Javanese and Bataks were astounded by the way the Dayaks were mistreated. However, 
like the Malays, they felt superior and despised the Dayaks (van Hulten 1992:79). The 
Senganans who had lived in the Malay area, tried to blend into their new environment as 
quickly as possible, in order to derive the full benefit of being Malay. One Dayak source 
cynically marked that the attitudes of some Senganans toward the Dayaks were even worse 
than those of "real" Malays (interview Kls). The NICA government in 1946 still observed 
certain discriminatory and contemptuous treatment of the Dayaks. Jn meetings where 
Dayaks and Malays were present, the Dayaks would sit on the floor while the Malays sat on 
chairs (van der Wal 1973a:397). When the Malays in the villages were asked why they did 
not clean their dirty streets, they replied that those jobs were for the Dayaks (van der Wal 
1973b:30). 
Access to education was almost closed to the Dayaks. It is true that formal schools 
were introduced to the province only at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, 
long before that Malays already had opportunities to study in the mosques and religious 
institutions (i.e. pengajian) or to receive private tuition from religious teachers. These 
Malays were trained to read and write Jawi, the Arabic-like script used within the 
sultanates' administration. 117 When the Dutch established a few village schools 
(volkscholen), enrolments were reserved only for children of the ruling family, aristocrats, 
and the middle-class. The locations of these "village" schools were not in villages near to 
the Dayak quarters, but in the capitals of the sultanates where most Malays dwelled (see 
§3.3.1). 
The Dayaks did not have the skills (i.e. education) that would qualify them to work 
for the sultanate administration. Even if they had the education, their kafir or heathen status 
would most likely have disqualified them from working for Islamic sultanates. The highest 
position open to the Daya.ks in the sultanate system was probably that of village chief 
117Some contracts between the Malay sultanates and the Dutch colonial government retained the Jawi version 
as well as the Latin version until the 1920s. 
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(kepala kampong). 118 As a result of this exclusion, almost all civil servants prior to 
independence were Malays and Muslims (cf. van Hulten 1992:80; van Loon 1999:29-36). 
Van Hulten who had lived since the 1930s in the region observed that even after 40 years of 
Dayak education since the early twentieth century no Dayak had become a civil servant. He 
further remarked that a Dayak could not even become a maid at the government offices. For 
a few who had attended mission schools, the highest positions open to them were teachers, 
mostly for mission schools (van Hulten 1992:61,80,114). This history explained "unusual" 
occupation preferences of the Dayaks in the 1950s. Many educated Dayaks were less 
attracted to civil service jobs. Many preferred teaching and nursing jobs, professions which 
had been opened to them during the colonial times and had strong association with the 
Catholic Church (for numbers schools and hospitals see Table 3-3). 
Table 3-3 Number of Schools, Students, and Hospitals (1906-1951, selected years) 
Year Numbers of 
Schools Students Catholics Hospitals 
1906 296 
1907 3 66 492 
1908 4 107 660 
1909 4 107 660 
1910 5 188 876 
1915 11 416 2 320 1 
1920 16 625 4,292 2 
1925 22 1,247 4,931 3 
1930 38 1,986 6,991 7 
1935 46 3,647 7,910 11 
1938 71 4,512 9,183 11 
1939* 43 5,409 7,408 8 
1947 33 4,324 6,981 5 
1948 73 7,721 8,207 5 
1949 86 9,097 8)426 5 
1950 82 10,180 9 792 5 
1951 93 11,193 11 922 6 
Source: van Valenberg (1953:167-9). 
Note: * The number of schools declined in 1939 because WWII had started in Europe, which affected funding 
to the missions. 
118The sultanates needed native chiefs because they were respected and therefore more effective in collecting 
taxes and produce from the local population. The sultans also turned to these chiefs when they need a 
workforce for labour intensive projects or "warriors" in time of war against their adversaries. 
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Under such a discriminatory system, channels for upward social mobility were 
closed to many Dayaks. All decision making for domestic affairs was in the hands of the 
sultans and the sultanate administration officers. The Dayaks were unable to change these 
unfortunate conditions. Firstly, as explained above, the sultans would try to keep the 
Dayaks from moving out from the sultanate's control because they were an important 
source of income. Secondly, some subservient Dayaks regarded their obligation to the 
sultanates as predestined by their ancestors (see for example Kadir 1993:63). Some Dayak 
elders explained that for the superstitious Dayaks, slight disobedience to the sultans would 
be considered sinful (tulah) and could bring them bad luck. For them, the sultans were 
descendants of holy people (orang keramat) (interviews Bln, Djg). 119 
The Dayaks were not capable of staging a successful rebellion against the sultanates. 
Living a nomadic lifestyle, being scattered in small groups, and practising tribal warfare are 
some of the reasons. Furthermore, the Malay sultanates were in a better position because 
the Dutch would support them to quell any domestic disturbances. Local history had noted 
at least four Dayak rebellions in the Sintang region: the Rebellions of Padung/Mensiku 
(1874), Tebidah (1890), Panggi (1908), and Apang Semangai (1913-6) (cf. Soedarto 
1978:89-90; Achmad, Rachman et al. 1982:30-33; Lontaan 1985:269-81; Syahzaman and 
Hasanuddin 2003: 114-5, 131). According to some Dayak elders, these rebellions, which 
were claimed by the local history books as wars against the Dutch, were in fact rebellions 
against the Malay sultanate as the de facto ruler in the region rather than the Dutch 
(interviews Djg, Mjg). 120 The Dutch were involved in quelling the rebellions because they 
119Similar attitudes could be found in several ethnic groups in Central Sulawesi. For tribes in Poso, converting 
to Christianity was similar to committing treason against the Luwu king. This conversion would bring 
misfortune because their ancestors, who had been loyal to the Luwu Muslim king, would be angry (Hasan, 
Darwis et al. 2004: 135-7). 
12
°National historical textbooks for high school in the 1980s also contained other historical biases. In the 
books regional disquiets during the Dutch colonial period were seen as either pro or anti-Dutch rebellions and 
usually ignored local power-struggle which fuelled the rebellions (Reid 2005:72). The historical textbooks 
used in high schools in the 1980s portrayed the proponents of Padri War in the 19th century as heroes just 
because they were anti-Dutch, despite being involved in mass killing of the members of customary 
community in West Sumatra and Batakland. Another example, Arung Palakka a Bugis prince of Bone who 
fought the domination of the Gowa sultanate was pictured as a villain just because he cooperated with the 
Dutch in 17th century (see Ricklefs 2001 :78-9, 182-3; Reid 2005:72). Elsewhere, one of the most politically 
contentious "distortion" was of the misinterpretation and omission in the Japanese historical textbook of its 
past occupation in China and Korea {Difilippo 2002:110-1; Rose 2005:128-9). 
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were obliged to help the sultanates as a condition of their political contracts, apart from 
their general interest in preserving peace and order. 
Observing the conditions of the Dayaks under the sultanates, some colonial officials 
and researchers who visited the areas such as Van Hoevel and Niewenhuis, requested the 
government establish direct rule in the Dayak areas so that the Dayaks would be freed from 
repressive Malay rulers (Irwin 1955:161; Coomans 1987:42). One important contribution 
of the colonial government was the eradication of slavery by the end of 19th century, 
although the social status of the Dayaks remained unchanged.121 One Dutch priest observed 
that the Dutch government generally ignored the problems affecting the Dayaks under 
sultanate rule (cf. van Hutten 1992:79, 82). 122 Their continued good relations with the 
sultanates were more important to the Dutch in order to keep the colony stable. 
3.3 Transition to Emancipation 
It was only towards the end of the century that the conditions of Dayaks began to 
change. Of great importance was the introduction of both government and mission schools 
in the 1890s which, although Dayak education progressed slowly, began a process that was 
to lead to the involvement of Dayaks in new political movements after the end of WWII. 
3.3.1 Dayak Education and Role of Mission Schools 
Formal education in West Kalimantan started m 1892 when the government 
established its first village school (volkschol) in Pontianak, the provincial capital. By 1918, 
the government already had seventeen village schools in the province, all located in urban 
areas, with around 1,200 students (Ahok, Ismail et al. 1983:43). The choice of urban 
location was not surprising, since many of these areas were the capitals of the sultanates 
and still had no formal schools at that time (cf. Ahok, Ismail et al. 1983:28-9, 43). 
Unfortunately, attending schools in urban areas was both impractical and costly for the 
121 Dutch colonial agreements with Mempawah, Taj an, and Pontianak sultanates in the 19th century had 
included articles barring the practice o f slavery (Afdeeling Bestuurszaken der Buitengewesten 
1929:263,291,334). On the slavery and its eradication in Indonesia, see Reid (1993). 
122Assistant resident of Sintang in 1877, for example, noted that the sultan had ignored the fact that the 
Dayaks should be free subjects under his contract with the Dutch (Reid 1993:78). 
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Dayaks.123 They needed to travel long distances and to pay more expensive economic and 
social costs in order to attend school. Students could not help their parents with their 
farming tasks, which would not have been the case if the schools had been nearby. They 
also faced difficulty in finding a place to stay during the school term, since they did not 
have family in towns. Since they lived outside their community, they would face social 
ostracism or even vilification from the majority of Malays in town (remember that the view 
that the Dayaks were uncivilised was pervasive at those times). Government schools might 
provide free boarding facilities, but the Dayaks might need to meet other costs and would 
face problems associated with their social status. A few Dayaks who were able to attend the 
government schools in the towns mostly ended up living with Malay families and working 
for them. They would convert to Islam and became Malay in order to avoid social 
complications (cf. footnote 92). 
Besides the government, Catholic missions which had started their activities in the 
province from the middle of the nineteenth century, also established schools.124 The first 
mission school for Dayaks was established in 1894 by P.H. Looymans SJ when he opened a 
missionary post in Sejiram. 125 The school was forced to close because of insufficient 
personnel, but was reopened on 22 August 1906 by missionaries from the Capuchin Order 
(Ahok, Ismail et al. 1983:28-9). In 1915, the missions had eleven schools with around 416 
students. By 1938 the numbers of mission schools had swollen to 71, with about 4,512 
students (Table 3-3). Most of the schools were primary schools in which the period of 
studies ranged from one to three years. A few of those schools were "advanced" (or 
continuation) schools, such as five-year primary schools, a teacher training school, a junior 
seminary, and an agricultural college (cf. Davidson 2002:98). Most of these schools were 
123 Some of these issues were mentioned as problems in advancing education in the Netherlands Indies 
(Djadjadiningrat 1944:18), which means that they were not specific to Dayaks. However, the social conditions 
of the Dayaks made their access to the education difficult. 
124West Kalimantan was mainly served by Catholic priests, particularly those from Capuchin Order. By 1914, 
West Kalimantan had 24 Catholic missions of the Capuchin Order and only nine Protestant missions. At the 
same time, East and South Kalimantan were served by 54 Protestant Rhenish missions (Afdeeling 
Bestuurszaken der Buitcngewesten 1927:204). For a glimpse of earlier Protestant mission works in West 
Kalimantan, see Houliston (1963) and Rusha (1969). 
125The missions usually established schools at the same time as they opened mission posts. They believed that 
providing education could be a good means of recruiting converts (Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia 
1974:317). 
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established in interior regions as their main targets were the Dayaks.126 The Chinese, on the 
other hand, usually enrolled at their own community schools or studied through private 
tuition; 127 whereas the Malays would not generally enrol at the mission schools for 
religious reasons. 
These mission schools did not pose the same problems for the Dayaks as the 
government schools did. Since the schools were located in the Dayak community, the social 
and economic costs were lower for students to attend. Problems of social vilification were 
minimal as the students stayed within their community. The schools usually provided free 
accommodation and meals to help students who came from other regions, but in return they 
were expected to help or work for the Church. 
Unfortunately, the progress of Dayak education was very slow until just before the 
break of WWII (see Table 3-3). In some regions, student enrolments had improved after the 
1920s, but attendance remairled poor. For example, the attendance at schools in Sibale and 
Tiang irl the Sirlgkawang area in 1922 was usually below 30% (Boelaars and Sabon 
1981 :31). This trend was partly due to the casual attitude of Dayaks toward education.128 
One old Dayak remembered that it was not uncommon for pupils to be forced or even 
"kidnapped" to attend schools. Attendance was also difficult to maintain, particularly 
during harvest periods, when the students were expected to help their parents (interview 
Bin, Coomans 1987: 114-6). External factors such as difficult terrain and long distance to 
reach the limited numbers of schools also contributed to this poor record. Not all Dayaks 
had the same access to schools because Catholic missions could only established schools in 
certain "strategic" locations due to limited funds and personnel, whereas government 
schools were concentrated in townships. The attitude of the local sultans toward the mission 
schools also influenced Dayak school enrolment (Doty and Pohlmann 1839:286). 
Sometimes sultans impeded the establishment of mission schools as in 1905 in eastern 
Singkawang. This attitude deterred the Dayak parents from sending their children to school 
1260ne source confinned that almost all the schools in the central sections of Borneo were mission schools 
(Vandenbosch 1941:47). 
127The missions did establish a few schools for the Chinese in towns. The first mission Chinese school was 
established in Singkawang in 1892 (Ahok, Ismail et al. 1983:28-9). 
128The lack of interest in education was acknowledged by the post-war Dayak leaders (DAO 1946b). 
Coomans (1987: 117) noted that East Kalimantan Dayaks had the same attitude toward education. 
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(Boelaars and Sabon 1981:23). Contagious disease would also drive the still superstitious 
Dayaks to desert schools, for example in Pelanjau where the school was forced to close 
down (Boelaars and Sabon 1981:23-4). 
The mission schools, not government schools, were the main providers of Dayak 
education. This education enabled Dayaks to access printed media and become aware of 
political developments in the province and also the nation. It was true that these enlightened 
Dayaks were still restricted from participating in local politics and given very little access 
to government jobs due to these discriminatory social system and religious constraints.129 
However, literacy had given them opportunities to work in other occupations which 
required more sophisticated administrative and organisational skills and involved wider 
social responsibility. Most of these occupations were related to the Church missions, such 
as teachers in the mission schools, nurses in mission health clinics, or catechists. Although 
the majority of them worked in these politically less influential occupations, the skills and 
experience that they acquired were important for their political advancement when 
opportunities arose after the WWII. The post-war government elevated many of them to 
assume strategic positions. Some became the most important figures in West Kalimantan 
politics from the end of the 1950s to the middle of the 1960s. In short, without the 
education provided by mission schools it would have been difficult for Dayaks to achieve 
what they had attained during the 1940s and 1950s. 
3.3.2 The Effects of Japanese Occupation 
The main players in West Kalimantan politics prior to the Japanese occupation were 
the educated Malays and migrant groups such as the Javanese and Batak. 130 They set up the 
West Kalimantan branch of Sarekat Islam (1914), Sarekat Rakyat (1923), Parindra (1936), 
129There were some prominent Senganan political figures, but they no longer considered themselves Dayaks 
and therefore could not truly represent Dayaks (see Djelani's explanation in DAO 1948). Senganan figures 
such as Djeranding Abdurrahman and Ali Anyang had associated themselves with the mainstream Malays. 
Djeranding Abdurrahman was a Dayal< born in Melapi village, Putussibau, Kapuas Hulu. He became the head 
of the West Kalimantan chapter of National Indische Partij in 1922, and after it was banned in 1923 he 
became the head of Serikat Rakyat which was established in 1924. He was accused of being a communist and 
sent to Boven Digul (Papua) in April 1927 (Balunus 1990). Ali Anyang a well known local revolutionary 
leader who was involved in military action against NICA (see Pemda Kalimantan Barat 1991). 
1300n rare occasions, Dayaks might also become members of the political party, like the case ofG.P. Djaoeng, 
the former Sintang district head, who claimed to be a member of Persatuan Anak Borneo prior to WWII 
(interview Djg). 
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and the regional Persatuan Anak Borneo (PAB, 1930) (see Pemda Kalimantan Barat 
1991:56-70). Aristocrats and members of the inner circle of the sultans of West Kalimantan 
were also active in the political parties. Members of the Pontianak sultanate, for example, 
were involved in Parindra, Muhammadiyah, and PAB (Rahman, Achmad et al. 2000: 145). 
Unlike the Dutch, who had used and benefited from the Malay sultanate rule, the 
Japanese who came to the region in 1942 were suspicious of the sultans. The Japanese 
feared that these sultans and other local leaders could use their social status and influence to 
undermine their authority. The authority of the sultans, which had been eroded during the 
Dutch, was further decimated during the Japanese occupation (Departement Pendidikan dan 
Kebudayaan 1980:30). Although the occupation did not abolish the sultanates in the 
province, the respect for the sultans was generally very low.131 From 1943 to 1944, the 
Japanese occupation forces kidnapped and summarily executed thousands of prominent 
local figures. 132 Among those victims were all the sultans of West Kalimantan, who in 
many cases were killed together with their heirs and close relatives. 133 Many Malay 
aristocrats, political activists, community leaders, and other important persons also became 
victims. However, although there may have been some isolated Dayak victims, they were 
largely bypassed because they posed no threat to the Japanese (cf. Davidson 2002:94). A 
Japanese newspaper, Borneo Shinbun, reported the massacres and their victims but did not 
list any Dayak victims, nor did the provincial government after independence.134 Unlike the 
aristocrats, the educated middle class and political activists, the Dayaks had no political 
role and no social influence that could be used against the Japanese occupation. 
The massacres, however, had political consequences of benefit to the Dayaks. 
Firstly, the Japanese had virtually abolished any remaining prestige of the feudal 
mThe attitude of Japanese occupation towards the sultanates differed from time to time and from region to 
region. Initially, the occupation aimed to abolish the sultanates in the navy-controlled region and Sumatra as 
they were prepared to be the permanent part of Japanese territories (Joint Publications Research Service 
1968:118, 150-1 , 158, 131). However, in order to win the hearts and minds of the people and for mobilisation 
~oals, the sultanates status was maintained (Joint Publications Research Service 1968:151,154, 158). 
32The total number of victims varied according to sources, but ranged from more than one thousand to an 
official figure of21,037 victims (Usman Mhd 2000:33-7; Davidson 2002:79; Heidhues 2005:1 11-2). This was 
the largest incident during Japanese occupation in Indonesia (Joint Publications Research Service 1968:208). 
133For example, there were about sixty victims from the inner circle of the Pontianak sultanate itself (Pemda 
Kali man tan Barat 1991 :87). Another source quoted around 30 victims (Rahman, Achmad et al. 2000: 150-60). 
134The names and positions of some prominent leaders who were murdered during the Japanese period were 
recorded much later in Pemda Kalimantan Baral (1991:58,89-90, 102-5). 
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government, the symbol of repression from the perspective of Dayaks. Its disappearance 
signified a new era for many Dayaks. One source claimed that the execution of feudal 
rulers was very important to free the Dayaks spiritually from their inferiority complex and 
second-class-citizen mentality. In the past, many Dayaks believed that they were destined 
to remain under the rule of the sultans whom they believed to have spiritual powers (orang 
keramat). 135 The executions of the sultans reduced the sultanates' legitimacy in the eyes of 
the Dayaks (interview Bln). 136 Furthermore, because of the killings, their positions were 
weak when the post-war government revitalised the sultanates system (Kementerian 
Penerangan 1953: 105-6). Secondly, several thousand victims were influential, middle class 
and politically active Malays as well as many Javanese and Bataks, and many Chinese.137 
With the disappearance of many capable people, West Kalimantan would soon face a 
shortage of skilled personnel to fill government positions after WWII ended (Bohm 
1986:64-5) thus providing opportunities for educated Dayaks (Davidson 2002:79). 
Throughout the Japanese occupation, particularly after the massacres, political 
activities in West Kalimantan halted. The Japanese forces almost immediately arrested the 
leaders of around thirty political organisations in Pontianak when they arrived in West 
Kalimantan. These leaders were released after pledging loyalty to the Japanese occupation. 
Shortly after, on 1 April 1942, the Japanese occupation authorities banned all political 
activities in West Kalimantan. Nissinkai, a social organisation created by the Japanese on 
24 May 1942 to co-opt or control nationalist activities, was also dissolved in October 1942 
(Pemda Kalimantan Barat 1991:92).138 The remaining middle-class and educated people, 
who were usually active in politics, suddenly found their political aspirations crippled as 
they were under tight Japanese surveillance. The political elite as well as the larger 
community lived in fear. Ahok wrote that Muslims went straight home without gathering 
135Sultanates in West Kalimantan were seen by the local population as the leaders of the material and spiritual 
world (Ranawidjaja 1955:83). 
136However, the old perception could still be found in some Dayak communities up until the recent past. In 
1948, the head of the Dayak Affairs Office reported that Dayaks in Tayan believed some problems they faced 
were because the sultan was not blessed or holy (DAO 1948:10). In the 1980s, some Sintang Dayaks were 
re.f.orted to be treating a descendant of the Sintang sultanate as ifhe was a holy man (interview Mjg). 
13 Wealthy Chinese were suspected of financially supporting the mainland Chinese against the Japanese in the 
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). 
138Borneo Shinbun (16-9-1942) mentioned that on 27 July 1942 the Japanese occupying government had 
issued a ban on all organisations (Law No 32). However, as mentioned by the newspaper, one of the largest 
"political" parties in West Kalimantan, Parindra, only announced its dissolution on 9 September 1942. 
77 
(as had been their previous practice) after the Friday sermon in order to avoid suspicion 
(Ahok, Ismail et al. 1983:58). 
Another aspect of Japanese occupation was the creation of more egalitarian society 
as a result of mass mobilisation. At the grassroots, other ethnic groups who always 
considered the Dayaks as having lower social status were forced to work together with the 
Dayaks. The once respected sultans were often required to participate in such mobilisation 
efforts. 139 This more equalitarian society improved the low confidence level of the Dayaks, 
who had been treated as pariahs in the past. 
The Japanese were surprised by a Dayak rebellion against them between February 
and May 1945. The Majang Desa War (Perang Majang Desa), which started in the Meliau 
area, was transformed into the most serious revolt against the Japanese occupation in West 
Kalimantan. In terms of casualties, apart from ordinary Japanese troops, one of the most 
feared Japanese commanders, Nakatani, was killed. The affected area spread from Sanggau 
to Sekadau, Sintang, Kapuas Hulu, Landak, and Ketapang (L(ayang) 1981; Bohm 1986:42; 
Balunus: 17). 140 The Japanese eventually brought the area under control but failed to fully 
pacify the rebels. This insurgency gained much credit because it was carried out during a 
time of harsh oppression and when other previously active members of the political elite 
had been completely silenced. The remnants of this rebel force re-emerged to take revenge 
on the withdrawing Japanese troops at the end of WWII. This revolt foreshadowed the 
coming political power of the Dayaks in West Kalimantan. 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
The unfortunate conditions of the Dayaks prior to WWII had far-flung effects on 
Dayak politics for many decades after independence. These conditions were inflicted partly 
by the discriminatory practices under sultanate rule. The Dutch colonial government also 
contributed to these conditions by letting the discrimination continue and not trying to 
139The participation of sultans in the mobilisation was taken from the case in East Sumatra, where the sultans 
were obliged to attend and participate actively in public events, including to perform dirt-work such as 
wielding a cangkul or hoe (Reid 1979:107). Similar treatments were very likely for the sultans in West 
Kalimantan as their status - judged by their ill-fated deaths- were no higher than those in East Sumatra. 
1400n 27 January 1947, many of the Dayak war leaders were awarded medals for their heroism by the Dutch 
government. After independence, they were also invited to Jakarta to meet the President several times in the 
1950s and 1960s (Balunus 1990:14). 
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improve the conditions of the Dayaks. Upward social mobility was almost impossible for 
many Dayaks because of their non-Muslim, uneducated, and backward status. The Dayaks' 
way to freedom was difficult to attain because the sultanates prevented them from leaving 
their regions in order to avoid economic loss. Rebelling against the sultanates was a 
difficult option because disobeying the sultans for many Dayaks was sinful and would 
bring bad luck, as the sultans were regarded as holy persons. Even when on rare occasions 
they finally rose up against the sultanates, the Dutch helped the sultans to crush the 
rebellion. One way out was to embrace Islam and become Malays. 
Dayak conditions in direct-rule regions were slightly better. Under direct Dutch rule, 
the Dayaks enjoyed more freedom than Dayaks in other regions. Many Dayak elders 
believed that the direct-rule system had contributed to the higher level of confidence among 
the Dayaks from these regions. Many important Dayak political leaders after WWII came 
from the direct-rule regions. 
Conditions would soon change after the end of WWII. The role of the Catholic 
mission schools in the rise of Dayak political activity after independence was crucial. 
Almost all Dayak political leaders after WWII were former teachers, nurses, catechists, or 
seminary students who were all connected to the Catholic Church. They were the first 
Dayaks to be recruited to work for the post-war government. Without education which was 
made available mainly through the mission schools, the "enlightenment" process would 
have been very slow. It would have been almost impossible for illiterate Dayaks to assume 
these strategic political positions. 
The Japanese occupation also brought positive consequences for the rise of Dayak 
participation in politics after the end of WWII. The occupation eliminated the legitimacy of 
the sultanates, crippled political activities in which the dominant Malays played an 
important part, and created more egalitarian masses. The Japanese massacred all the sultans 
as well as many influential figures in the province. The Dayak revolt against the Japanese 
in central West Kalimantan also gave them confidence to pursue their needs after WWII. 
By the time of the Japanese capitulation the majority of Dayaks still lived in rural 
areas, were uneducated, and had almost no political role. The prospect of Dayak 
advancement was bleak as the political system was still dominated by non-Dayaks. A few 
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enlightened Dayaks who had worked under the Catholic missions were incapable of 
changing this condition without external help. They had no access to the government, had 
no political experience, and had not established themselves as leaders of the Dayak 
community for effective political mobilisation. A government which was willing and 
capable of changing the condition was the only hope. This government would need to 
guarantee the Dayaks access to and a share in all aspects of governance, because after 
centuries of marginalisation, they were not in a position to compete with the more advanced 
ethnic groups. This was exactly what happened after WWII as the next chapter will show. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RISE OF DA YAK POLITICS (1945-1960) 
"The first Dayaks [who took part in the emancipation] 
now had high positions in the West Kalimantan 
government, whereas the sultans, who used to rule 
them, became their subordinates" (translation of van 
Hulten (1992:81)141 
The situation of the Dayaks from the beginning of the twentieth century had started 
to improve, particularly in areas of direct rule. They started to have access to education and 
to do "office" work within the mission networks. The weakened sultanates and their 
eventual demise at the hands of the Japanese occupation also contributed to the 
improvement. The Dayaks would soon benefit from the political changes in the province 
after the end of WWII. 
This chapter explores how Dayak political activities emerged after WWII and how 
they evolved until the early 1960s. The first section discusses the opportunities provided to 
the Dayaks after the end of WWII. This section will show that the "inclusive" policies of 
the post-war governments, the role of individuals within those governments, and the 
establishment of Dayak institutions had enabled Dayaks to participate in the provincial and 
local political arenas. The second section examines the impact of the dissolution of the pro-
Dutch DI.KB government on Dayak politics, and the rise of the Dayaks in local politics as a 
result of the victory of the Dayak Unity Party (PD) in the 1955 and 1958 elections. 
4.1 Post-war Opportunities for the Dayaks 
The previous chapter has discussed the conditions prior to WWII that prepared the 
educated Dayaks to take up post-war opportunities: Dayak access to education, the 
disappearance of feudal sultanates, and the Dayak-led Majang Desa insurgency. However, 
141The original read: "Orang-orang pertama' suku Daya sekarang menjadi orang-orang yang berpangkat tinggi 
di Borneo Barat, sedangkan raja-raja pribumi yang semuanya memerintah mereka, menjadi bawahannya." 
Van Hulten was a Catholic missionary, who had worked among the Dayaks in West Kalimantan for 36 years, 
from 1938-1974. 
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there were other equally important post-war developments for Dayak politics which will be 
discussed below: the inception of post-war governments, the influence of some pro-Dayak 
political figures in the West Kalimantan government at that time, and the establishment of 
pro-Dayak institutions. 
4.1.1 Inception of Post-war Governments 
After the war ended, the allied forces established a temporary administration in the 
province. The Commander of Australian Forces arrived in Pontianak by plane on 14 
October 1945, while the remaining Australian forces arrived together with NICA officers 
by ship from Banjarmasin on 16 October. The Dutch post-war government, the Netherlands 
Indies Civil Administration (NICA), officially took over the administration of the province 
from the allied forces on 22 October 1945 (Australian War Memorial 1946; Pemda 
Kalimantan Barat 1991: 122). This interim government became aware of the existence of 
the number of Dayak bands ready to engage in conflicts when they encountered them in 
Pontianak and some other urban areas in October 1945. It was reported that the main 
purpose of these bands was not political; it was not to take control over the areas, but to 
search for the remaining Japanese troops. The presence of these bands, however, posed 
security risks to the urban population as they were involved in lootings and other crimes. In 
Landak, possibly in a racially motivated clash, the Dayaks killed a few Malays. Other cities 
such as Sanggau and Ketapang also experienced similar conflicts. Disturbed Malay leaders 
in Pontianak, such as Uray Bawadi, suggested that the leaders of these Dayak bands be 
arrested. However, the other Malay leaders preferred not to antagonise Dayaks in order to 
avoid possible skirmishes (Basry 1961:69; Yanis 1998:38-9).142 
Knowing the potential problems these bands could cause and wanting to secure the 
Dayaks' support, the allied forces invited the leaders of these forces to a series of meetings 
142A war diary from the Australian Army Headquarters mentioned inter-racial disturbances in Sanggau and 
surrounding Nanga Pinoh. In a meeting with the Chinese and Malay leaders in Pontianak on 18 October 1945, 
the Australian army commander mentioned that there were ethnic clashes involving Dayaks against Malays 
and Chinese (Australian War Memorial 1945; Australian War Memorial 1946). The tensions and conflicts 
within the communities after WWII were not only typical of West Kalimantan but also elsewhere (cf. Bigalke 
1981; Kahin 1985). 
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(L(ayang) 1981:55-8; Davidson 2002:95-6; Balunus:33).143 At one meeting these Dayak 
leaders raised several points, one of them being a demand to eradicate racial discrimination 
(Balunus 1990:13).144 As an indication of the allied forces' goodwill toward these Dayak 
bands, one of their leaders, Pang Dandan or Orang Kaya Mandi Setia Negara, was granted 
the title of supreme commander. The title was conferred by the newly enthroned sultan of 
Pontianak, Sultan Hamid II, after receiving advice from the NICA resident. 145 Shortly after, 
Pang Dandan was appointed as the first head of the Meliau Council (Rivai 1978:66-7). He 
helped the Dutch government to restore peace in some regions and visited Dayak villages to 
counter the propaganda from the anti-Dutch sections of the community (van der Wal 
1973a:606; van der Wal 1973b:30). In 1946, to show their appreciation of the Dayak 
revolts against the Japanese, NICA invited Dayak leaders from Putussibau, Sambas, 
Singkawang, Pemangkat, Sanggau and other places to Pontianak to attend the trials of the 
Japanese war criminals (van der Wal 1973b:30). The NICA was also said to have employed 
many Dayaks who had previously revolted against the Japanese (Basry 1961 :71-2). 
When NICA formed an interim government in West Kalimantan, it took a special 
interest in the Dayaks. In January 1946, NICA established the Dayak Affairs Office (DAO), 
the first institution established in West Kalimantan to deal with issues related to the Dayaks 
(see §4.1.3.1). In October 1946, seven Dayaks were appointed to the newly created forty-
member West Kalimantan Council (West-Borneo Raad). This council was established to 
advise the assistant resident of West Kalimantan (see Table 4-1). This was the first time 
that the Dayaks were involved in the official policy-making process in the province. The 
143The Australian anny commander was reported to have met the Dayak leader, who had travelled for three 
days from upriver, on the morning of 17 October 1945 (Australian War Memorial 1946). 
1440thers noted that Panglima Burung also demanded that a new sultan of Pontianak be anointed (Pemda 
Kalimantan Barat 1991:121-2; Rahman, Achmad et al. 2000:164-6). This account is difficult to accept 
because there was nothing to link the Pontianak sultanate with Panglima Burung from Meliau. Meliau was a 
direct-ruled area. Also, the Panglima first arrived in Pontianak in September 1945. By that time, Pontianak 
already had a new sultan. One Dayak elder did not recall the event at all (interview Bin). This was probably a 
fabricated account to show that the Dayaks supported the sultanate government. Panglima Burung (born 1914, 
died October 2005) was a revered Dayak war chief thanks to his role in the revolts against the Japanese 
occupation in the province between 1944 and 1945. He was still employed by the government to negotiate 
peace during the conflict in I 997 and even in the conflict in Central Kalimantan in 2001 (Akcaya 29-10-2005, 
4-3-1997; Jakarta Post 20-3-2001 ). Many believed that he had mystical powers (Akcaya 29-10-2005; Equator 
12-3-2001). 
145Pang Dandan was a traditional leader (temenggung) in Kunyil village {Meliau sub-district), a place where 
the revolt against the Japanese began in 1945. He was the top commander ofMajang Desa War League which 
was formed on 13 May 1944 to fight the Japanese (L(ayang) 1981 :61-2). 
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Dayaks were also given seats on local councils in Sambas, Sintang, Landak, Sanggau, 
Mempawah, Matan, Sekadau, Boven Kapuas and Meliau (Bohm 1986: 130).146 NICA sent 
J.A.M. Linggie, J.C. Oevaang Oeray and G.P. Djaoeng, as the first Dayaks to attend the 
official training school for government officials (MOSVIA) in Makassar in 1946. Very 
soon they would play an important role in provincial politics.147 The post-war government 
also approved and supported the establishment of an institution, Persatuan Dayak (PD) or 
Dayak Unity, which later became an important political force for Dayaks. 148 These 
benevolent policies to Dayaks were not merely altruistic but also an acknowledgement of 
the Dayak loyalty. Dutch official documents showed PD's strong support for the Dutch 
government in many occasions (van der Wal 1973b:88-9; van der Wal 1973a: 179, 195, 
605). As later discussion will show, their support was crucial as the other important 
segment of the community, the Malays, did not welcome the return of the Dutch to the 
province. 
Table 4-1 Members of West Borneo Council (1947) 
Representatives Names 
Chairman Sultan Hamid 
Dayak P.F. Bantang, Sandjoek, A.F. Koraak, A. Mamoi, Abdulkadir 
Representatives (7) bin Diawi, J.C. Oevaang Oeray, and Y. Mandor 
Malay Zaini bin Mohammad Noor, H. Malik bin H. Soe'oed, Raden 
Representatives (6) Abdul Moetalib Rifai, Mohammad Saleh, Ade Mohammad 
Djohan, Mohammad Djapri 
Chinese Soeng Khin Njoek, Jo Tjhai Siang, Then Hon Tjhiap, Lim Liat 
Representatives (8) Njan, Tjhoen Jan Pau, Tio Khian Soen, Ng Tjhiauw Hen, Fo 
Nauw Hie 
Dutch A.H. Bohm, M.A. Duisterhof, H.J. Harmsen, J. van Zijll 
Representatives (4) de jong. 
Swapraja 15 Swapraja heads (3 head of neo-Swapraja, and 12 sultans 
Representatives including Sultan Hamid) 
Source: Bohm (1986:62); Schiller (1955:123). 
The government devised policies which differentiated between the Dayak, non-
Dayak, and Chinese communities (DIKB 1948), which in return guaranteed increased 
146The Dayaks did not have representatives in Pontianak, Tayan, Kubu, Simpang, Sukadana, and Pinohland 
(Bohm 1986:130). 
147By 1960 Oeray became the governor of West Kalimantan (more on Oeray see footnote 156), Djaoeng 
became the district head of Sintang, Linggie became the wedana ofNanga Pinoh. 
148The Dutch government, for example, gave 100,000 florins to the organisation (van der Wal 1973b:89). 
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representation for Dayaks.149 In education, this differentiation would facilitate the adoption 
of appropriate measures intended to remedy Dayak problems. Policies on the establishment 
of government schools, for example, would become more equitable between the Dayak and 
Malay villages. In politics, this differentiation ensured that Dayaks, despite being 
inexperienced and less qualified, would always have a share in the government and other 
political representation. As a result, the Dayaks always had representatives in all post-war 
governments and their executive boards. Their inclusion was in line with Batavia's 
determination to include minorities in the post-war government (cf. van Hulten 1992:79), 
probably a strategy to boost support for the government. 
Other policies of the NICA were designed to ensure that the Dayaks would receive 
fair and equal treatment. Practices that would lower the status of the Dayaks were to be 
discontinued. It also wanted the Malay adat or customary privileges, which perpetuated the 
inequality of the Dayaks, to be abolished. It would appoint Dayak administrators and 
officials if there were suitable candidates. It also would strengthen the Dayak adat network 
although this was to be done without harming the position of the sultans (van der Wal 
1973a:397). 
These policies were continued by the subsequent government, the West Kalimantan 
Special Region Government (DIKB), which was established on 12 May 1947. The head of 
DIKB was Sultan Hamid II, an active Dutch military official and a son of the slain 
Pontianak sultan. He was assisted by a five-member executive board: two Dayak 
representatives, one Malay, one Chinese, and one Dutch representative. The Dayaks had 
eight representatives out of a total of forty members of the DIKB. The other members were 
divided among the non-Dayak natives (i.e. Malays), Chinese, Arabs and the Dutch, and 
fifteen from the swapraja (see Table 4-2). It is quite obvious that policies of the post-war 
governments had promoted the Dayaks' political role. 
The next section describes the important role of some individuals in opening 
opportunities for Dayaks. 
149In Indonesian historical text books, this type of social differentiation is usually seen as colonial powers' 
policy of "divide and rule". 
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Table 4-2 Members of Daerah Istimewa Kalimantan Barat (1948) 
Affiliation I Name of Representative 
Status 
Chairman Sultan Hamid II 
Dayak J.C. Oevaang Oeray*, A.F. Koraak*, I. Kaping, F.C. 
Representatives Palaunsoeka, J.A.M. Linggie, P.J. Denggol, M.Th. Djaman, 
(8) P.F. Bantang 
Malay Mohamad Saleh*, Haji Sudhi, Uray Ibrahim, N. Winokan, 
Representatives Mansyur Rivai, Mohamad Bakri, M. Taib, Masyhadan 
(8) 
Chinese Lim Bak Meng*, Lim Liat Njan, Bong Chun Fat, Sim The 
Representatives Hui, Cung Lim Sen, Tio Kiang Sun, Ng Tjhiauw Hen 
(7) 
Arab/Dutch Niewenhuysen*, F. Brandenberg, Van der Groden, Gulam 
Representatives Abbas bin Abdul Huseiein 
(4) 
Swapraja 15 Swapraja Heads (3 head of neo-swapraja, and 12 sultans 
Representatives including Sultan Hamid) 
(15) 
Source: Pemda Kalimantan Barat (1991:170). 
Note: •These individuals also became members of the executive council ofDIKB. 
4.1.2 The Role of Individuals 
The government' s supportive policies could not have materialised without the 
commitment of several individuals who held key positions in West Kalimantan at that time. 
Van Hutten explained that Dr A.H. Bohm had played a crucial role in the political ascent of 
Dayaks during the time of NICA and DIKB. Before WWII, Bohm was a controleur in 
Semitau and had been working among the Dayaks in the province since the mid- l 930s. He 
was one of only a few high ranking officials in the province who survived Japanese 
imprisonment in Sarawak (then British Borneo), and among a few high ranking Dutch 
officials who returned to the province right after the war. 150 As cabinet secretary of DIKB 
and advisor to Sultan Hamid II, his influence during the DIKB period was equally 
important (see van Hulten 1992:85-9). 151 It was also believed that he had proposed the 
Dayaks become members of the West Kalimantan Raad because of his previous role and 
150He accompanied the commander ofNICA in West Kalimantan on his arrival in Pontianak on 16 October 
1945. The two Dutch military officers who had arrived two days before Bohm were Binkhuizen and 
Schuilwerve (Bohm 1945; Australian War Memorial 1946). 
151The Dutch officials "attached" to the executive body of each of the federal states (1945-1950) had a vital 
role in running the states. Van Klinken (2006:33), for example, finds that the Greater Dayak Council of 
Central Kalimantan always acted under the supervision of J. Dijk, the Dutch controleur of Sam pit. 
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knowledge of the region, and the absence of officials with similar credentials (interview 
Djg). 
Sultan Hamid II was another important figure who facilitated the entry of Dayaks 
into politics.152 He was anointed as the new sultan of Pontianak by the NICA on 23 October 
1945 after unseating his pro-republican nephew, Syarif Thaha Alkadri (Yanis 1998:35; 
Rahman, Achmad et al. 2000:162-4). 153 His political outlook was pro-Dutch (Agung 
1983 :326), 154 which could be traced back to his military career with the Dutch colonial 
army. 155 During his leadership in DIKB, he supported the Dayaks entering special federal 
military and police units. He instructed they be accepted into the units, although the 
majority of them were illiterate (interview Bin). As a result, around 40% to 60% of the 
federal military and police units were Dayak (interviews Kls, Bin, and Syk, cf. Bohm 
1986:99; Yanis 1998:273). 
Sultan Hamid's support for Dayaks had a catch. He understood that his pro-Dutch 
DIKB government received limited popular support from the Malays, as many of their 
activists had been influenced by the pro-Jakarta nationalist movement (see §4.2.1). The PD 
and the Dayaks, on the contrary, were very supportive of his government. Therefore, the 
152Sultan Hamid II was born in 1913, and died in March 1978. He was raised by a British nanny and later 
married a Dutch lady. He was the only surviving son of the sultan of Pontianak after the massacre by the 
Japanese in 1944. During the time of the massacre, Sultan Hamid was imprisoned by the Japanese in Jakarta 
as he was a military officer of the Dutch government. The Japanese occupation force did not know of his ties 
with the Pontianak sultanate. 
153Syarif Taha Alkadri was installed as sultan on 29 August 1945 at the age of 18 (Rahman, Achmad et al. 
2000: 162-4). Sultan Hamid was referred to as the "true" sultan by the Allied Forces. He returned to West 
Kalimantan together with the chief of the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service, Colonel Spoor, on 22 
October 1945 (Australian War Memorial 1945; Australian War Memorial 1946). Republican refers to those 
who supported the government of the Republic ofindonesia, headed by Soekamo. 
154He led DIKB which was known as a staunch pro-Dutch state. After the Dutch launched its first military 
assault to the nationalist government in July 1947, he proclaimed that the army of West Kalimantan would 
annihilate the nationalist government if the Dutch failed to do so (Kementerian Penerangan 1953:43). DIKB, 
together with some states in Sumatra and East Sumatra, supported the second Dutch military action against 
the Republic (Agung 1983:197-8, also 224, 252). 
155 At the age of 22 he was already a military officer with the rank of first lieutenant, and at the age of 26 was 
second lieutenant. By 1940 he was the only one of eight natives from a total of274 first lieutenants in the 
Netherlands Indies Army (Bachtiar 1988:3). In 1946 at the age of 40, he became a major general, the highest 
military rank ever attained by a native Indonesian under the Dutch. He was given the prestigious title of 
Adjutant of the Queen of the Netherlands (Rahman, Achmad et al. 2000: 174-5). This appointment was a 
strategy by the Dutch to increase the chances of Sultan Hamid occupying the position of defence minister in a 
future government. Within the Indonesian army, he was second only to General Soedirman. The Republic of 
Indonesia was preparing Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX for the position (Nasution 1983:179). 
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sultan's support for the Dayaks could be perceived as a strategy to keep afloat his own 
government. 
In addition to the two individuals mentioned above, there are other Dayak political 
leaders, such as Oevaang Oeray, F.C. Palaunsoeka, Agustinus Djelani, and others, whose 
role was equally important in the Dayak emancipation as is illustrated in the description of 
two Dayak institutions below. 
4.1.3 Dayak Organisations 
4.1.3.1 The Dayak Affairs Office: The Pioneer 
The role of the Dayak Affairs Office (DAO) in the Dayak rise in politics was 
indispensable. DAO was established in January 1946 by the NICA. Appointed as its first 
chairman was Oevaang Oeray who was then a student at MOSVIA Makassar (Davidson 
2002:96; Balunus:2). 156 After Oeray was appointed as an executive member of DIKB in 
194 7, the leadership of the office was transferred to Agustinus Djelani (interview Syk).157 
The following will explain the DAO role in pushing political equality and education 
opportunities for the Dayaks to show the significant role of the DAO for Dayak 
emancipation after WWII. 
One of the first political issues addressed by the Office was the objection of Dayaks 
in Sanggau, Sekadau and Tayan to accepting the authority of the sultanates, which had just 
been revived by NICA. The DAO document explained that these Dayaks refused to be 
placed under the same sultanates that had oppressed them in the past. To solve the problem, 
DAO initiated a meeting on 10 November 1946 which was attended by Oeray, Dutch 
officials (including the assistant resident), the sultans of Sanggau, Sekadau and Tayan, 
156Johannes Chrysostomus Oevaang Oeray, a Kayan Dayak, was born on 18 August 1922 in Mendalam, 
Kapuas Hulu. He attended a seminary school before WWII. He worked at the district office in Kapuas Hulu 
during the Japanese occupation. After the war, he was sent to Makassar to attend training for civil servants, 
but was brought back to Pontianak before finishing training. Sultan Hamid wanted him to head the Dayak 
Affairs Office in 1946. He was a chairman of PD for a short period from 1947 (probably until 1948 or 1949), 
executive member of West Kalimantan Council and DIKB, and member of the national Konstituante, a 
council established to draw up the new constitution. He was a wedana of Putussibau, then head of Sintang 
district, and from 1959-1966 governor of West Kalimantan. He represented Golkar in the national DPR as a 
result of his support for the party in the 1977 general election. He died of a heart attack on 17 July 1986 in 
Pontianak. 
157 Agustinus Djelani, a Taman-Kapuas Dayak, was born on 19 September 1919 in Melapi, Kapuas Hulu. He 
completed his secondary education at a seminary in Flores in 1946. From 1947 to 1954 he was the general 
chairman of PD. From the end of 1940s to mid-1950s, he was a Member of Parliament, Konstituante, and 
DPR in Jakarta. From 1958-1966 he was head of Pontianak district. He died on 29 January 1977. 
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Malay chiefs from those regions, and Dayak representatives. The Dutch officials urged the 
Dayaks to seek compromise rather than break away. These officials certainly did not want 
to see an administration that they had just created crumble because of internal friction 
between its main supporters, the sultanates and the Dayaks. The Dayak representatives, 
who were initially adamant about breaking away, finally agreed to Oeray's proposal that 
they stay in the system provided the sultanates met Dayak conditions. Their conditions 
were that the Malay sultanates should provide services to all citizens without discrimination, 
give certain priorities to Dayaks in employment and education, treat each religion equally, 
and accommodate Dayaks in the local legislature. The sultanates were required to employ a 
local Dayak Affairs Officer, who would ensure that those agreements were respected. The 
sultans agreed to all these conditions (see the background and discussion in DAO 1946a). 
Ten days after the meeting, Oeray wrote a letter to the assistant resident in 
Pontianak asking him to immediately appoint personnel for the local DAO offices, as 
suggested in the agreement. In the letter he nominated A.F. Koraak for the Boven Kapuas 
and Semitau regions, and P.J. Denggol for the Sanggau, Sekadau and Tayan regions, and 
suggested that the assistant resident propose candidates for other regions.158 His condition 
for the appointment was that each candidate should be "a genuine Dayak, who is still a 
100% pure Dayak, not yet faded". 159 This condition was quite obvious to prevent more 
qualified Senganans or Muslim Dayaks from occupying the positions, as he did not believe 
that the Senganan could strive for the Dayaks' best interests. Furthermore, he required that 
these officers be stationed at government offices, not at the sultanate offices (DAO 1946c). 
These officers were not to be located in sultanate offices, because otherwise they would be 
working under sultanate pressure or influence. This objection showed he doubted the 
sincerity of the Malay sultanates in promoting Dayak interests. The Dayak distrust of the 
sultanates was still evident in the DAO report in 1948 (handwritten explanation in DAO 
1948:6). The attitude of these Dayaks confirmed their bitter past relations with the sultans, 
Senganan, and also the Malays. 
158Both Koraak and Denggol would soon be appointed as executive members of the NICA and later DIKB 
~overnment. 
59The original read: "bangsa Dayak sedjati, jang masih 100% Dayak toelen, beloem loentoer" . 
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On the Dayak education front, most likely as a result of a DAO proposal, the 
government for the first time sponsored Dayak students to study at Pontianak' s MULO, an 
equivalent to junior high school. Most of the students were from Kapuas Hulu, a former 
directly ruled area. 160 DAO also sent a letter to the Director of Education in Batavia on 13 
November 1946 to report the lack of Dayak educational opportunities , the causes and 
possible solutions (DAO 1946a). According to the DAO the main reason for the low level 
of education among the Dayaks was their lack of access to education. In rural settings, 
government village schools were usually established in Malay villages, although in some 
cases the majority of students in the schools were Dayaks from other villages. The Dayaks 
had only one five-year primary school (vervolegschol) in Nyarumkop. There was also a 
teacher-training college (CVO) for Dayaks, also located in Nyarumkop, that could accept 
only thirty students annually. The other CVOs, in Sintang and Pontianak, only had a very 
few Dayak students: three in Sintang, and only one in Pontianak. Another contributing 
factor to the lack of access to education was the stereotype prevalent among government 
officials that the Dayaks were lazy and did not want to attend school. DAO made several 
recommendations to remedy the Dayak education problem: that the government establish 
schools in Dayak villages; that for schools not located in Dayak villages, the government 
provide separate accommodation for the Dayak students since they had different customs; 
that schools with a majority of Dayak students be given Dayak teachers; that to alleviate 
Dayak teacher shortages Dayak teachers without formal qualifications be permitted to teach; 
that financial support be provided to needy Dayaks to attend secondary school, such as the 
MULO in Pontianak; and that a Dayak school inspector be appointed to oversee the process. 
The efforts of DAO and PD in promoting education for the Dayaks resulted in a significant 
increase of Dayak students (Table 4-3 and Table 3-3). 
In the first few months of its establishment, with the support from the government, 
DAO had made some breakthroughs to the benefit of the Dayaks. There was not much 
160The fi rst two students were Massoeka Djanting (who later changed his name to H.M. Baroamas Tjabang 
Balunus), and Antonius Buan. The next group of students were Keladan, Iman Kalis, A.R. Sampe, Syahdan 
Sahuddin, Sabinus, I. Andi, I Kepu, Daniel Suryamassoeka, and Noeh Yahya (interview Syk). Except for 
Sahuddin from Landak, all the above students were from Kapuas Hulu or Semitau. Several individual started 
to hold important positions during the Oeray era, and a few rose to the senior positions in the provincial 
administration during the New Order period. 
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documentation available on DAO's later activities before it was dissolved in 1950. One 
report in 1948 by the head of DAO, Agustinus Djelani, showed that it had conducted 
regular visits to the region and remained as a respected government organ to deal with 
Dayak affairs. He reported that during his tour to the interior regions he was always 
accompanied by local officials, had audiences with the Dutch officials, and obtained 
immediate responses from them on many occasions. The assistant resident of Sanggau, for 
example, ordered rice to be sent swiftly to the Tayan area after learning from Djelani that 
there was a rice shortage in that area. The assistant resident also immediately removed the 
current Dayak representative in Tayan when he learnt that he was under the influence of the 
sultan and was not working in the best interests of local Dayaks. The sultan of Sekadau was 
made to dispatch rice to areas in need, give financial contributions to schools, and make 
some changes in personnel within the sultanate administration (DAO 1948). 
Table 4-3 Percentage of Dayaks Students (by June 1949) 
Percentage of Students Total Number 
Regions Dayaks Non-Dayaks Chinese Students 
Pontianak 2.9 33.9 63.2 11.644 
Kubu - 53.0 47.0 738 
Landak 56.8 22.0 21.3 2,447 
Mempawah 26.0 26.9 47.1 7,374 
Singkawang 10.9 16.l 73.0 8,363 
Pemangkat 0.7 31.2 68.2 6,008 
Sambas 4.6 58.4 37.0 3,658 
Bengkayang 24.7 6.8 68.5 1,845 
San1nmu 52.9 31.5 15.6 2,601 
Sekadau 23.8 39.3 36.9 1,825 
Tayan/Meliau 28.3 40.3 31.4 954 
Sintang 9.6 56.7 33.7 1,308 
Melawi 23.5 44.2 32.3 1,687 
Semi tau 37.0 58.2 4.8 1, 119 
Putussibau 56.6 34.0 9.4 1,421 
Matan Hilir 0.9 81.6 17.5 2,429 
Matan Hulu 61.8 38.2 - 1,161 
Sukadana 7.4 58.8 33.8 794 
Total 16.6 36.7 46.8 59 376 
Source: Suar 1949/45:2-4. 
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4.1.3.2 Persatuan Dayak (PD): Organised Ethnic Politics 
The embryo of Persatuan Dayak (Dayak Unity Party) was believed to have stemmed 
from a religious retreat of Catholic teachers in Sanggau in 1941. At the end of the retreat 
the leaders of the event, including A.F. Koraak, J.R. Giling, and M.Th. Djaman, issued a 
statement calling for the formation of a political organisation that could strive for Dayak 
interests. One source claimed that the commitment was inspired by a letter written by 
Oevaang Oeray, then a student at the seminary in Nyarumkop. The political statement 
coming out of a religious meeting, which was supposed to be non-political, startled the 
Church authorities and resulted in the expulsion of Oeray from the seminary (Kadir 
1993 :303-4; Kadir 1995 :4-5; Davidson 2002:93). 
The first known formal Dayak organisation in West Kalimantan, Dayak in Action 
(DIA), was founded on 30 October 1945 in Putussibau by a Dayak teacher, F.C. 
Palaunsoeka.161 The Catholic Church's role was significant in DIA's beginnings and in its 
rapid growth later. Before its establishment, Palaunsoeka was reported to have consulted 
with and received moral support from a Javanese priest, A. Adikardjana, the only working 
Catholic priest in West Kalimantan. 162 After 1946, some Catholic priests continued to 
secretly give advice and participate in discussions with PD leaders (Kadir 1995 :7).163 The 
majority of the committee members and the branch chairmen were teachers at local 
Catholic village schools. One Catholic priest also corroborated the account of the influence 
161Reference to DIA was scarce and brief (Parlaungan 1956:356-7; Gubemur Kalbar 1962; Balunus 1990; 
Kadir 1993; Davidson 2002). The only link DIA had with PD was that both were founded by Palaunsoeka. 
DIA was Dayak in Action and not Daya in Action. The term Daya was introduced only after mid-1947 by the 
PD leaders (see footnote 167). There was also a possibility that the DIA was Dayak in Actie (see Gubemur 
Kalbar 1962). Actie is a Dutch word for "action". F.C. Palaunsoeka was born on 19 May 1922 in Melapi 
village, Kapuas Hulu. He was a teacher between 1942 and 1946, and a civil servant in several departments in 
West Kalimantan from 1947 to 1949. He was once an editor for Su/uh Kalimantan and Keadilan newspapers 
(the latter was the PD official newspaper). He established DIA in 1945 and PD in 1946. He spent most of his 
political career in Jakarta as a member of the national legislature and national assembly from the end of 1940s 
until the mid-1980s. He joined Partai Katolik after PD was dissolved, and became an official of the national 
PDI when Partai Katolik was merged into PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party). In 1988 PDI dismissed him 
together with seven other senior members (tokoh tua) as a result of an internal party struggle. Some of the 
information here is culled from Parlaungan ( 1956 :3 56-7); Roeder ( 1971 :278), and Sukamto, Wuryandari, 
Sihbudi (1991 :57-61). 
162 Father Adikardjana was visiting Putussibau when Palaunsoeka consulted him on forming the DIA. 
Adikardjana was the only working priest in West Kalimantan, since all European and Chinese clergy were 
detained by the Japanese and had not yet returned to West Kalimantan. Bohm wrote that the Apostolic Vicar 
van Valenberg returned to Pontianak only in October 1945 (Bohm 1986:35). The majority of missionaries 
returned to Pontianak in early December 1945. The group under van Hulten arrived in Sanggau in February 
1946 and Sintang in March 1946 (van Hutten 1992:50-1). 
163Secretly, because officially Catholic Church did not want to be involved in politics. 
92 
of the Catholic Church on the PD (van Hulten 1992: 118-22). The fact that carbon copies of 
much official PD correspondence during the formative years were sent to the Catholic 
Church confirmed the role of the Church in the Dayak political ascent. 
On 1 October 1946, almost a year after its inception, DIA became Persatuan Dayak 
(PD) (Parlaungan 1956:356-7; Kadir 1993:306; Balunus). The organisation leaders then 
were Marinus Andjioe as chairman, Palaunsoeka as junior chairman (ketua muda), Telajan 
and Pelang as secretaries, A.F. Koraak and Agustinus Djelani as advisers, Martinus M. Tani 
as treasurer (PD 1946). 
After changing its name, the organisation leaders took the important step of moving 
the headquarters from remote Putussibau to the capital of the province, Pontianak, in 
December 1946. In Pontianak, PD could participate in rapid political developments 
occurring in the provincial capital (Kadir 1993:306). PD would not be able to respond 
quickly if its headquarters were still in Putussibau because of the transportation and 
communication difficulties. To illustrate this point, the first letter sent by PD from 
Putussibau took three weeks to reach Pontianak (handwritten note in PD 1946). In addition, 
connections to the rest of West Kalimantan were better made from Pontianak than from 
Putussibau. PD would also have higher prestige with headquarters in Pontianak rather than 
in obscure Putussibau. Before moving to Pontianak, PD was a relatively unknown political 
body. 164 Initially, PD (or in this case DIA) only had branches in Kapuas Hutu region 
(interview Bin). 
PD had previously missed taking part in some major government political initiatives. 
No founders of DINPD were appointed to head or staff DAO and none were invited to 
become members of West Kalimantan Council. Earlier political discussions among Dayaks 
in the province also failed to mention the existence of DIA or PD. For example, a political 
letter by Linggie in August 1946 did not mention DIA (Linggie 1946). Similarly, a 
reflective article by Oeray earlier in May 1946 did not indicate the existence of DIA (Oeray 
1946). Some of DA O's earliest documents also did not indicate the existence of DIA or PD 
164Its establishment document in 1946 implied political function of PD, as it did not allow its members to join 
other political party without the approval from its chairman (PD 1946, Bohm 1946a). 
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(DAO 1946a). It was not until November 1946, that PD started to appear in DAO official 
communications (DAO 1946b). 
After the decision to move its headquarters to Pontianak, a meeting was held in 
Pontianak on 1 January 1947 between Agustinus Djelani as representative of PD 
Putussibau, Oevaang Oeray, and a few Dayaks who worked in the capital. 165 The meeting 
chose Oevaang Oeray to head a new province-wide PD - not a surprising decision since as 
the head of DAO, he was naturally the most important and influential Dayak figure in the 
whole province. The leadership structure of PD at this time was simple because of the lack 
of manpower in the capital: Oevaang Oeray was the general chairman and Treasurer, M. 
Nyaboe was junior chairman, and L. Okeng and A. Butar were secretaries (PD 1947b). 
Some time after Oeray was elected as a member of West Kalimantan Council, the 
chairmanship was transferred to Agustinus Djelani. When Djelani was elected as head of 
Pontianak district in 1958, he relinquished the chairmanship to Palaunsoeka. Palaunsoeka 
continued to hold the chairmanship until the party's final days in the early 1960s. The 
leadership changes were smooth and the elite was relatively solid, at least until the end of 
1950s (various interviews, Djelani 1976; Kadir 1993 :306-7). 
The results of PD consolidation were timely. When DIKB was established on 12 
May 1947 to replace the West Kalimantan Council, PD was involved in the process 
because all eight Dayak representatives in the DIKB were members or leaders of PD. They 
were J.C. Oevaang Oeray, A.F. Koraak, J.A.M. Linggie, M.Th. Djaman, F.C. Palaunsoeka, 
CJ . Impan, P.F. Bantang, and P.J. Denggol (Nasution 1977:269-70). Oeray and Koraak 
were also part of the DIKB five-member executive board. 
PD' s role in the betterment of Dayaks' condition was enormous. It had four 
objectives: to raise the Dayaks' self-esteem after being repressed by both Dutch colonial 
rule and the Malay sultanates; to create equal rights by eliminating discrimination and 
nepotism in civil service recruitment; to eliminate the special duties or taxes imposed only 
on the Dayaks (practices derived from tradition and the edicts of the sultanates); and to 
achieve political freedom (PD 1954:5). By the end of the DIKB, the PD had achieved its 
165The resident's office acknowledged this as the founding date of PD (West Borneo Raad 1947:21). This 
clears some confusion about chronology as described in Davidson (2002:95). 
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main objectives generally speaking. PD had made itself known to the Dayaks and had 
gained a quite high level of trust. Dayaks kept the PD headquarters in Pontianak informed 
of any issues they had with the government by frequent communication demonstrating their 
trust of the party. 166 The government recognised PD represented Dayaks politically as 
indicated in the statement on the establishment of DIKB in 1947. For cases related to the 
Dayaks, the government consulted the DAO, which undoubtedly coordinated closely with 
PD. The government for example followed the PD decision to switch the spelling from 
"Dayak" to "Daya" in 1947. 167 The post-war government discontinued discriminatory 
policies affecting the Dayaks. Dayaks started to have access to government offices and 
joined the police force and the military. Schools for the Dayaks had multiplied, the majority 
of which were established or partly financed by the PD. By 1948, PD had already 
established about forty PD schools (Davidson 2002:97).168 
All post-war opportunities for the Dayaks described above contributed significantly 
to the rise of Dayak politics as presented below. 
4.2 The Rise of Dayak Politics 
4.2.1 The Dissolution of DIKB and the Transition Period 
Post-war Dayak emancipation was partly due to the "inclusive" policies of the pro-
Dutch government. As a consequence, the PD and most Dayak leaders - unlike many 
Malay politicians outside the government- were sympathetic to the Dutch. In 1946, J.A.M. 
Linggie, later a PD official, stated in his communication with Dayaks that they would be 
better off under Dutch leadership than Indonesian. Linggie argued that the Indonesian 
1661 found such correspondences from Sambas, Landak, Sanggau, and Putussibau Dayaks. 
167The negative connotation of the "Dayak" almost certainly provided the main drive for the name change. 
The new term "Daya" means power and resourcefulness in the Indonesian language. The term "Dayak" or 
"Dajak" in the Dutch spelling, was used at least until mid-May 1947 because Keadilan, the PD newspaper, 
still used "Dayak" in its publication on 16 May 1947. Davidson observed that Oeray in his private 
correspondence in November 1947 had already used Daya (see Davidson 2002:95,425). However, the switch 
to "Daya" was not a personal preference, as implied in Davidson (2002:95), it was a party decision. Two 
written sources noted that the switch to "Daya" was adopted at a PD party meeting in 1947 (Kadir 1993:6,307; 
Muslim and L(ayang) 1994:40). This thesis will use the spelling Dayak. Another similar experience in another 
part of Kalimantan (i.e. Sabah) is the name change of"Dusun" to more prestigious "Kadazan" by their native 
leaders in the 1950s and 1960s (Loh 1992:225-6). 
168Although the source was undated, the document was most likely written before 1948 because it still used 
Van Ophuysen spelling. The spelling was in use until 1947, when it was replaced by Suwandi spelling. One 
characteristic of Van Ophuysen spelling was the use of "oe" instead of "u", therefore "baroe" instead of 
"baru". For the history of the Indonesian language spelling refer to Badudu (1984). 
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domination (most possibly he referred to the Malays) would end emancipation 
opportunities for the Dayaks (Linggie 1946).169 A similar supportive tone was also found in 
P.J. Denggol, a catechist who later became a member of the PD elite. He claimed that most 
Dayaks longed for Dutch rule, as it always protected the Dayaks from Chinese usury and 
also Malay despotism (van Loon 1999:47-8). While this claim was not entirely true as the 
Dutch government failed to free the Dayaks from oppression, it showed nevertheless that 
the Dayaks preferred the return of Dutch rule than to subject themselves under Malay 
sultanates. It was no surprise that PD applauded the formation of DIKB and claimed that its 
establishment signified a departure from an inferiority complex among the Dayaks and the 
coming of self-government (PD 1947a). However, Dayaks were also critical of the Dutch. 
On several occasions, while condemning feudal practices, the Dayaks also criticised the 
Dutch government for allowing such practices to continue. The main villains, however, 
were the Malay sultanates, not the Dutch government (Keadilan 26-5-1950, Davidson 
2002:99-100). 
Dayak support for the pro-Dutch or pro-federal DIKB started to wither early in 
1950. Until March, PD was still reluctant to support the unitary state, and contended that 
the "state form" was not crucial issues of he nation. Only on 12 April 1950 did PD 
officially declare its support for the unitary state, with some conditions. Should the merger 
take place, it demanded West Kalimantan be given a high level of autonomy and remain a 
separate province (Keadilan 5-5-1950). At the beginning of May 1950 PD was still 
criticising the growing pressure to "force" DIKB into a merger with the Republic of 
Indonesia. It preferred a peaceful and natural incorporation process (Keadilan 5-5-1950). 
The main reason for the changing attitude was increasing hostility toward the federalist 
view at the national level. By 4 April 1950, only four negara bagian (member states of RIS) 
continued to exist within the federal state - DIKB, Republic of Indonesia, State of East 
Indonesia, and State of East Sumatra. The other twelve states had merged into the Republic 
169The original read "Kita hanja maoe dipimpin oleh Belanda sebab kalau kita djatoeh ketangan sesama kita 
Indonesia jang lain, nistjaja djalan kemadjoean bangsa kita tertoetoep kembali dan masoek poela kedalam 
perangkap pendjadjahan yang lebih erat dan terik menggenggam dan memeras kita" (Linggie 1946). 
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of Indonesia (Feith 1962:65).170 According to Feith, constant pressure from Jakarta, the 
generally anti-Dutch local population, and weak states or states with no "real" social or 
political identity, were factors contributing to the merger (Feith 1962:71-6). 171 
Outside DIKB, local politician' s demand that DIKB be dissolved and West 
Kalimantan merged into the Republic of Indonesia grew stronger after 1949. One of the 
strong pro-unitary state lobby groups in the province, the West Kalimantan National 
Committee (KNKB), which was formed on 20 December 1949, demanded the disbanding 
of DIKB and rejected all DIKB resolutions (KNKB 1949; KNKB 1950a; KNKB 1950c; 
KNKB 1950b).172 KNKB gained more bargaining power, after the central government in 
Jakarta treated its representatives as fonnal officials of West Kalimantan when they visited 
the capital (DIKB 1950b). The fate of DIKB was sealed when its strongman, Sultan Hamid 
II, was arrested in April 1950 in connection with his involvement in an attempt to 
overthrow the central government in January 1950 (for details of plot read Persadja 1955). 
On 7 May 1950, the DIKB executive council decided to dissolve itself (DIKB 1950a; 
DIKB 1950c).173 
The demise of DIKB brought with it ethnic and social tension, particularly between 
the Dayaks and Malays (Bohm 1986: 106-9). In April 1950, when the downfall of DIKB 
was only a matter of time, the pro-unitary state newspapers, such as Terompet and Suasana, 
170The federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RJS) was fonned after a conference in Linggarjati 
on 12 November 1946. The member states grew as the Dutch colonial government continued to create "new 
states" in order to maintain its influence, which was considerably weakened by the Republik Indonesia led by 
Soekarno-Hatta. By 1949 there were 21 political entities in former Dutch East Indies, one of which was the 
Republik Indonesia (also Feith 1962:59; Cribb 2000:160). These states could not endure when the Dutch 
"protector" departed after the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the federal Republic of the 
United States oflndonesia (RIS) on 27 December 1949. 
l 71Feith gave examples of the Central and East Java States whose boundaries did not correspond to ethnic 
realities but "simply to the limits to which the Dutch had been able lo extend their military occupation" (Feith 
1962:72). 
172KNKB was a council formed by various religious, social and political organisations, the ultimate aim of 
which was to integrate DTKB into Republik Indonesia. Its main supporters were nationalist Malays, Javanese 
and others. The PD official opposition to the integration made it impossible for its members to support KNKB. 
Some key figures of the West Kalimantan Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) also supported the federal state. 
The leaders ofKNKB were Tan Husni Abdullah and S.H. Marpaung. Other figures ofKNKB were M. Nazir 
Effendi, Munzirin A.S., Burhan Ibrahim, and A.S. Djampi (Departement Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 
1980: 124, 126-7). Some of these individuals continued to play important political roles in provincial politics 
from the 1950s onward. Tan Husni Abdullah, for example, was one of the leaders of a political party (IPKl) 
until its merging into PDI in 1973. 
m After the dissolution of the executive council, the central government placed a resident to administer the 
region. There were four residents before Oevaang Oeray was elected as governor at the end of 1950s: R. 
Budiardjo, Soedjono, R.M. Soeparto, K.Ng. Bambang Suparto (Pemda Kalimantan Barat 1980:6). 
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demanded that officials and supporters of federal DIKB - Dayak officials were the obvious 
supporters - be excluded from the new government and be punished for their collaboration. 
There were widespread rumours that Dayak leaders and DIKB officials would be detained 
after the formation of the new government. In a critique published in the newspaper, 
Keadilan (5-5-1950), Dayaks argued that the "revenge policy" of the new government 
towards former officials would only bring difficulties for the new government. A Dayak 
wrote in the government bulletin, Suar (5-5-1950), that Dayaks would not stand by if the 
retribution occurred. To reduce the rising tension and the potential for conflict, Oeray wrote 
to the newspaper to deny rumours that he and other Dayak officials had been kidnapped 
and killed (Keadilan 26-5-1950). 
After the dissolution, the entire DIKB structure was dismantled, including its Dayak 
Affairs Office. The DIKB Dayak "affirmative policy" was discontinued, because it was 
seen by the new government as reminiscent of the colonial policy of "divide and rule". A 
plan already underway to conduct a political election was also scrapped. 
PD's political role in government was disrupted from the time of the dissolution of 
DIKB until the election in 1955. Due to its past, PD was understandably low profile during 
the early 1950s as the high tide of nationalism swept across the country. The Dayaks and 
their leaders continued to be associated with regional PD, unlike former collaborators in 
other parts of the country where according to Feith (1962:74) joined the republican 
political parties in their region to clear their names. Fortunately, there was no detention or 
imprisonment of the former DIKB officials as rumoured. There were no indication of mass 
retrenchment of former employees of the negara bagian as it was not government policy.174 
The policy of the Republic of Indonesia on 13 March 1950 stated that all civil servants of 
former negara bagian who chose to merge into the republic would normally be absorbed to 
174 In the case of West Kalimantan mass retrenchment was also not possible since most of provincial 
government officials were categorised as those who cooperated with the Dutch (Kementerian Penerangan 
1953:78). Moreover, 75% the members of national parliament were former representatives of senate and 
federal parliament (Kementrian Penerangan 1954:629), some of whom were collaborators themselves, and 
would prevent the implementation of such "revenge" policies. 
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serve the new government. 175 However, the same policy gave priority for reemployment for 
those who did not cooperate with the pro-Dutch government, although would be managed 
carefully to avoid tension in the civil service (Kementerian Penerangan 1953:67-8; see also 
Feith 1962:82-3). 
As a result, it could be safe to assume that all Dayak civil servants, whose numbers 
were still very small, remained in the bureaucracy. However, there were a few set backs as 
a consequence of their previous pro-Dutch outlook, particularly for those who held 
prominent position in the executive board of the DIKB. When the executive board of the 
DIKB announced its dissolution on 7 May 1950 (Suar 20-05-1950), its members returned 
to their home region office, and be satisfied with much lower positions. A.F. Koraak and 
Oeray, returned to Kapuas Hulu. One source mentioned that Oeray was out without any 
position for almost a year before being reinstated as sub-district head of Putussibau, and 
then as acting wedana176 of Kapuas Hulu. A.F. Koraak became a sub-district Head and later 
wedana of Kapuas Hulu. P.J. Denggol became assistant wedana of Meliau (interview Bin). 
J.A.M. Linggie returned shortly as a regular civil servant in Sanggau, before assuming the 
position of Demang of Semitau (interview Ari). Only A. Djelani (at the time general 
chairman of PD) and F.C. Palaunsoeka continued to serve as members of the national 
House of Representatives in Jakarta, which they had held since the end of 1940s 
(Kementrian Penerangan 1954:626-30; Parlaungan 1956:356-7; Roeder 1971:278-9; 
Djelani 1976).177 Many officials in other former "puppet" governments in other regions 
also experienced the same treatment. Only a few former leaders of the member states 
175The Dutch officials in the negara bagian however were treated differently. The regulation mentioned that if 
they were no longer required by the negara bagian then they would be returned to RIS (Kementerian 
Penerangan 1953:67-8). In West Kalimantan the transfer of Dutch officials to Indonesian had occurred since 
April 1950, when the Dutch Official Heads of Pontianak, Singkawang, Ketapang, Mempawah and Sambas 
were replaced (Suar 05-05-1950). 
176Wedana was the head of the kewedanaan, an area one administrative level below district (kabupaten) but 
higher than sub-district (kecamatan). Demang or assistant demang was a regional link between European and 
traditional governments (see Cribb and Kahin 2004: 189-90). The kewedanaan system was gradually 
abolished from 1963 (Surianingrat 1980:30). 
177The members of house of representative after the dissolution of RIS consisted of members from the 
Republic lndonesia and members from negara bagian (Feith 1962:128; Cribb and Kahin 2004:490). Prior to 
dissolution of RIS, Djelani was a member of the Senate, while Palaunsoeka was a member of House of 
Representatives. At the national House of Representatives both were under the Catholic Party (Kementrian 
Penerangan 1954:626-30). 
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reassumed an important political role after the dissolution of RIS (Keadilan 5-5-1950, Feith 
1962:74).178 
PD as a political party was not disbanded by the new government and later partook 
in the elections of 1955 and 1958. It scored successes in both elections which paved the 
way for the Dayaks' return to political prominence at an even higher level. 
4.2.2 Victory in the Elections of 1955 and 1958 
PD grew rapidly as a result of a partnership with the DAO, assistance from the post-
war governments, help from the missionary network, and most importantly, relatively 
united leadership. Formal PD membership in mid-1947 was reported to be around 50,000 
(West Borneo Raad 1947:22). That figure was approximately 12% of West Kalimantan 
Dayaks, an impressive achievement within a short period of time considering the 
geographical difficulty, the inexperience of the Dayaks in politics and constant political 
intimidation (cf. van Hulten 1992:118-23). 179 Before its merger with Partindo in 1961, 
West Kalimantan PD was probably the strongest ethnic political party in all Indonesia. 
PD contested the first national election on 29 September 1955, and scored a 
significant success. At the national level, PD ranked twelfth of 118 parties registered for the 
election. 180 It secured one seat in the DPR and three seats in the National Constituent 
Assembly or Konstituante (Balunus 1978).181 The achievement of PD in West Kalimantan 
surprised many well-established rivals as they, except Masyumi, were running behind PD. 
PD and Masyumi were the only two parties to attain more than 30% of the votes in West 
Kalimantan. PNI obtained less than 17% sit in third place (see Table 4-4). This 
achievement made Feith name PD as the only success story in the 1955 election for a local 
and ethnic-based political party (Feith 1957 :60). 
1780ne such figure, as mentioned previously, was Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, the former prime minister of 
State of East Indonesia (see footnote 20). 
179The Dayak population in the province in 1948 was approximately 416,471(Bohm1986:30). 
180 At the final counting, this position dropped to 22nd, overtaken by some smaller political parties that had 
vote-sharing agreements (stembus accord) with each other (Balunus). 
181Palaunsoeka was elected representative of National Assembly, while Agustinus Djelani, Oevaang Oeray, 
and W. Hittam were representatives to the Konstituante (Balunus 1978). 
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Table 4-4 Elections in 1955 and 1958 in West Kalimantan 
Scope/Platform 1955 1958 
Political National Constituent Local % 
Parties Parliament Assembly Parliament Changes 1955-1958* 
artai Persatuan Dayak ocal!Ethnic 146,054 157,490 201,199 21.7 
PD 
asyumi ational/lslamic 155,173 152,715 139,741 -9.3 
artai Nasional Indonesia ational/Nationalist 64,195 74,123 62,734 -18.2 
NI 
ahdlatul Ulama (NU) ational/Islamic 37,945 37,123 31,703 -17.l 
ational/Socialist 15,909 13,848 20,326 31.9 
ational/Communist 8,526 8,680 17,124 49.3 
Ikatan Pendukung ational/Nationalist 7,289 5,993 5,028 -19.2 
emerdekaan Indonesia 
IPKI 
artai Katolik (PK) ational/Catholic 2,505 2,259 
artai Syarikat Islam ational/Islamic 3,030 1,863 
ndonesia PSII 
Source: Feith ( 1957:69), Kementerian Dal am Negeri ( 1959), Alfian ( 1971: 133-6). 
Note: *Changes are calculated from the election results in 1958 and Constituent Assembly in 1955. 
The PD success in the election brought the Dayaks back to the centre of West 
Kalimantan politics. Based on the election result, from thirty provincial DPRD seats, PD 
obtained nine while Masyumi held ten. 182 Other political parties gained fewer seats: PNI 
won four, NU three, while PSI, Parindra, IPKI and PK.I held one seat each. PD's 
performance at the district level was similarly good. In Pontianak, Sanggau, Sintang, and 
Kapuas Hulu districts, PD sent more members to the local DPRD than any of the other 
political parties. It ranked second in the Ketapang DPRD. It only failed to secure seats for 
the DPRD of Pontianak city because the city had only a small Dayak population (cf. 
Kodam XII 1972:77). Dayaks also gained good representation in regional executive 
councils (DPD) at both the provincial and district levels. 183 PD secured two DPD seats at 
182Law 14/1956 ruled that a provisional DPRD be formed based on the result of the election, and based on 
regulation Permendagri 12/ 1956, West Kalirnantan provincial DPRD was allocated thirty seats. 
183The DPD was an important body as its members performed daily executive responsibilities and - under the 
parliamentary system at that time - was responsible to the DPRD. The DPD was chaired by the executive 
head (i.e. bupati or governor) and usually had five members. 
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the provincial level. At the district level it secured two seats in Pontianak, Sintang, and 
Kapuas Hulu districts, three seats in Sanggau district, and one seat in Sambas and Ketapang 
districts (Kodam XII 1972:77-8). 
The political influence of PD increased significantly after the 1955 election. Dayaks 
who had previously distanced themselves from PD, either because of fear of threats from 
other more established parties or lack of confidence in PD, started to approach the party. 
PD was able to attract a few Dayaks who had previously joined other political parties. One 
example was Petrus Anjiem, a Dayak who was a PNI official in Landak in the early 1950s. 
His PNI affiliation had created a big political division among the Dayak community in 
Menyuke (Boelaars, Undoen et al. 1981:44). Anjiem became an important figure in the 
successor to PD, Partindo. One source mentioned that PD success after 1955 and the rising 
profile of the Dayaks had prompted some Senganans to reclaim their Dayak roots (Kadir 
1995:52). In contrast to its previous scepticism towards Senganans, PD in the 1950s now 
prepared to accept Senganan leadership within the party. Leaders of PD in Sambas (M. 
Idris) and Pontianak districts (Sadjali Usman) were well known Senganans. Some 
Indonesian-Chinese, who had contested separately under the Catholic Party in the 1955 
election, agreed to join forces with PD in the 1958 election, and secured two seats for PD in 
Pontianak city (interviews Bln, Lnj). 
As required by Law 19/1956, another election was carried out to elect new members 
of the regional parliament. In West Kalimantan, local parliamentary elections were 
conducted on 22 May 1958, except for Pontianak city where the election was held on 12 
June 1958 (Pemda Kalimantan Barat 1989:9). This election was a repeat success for PD. It 
received over 21 % more votes than in the 1955 election, whereas all the major national 
political parties, Masyumi, PNI, and NU, suffered losses (see Table 4-4, Table 4-5). Given 
that it was unlikely that many non-Dayaks apart from some Chinese would vote for PD, the 
major part of this 21 % might have been the result of a change in the voting behaviour of 
Dayaks who had previously voted for other political parties. These Dayaks voted for other 
political parties because of intimidation, lack of awareness or hesitation.184 
184 Van Hulten noted that political intimidation and propaganda from other political parties led to the 
submission of the na'ive Dayaks to other political parties (cf. van Hulten 1992:118-23). 
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Table 4-5 Shift of Votes in the 1955 and 1958 Elections 
Other 
District/Province PD Masvumi PNI NU PSI PKI IPKI Parties 
Pontianak Citv 3,071 -1,883 413 -1,068 -36 1,203 -970 -1,747 
Pontianak 12,078 -5,445 -1 ,059 -2,870 1,187 2,041 -492 250 
Sambas 4,591 -1 ,228 1,682 54 826 3,618 -733 791 
Sanggau 13,197 -2,044 970 -216 219 529 -424 124 
Sin tang 16,904 -3,083 -249 44 -78 740 -653 -7,594 
Kapuas Hulu 2,333 -1,898 245 482 169 -33 -58 1.349 
Ketapang 2,835 223 -2,538 -907 -698 958 -610 -1 ,355 
West Kalimantan 55,009 -15,358 -536 -4,481 1,589 9,056 -3,940 -8,1 82 
Source: Kementerian Dalam Negeri (1959); Alfian (1971:133-6). 
Table 4-6 The 1958 Election and Parliamentary Seats Allocation 
Election 1955 Election 1958 
Province or Cl '8 * Cl District c;; ~ - - - :::l -
U') 
«;l ~ a Cl ~ ~ ~ ~ ..... .... 4-< C/} ;;..... Cl) .... 4-< 0... 0 0 ~ 0.... ~ U') ~ ..r:: 0 0 E-
- "" 
..... E-~ ~ 0 ';J. 
West Kalimantan 9 30 30.0 12 4 l 1 9 2 1 30 40.0 
.... 
(.) 
·5 
.~ 
Cl 
Pontianak 0 15 0.0 2 1 1 1 6 2 2 15 13.3 
City 
Pontianak 9 26 34.5 13 3 1 1 7 4 1 30 43.3 
Sambas 3 21 14.3 5 4 3 12 1 2 1 28 17.9 
Sanggau 9 15 60.0 12 3 3 2 l 1 22 54.5 
Sintang 5 15 33.3 9 3 3 1 1 17 52.9 
Kapuas Hulu 7 15 46.7 7 2 5 1 15 46.7 
Ketapang 4 15 26.7 4 3 6 2 15 26.7 
Total 46 152 303 64 23 3 6 51 14 7 4 172 37.2 
Source: Kodam XII (1972:79-80). 
Note: Source did not include two seats for NU in Ketapang. 
The 1958 election result further consolidated the Dayaks' position in the executive 
and legislative branches. PD secured more seats than any other political party in the 
provincial parliament. Out of a total of 30 seats, PD won 12 seats, followed by Masyumi 
nine seats, and PNI four seats. PD also outperformed all the other political parties at 
Pontianak, Sanggau, Sintang and Kapuas Hulu districts (see Table 4-6). At the provincial 
level, an existing Dayak deputy-head of the DPRD and two existing DPD members were 
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re-elected in November 1958. Oevaang Oeray was appointed as West Kalimantan executive 
head (Kepala Daerah) and then also as governor in 1959 (Pemda Kalimantan Barat 1989:9-
11). 185 In 1958, four out of six district head positions were won by Dayaks, namely 
Pontianak, Sanggau, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu districts (see Table 4-7). Dayaks also 
became the heads of district legislatures in Sanggau, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu and deputy 
heads in the provincial and Pontianak district legislatures (Balunus 1978). 
Table 4-7 Elected District Heads and Supporting Political Parties (1959) 
Districts District Head Elected Political Party Appointed 
(not 
Pontianak Citv Maizir Achrnaddyns 11-Jul-1958 Masyumi anoointed)* 
Pontianak A. Dielani l 3-0ct-1958 PD 16-Apr-1959 
Sambas Zaini HM Noor 3 l-Oct-1958 Masyumi 6-May-1959 
San1nrnu M.Th. Diaman 10-Jan-1958 PD 23-Mav-1959 
Sintang GP Diaoeng 9-Jan-1958 PD 25-Mav-1959 
Kapuas Hulu J.R. Giling 29-0ct-1958 PD 30-May-1959 
Ketapang Hercan Yamani 20-Nov-1958 NU 16-May-1959 
Source: Pemda Kalimantan Barat (1960). 
Note: *For an unknown reason, the interior minister did not appoint Achmaddyns. A Moeis Amin later 
became the mayor. 
PD seats in the legislatures after 1958 also increased quite significantly. At 
provincial level, PD gained an additional three seats. PD obtained four more seats in 
Pontianak and Sintang, three more seats in Sanggau, and two more seats in Sambas. PD 
also obtained two seats in Pontianak city, where it had previously held no seats. PD 
representation in the DPD remained as high as in 1955, except for Sintang district where 
PD had gained one additional seat (see Table 4-8). 
The better position in the legislature and executive were quite important for the 
Dayaks, as they now could use their influence to improve their political position. After 
securing those top positions, PD was able to ensure that some of its members became sub-
185Before 1960, the provincial executive head and governor were different positions and held by different 
individuals. The governor was a representative of central government, while the executive head was the one 
responsible for the day-to-day governance of the province. Oevaang Oeray was the first governor who also 
held the position of executive head (Pemda Kalimantan Barat 1989:10-1). An equivalent process also 
occurred at the district level after 1960, where the position of bupati and executive head at the district level 
were held by one person. 
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district heads in Dayak areas, although they were less qualified (interviews Djp, Syk, 
Pemerintah Sanggau 1970).186 Some Dayak officials, for example, had tried to increase the 
numbers of the Dayak civil servants, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
Table 4-8 DPD Seats Allocation from the 1955 and 1958 Elections 
Province or PD Masyumi PNI NU PSI 
District 1955 1958 
West Kalimantan 2 2 2 1 
Pontianak City 0 0 2 1 1 1 
!Pontianak 2 2 2 1 
.... 
(.) Sambas 1 l 2 1 1 
.E Sanggau 3 3 l 1 
"' Q Sin tang 2 3 1 1 
tKapuas Hulu 2 2 2 1 
Ketapang 1 1 2 1 1 
Total 13 14 14 8 2 2 
Source: Kodam XII (1972:79-80). 
PD did not win those political positions by itself. In some cases, such as in 
Pontianak and Kapuas Hulu districts, PD needed political alliances because its seats alone 
were not sufficient to win in a voting process if all other parties formed an alliance against 
PD' s candidate. Based on regulation PP 44/ 1957, each district head was to be selected 
through voting by the members of legislature, while the interior minister only had the 
option to agree or disagree with the result. In the Ketapang election, for example, there 
were three candidates for district head: P.J. Denggol supported by PD, Hercan Yamani 
supported by NU and Masyumi, and Tengku Muhammad supported by PNI. Hercan 
Yamani won the voting and became the head of Ketapang district (Noerachman 1959). In 
Pontianak city, Maizir Achmaddyns won the election, but was never sworn in as mayor 
because the minister vetoed the election result. 
At provincial level, throughout the period 1955 to 1960, PD formed alliances either 
with Masyumi or PNI, two major political parties in the DPRD. This was possible because 
Masyumi and PNI were always at odds with each other as a result of their rivalries at 
national level. Their animosity made the PD position safe from a possible coalition between 
186However, the majority of the bureaucracy was still in the hands of Malays. One reason was that the 
majority of civil servants were appointed by previous governments. See Chapter 6 on marginalisation. 
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the two.187 After the 1955 election, PD formed an alliance with Masyumi. Masyumi secured 
the post of chairman of the Provincial Parliament (i.e. M. Fachrie Satok), and PD provided 
the deputy chairman position (i.e. Saijan Tiong). In return, PD secured two of the most 
important DPD departments: the General and Human Resources Department, and the 
Education and Health Departments.188 During the election for provincial executive head on 
17 March 1959, PD decided to cooperate with PNI, after Masyumi persisted in nominating 
its own candidate (i.e. Muzani A. Rani). PD supported the PNI candidate as chairman of the 
Parliament (i.e. Abdussjukur). PD's candidate, Oevaang Oeray, was later appointed as West 
Kalimantan executive head (kepala daerah). Cooperation with PNI ended at the election for 
governor/executive head (gubernurlkepala daerah) on 14 November 1959, because PNI 
decided to put forward its own candidate (i.e. R.P.N. Loemban Tobing). 189 And as 
Masyumi had been banned, 190 PD cooperated with military and other political parties so its 
nomination could make it to the list of final recommendations to the President (interview 
Bln). Oeray was appointed by the President as the first governor/executive head of West 
Kalimantan. 191 
How were these agreements possible when there had been tensions between Dayaks 
and non-Dayaks prior to 1950? One possible answer was that softening of the PD attitude 
made it more acceptable to other political parties. It appeared that after the end of DIKB in 
1950, PD had moved away from its ethnic approach to a more inclusive approach. Unlike 
the party objectives as set out in 1947, party objectives in 1954 and 1958 did not include 
particular mention of "Dayak" interests. The 1954 and 1958 documents employed more 
general and inclusive terms such as "the oppressed" (PD 1954; Doengo 1969). This 
187The details of PD cooperation outlined hereafter came from a former PD politician (interview Bln) and 
were cross-checked with Pemda Kalimantan Barat (1989:8-12). 
188Both were important positions for Dayak emancipation. Other departments were finance, public works, and 
social/economy. For details of DPD responsibilities and structure see UU 14 1956, UU No. 25/1956 and SK 
1711957/DPRD West Kalimantan. 
1890eray's nomination was not as a result of an alliance with PNI as claimed by Davidson (Davidson 
2002:101). 
190The first limited ban was issued in September 1958 after indication of the party's involvement in the revolts. 
General Nasution, the army chief of staff, ordered a ban on Masyurni and other political parties in areas that 
had supported PRRl or Permesta (Ricklefs 2001:321 ). The official ban was issued on 17 August 1960 
(Keppres 200/1960). Other factors contributing to the ban were Masyumi's enmity towards Soekamo and its 
opposition to Soekarno's Guided Democracy (see Mahendra 1999:51-2; Ricklefs 2001 :324-5). 
19!Unlike in previous elections where the local DPRD could appoint directly the governor or bupati, from 
September 1959 the appointment was made by minister of internal affairs (for the bupati) and president (for 
the governor position) (Cribb and Kahin 2004: 109). 
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changed attitude was not just so that PD could "fit in" with other political parties at that 
time, but also partly because opportunities for Dayaks had improved greatly since 1945. 
Dayaks already had access to government positions, including some leadership positions. 
This was particularly true after 1955 when PD secured many important positions in the 
bureaucracy and legislature. Their increasing inclusion in the government had softened 
their attitude. 
From another perspective, it also appeared that some non-Dayak politicians started 
to acknowledge Dayaks' marginalised conditions, and were more willing to support them. 
For example, in a letter of support for I. Kaping as the head of the Cultural Department of 
West Kalimantan (Kepala Djawatan Kebudayaan Kalimantan Baral) in January 1958, the 
provincial DPRD supported his candidacy by stating he was a "true native son" (DPRD 
Kalbar 1958). Dayak candidates were often supported by other political parties. For 
example, a PD candidate, Palaunsoeka, was supported by Masyumi, NU, IPKI, and PSI as a 
candidate for the National Planning Council (DPRD Kalbar 1959). 
One important factor behind the appointment of Dayaks to head local government 
bodies was Soekamo's preference having native sons (Davidson 2002:101-2). Based on 
new regulation Penpres 6/1959 (7 November 1959), the provincial or district DPRD only 
recommended some candidates to the President or in the case of district head to the interior 
minister, who would then make the final decision on who was to be appointed. The central 
government had the privilege of choosing a candidate it liked. This election process was 
quite different to that under regulation PP 44/1957, where members of DPRD who selected 
the governors and district heads, the president or interior minister only had the power to 
confirm or reject a winning candidate. 
4.3 Summary and Conclusion 
The NICA and DIKB governments established after the end of WWII in West 
Kalimantan had given Dayaks their first opportunities to participate in decision-making in 
the province. Several Dayaks were appointed to the provincial and district executive 
councils. These governments also devised policies that gave Dayaks a fair share in the 
political arena and other fields. 
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Some figures in the new government had a commitment to improving Dayak's 
political status. One was A.H. Bohm who had worked closely with Sultan Hamid II, the 
head of DIKB. Behind their attitude was their realisation that Dayak support was 
indispensable to sustain the DIKB. The DIKB was less popular among the Malay political 
elite outside DIKB itself, because they preferred the unitary state, and claimed DIKB was a 
puppet of the Dutch. 
Two important Dayak institutions were established at this time. The first was the 
Dayak Affairs Office, whose task was to deal with any matters relating to Dayaks. 
Supported by the government at that time, DAO initiated efforts to address the greatest 
concerns of the post-war Dayaks, including such sensitive issues as the revival of feudal 
government, equality for Dayaks, freedom of religion, and Dayak education. The second 
institution, which turned into a political party, was Persatuan Dayak (PD). PD support for 
the pro-federal DIKB brought consequences after the DIKB was forced to disband. DAO as 
an instrument of the DIKB was dissolved when the DIKB disbanded. The top PD leaders 
disappeared from provincial politics for a few years, although Dayak politics continued to 
thrive through its political party, PD. The success of PD in the 1955 and 1958 elections 
returned Dayak politicians to prominent positions. PD was able to put more members into 
provincial and several district parliaments than any other political party. With its greater 
numbers in the DPRD and some cooperation with other political parties, PD was able to 
win the position of governor and several district head positions. 
It can be concluded that the DAO and particularly the PD had successfully turned 
the once divided, weak, and non-political Dayaks into a solid and major political force in 
West Kalimantan. As has been mentioned above, their success was possible due to the 
support of the two post-war governments. Without that support, the emancipation 
movements started by some enlightened Dayaks would not have been able to go far because 
of the resistance they would have faced in the field. It was only with the support of the 
Dutch that the DAO was able to secure some initial but important breakthroughs, 
particularly in obtaining concessions from the sultanates. This was an important step to free 
the Dayaks from feudal influence, the main source of the Dayak submissive and inferior 
mentality. Together with PD, DAO had tried to tackle other problems, such as to improve 
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the educational level of the Dayaks by establishing many schools in the interior regions. 
The quite dramatic transformation was also possible because of strong and united Dayak 
leadership, a result of the siege mentality and perception of the common enemy. However, 
as soon as the leadership broke down, as will be shown in the next chapter, the Dayak 
movements dissipated. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE DECLINE OF DA YAK POLITICAL MOVEMENTS (1960-1971) 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the first Dayak political party supported the Dutch 
colonials. The Dayaks and their party were some of the staunchest supporters of DIKB, a 
state created by the Dutch. Although, they disappeared temporarily from provincial politics 
after DIKB was dissolved in 1950, they made recovered quickly after PD "won" the 
elections in 1955 and 1958. The number of Dayaks joining the bureaucracy started to 
increase, although they still represented a very small proportion. Dayaks were appointed as 
executive heads in several districts. For example, a Dayak was also appointed as governor 
of the province. This "golden" era for Dayak politics lasted for a little more than ten years 
(1955-1966). After 1966, however, Dayak political influence declined rapidly. From the 
end of 1950s to the mid-l 960s, Dayak politics underwent various life-saving processes, 
from PD to Partindo, and from Partindo to IPKI. Each process weakened Dayak politics 
even further. 
This chapter explores the decline of Dayak politics, and its causes and consequences. 
Following this introduction, the first and the second sections respectively will discuss 
causes and consequences of the merger of PD with Partindo, and then the merger of 
Partindo with IPKI. The third section will examine the demise of Dayak politics toward the 
end of the 1960s and approaching the general election in 1971. The last section will 
examine the causes and consequences of the conflict between the Dayaks and the Chinese 
in 1967. 
5.1 The Break-up ofDayak Politics: The End of Ethnic PD 
5.1.1 PD Merger with Partindo 
At the end of the 1950s, Indonesia faced several political uncertainties. Liberal 
democracy did not give stability to the nation as parliamentary governments failed to 
consolidate as a result of the struggle between political parties. After years of deliberation, 
the Konstituante was still unable to reach compromise on the new constitution. Meanwhile, 
insurgencies were on the rise in some regions. As a solution, Soekamo introduced the 
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Guided Democracy system, where the President became the power centre of Indonesian 
politics. 
Under Guided Democracy, a new regulation, Penpres 711959, was introduced to 
regulate political parties. It aimed at curbing growing regionalism as well as limiting 
foreign intervention in Indonesian politics. Under this regulation political parties could not 
receive foreign funding without government permission and no foreigner could be a 
member of a political party. More importantly for local political parties, this regulation 
required the political parties to have branches in at least a quarter of the provinces. Many 
regional parties whose constituents were based in certain areas could not fulfil this 
requirement, and PD was one of them. 
PD was not able to satisfy this condition since it had only four branches, all in 
Kalimantan (Doengo 1969:4). Within the other three Kalimantan provinces, only Central 
Kalimantan was strong enough to gain enough votes to have a few representatives in the 
local parliament in the 1958 general election.192 There were efforts to set up new branches 
in Y ogyakarta and other cities, where Dayaks were studying, but the number of Dayaks in 
these cities were very small. Dayak students were not united politically, especially those 
from outside West Kalimantan. Eventually, all efforts to set up additional branches failed 
(interviews Kls, Ttg). 
The only alternative to save the party was to merge into a larger national party. 
Internal party deliberations resulted in a decision that the new party should have a 
nationalist and not a sectarian (i.e. religious) platform. This requirement automatically 
excluded the Catholic Party, a party favoured by Palaunsoeka, one of PD top leaders. There 
were three other nationalist parties that fulfilled these requirements: PNI, IPKI, and 
Partindo. PNI was a party with a long history dating back to 1927. It was established by 
Soekarno, who was a student at that time. IPKI was a relatively new party founded on 20 
May 1954 by military veterans. Partindo was the newest party, established only on 6 
November 1958.193 In 1959, the leaders of West Kalimantan PNI were S.H. Marpaung and 
192PD obtained three seats in the Central Kalimantan provincial DPRD. At the district level, only in Kapuas 
district did PD gain a significant number of seats (five seats) (Kementerian Dalam Negeri 1958). The majority 
ofDayak votes of Central and East Kalimantan went to nationalist and Christian political parties. 
193Historically, Partin do was first founded on 29 April 1931 after the colonial government banned PNI. 
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Dr Soedarso, both of whom were not native to West Kalimantan. West Kalimantan IPKI 
was led by Ibrahim Saleh and Tan Husni Abdullah, both of whom were Malay. Partindo, as 
a new comer in national politics, still had no establishment in West Kalimantan. 
PD leaders realised that they would lose their dominance if they merged with PNI as 
PNI was already an established political party in West Kalimantan. Merging with the 
smaller IPKI probably required fewer compromises, but the party only had few prospects. 
IPKI was a small political party, both locally and nationally, with support mainly from 
military veterans and their sympathisers. The next alternative was the newly established 
Partindo that had however grown rapidly at national level because of the personal links its 
leaders had with Soekarno. 194 Later, its close association with Soekarno and its leftist 
leaning brought about Partindo's demise, discussed in due course. Partindo rose quickly to 
national prominence and by 1964 it already had several cabinet ministers.195 It claimed to 
be the purest adherent of Marhaenism, a very popular political concept in the l 960s.196 
The leadership of PD finally chose to merge with Partindo. 197 There are several 
possible explanations for this decision. One obvious reason was that merging with Partindo 
required the smallest political sacrifice for PD as PD could preserve its structure and 
personnel. The reason was that Partindo did not have a presence in West Kalimantan (cf. 
Doengo 1969:4). In fact, as far as West Kalimantan was concerned, the merger would be a 
mere change of party name, from PD to Partindo. With a PD official letter signed by Saijan 
Tiong, deputy general chairman of PD then, all PD branches, affiliates and leaders 
automatically became Partindo branches, affiliates and leaders on the day of the merger, 15 
August 1961 (Partindo 1961). Another reason was that Partindo had good political 
prospects, as explained above. 
194Asmara Hadi, the general chairman of Partindo, was a son-in-law of Soekamo. Partindo chairman, Winoto 
Danu Asmoro, was Chief Assistant to the President. Other Partindo leaders such as AM Hanafi, Armunanto, 
and Winamo Danuatmodjo were close confidants of Soekamo (also Rocamora 1975:233; Oei 1995:96). 
195They were Sutomo Martopradoto, Oei Tjoe Tat and Armunanto Adisumarto and Armunanto (Crouch 
1978:195). Support for Partindo was also on the rise in some regions, besides Oevaang Oeray, Governor 
Sutedja of Bali was also a member/sympathiser of the party. All Dayak bupati in West Kalimantan, bupatis of 
Buleleng or Tana Toraja were members or sympathisers of Partindo (see for example Robinson 1998a:376; 
Bigalke 2005:416). 
196 Marhaenism was an ideology concocted by President Soekamo to describe the Indonesian version of 
Marxism. 
197PD chapters in South and Central Kalimantan seemed to have merged into PNI (Rocamora 1970:379). 
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PD's merging with Partindo had several political consequences though: the end of 
Dayak political unity; the more inclusive political approach of the new party; and rapid 
penetration of national politics into Dayak politics, including the influence of leftist politics. 
5.1.2 Partindo versus PK: The End of Political Unity 
Although officially all PD branches were instructed to merge with Partindo, a 
number of individuals chose not to join. The majority of this small faction led by 
Palaunsoeka joined the Partai Katolik (Catholic Party, PK).198 Prior to that, PK was a very 
small political party in the province. In the 1955 election, it only obtained 2,505 votes, or 
less than 0.6% of the total provincial votes, and only gained a seat in the provincial DPRD. 
Its very low number of votes in interior districts indicated that the majority of the Dayaks 
did not support the party .199 
Palaunsoeka's preference to join PK was not only because he was a devout Catholic, 
but his decision could also have been influenced by his quite long political ties with the 
party. Their close ties started at the end of 1940s when Palaunsoeka was appointed a 
member of national parliament, where he became a member of PK Faction. This led to 
cooperation between PD and PK in West Kalimantan during the 1958 local election, in 
which PK contested under the name of PD. Members of PK such as Lim Bak Meng 
(provincial level) and Paulus Tjong Bun On (Pontianak city), were listed in the legislature 
as PD representatives (interview Bin). The communist issue within the Partindo leadership 
might also have contributed to Palaunsoeka's decision to join PK (cf. Davidson 2002: 107). 
As will be discussed in §5.1.4, Palaunsoeka's followers argued that the merger with 
Partindo would drive the Dayaks to communism. 
Palaunsoeka's history in PD surpassed Oeray's, but still he failed to persuade a 
majority of the PD leadership to join PK. Palaunsoeka was the founder of DIA, the 
predecessor of PD. He was the deputy chairman of the party in 1947, and became one of 
198 He then became the general chairman of West Kalimantan PK, and later a member of the Central 
Leadership Board (DPP) of PK at the national level. Before the 1955 election, the party provincial chapter 
was headed by a Chinese, Lim Bak Meng, while the Singkawang chapter was headed by a Dayak, Agustinus 
Lanjo. According to one memoir, West Kalimantan PK was established by Lim Bak Meng in 1952 (Lim 1977; 
Lim 1978). 
199Its highest number of votes was obtained in coastal regions: Sambas district with 1,001 votes, followed by 
Pontianak city with 744, and Pontianak district 532 votes. Other districts received negligible results between 
28 and 75 votes each (Alfian 1971:135). 
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the party chairmen in 1951, and then its general chairman until the party was defunct. 
Davidson believed that his stays in Jakarta as a member of parliament had prevented him 
from having continuous contact with the local party leaders, and as a consequence he lost 
some of his personal influence within the PD leadership (Davidson 2002: 108). On the other 
hand, unlike Palaunsoeka who spent most time in Jakarta, Oeray was based in West 
Kalimantan and therefore was able to maintain his influence within the party (Davidson 
2002: 108). Oeray was general chairman in 1947 for only a short period and then became 
advisor to the party. However, his leaderships during the first two years after WWII and his 
position in the executive council of DIKB had made him better known than Palaunsoeka. 
As the governor, be had influence over all important Dayak civil servants and members of 
the legislature, who were apparently also leaders of PD. The source also noted that Oeray 
was a more able communicator capable of attracting a larger audience compared to the 
more "bookish" Palaunsoeka (Davidson 2002: 108). 
The rivalries between Oeray and Palaunsoeka and their followers from the end of 
1950s continued into at least the first two decades of the New Order period. At the 
beginning of the split, Oeray accused Palaunsoeka of being a traitor because he had 
converted a PD seat in the National Parliament into a PK faction seat without consulting the 
party.200 On the other hand, Palaunsoeka accused Oeray of illegally merging the party with 
Partindo, because it was done without his approval. Palaunsoeka as general chairman was 
apparently absent from the meeting which decided that the merger should take place 
(various interviews). After the split, Governor Oeray excluded members of PK from 
important executive and legislative appointments. All existing members of provincial 
legislatures from the former PD who supported Palaunsoeka and joined PK, such as Lim 
Bak Meng, M. Andjioe, and Massoeka Djanting were replaced. On several occasions, 
Oeray was also very critical towards the Church authorities because generally they were PK 
200It seemed that the PD cooperation with PK at the National Assembly before 1955 was a party decision, as 
besides Palaunsoeka, Djelani (the chairman of PD), also joined the PK Faction (see footnote 177). However, 
Palaunsoeka continuing his membership in the PK Faction after 1955 election could be a result of his 
individual decision because PD had its own faction in the Konstituante. Forming its own faction in the 
parliament was possible for PD. There were at least three political parties - AKUI, PPTI, PlR Hazairin -
which only had one seat each but yet had their own factions in the parliament (Parlaungan 1956:34). 
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supporters (van Hulten 1992; Davidson 2002:108).201 Partindo's acting director of the Civil 
Service Institute (APDN) allegedly prevented many candidates with PK background from 
joining the academy (interview Lnj).202 Partindo supporters were also behind moves to 
thwart Palaunsoeka's bid for the governorship in 1967, after Oeray was removed from 
power.203 On the other hand, PK members also opposed Partindo and Oeray's leadership. 
PK had demanded Oeray's resignation from early 1965, long before similar but more 
serious demonstrations were staged. In March 1965, together with other political parties 
such as PNI and Parkindo (a Christian Party), PK signed a resolution urging Soekarno to 
remove Oevaang Oeray from the governorship. In the letter, they accused Oeray of 
spreading hatred between the native and non-native populations (Surat Resolusi 1965).204 
During the pogrom against the Chinese in 1967 (see §5.4), Palaunsoeka criticised Oeray 
and his supporters for being the protagonists behind the frenzied Dayak mobilisation 
(Pembangunan 16-11-1967; Kompas 20-11-1967). 
5.1.3 More Inclusive Partindo 
As previously discussed, PD seemed to have embraced a more conciliatory 
approach toward other political parties since the mid- l 950s. However, by and large PD was 
still inherently an ethnic party. PD was Persatuan Dayak and its statutes clearly mentioned 
that PD was only for the Dayaks. Non-Dayaks who had genuine concerns for the Dayaks 
could only be extra-ordinary members (PD 1954:9).205 
Partindo was far more inclusive than PD, although the majority of leaders and 
members of West Kalimantan Partindo were Dayaks. Unlike PD, Partindo was a nationalist 
party with open membership, and had a growing number of non-Dayaks in the top 
leadership positions. After a party congress in 1964, West Kalimantan Partindo had four 
201Another reason for Oeray's criticism of the Church was that its top leadership was always too much under 
the power and direction of the Dutch priests (interview Smd). 
202 Although the Director rejected the accusation, suspicions among the PK sympathisers about the exclusion 
were strong (interviews Ttg, Lnj). 
203Some Partindo members went to Jakarta to assure the central government that Dayaks would not act against 
the decision to install a non-Dayak governor. This neutralised earlier demands from some other Dayaks for a 
Dayak governor (interview Mgn). 
204The excerpt in Indonesia read "menghamburkan pidato yang bemada memecah belah persatuan . . . dan 
sering mengakibatkan rasa permusuhan bathin antara suku penduduk asli dan pendatang" (Surat Resolusi 
1965). It was not quite clear whether the native (suku penduduk asli) referred solely to Dayaks. 
205Lim Bak Meng, a prominent Chinese during the 1950s and 1960s, claimed that he had belonged to PD 
since 1947 (Lim 1978). 
115 
non-Dayaks, Ajub Akri, Slamet A.H., P. Susilo and Djufri Saleh, appointed to top 
leadership positions, while the Dayaks were represented by Ngo Lahay (as party chairman), 
Victor Oendoen and Hugo Mungok (Bintang Timur 07-10-1964). Some non-Dayaks 
represented Partindo in the DPRD, such as Slamet A.H. and Ng Eng Soe at provincial level; 
Djufri Saleh, and Tan Bu Hiap206 in Pontianak city; Lim Soe Seng, and H. Minun Abdul 
Wahid in Pontianak district; and Tjong Rian Kong in Sambas (Gubernur Kalbar 1964:8-
15).207 Pluralism within the party leadership would naturally prevent the party from taking 
an exclusively ethnic approach. 
Compared to PD, Partindo sent fewer members to the DPRD. Regulation Penpres 
411960 (June 1960) forced political parties, including Partindo, to forgo some of their seats 
in order to accommodate the newly created functional groups (golongan karya) in the 
legislatures (see Table 5-1).208 Partindo also lost some of its DPD seats because of the 
implementation of the concept of nationalist-religious-communist (Nasakom). This concept, 
which was introduced in 1960 by Soekamo (Mackie 1974:86), required the presence of 
each of these elements in every important government body. As Partindo had a larger 
number of seats in the DPD compared to other political parties, it was required to relinquish 
some of its seats to the Communist Party (PKI). At the provincial level, Dayak DPD 
members were reduced from two to one. Similar changes happened at the district level. 
Partindo, therefore, needed more compromise and cooperation with other political parties in 
many issues which further made the party more inclusive in its approach. 
206He had an affiliation with Partindo and PKl, but decided to retain his PKl membership when he was asked 
to choose (interview Djf). When he resigned from Partindo on 6 May 1963, his position in the DPRD wa<> 
given to Djufri Saleh (Gubemur Kalbar 1964:appendix). 
207Reasons for non-Dayaks wanting to join Partindo varied. A few joined because their Dayak superiors were 
the Partindo leaders (interviews Djf, Lnd). Strategically crafted leadership, such as Partindo in Sambas and 
Pontianak districts with their Muslim leaders (i.e. Senganan) attracted Muslim Malays to the party (interview 
Idr). 
208After the Presidential decree in July 1959, the President began moves to concentrate power in his own 
hands. ln March 1960, the President dissolved the elected national legislature and created a new "mutual 
cooperation" legislature (DPR-GR). In this new legislature, more than half (54%) of members came from 
functional groups, all of whom were appointed by the President. The functional groups were introduced into 
the legislature in order to accommodate wider interests and most importantly to balance the role of political 
parties, which had destabilised the political system prior to the Guided Democracy, as can be seen from 
incessant cabinet reshutnes (Tas 1974:270-1; Ricklefs 2001 :324-5). 
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Table 5-1 Number of Seats in Parliament of Selected Parties (1958, 1963) 
[Province or PD/Partindo PN1 NU PK.I IPKI 
District 1958 1963 1958 1963 1958 1963 1958 1963 1958 1963 
[West Kalimantan 12 7 4 3 2 3 1 1 I I 
Pontianak City 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 I 1 1 
Pontianak 13 8 3 2 4 3 I 1 1 1 
...... 
Sambas 5 5 4 3 I 4 2 2 
-~ 
.... Sanggau 12 7 3 2 2 1 ...... Ul 
a Sin tang 9 6 3 2 I 
Kapuas Hulu 7 5 2 2 
Ketapang 4 3 3 2 2 
lrotal 64 43 23 17 12 14 7 5 3 3 
Source: Kementerian Dalam Negeri (1958), Gubemur Kalbar (1964:8-15). 
West Kalimantan Partindo also became more inclusive because of the deeper 
influence of national politics on the province. The Dwikora campaign against Malaysia 
between 1963 and 1966 brought the relatively calm West Kalimantan to the forefront of 
national politics. This campaign required political repositioning and adjustment of all 
elements in West Kalimantan. It brought together many political parties, some of which had 
been estranged from each other. National Partindo, as one of the most radical political 
parties and one of the main supporters of the campaign, drove the West Kalimantan 
Partindo to take full part in the campaign. On many occasions Dayaks were mobilised to 
support the Dwikora campaign (Bebas 30-7, 9-10, 7-11-1963). This campaign 
"nationalised" the "exclusive" Dayaks and incorporated them more into national politics. 
5.1.4 Partindo and Leftist Politics 
Since its inception, West Kalimantan Partindo had been plagued with accusations of 
being a communist party. The accusation was rejected by its leaders, many of whom were 
Catholics, as baseless. Upon receiving the party chairmanship in August 1962, Ngo Lahay 
vowed to take action against any atheists within the party (Partindo 1962b). Previously, on 
24 March 1962, West Kalimantan Partindo protested and rejected the installation of a pro-
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communist leadership in the party's national headquarters (Bintang Timur 28-12-1961, 
Partindo l 962a). 
Anti-left moves within West Kalimantan Partindo seemed to wither as national 
politics leaned left and with Partindo governor (Oevaang Oeray) trying to emulate 
Soekamo, who was getting closer to the left from early 1960s.209 Like the party at the 
national level, West Kalimantan Partindo developed close relations with Baperki (Oei 
1995:98). This relationship is important to mention because at a later stage many Partindo 
leaders were detained because of their links with Baperki (see §5.3.2). 
Baperki was a Chinese organisation aimed at integrating the Chinese into the 
Indonesian community. Its national leader, Siauw Giok Tjhan, was known to have close 
relations with the PKJ. West Kalimantan Baperki 's leftism was found in some of their 
members, such as Pheng Zen Nen, who was also an important figure in PKJ. Baperki's 
chairman, Liem Kiong Wan was head of HSI, an affiliate of PKI (Rachrnan, Mansjur et al. 
1970:219, 225).210 Some teachers in Baperki schools who were recruited from Java turned 
out to be volunteers from Pemuda Rakyat, another PKJ affiliate (interview Kpg). 
West Kalimantan Baperki, contrary to general belief, was a small organisation with 
limited support from the Chinese population in the province. Most West Kalimantan 
Chinese who did not have Indonesian citizenship papers, were totok?-11 and were generally 
uninterested in Indonesian politics. Consequently, they were not attracted to j oin Baperki, 
209National politics from the beginning of the 1960s had been characterised by the competition of tvm 
opposing political powers - the PKI and its groups versus the army which was supported by anti-PKI political 
parties - and Soekamo who tried to manage them. However, closer to the end of his rule, Soekamo had grown 
increasingly close to the left (Feith 1964; Crouch 1978:51-68; Ricklefs 2001:327-341). 
210HSI or Himpunan Sa1jana Indonesia was a scholar league established in early 1962 and linked to PKI 
(Feith 1964:1962). 
211The concept of totok referred to Chinese who were born in Mainland China and continued to live a Chinese 
lifestyle. This concept was applicable in Java to differentiate them from the Java-born Chinese who had 
adapted to Javanese culture. In West Kalimantan, the conditions were completely different. The majority of 
West Kalimantan-bom Chinese, to this day, are still practising the Chinese culture and speaking Chinese 
dialects. West Kalimantan Chinese never regarded themselves as peranakan (qiaoshen). In their eyes, all 
Chinese from Java and Jakarta are the peranakan, mainly because they lost their Chinese culture and their 
ab ility to speak Chinese. 
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which had an orientation towards Indonesia.212 Because of the lack of interest of the local 
but "alien" Chinese, almost all the leading figures of West Kalimantan Baperki, such as 
Liem Kiong Wan, Liem Djoe Siong, and Ong Cin Ciat, were not local Chinese. They 
remained aloof from the majority of the local Chinese because of their busy careers, their 
peranakan attitude and their inability to communicate in local Chinese dialects. 213 A 
peranakan Chinese doctor from Java who worked for the government and who was al~o an 
official of Baperki in Pontianak district, recollected that he had never had close relations 
with the local Chinese because to them he was an "outsider" and a government agent 
(interview Kpg). There were a few local Chinese who had obtained Indonesian citizenship 
and had joined Baperki, such as Ng Nyiap Liang, Ng Eng Soe, and Nio Peng Hian. 
However, they were still totok in their orientation (interview Nes). This lack of support 
from the West Kalimantan Chinese was the main reason why Baperki did not contest the 
1955 and 1958 elections in West Kalimantan.214 
West Kalimantan Baperki differed greatly from its headquarters in Jakarta. Unlike 
the active and more organised Baperki in Jakarta, one member remembered West 
Kalimantan Baperki as a simple organisation without any formal structure and regular 
meetings. Until its end it was still an organisation based more on volunteering and 
spontaneity than on careful planning, because its core leaders were all busy professionals 
(interview Kpg).215 Its profile depended much on its core leaders' wide social and political 
contacts. One of its important programs, according to its members, was related to education, 
2 12Davidson asserts that the majority of Chinese had hardly any interest in Indonesian politics, since the 
majority of them were attracted more to political developments in mainland China, did not have Indonesian 
citizenship, and spoke poor Indonesian (Davidson 2002: 129). A military source noted that 95% of the West 
Kalimantan Chinese by 1960 did not hold Indonesian citizenship. The percentage of alien Chinese had 
dropped to only 70% in 1971. This number is based on the 1971 census which stated that the West 
Kalimantan population had around 226,21 6 Chinese, and that the province had 158,805 resident aliens (see 
Kodam XII 1972:54-5,325-33). Most aliens in West Kalimantan were undoubtedly Chinese. 
213 Language was an important element because many Chinese only spoke Chinese dialects and rudimentary 
Indonesian. In fact, in some places, they could not speak Indonesian at all. In these places, it was the native 
population who adapted by speaking Chinese. At that time many Chinese did not see the Indonesian language 
as essential in their business activities, therefore they did not bother to learn it (interviews with Kpg, Nes, Asl, 
Kodam XII 1972:58). 
214This provides an answer to J.A.C. Mackie who was puzzled by the absence ofBaperki in West Kalimantan 
during those two elections (Mackie 1974:350). 
215For example, Lim Kiong Wan, its chairman, was a surgeon in the province and worked at the Pontianak 
General Hospital. Almost everyone of importance at that time knew him. Liem Djoe Siong was another 
doctor working at the government hospital in Pontianak. Ong Cin Ciat was a respected lawyer in Pontianak. 
Kwee Poo Gwan, the Baperki leader of Pontianak district, was the only government doctor in the district. 
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such as establishing Baperki schools and inviting teachers from Java. It also planned to 
establish a university that was never realised because of the abortive coup in 1965 
(interviews Kpg, Nes).216 The organisation was registered at the governor' s office as an 
educational organisation, and not a political organisation (Ngo 1978: 1). 
The political cooperation between the Dayaks and Chinese did not start only with 
Baperki. During the heyday of PD, a few Chinese already represented PD in the local 
DPRD. In some districts, such as in Sanggau, a few Chinese officials ardently supported the 
PD. 217 Since the merger with Partindo, the number of Chinese in the legislature 
representing Partindo had slightly increased: Ng Eng Soe, Tan Bun Hiap, Liem Soe Seng, 
and Tjong Rian Kong were elected into various DPRD (Gubernur Kalbar 1964:8-15, 
appendix). Cooperation with the Chinese would benefit Partindo financially and politically. 
Financially, the Chinese controlled much of West Kalimantan 's economy, and were 
potential financial contributors for the party's activities.218 Politically, as the third largest 
ethnic group in West Kalimantan, the Chinese were potential supporters (i.e. supplying 
manpower during political rallies and other resources.) even though they were resident 
aliens. 
Personal contacts between the leaders of West Kalimantan Partindo and Baperki 
may have started from the early 1960s. At the national level, from the beginning of 1960 
some Baperki leaders had already become leaders in Partindo, and vice versa (Oei 1995:90, 
96). Formal cooperation between the two organisations in West Kalimantan was unlikely to 
have been sealed before 1964. An official invitation to Ngo Lahay, chairman of Partindo, to 
216 At the Baperki conference in August 1965 in Jakarta, West Kalimantan Baperki was praised for its success 
in opening 42 Baperki schools. According to one source, some teachers from Java were PKI cadre. The 
source reasoned that there were not so many teachers from Java who wanted to volunteer to become teachers 
in the "jungles" of West Kalimantan, except teachers from the Pemuda Rakyat, an affiliate of PKI (interview 
Kf,g) . 
21 During its campaign in 1958, PD pamphlets in Sanggau district included a Chinese version side by side 
with the Indonesian version (PD 1957). This support was because of the influence of the Chinese head of the 
Sanggau civil registry, Ku Dji Hiun. He was the son of a former Chinese Affairs official during the Dutch 
colonial period known as kapitan or laothai. He was allegedly one of the founders of Sanggau Baperki in 
1965. After 1965, he safely exited from politics and asked for early retirement (various interviews). 
218Lanjo mentioned his close relations with the Chinese in the 1950s because of mutual relations in setting up 
business (interview Lnj). Lim Bak Meng helped PD open a small trading company to raise funds for PD 
congresses (Davidson 2002: 10 I). 
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join Baperki was not made until August 1965. 219 Some Dayaks in Singkawang and 
Sanggau who became leaders of Baperki in their respective places also claimed that the 
timing of their joining the organisation was quite near to the coup (interviews Ssg, Wbd). 
According to one Partindo official, the chairman of West Kalimantan Baperki, Liem Kiang 
Wan, was made one of the deputy chairmen of Partindo. Ngo Lahay and H.G. Mihing, two 
Partindo officials, also appeared in the provincial Baperki structure (interviews Mgk and 
also Bln). In some areas, such as Singkawang and Sanggau, Partindo leaders led the setting 
up of Baperki. There was a direction from West Kalimantan Partindo to penetrate and seize 
the leadership of Baperki in West Kalimantan in order to block the PKI's influence on the 
schools of the Indonesian-Chinese (Lahay 1969). As it was party policy, many members of 
Partindo at the district level were automatically included in Baperki, sometimes without 
their knowledge (interviews Ssg, Djn). 
Partindo's leftist links were not limited to links with Baperki. Partindo encouraged 
its members to join HSI which at the national level was known as an affiliate of PKI. 
However, according to one figure within West Kalimantan HSI, West Kalimantan PK! did 
not list HSI as an affiliate.220 The source claimed that the reason for Partindo allowing its 
members join HSI was that Partindo did not have its own university graduates' association, 
as PNI did with its ISRI (Ngo 1978:2). 
West Kalimantan Partindo also had some communist sympathisers. One party top 
official claimed that Slamet A.H., one of the party deputy chairmen, often made pro-
communist comments (interview Mgk). Slamet was officially expelled from the party on 26 
November 1965 after the party found that he was a communist cadre (Partindo 1965a). 
Susilo, another of the party deputy chairmen, was also believed to be a communist cadre. 
He "disappeared" some time after the coup (interview Smd). Occasionally some Partindo 
members in the government also purportedly made pro-communist statements (interviews 
Djg, Mgk, Syk). 
219Lahay's letter to the chairman of West Kalimantan Baperki, refusing to join Baperki, was dated 16 August 
1965. Lahay referred to the invitation to join Baperki as "yesterday's conversation". Citing other personal 
commitments, Lahay refused to take up the invitation (Partindo 1965b). Two sources mentioned that Ngo 
Lahay later sat in Baperki leadership ranks (interviews Bin, Mgk). 
2200 ther known affiliates of PKI at the national level were Gerwani (Indonesian Women's Movement), 
Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth), SOBS! (All Indonesian Trade Unions Federation), BTl (Indonesian 
Farmers' Front), and Lekra (League of People's Culture) (see for example Thomas 1981:372). 
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5.2 Further Breakup of Dayak Politics: The End of Leftist Partin do 
5.2.1 Partindo after the Coup 
In the morning of 1 October 1965, a group of army officers and communist 
supporters under the command of the chief of the Presidential Guard ( Cakrabirawa) 
kidnapped and murdered several top army generals.221 However, in less than three days the 
anti-coup forces under Major General Soeharto were able to overpower rebels in Jakarta. 
Soeharto and his supporters believed that the movement was a coup attempt by the PKI, 
and soon led a drive against the communists. On 12 March 1966, a day after securing the 
Supersemar222 mandate to restore security, Soeharto dissolved the PKI. A week later he 
arrested fifteen cabinet ministers. This was followed by dismissals and suspensions of 
suspected government officials, military officers, and regional bureaucrats (Crouch 
1978:195). Many who had links with the PKI and its affiliates were arrested and in parts of 
Java, Bali, and Sumatra they were killed en masse. Soekamo was accused of knowing 
about the coup plan but not preventing it from happening and being reluctant to incriminate 
PKI. He was finally stripped from power in 1967 after failing to reverse the trend to unseat 
him. 
The political tide after the coup changed direction rapidly, from leftist to a rightist 
orientation. Political parties which had a leftist and pro-Soekamo leaning were the main 
targets of the incoming regime. Partindo was automatically a target because it had close 
relations with Soekamo and aligned with the leftist elements, such as PKI, Asu-PNI, 
Baperki, and HSI (USETUPR 20-6-1966).223 Partindo had a close relationship with PKI and 
221The New Order used the term "Movement of 30 September of PK!" or G30SIPKI, also known as Gestapu. 
Soekamo preferred the term"! October Movement" or Gestok (Gerakan Satu Oktober). 
222Supersemar was a short form of Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret or the Order of March 11, the date when the 
mandate was issued by President Soekamo. 
223The internal friction within the PNI at the beginning of 1965 resulted in the expulsion from the party on 4 
August 1965 of right-wing leaders: Hardi, Mh. Isnaeni, Hadisubeno Sosrowerdojo, Osa Maliki, Karim M. 
Durjat, Muh Achmat, and Sabilal Radjad, and several others. Practically until the establishment of the right-
wing PNI on 6 October 1965, the party was under the influence of left-wing leaderships. The right-wing PNI 
had Osa Maliki as chairman, and Usep Ranawidjaja as secretary, and was therefore nicknamed PNI Osa-Usep. 
The left-wing had Ali Sastroamidjojo as chairman, and Surachman as secretary, and was therefore known as 
PNI Asu. At a reconciliatory party congress in April 1966 in Bandung, the right-wing, with support from the 
regime, won the leadership (Rocamora 1970; Sjamsuddin:Chapter 2-3). Surachman evaded arrest but was 
killed in operation against the communists between June-July 1968 in Blitar, East Java. 
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PNI because they shared a similar nationalist left platform.224 Its newspaper, Bintang Timur, 
was known for its radical and pro-left tone. On 4 October 1965, Partindo in Jakarta 
published a statement which described the coup movement as just a problem within the 
army (cf. Dinuth 1997:94). This statement resembled the rebels' claim and was considered 
pro-coup. The new anti-communist regime quickly suppressed Partindo and other leftist 
parties, although the regime never issued a formal instruction to ban Partindo. Many 
Partindo leaders, including those who held ministerial posts, were arrested (see Crouch 
1978:195). In mid-1967, the Jakarta military commander prohibited members of Partindo 
and organisations under it (onderbouw) attendance at the legislature meeting. In 1968, the 
only two members of Partindo in the national legislature were discharged (Sekretariat DPR-
GR 1970:382). In a statement in April 1970, the Minister of Internal Affairs Amir 
Machmud, singled out Partindo as a leftist party and made its members ineligible to be 
elected (van der Kroef 1971 :219). 
In West Kalimantan, Partindo was also accused of being a political partner of the 
PKI (Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970:218). One priority of the New Order government was 
the removal of the Partindo governor, Oevaang Oeray. While his direct ties with 
communists were never established, apart from some cursory leftist comments (see Bintang 
Timur 28-7-1962), 225 Oeray was a Soekarnoist. 226 After a series of military-instigated 
student demonstrations to demand his resignation (interview Smd), Oeray was finally 
224Van der Kroef described Partindo as "a left-wing and subsequently PKI-infiltrated offshoot of the PNI" 
(van der Kroef 1971:123). At the local level, PKI leaders were reported to have assisted Partindo (Rocamora 
1975:229,412). 
225Soon after the coup, one source close to Oeray mentioned that he believed that the Revolution Council 
(Dewan Revolusi) formed by Colonel Untung might offer an alternative solution to the country's problems 
(interview Smd). According to a foreign office evaluation, Oeray was not a PKI sympathiser (Poulgrain 
1998:262). 
226 Both Oeray and Tjilik Riwut, the Dayak governor of Central Kalimantan, were close to Soekamo 
(Davidson 2002:101-2). According to Djufri Saleh, before the 1965 coup Oeray was a strong candidate for 
minister of transmigration, as recommended by Tjilik Riwut. During an interview, Tanting Ngo confirmed 
Oeray and Riwut's closeness to Soekamo, by citing his own experience. Tanting Ngo was about to be 
nominated to the position of deputy governor of East Kalimantan, by both Oeray and Riwut. These 
promotions were never realised because of the coup. 
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removed from the governorship on 12 July 1966 by a ministerial decision, instead of a 
presidential decree.227 Replacing Oeray was Colonel Soemadi, his deputy.228 
Following Oeray's dismissal from the position of governor came the removal of all 
Dayaks from district head positions,229 and the replacement of many Partindo members of 
executive governing bodies (BPH)230 and other officials whose loyalties were unclear. One 
high-ranking official at the governor's office, who had direct knowledge of the dismissals 
gave two reasons: long service time and lack of skills. All district heads had exceeded their 
terms since all were installed between 1958 and 1960. The government also needed to 
refresh the leadership with more capable persons (interview Smd). However, the dismissals 
could be also seen as part of the purge of pro-Old Order officials and the installation of pro-
New Order officials. The government tactfully described their replacement as "ending term 
of service" (selesai masa tugas). Honourable exits were important to avoid social unrest 
since all offi cials were highly charismatic figures among the Dayaks because of their 
pioneering role in Dayak emancipation since the 1940s.231 Oeray and almost all former 
Dayak district heads with ties to Partindo, however, remained active public servants. Oeray, 
for example, remained at the provincial office as a senior official until 1971 , when he was 
transferred to Jakarta. He was occasionally given important tasks after being stripped of his 
governorship. In 1968, for example, he led a team of several district and provincial bureau 
227The proper presidential decree for Oeray' s removal was issued later on 22 September 1966 (Pemda 
Kalimantan Barat 1989: 17). The use of a ministerial decision showed the regime's desperation to him. As in 
July 1966 Soekamo still exercised most of his formal presidential powers, including the appointment or 
dismissal of governors. He might not have been willing to sign the removal of his confidants. 
228Before becoming the deputy governor, Soemadi had been a military lawyer at Tanjungpura Regional 
Military Command in Pontianak until 1964. Soemadi, a Javanese Christian, was born in Yogyakarta in 1923. 
He was sworn in as the deputy governor on 16 September 1965. On the day ofOeray's dismissal, Soemadi 
was appointed a caretaker governor. He was appointed as governor on 1 July 1967 and continued serving in 
that position until 26 September 1972, when he was replaced by Colonel Kadarusno. He then served as 
general chairman of West Kalimantan Golkar from 1972-1984 (interview Smd, Pemda Kalimantan Barat 
1989: 17-20). 
229By 1967 all district heads under Oevaang Oeray had been replaced, except one in Ketapang. The surviving 
district head was Lieutenant Colonel M. Tohir of Ketapang. He was a candidate supported by NU, and was 
only elected into the office in early September 1965. 
230 This executive council was an important body in assisting the governor's daily task. According to 
regulation Penpres 6/1959, BPH relations with the governor were like relations between the president and 
state minister (menteri negara). Previously BPH was known as DPD. 
231Already pro-New Order student demonstrations demanding Oeray's dismissal had received counter-Dayak 
demonstrations. However, effective and continuous counter-demonstrations were difficult to stage because 
Pontianak only had a small number of Partindo supporters. Demonstrators who stormed the governor's office 
travelled a long distance from interior regions (interviews Smd, Djk, Abs, Ttg). For the same reason, the 
governor who replaced Oeray had tried to prevent his arrest at the end of the 1960s (interview Smd). 
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heads to investigate trade opportunities in Kuching (Pemda Kalimantan Barat 1968). On 23 
January 1971, he was appointed head of the Regional Screening Committee (PPD), a 
committee to screen legislature candidates for the 1971 election (Gubernur Kalbar 
1971a:245). Others such as Bupatis Djaoeng and Djelani were appointed advisors to the 
new district heads, and later were transferred to work at the provincial office. By mid-1968, 
all district heads were active military officers, except in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu (Kodam 
XII 1972:40-8). 
Other than those changes, there were no prosecutions of West Kalimantan Partindo 
members so long as they were not involved with PKI. In the first few years after the coup, 
their involvement with Baperki was not seen as a factor requiring prosecution. This was 
contrary to what was happening in other parts of Indonesia where many Baperki and 
Partindo leaders became the targets of military operations and were often arrested. One 
possible explanation for this exception was that the military acknowledged the rationale put 
forward by Partindo leaders for their involvement in Baperki. Partindo leaders contended 
that their involvement in Baperki was to prevent Chinese schools from falling under 
communist influence. The Baperki chairman had given some examples, such as the 
dismissal of several communist teachers from Baperki schools in Pontianak, and almost no 
PKI influence was found in Baperki schools under the leadership of Partindo (Lahay 1969; 
Kodam XII 1970; IPKI 1971). In fact, many Dayak Partindo leaders helped the military 
campaigns uproot the communist insurgents in 1967 to prove that they were not 
communists (see §5.4). 
The extensive purging in the bureaucracy that took place in some regions in Java 
did not occur in West Kalirnantan. By June 1967, the regime only dismissed 275 employees 
from the whole West Kalimantan bureaucracy. The highest number of dismissals came 
from Pontianak and Sambas district offices. Purging was apparently more severe in 
departments or offices that had leaders who were close to the communists, such as the 
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Public Works Office, where 45 people were dismissed (Table 5-2).232 One source noted that 
there were significant dismissals in the postal service, which was headed by Slamet A.H., 
the deputy chairman of Partindo (interview Bin). 
Table 5-2 Dismissals of Leftists from the West Kalimantan Bureaucracy (by June 
1967) 
Number of 
Offices Number employees 
Discharged 1971 
Governor's Office 18 612 
Kapuas Hulu 7 371 
Sintang 17 377 
Sarnnrnu 7 354 
Pontianak 30 559 
Sambas 34 546 
Ketapang 7 396 
Pontianak City 7 492 
General Work (PU) 45 504 
Forestry 13 108 
Education (PDK) 38 3,537 
Others 52 1, 185 
Total 275 9,741 
Source: Gubemur Kalbar (1967b:8); Varia 1971/23-4:46. 
Neither did West Kalimantan experience the extensive leftist prosecutions that 
happened elsewhere. The relatively small number of communists in West Kalimantan 
meant they were not a threat to the military. Their representatives in DPRD and the BPH 
were the result of centrally imposed Nasakomisation and did not represent its real political 
force. One reliable government source confirmed this by stating that he had difficulties in 
1964/5 in finding PKI figures to be placed in the Sintang and Kapuas Hulu DPRD, as part 
of Nasakomisation (interview Smd). 233 The political map of West Kalimantan in 1960 
232The head of the provincial Public Works Office was W.S. Silitonga who was also the head of the West 
Kalimantan HSI (Abdulsalam 1997:74). Together with another HSI figure, Tanting Ngo, he was convicted in 
October 1965, but rehabilitated a month later (Kodam XH 1965) but was then dismissed from his position in 
mid-1966 (Abdulsalam 1997:74). Bambang Soemitro, PKI leader before S.A. Sofyan, was once the head of 
the provincial Public Works Office (Davidson 2002:130). The heads of the offices in Ngabang and Sintang 
were also linked with communists (interview Mjg). The strong communist influence in the Public Works 
Office was confinned by van Hulten (1992:66-7). 
233Davidson had a similar belief, that the PKI did not have a strong footing in West Kalimantan (Davidson 
2002:128) 
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estimated PKl to have support of only around 2.5%, a very small figure compared to 
Partindo 30%, the Catholic Party 23%, PNI 22%, and NU 21 %. PKl also had little political 
support at the district level, except in Pontianak city. After the coup, the military estimated 
that around 3,500 persons needed to be investigated in the province (Rachman, Mansjur et 
al. 1970:226). 
The lack of popular support meant the Communist Party could not mobilise enough 
power to intimidate their opponents or to instigate communist unilateral action (aksi 
sepihak) in West Kalimantan (Davidson 2002: 137).234 Intimidation and unilateral action in 
Java that contributed to the enmity that drove mass killings, did not exist in West 
Kalimantan. Furthermore, the West Kalimantan military had already suspended PKI 
activities on 16 October 1965 (Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970:225), before the time of the 
mass murder of the communists took place in other regions. 
The Regional Military Commander Ryacudu and Governor Oeray, the two most 
powerful men in West Kalimantan at that time, were Soekarno loyalists and allegedly 
lenient in purging the suspected communists. For example, two HSI figures, Tanting Ngo 
and W.S. Silitonga, who were convicted on 19 October 1965, were rehabilitated by 
Ryacudu a month later after a personal written guarantee from Governor Oeray (interview 
Ttg, Kodam XII 1965). Davidson has also noted existing amicable relations between 
Ryacudu and the head of West Kalimantan PKJ, Sofyan (Davidson 2002: 128). 
5.2.2 Merging into IPKI and Saving Dayak Politics 
As discussed above, West Kalimantan Partindo initially did not experience the 
prosecutions that other branches experienced. However, its leaders knew the danger was 
imminent and the future of the party was bleak. One party official recalled that shortly after 
the coup, Partindo's headquarters were moved from central Pontianak to a rather obscure 
place beside a rented motorcycle workshop, and that its leaders were in semi-hiding 
234At least in 1963, the local newspaper Bebas did not make any references to communist unilateral action like 
those in Java and elsewhere. Related local military publications also did not indicate such action took place. 
At the national level, Ricklefs (2001 :331-2) reported that the unilateral action mainly occurred in Java, Bali, 
and North Sumatra. The only written indication of the communist unilateral action was from a short memoir 
by Lim Bak Meng. He mentioned that in 1963 the Catholic Party was busy to deal with the action from BT! 
and SOBS!, two affiliates of PKI (Lim 1977; Lim 1978). 
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(interview Mgk). The dismissal of Oeray in July 1966 ended the remaining source of 
protection for Partindo. 
Table 5-3 Estimation of Strength of Political Parties in West Kalimantan (%,1960) 
Province or IP.KI* PK 
District 
West Kalimantan 29.9 22.9 
Pontianak City 15.8 12.6 
Pontianak 28.7 22.3 
...... 
. ~ Sambas 29.5 2.4 
...... Sanggau 39.2 26.J ...... ti) 
a Sin tang 42.8 26.4 
Kapuas Hulu 26.3 32.9 
Ketapang 15.8 35.6 
Source: recalculated from Kodam XII (1972:76). 
Note: *IPKI was in effect the old Partindo. 
PNI 
22.l 
5.9 
7.8 
28 
32.2 
20.5 
28.8 
23.8 
NU PKI MURBA PSII 
21.4 2.5 0.9 0.3 
28.8 31.9 3.8 1.1 
37.4 1.4 2.2 0.1 
33.2 5 1.3 0.7 
1.9 0.3 0.1 0.3 
10.l 0.2 0 0 
11.9 0 0 0 
23.9 0.3 0 0.6 
Unlike Partindo in other places where the party had disbanded itself or was "frozen" 
by local authorities, West Kalimantan Partindo still officially existed. The new regime in 
West Kalimantan handled the Partindo case carefully to avoid unnecessary political and 
social risks. By 1965 Partindo was undoubtedly the largest force in West Kalimantan 
politics, at least in terms of membership (see Table 5-3). As explained above, its leaders 
were highly charismatic for many of its large Dayak followers. The regime, particularly the 
military, was very keen to find the solution to this problem. The military did not disband it 
as it might cause problems, but merged it into a "trusted" political party, IP.KI. Facilitated 
by the military, 235 West Kalimantan Partindo leaders convened an extra-ordinary party 
conference on 26 September 1966 which declared that the party would merge with IP.KI. 
West Kalimantan IP.KI officially accepted the merger on 28 September 1966, followed by 
military approval on 6 October 1966 (IPKI l 966b; Kodam XII 1966; Partindo 1966). The 
Military Commander, Ryacudu, approved the merger on 16 October 1966. He also 
235The role of the military in the merger was quite evident as it wanted to solve the problem. In his merger 
speech, Ngo Lahay, the chairman of Partindo, also indicated the important roles of Regional Military 
Commander Ryacudu, and his aide, Lieutenant Colonel Siswojo Atmodihardjo (was appointed as mayor of 
Pontianak city on 25 January 1967), in the merger process. He also mentioned other important figures in 
Jakarta who were involved in the process, namely General Nasution, Professor Umar Senoadji, and Brigadier 
General Sukendro (Lahay 1966). One participant at the conference on 26 September 1966 also recalled the 
role of the military officials in preparing and setting up the conference (interview Kdr). 
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instructed that information about the "Partindo solution" be disseminated as widely as 
possible (Kodam XII 1966). 
There were several reasons behind the military preference for IPKI over other 
political parties. IPKI was supported by military retirees and veterans, and was a strong 
supporter of the New Order. The regime's trust in IPKI could be seen in a similar case in 
North Sumatra, where the regional military commander, Sarwo Edhie, preferred that ex-
members of PNI join IPKI (Sjamsuddin: 180-6). The merger of Partindo into IPKI would 
give the government access to "control" over leaders and the large number of followers of 
the former Partindo. For Partindo, merging into the military-backed IPKI was the safest 
option because of the growing power of the military within the new regime. Association 
with the military could also "neutralise" the party's past links with the left.236 Also, IPKI's 
nationalist platform was more acceptable for predominantly non-Muslim Dayak members 
of Partindo. Merging with other parties seemed to be more problematic for Partindo. The 
Catholic Party was not a viable option because of the conflict between the elite of the two 
parties (see §5.1.2). Joining Islamic parties was also not an option because of its 
predominantly non-Muslim Dayak members. Joining another nationalist party, PNI, was 
not desirable both for Partindo and the regime. Partindo would not want to merge with the 
Soekamoist PNI, which had become one of the main enemies of the new regime. In 
Sumatra and many provinces in Java, the military had urged the dissolution of the PNI 
(Sjamsuddin: 180-6). The regime would also deter Partindo a merger with PNI as that 
would create a greater challenge for the regime. It was not possible to merge with Sekber 
Golkar (hereafter Golkar), which had not yet emerged as a political force and was not yet 
envisaged as the political vehicle for the new regime, although quite soon it would be 
transformed into an important organ of New Order.237 
236Following the merger, Partindo quickly fostered a new alignment with the New Order, and shed all 
remaining ties with its leftist past. A letter from Sanggau IPKI dated 3 October 1966 showed that Partindo's 
affiliates had changed their names to include the term "Pancasila". For example: Gerakan Pemuda Indonesia 
became Gerakan Pemuda Pancasila; Gerakan Tani Marhaen became Gerakan Tani Pancasila; Gerakan Serikat 
Buruh Indonesia became Kesatuan Buruh Pancasila, Wanita Indonesia became Gerakan Wanita Pancasila 
(IPKI 1966a). West Kalimantan IPKI inherited a few affiliates that even IPKI headquarters did not have. 
237The military established Sekber Golkar in October 1964 in order to coordinate army-civilian cooperative 
bodies to counter growing political influence of PKI (Ricklefs 2001 :334). 
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Unfortunately, not long after the merger, problems started to emerge for the "new" 
party. The national IPKI leader, Brigadier Sukendro, an ally of General Yani who was 
killed in the 1965 coup attempt, was detained in a wave of arrests to uproot pro-Soekamo 
elements within the military in July and August 1967 (van der Kroef 1971:98).238 The role 
of General Nasution, one of the founders of the New Order who was considered the founder 
and benefactor of IPKI, also declined after 1968 because of his growing opposition to the 
newly elected president.239 Towards the end of the 1960s, Golkar had emerged as the sole 
political vehicle of the regime and consequently other political parties, including IPKI, had 
lost influence. This overall trend at national level weakened IPKI considerably. In West 
Kalimantan, the "new" IPKI, the result of the merger, started to disintegrate because of the 
internal frictions between the original members (i.e. Malays) and new members (i.e. 
Dayaks) which will be discussed below. 
5.3 The Demise of Dayak Politics and the 1971 Election 
5.3.1 Manoeuvres to Support Golkar 
By 1969, Soeharto had strengthened his position. He had not only successfully 
secured support from the central and regional bureaucracies, but had also installed his 
loyalists in most key military positions by eliminating or sidelining dissident officers (van 
der Kroef 1971; Ward 1974:8-9; Crouch 1978:Chapter 9; Ricklefs 2001:297-8). On the 
economic front he had stabilised the economy, and had embarked on the first Five Year 
Development Plan (Repelita). Concerned to legitimise his regime, Soeharto decided to call 
the election, which had been postponed since 1968. 
At the beginning of his regime, Soeharto did not plan to use Golkar as the main 
political machinery to contest the election. The Golkar leadership expected to be only one 
of the big three in the election (Crouch 1978:264-5). The regime's cultivation of relations 
238 In 1965, Sukendro was A1my Intelligence Chief. He then became a minister in the Second Revised 
Dwikora Cabinet (March-July 1966). Nasution speculated that Sukendro was arrested for trying to help 
Soekamo out (Nasution 1988:8-9). 
239General Nasution was a target in the 1965 coup attempt, but escaped. He was appointed chairman ofMPRS 
from 1966 and had chaired sessions of the MPRS that revoked the presidential mandate of Soekamo in 1967. 
Nasution's political influence and independent views started to distance him from the new regime. He was 
eased out from the New Order power circle after the conclusion of the MPRS sessions in March 1968, and 
finally retired from the army in 1972 (Nasution 1998:Chapter 8). 
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with political parties, such as PNI, led many to believe that it would be cooperating with 
those parties in the post-election government (cf. van der Kroef 1971; Crouch 1978:265). 
Toward the 1971 election, the regime decided to use Golkar as its sole vehicle to win the 
election. The regime's hostilities toward the other political parties escalated as the regime 
wanted to ensure Golkar's victory. 
One way to weaken political parties was through government intervention. A 
special military operations unit called Opsus (operasi khusus) had played roles in 
instigating some internal party struggles (Sebastian 2006:45-6).240 Its main objective was to 
remove the recalcitrant or pro-Old Order leaders before the election and establish control 
over the parties under new leaderships. All the major political parties, except probably NU, 
were subjected to internal purges. Other functional and professional groups, such as 
associations of journalists (PWI), lawyers (Persahi), and medical doctors (IDI), were not 
exempt from government intervention. In the internal struggles, the regime extended 
recognition only to leaders who supported it. Subsequently, those leaders who won the 
contest became collaborators with the regime (see Nishihara 1972:21-22; Ward 1974:17-9; 
Crouch 1978:Chapter10). 
Policies and regulations were also engineered to help Golkar win. Permen 1211969, 
promulgated in December 1969, required members of the functional group in national, 
provincial and district legislatures to sever their affiliations with political parties.241 Since 
this group occupied more than half of the parliamentary seats, their switch to Golkar was a 
windfall for Golkar. This requirement was greatly resented by political parties since many 
members of the functional group in the Parliament had links with political parties (see 
Ward 1974:11). For example, 76 of the 242 members of the functional group in DPR-GR 
were affiliated with political parties (Crouch 1978:24 7-8). Similar processes also happened 
in West Kalimantan. Those members of the functional group who had links with the 
2400psus was set up by Soeharto during the lrian Barat campaign (1963-66). Its function was to compile 
political intelligence and was at times used by the President to conduct sensitive foreign diplomatic 
assignments. Ali Murtopo headed the unit for many years. Opsus was linked to the implementation of the Act 
of Free Choice in 1969, through which lrian Barat became a province of Indonesia. It was also involved in 
negotiations with Portugal regarding East Timor in the mid-1970s (Kingsbury 2003:128-9; Sebastian 
2006:45-6). 
241Some other regulations between 1966 and 1967 (i.e. 1 February 1966 and Law 2011967) had removed the 
communist representatives and sympathisers from the DPRD, and at the same time provided seats for pro-
New Order elements. 
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political parties severed their ties with them, and became members of Golkar (see Gubemur 
Kalbar 1964:8-9; Gubemur Kalbar 1970: 14-5; Kodam XII 1972:81).242 
Another policy, PP 611970, aimed at preventing civil servants from supporting 
political parties was promulgated in February 1970. Those civil servants included the 
military and the police, employees in the defence ministry, and other civil servants as 
stipulated by the President. In the implementation, almost all civil servants were bound by 
this regulation (Ward 1974: 12). This policy cut off ties between the political parties on the 
one side and civil servants and army members on the other. Civil servants were required to 
sign a statement in which they vowed to give their loyalty only to Golkar (monoloyalitas). 
West Kalimantan was no exception. For example, in Sanggau district, all sub-district heads 
were asked to sign a monoloyalitas statement called Pernyataan Bersama Camat 
Sekabupaten Sanggau (Declaration of Sub-District Heads in Sanggau District). In the 
statement dated 7 April 1970, they declared the severing of their ties with political parties 
(Pemerintah Sanggau 1970). In effect, the local bureaucracy had no choice but to ensure 
Golkar won the election or face "disciplinary" actions from the regime for not being able to 
boost support for Golkar.243 
5.3.2 Golkar, IPKI and the Election of 1971 
Internal friction within IPKI, i.e. between the original Malay members and new 
former Partindo Dayak members started to appear soon after the merger. The original 
Malay members of the party were not satisfied with the merger, as they were not much 
involved in the process. The merger decision and process were made by the regime and 
party headquarters in Jakarta. The Malay leaders in the party were also dissatisfied with 
their loss of their dominance in the party leadership because the growing influences of the 
Dayak leaders within the party. In terms of the ethnic composition before the merger, West 
Kalimantan IPKI was basically a Malay party. After the merger, the party structure on 28 
242F.X. Jos Di it Sinsang, who was a member of Partin do and then IPKJ, was appointed by Golkar as a member 
of Parliament representing intellectuals from Golkar. He wrote a letter of resignation to Golkar on 28 March 
1970. In the letter he explained that according to regulation Permen 12/1969 he could not be a member of a 
political party (i.e. IPKJ) while holding a seat representing a functional group (Sinsang 1970b). Diit Sinsang 
was arrested in early 1971. 
243During the New Order regime it was quite common that officials who failed to win Golkar in the election to 
be "demoted". Civil servants who were known to support other political parties were usually required to 
resign from their government jobs. 
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October 1966 showed that Dayak figures had penetrated every part of its leadership 
structure. At least 40% of party officials were Dayaks (18 out of 43). Oevaang Oeray was 
made the Advisor to the party. This dissatisfaction was exacerbated by the rather high 
expectation of the "new" Dayak members, whose party was once much more influential 
than IPKI. Internal friction between the Malays and Dayaks became inevitable. 
In 1968, Tan Husni Abdullah, the Malay chairman of IPKI, decided to expel all ex-
Partindo members from the party. He reasoned that some of them were involved in the 
banned organisations, such as Baperki, HSI, and PK.I. However, this decision was annulled 
by headquarters on the basis that before the merger all ex-Partindo members in the pary at 
that time had obtained security clearances after thorough military screenings. IPKI 
headquarters then took over the party leadership of the province to prevent further 
disintegration (IPKI 1971). On 27 February 1970, the headquarters gave a mandate to 
Ibrahim Saleh, a Malay founder of West Kalimantan IPKI, to form a new party leadership. 
The final party leadership, legalised on 16 June 1970, included only 28% Dayaks (6 out of 
21). The majority of former senior Partindo members were excluded from the new structure 
(IP.KI 1970). The exclusion was very likely to reinstate Malay paramountcy in the party and 
at the same time to prevent a stronger Dayak influence in the party leadership. 
As the election approached, calls to arrest ex-Partindo members within IP.KI 
emerged. In the beginning, the new Regional Military Commander Soemadi (note that the 
governor also had the same name), who was installed just a few months earlier, issued a 
statement to back his predecessor's stand on the innocence of West Kalimantan Partindo.244 
The statement on 7 October 1970 stated that Partindo was not an illegal party and ex-
Partindo members in IPKI who had ties with Baperki were allowed to conduct political 
activities so long as they were not involved in the 1965 coup nor had become underground 
members of PKI (Kodam XII 1970).245 Nevertheless, the mounting pressure forced Ngo 
Lahay the former chairman of Partindo and at that time a member of provincial legislature 
244The military commander before Soemadi was Antonius Johannes Witono Sarsono (July 1967-April 1969). 
Prior to Witono was Ryacudu (September 1963-July 1967). For the complete list of the military commanders 
from the 1950s to 1980s see Journal Indonesia (1983: 117). 
245pKJ allowed its members to become members of other parties. 
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representing IPKJ, to resign on 11October1970 (Surat Menyetujui 1971).246 On 15 January 
1971, after almost four-and-a-half years since the 1965 Coup, the military finally arrested 
some core ex-Partindo/Baperki members. In Pontianak, Ngo Lahay, H.G. Mihing and 
Tanting Ngo were arrested; in the Sambas area M. Idris, Diit Sinsang; in Sanggau Philips 
Neng. The duration and type of arrest varied: for leaders such as Ngo Lahay, H.G Mihing, 
and Tanting Ngo it lasted until September 1971 (various interviews, Ngo 1975). All were 
barred from public gatherings, and were not allowed to participate in the 1971 election. 
Another Partindo figure E.D. Tundang, who headed a government office, was charged with 
corruption and arrested on 2 March 1971. A higher court in Jakarta found he was not guilty 
and ordered his release on 24 September 1973 (Akcaya 18-4-1977). 
The regime target now was the former Governor Oeray, who was still active 
working at the governor's office at the time of those arrests. With the rank of resident, he 
was one of the highest active civil servants at the provincial level, who was not on Golkar's 
side.247 He maintained his political association with IPKI, and was listed as the party's 
main candidate for the election. Understanding Oeray's influence, the military commander, 
who had the final say on the list of legislature candidacies, demoted Oeray's position to 
number 20 on the list, an unelectable position (cf. Gubemur Kalbar 1971 b).248 Oeray, who 
was at the time the head of the Regional Screening Committee, was not satisfied with the 
change. Facing Oeray's defiant attitude, the military commander planned to arrest him. 
However, Governor Soemadi was not keen on having Oeray arrested, as it could create 
unnecessary political risks that could undermine the election which was due in four months 
time. He asked the minister of internal affairs to promote Oeray and used that as a pretext to 
transfer him to Jakarta (interview Smd). The minister agreed and issued the promotion on 
28 February 1971. On 9 March 1971, approximately a week after the promotion, the letter 
for his transfer was out. Knowing of the scheme to uproot him from his power base in 
Pontianak, Oeray initially refused to comply with the transfer (interviews Bin, Syk). It was 
246By this time, Ngo Lahay was no longer in the IPKI leadership structure, since his name was not in the new 
party structure issued on June 1970. The only senior Dayak leaders in the structure were E.D. Tundang, A. 
Sawa, and Asam Djarak. Tundang would soon be arrested, while Sawa and Djarak would be joining Golkar. 
247 Another party figure in the bureaucracy, Dr Soedarso from PNI, was made to retire shortly before the 
election. 
248The original position of Oeray in the list was not disclosed, but probably was within the first five. 
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not until 20 March 1971 that he finally decided to leave, when it was clear that arrest by the 
military was imminent if he refused to board the plane to Jakarta (for the dates, see Varia 
6/VJ March 1971).249 
The arrests of the former Partindo members in January 1971 and removal of Oeray 
were probably the regime's last resort after persuasion to make them switch to Golkar 
failed. 250 Their arrests had been delayed several times since the first arrest warrant was 
issued in December 1969 and then again on 2 November 1970.251 This delay gave time for 
the military and Golkar to persuade the ex-Partindo members IPKI to switch sides. Internal 
IPKI document explained that some time in 1969, the West Kalimantan military authority 
sent Lieutenant-Colonel Nurdin Djain to Jakarta to persuade the leaders of national IPKI to 
allow all ex-Partindo members of West Kalimantan IPKI to be transferred to Golkar. This 
request was rejected by IPKI headquarters. The document also disclosed Golkar approaches 
to recruit IPKI members, particularly those from lower echelons (IPKI 1971). Various 
interviews also confirmed that the military threatened ex-Partindo members to join Golkar 
or face imprisonment. At one time there a document was circulated which contained the 
names of more than ten leaders of Partindo in Pontianak to be arrested - undoubtedly 
putting more pressure on the Dayak leaders to switch to Golkar (interview Lnj). 
The military and the regime efforts finally paid off within a month of Oeray's 
departure to Jakarta. On 17 April 1971, five senior Dayak leaders, A. Djelani, P. Anjiem, I. 
Kaping, A. Sawa, and J.A.M. Linggie, together with other Dayak figures, publicly 
announced they were joining Golkar. Two of them, A. Sawa and Asam Djarak, were IPKI 
officials in the new structure formed in June 1970. The others were probably still members 
or sympathisers of IPKI before they decided to join Golkar. In the statement, they advised 
other Dayaks to follow suit and give assistance to local authorities, especially the military 
commander, to make a success of the election and development program of the New Order. 
A special taskforce was formed to inform local Dayaks about the change in political 
249The central government once contemplated removing Oeray from West Kalimantan after the 1967 conflict 
(interview Mgn, Doera 2003:122). 
2500eray's refusal to switch to Golkar had influenced many of his followers not to join Golkar. 
251 These were based on private communications from Diit Sinsang to Oevaang Oeray (Sinsang 1970a), as 
well as IPKI Document (IPKI 1971). According to Sinsang, the instructions were based on Kogam Instruction 
No. 9/1965 that all officials of Baperki be classified as "B" and if they were civil servants they should be 
dishonourably discharged. 
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alignment of their leaders (Golkar 1971b). On 19 May 1971, Nurdin Djain, this time as 
general chairman of West Kalimantan Golkar, instructed these Dayak figures to campaign 
for Golkar. On 24 May 1971, these Dayak leaders announced that thousands of Dayaks had 
chosen to join Golkar. In the same document they also rejected rumours that their joining 
Golkar was because of intimidation (Golkar 1971 a). 
Pressure on IPKI and other political parties increased as the election approached.252 
Golkar and the military rightly had concerns over IPKI, because it had become one of the 
largest political parties in West Kalimantan following its absorption of Partindo. Some 
district Regional Governing Councils (Muspida) had urged IPKI branches to disband 
themselves (IPKI 1971).253 The head ofKetapang IPKI at that time, for example, decided to 
dissolve the party upon receiving "advice" from the local military commander (interview 
Smj). Six of the party's candidates, most possibly of ex-Partindo background, for the 
election were disqualified by the local military commander. That number was the highest 
among the political parties in the province (see Nishihara 1972:59). 
During the election campaign, political parties in many areas were intimidated and 
unable to campaign properly. The head of Pontianak district IPKI, who was later to become 
a member of Golkar, recollected his being detained and intimidated by the military so that 
he joined Golkar (interview Shd). Similar intimidation was felt in Sintang (interview Mjg) 
and very likely also in other interior districts. In contrast, Dayak leaders campaigned freely 
for Golkar. In the end, West Kalimantan IPKI managed to get only two seats in the 
provincial DPRD, the fifth rank after Golkar, NU, Parmusi and PK.254 Both IPKI seats were 
allocated to Malay candidates: the first and third candidates. The second candidate, Herman 
Imang Ngo - a Dayak, who should have been elected, was bypassed.255 There was a strong 
belief that many IPKI votes were Dayak votes. As an illustration, the sub-district head of 
Me Jiau during the election explained that the party won 100% of the votes in some remote 
252Political pressure and intimidation toward political parties were also common in many parts in Indonesia as 
the regime tried hard to ensure that Golkar won. The phenomenon of "self-disbanding" of political parties as 
the result of political pressure was quite common at this time. 
253Muspida is made up of the heads of the military, police, and civil administration. 
254IPK1 obtained no seat at the national level, and ranked only ninth out often parties in West Kalimantan. 
255 According to one ex-Partindo member, at this time, ex-Partindo leaders were only "guests" in IPKT. 
Important decisions were in the hands of Tan Husni and Ibrahim Saleh, both were Malays (interview Shd). 
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villages under his control. He found out later that the Dayaks in these areas were not aware 
of the recent changes in the political affiliation of their leaders to Golkar (interview Omr). 
5.4 Dayak Politics and Conflict in 1967 
Communists and their sympathisers had become the target of the "cleaning" 
operation throughout Indonesia after October 1965. In some regions in Java, Bali, and 
Sumatra, the anti-communist mass supported by the army rounded up and killed targets en 
masse. In Java and Bali, mass killing intensified as soon as the RPKAD, a crack unit within 
the army, came to the regions. The military and the police were also reported to allow or 
even encourage the murders to take place (see for example Cribb 1990). 
Conflict of a quite different nature also occurred in West Kalimantan, some time 
after the mass killing elsewhere had stopped. Between September and November 1967, tens 
of thousands of Chinese who lived in the northern part of the province were driven out from 
their homes by Dayaks. Many of those Chinese who refused to move or who retreated too 
late were killed. The official record was 249 deaths and almost 60,000 refugees at the end 
of the conflict (Gubernur Kalbar l 967a; Davidson 2002: 156). There has been a strong 
belief among scholars that the Dayaks were not capable of waging such a cruel war against 
the Chinese without a third party being involved, in this case, the army (for example, PEER 
1968; Davidson 2002). Members of the Dayak political elites who had just lost their 
positions were also suspected of waging war to show their allegiance to the new regime and 
at the same time to regain its trust. This section will re-investigate these claims by 
examining some new evidence. 
In order to understand the conflict better, the next will first give a brief chronology 
showing how the conflict evolved. It will be followed by discussion of the situation prior to 
the conflict and its "political" causes. 
5.4.1 Chronology of the Conflicts 
The spark of conflict had begun at least a week earlier than the commonly cited 14 
October 1967 in Uduk Village (FEER 21/27-1-1968, Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970:271; 
Davidson 2002:155). A confidential report prepared by the governor's office (Gubernur 
Kalbar 1967a) listed earlier Dayak attacks between 5 and 7 October, when they burnt and 
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looted Chinese houses in Tepo village, Air Besar (Landak), adjacent to Sanggau Ledo 
(Bengkayang). These acts were followed by similar incidents in the Bengkayang sub-
district from 13 October, which prompted the worried Chinese to seek refuge in 
Bengkayang city. In one incident, the Dayaks killed several Chinese in Sansak village in 
retaliation to the rebel attack on nearby Uduk village. The rebels, as will be discussed 
below, were mostly Chinese. By 18 October Bengkayang city already sheltered about one 
thousand refugees. On 19 October Dayaks in Samalantan (Bengkayang) started to distribute 
"red bowls", a Dayak call for mass mobilisation for war. After the distribution of the red 
bowl, Dayak mobilisation against the Chinese intensified, and the conflict became a 
"traditional" war in which all adult Dayak men were obliged to join the call to fight the 
enemy (i.e. Chinese). 
Sporadic killings had occurred from mid October although the more deadly killings 
did not occur until after 28 October 1967. The three most deadly attacks happened during 
the first and second weeks of November in Senakin, Darit and Sebadu, all in Landak 
district, and claimed a total of 210 lives (Gubemur Kalbar 1967a; Davidson 2002:156). 
Only after these attacks did the military commander, on 17 November, order the Dayaks to 
stop the "demonstrations" and ordered the army to shoot on the spot those who refused to 
comply (Pembangunan 21-11-1967). The demonstrations dissipated after this injunction 
although a government report still mentioned occasional clashes up to the end of November 
1967 (Gubernur Kalbar 1967a). 
5.4.2 Conditions prior to the Conflict 
5.4.2.1 The Effect oflnsurgencies 
From 1963, West Kalimantan had become a frontier for the Indonesian campaign 
against the formation of the Malaysian Pederation by the British govemment.256 Indonesia 
sent its military forces and volunteers to the West Kalimantan border (and also to some 
parts of Sumatra). It also sheltered and trained Sarawakian guerrillas so that they could be 
sent back into British Borneo to disrupt the formation process (Rachman, Mansjur et al. 
256Soekamo believed that the Federation was a "puppet" state and a new form of colonisation, a threat to 
Indonesia. He believed that the decision to form the Federation was made without full consultation of the 
local population, particularly in Sarawak and Sabah. 
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1970:232-5). Between October and November 1965 there were 2,313 volunteers (Davidson 
2002:125). 
The guerrillas were relatively undisturbed during the political transition in Indonesia 
between 1965 and early 1967. After the abortive coup, the government continued its anti-
Malaysia campaign and therefore still needed the rebels (see Rachman, Mansjur et al. 
1970:240). Davidson reported that as late as August 1966, the Indonesian military still 
conducted guerrillas training (2002:133). The anti-communist drives in the province were 
not directed at the communist guerrillas who were fighting the establishment of Federation 
of Malaya, but members of PKT and sympathisers. Because of this political attitude, the 
activities of communist rebels in Indonesian Kalimantan seemed to regain their vigour 
whereas communist activities had almost stopped elsewhere in Indonesia (van der Kroef 
l 968a:251-2; Davidson 2002: 151 ). Davidson mentioned a number of incidents related to 
the increased PKI activities in coastal towns between August and November 1967 
(2002:151). 
Initially the Indonesian government did not think rebels would be a threat as their 
political aim was to overthrow the Sarawakian government (i.e. to sabotage the formation 
of the Federation of Malaysia). They only became a security risk to Indonesia when they 
refused to disarm and surrender after both Indonesia and Malaysia ended the confrontation 
on 11 August 1966.257 Starting in October 1966, the Indonesian army began operations to 
regain control over rebel strongholds and clashes were unavoidable (for details of the 
operation see Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970:239-339). 258 By this time, some ex-PKI 
members who had evaded capture by the Indonesian government had joined the guerrillas, 
2570 nly 99 surrendered, while 739 Chinese volunteers chose to remain at the Indonesian border to continue 
their operation (Gubemur Kalbar l 967a:82). A general amnesty was also offered by the Sarawak government 
to the communist guerillas between July 1966 and January 1967 but it only resulted in 41 surrenders (van der 
Kroef 1968a:253). 
258Some of these operations were not successful. The first cause was the withdrawal of all special combat 
units from West Kalimantan and their role was transferred to less experienced local army units. The local 
army units were inexperienced because they had not been involved directly in the military operation during 
the confrontation. Secondly, there was no handover of intelligence information during the transfer. Another 
obstacle was the small size of the army compared to the vast territory. Undoubtedly there were also 
communist cadres within the army which further undermined the military actions against the rebels (interview 
Djg, Kompas 9-8-1967, Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970; Davidson 2002). 
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although ex-PKI fanned a small minority in the rebel force dominated by Sarawakian 
Chinese (for the rebels structure refers to Kodam XII 1972).259 
The government did not deal resolutely with the rebels until they attacked a military 
depot in Sanggau Ledo (Bengkayang) on 16 July 1967 (Rachman, Mansjur et al. 
1970:257).260 Rebels killed several guards and absconded with significant amounts of arms 
and ammunition.261 After the attack, the central government began to see the seriousness of 
the situation and agreed to dispatch reinforcements (van der Kroef 1968a:257; Rachman, 
Mansjur et al. 1970:260). National newspapers, such as Kompas and Angkatan Bersenjata 
started to cover the rebel issue more seriously. 
5.4.2.2 Rising Anti-Chinese Sentiment 
Indonesia's relations with the PRC after the coup in 1965 deteriorated rapidly as 
PRC continued to praise the Indonesian communists and denigrate the incoming regime. 
The deteriorating relations reflected badly on the Chinese in Indonesia, many of whom held 
PRC citizenship. Anti-Chinese incidents were on the increase, ranging from demonstrations 
to demand their repatriation, nationalisation of their businesses, restrictions on their 
business activities, to physical attacks on the Chinese and their property (Staf Chusus 
Urusan Tjina 1968:26-39; van der Kroef 1968b:from p. 26; Cappel 1983; Setiono 
2003:Chapter 49). The spiralling number of incidents from one place to another was partly 
due to the lack of government action, which was perceived as government "approval". 
Reports of anti-Chinese attacks by the national press were also covered by local 
newspapers, which resulted in an increase of local hostility towards the Chinese. 
259From this time on, the rebel forces were comprised of Paraku, PGRS, Indonesian volunteers, and PKI 
members. The Paraku rebels were concentrated on the eastern border, while PGRS was mostly situated on the 
western front (Davidson 2002: 133-4 ). This chapter will use the terms guerillas and rebels. 
260The underlying reasons behind this less serious campaign, according to Davidson, partly included the 
regime's pre-occupation with eliminating the communists in Java and Bali, and partly the misjudgement about 
the real conditions in West Kalimantan. Furthe1more, it was difficult for the existing military to effectively act 
against the rebels whom they had earlier supported and trained (Davidson 2002:143-4). 
261 The rebels seemed to understand the details of the military depot hence the successful attack. The 
government suspected the help of internal "sources", Chinese villagers, as well as Chinese who had business 
dealings with the military (Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970). 
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In West Kalimantan, the Chinese were also ostracised. On 20 December 1966, the 
military commander ejected all officials of Zhonghua Gonghui and hundreds of Chinese 
from the province (Setiono 2003:807).262 
Davidson has listed the regime anti-Chinese policies from 1966 to mid-1967, 
including banning or restricting organisations, repatriation efforts and forced labour 
(Davidson 2002: 138-9). Davidson noted that early in the year 1967, the authorities had 
forced nearly 8,000 Chinese to work on the Singkawang-Seluas road, some 3,000 to open 
rice fields in Sanggau, and another 600 to build an army barracks in Semitau (Kapuas Hulu 
district) (Davidson 2002:139). In January 1967, military authorities began the resettlement 
of an initial 5,000 Chinese away from the Sarawak border. The Chinese were no longer 
allowed to live within five miles of the border (van der Kroef 1968a:255). On 17 February 
1967, about 545 alien Chinese were gathered in Pontianak for eventual repatriation back to 
China, although they were returned to their villages because there was no transportation 
(Kodam XII 1981:2). In April 1967, the government announced a plan to repatriate 350,000 
Chinese to PRC (van der Kroef 1968a:255).263 In sum, the Chinese had become targets of 
the new regime and the military authorities were able to "force" the Chinese to do what 
they wanted. 
The majority of West Kalimantan Chinese were believed to be sympathetic to the 
communists, although they were not necessarily ideologically communists (Houliston 
1963:14; Peterson 1968:17). In some areas, local Chinese support for rebels was strong. 
One key PK.I figure who was captured in 1967 claimed that rebels ' influence in the Chinese 
villages was almost 100%. The source maintained that more than 90% of Chinese youth in 
those areas were communist sympathisers, and around 20% of its youth were active 
members of the rebel group (Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970:259, 276). Ethnic and cultural 
similarities between the Sarawakian rebels, who were invariably Chinese, and the West 
262 This organisation was the main organisation of totok Chinese, who mostly did not have Indonesian 
citizenship, and were oriented to mainland Chinese (PRC). 
263This number was too high because the total Chinese population in the province in 1971 was about 226,216, 
a fraction of whom held Indonesian citizenships. 
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Kalimantan Chinese made cooperation easier (Pembangunan 7-11-1967, Rachman, 
Mansjur et al. 1970:274).264 
After the rebel attack in July 1967 in Sanggau Ledo, local and national newspapers 
started to publish articles demonising the Chinese in West Kalimantan as Communists 
(Tjinkom or T]ina Komunis) and West Kalimantan as a PRC enclave (Kantong RRT).265 
One military priest remembered a rumour spread among the Dayaks that 80% of West 
Kalimantan Chinese were communist rebels (Doera 2003: 130). 266 Even the military 
commander admitted touring the region several months before the attacks to advise Dayaks 
not to trust the Chinese because they were "in league" with the communists (Alexander 
1973:4). Continuous campaigns to uproot the communists throughout the country, and 
campaigns to link the Chinese with the communists, could have influenced Dayaks' belief 
that the communist rebels were the enemy of the state and that the Chinese were assisting 
them. As a result, "in the eyes of the Dayaks and Malays, all local Chinese were 
sympathisers of the communist guerrillas - if they were not secret members" (FEER 3/9-
12-1967). It was this new national and local outlook that shaped Dayak attitude to the 
Chinese, who otherwise maintained peaceful relations with the Dayaks.267 This growing 
anti-Chinese sentiment and continuing campaign to show that the Chinese were the enemies 
later became a pretext and justification for the Dayaks attacking the Chinese .. 
264The other supporting facts were that the majority of the Chinese population in the province were resident 
aliens, who mostly supported the Communist PRC. 
265Consult articles published between September and November 1967 in Pembangunan (local newspaper) and 
Kompas (national newspaper). 
266 The priest believed that the rumours were a distorted version of a fact that 80% of the rebels were 
Malaysian Chinese (Doera 2003:130). Doera was a military priest in West Kalimantan (1967-1971) whose 
pol itical views often irritated his superior. This had led to his house-arrest and his eventual resignation from 
the military priest position in March 1971 (Doera 2003). 
267 A Protestant pastor asserts that while they did not always mingle they managed to coexist well (see 
Peterson 1968). While Chinese traders perhaps had exploited the Dayak farmers (interview Kpg), the majority 
of the Chinese who lived near the Dayaks were farmers themselves. The fact that many older generations of 
Dayaks in conflict areas spoke Chinese dialects, and similarities of some cultural aspects of the Chinese and 
Dayaks, shows that both communities had mingled. At the end of the 1960s, the relations of many pro-rebel 
Chinese and some indifferent or pro-government Dayaks might have turned sour because of political 
differences. The report claimed that the Chinese merchants in some areas had become antagonistic to some 
Dayaks who were helping the military against the rebels (Rachrnan, Mansjur et al. 1970:276). 
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5.4.3 Political Explanations 
5.4.3.1 The Role of the Military 
Dayak attacks on the Chinese benefited military operations against communist 
rebels. This benefit was clearly stated in governor and military documents which claimed 
that, with the disappearance of all Chinese from rural areas of Bengkayang and Landak 
districts, the link between local Chinese and rebels would be cut off and communist cells 
consequently be in disarray (Gubemur Kalbar 1967a; Kodam XII 1968; Rachman, Mansjur 
et al. 1970; Kodam XII 1972; Kodam XII 1981).268 The military had encouraged Dayaks to 
fight the rebels. Prior to the conflict, the military commander had toured the region to 
remind the Dayaks that the Chinese were helping the rebels (Alexander 1973:4). The 
commander also urged Dayaks to avenge blood for blood (Davidson 2002: 150). The 
military was also reported to have granted titular military rank to Dayak leaders and 
conducted festive celebrations after a successful killing of suspected communists to 
encourage the attacks.269 
In this context, some sources believe that the killing of several Dayak traditional 
leaders, allegedly by rebels, were in fact, the work of the Indonesian military. Through the 
killings, they hoped to stir Dayaks into fighting rebels (Davidson 2002: 149; Doera 
2003: 149). Some Dayaks had good relations with rebels and were not enthusiastic about the 
military campaign to fight the guerillas (Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970:273). Doera, for 
example, asserted that the Dayaks in the border areas, who were not concerned with politics, 
had good relations with rebels (Doera 2003: 149). In Sungkung and Kapuas Hulu, some 
Dayaks were not interested in fighting the rebels (see also Peterson 1968:10; Rachman, 
Mansjur et al. 1970:272-3,247). 
It seems that the military did in fact encourage Dayaks to fight the rebels (see 
Davidson 2002: 160), but it is less convincing to claim that the conflict was the result of a 
planned conflict to "separate the Chinese from the rebels" (see such arguments in Herbert 
Feith in FEER 21/27-1-1968, Davidson 2002:149). Although a secret intelligence operation 
268The governor, for example, claimed that "because of the people's movement, the communist network and 
cells were disarray and [their communication] were cut-off completely" (Gubemur Kalbar l 967a). 
269Both o f these practices noted by Davidson (2002:159) seemed to be the practices of later operations under 
the Regional Military Commander General Soemadi (1969-1973) (see also Soemadi 1974:94-6). No evidence 
has been produced to show that they were adopted in 1967. 
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cannot be ruled out, evidence is lacking of a high-level scheme. Coordination at the top 
levels of the military and bureaucracy was lacking to support the theory of a planned war. If 
the war were planned and executed from Jakarta, there should be at least some general 
briefings to the key local officials to ensure they had some understanding so that they 
worked to achieve an objective. But the confusion among the top ranking regional officials 
and their different responses suggested that no such briefings had been given. A high 
ranking bureaucrat such as Major Usman Idris, the head of Pontianak district and an active 
military officer, instructed all sub-district heads to return the Chinese refugees, particularly 
the farmers, to their homes so that they could take care of their crops (Pembangunan 9-11-
1967). As the head of Pontianak district, a district where major conflict had taken place, it 
was very unnatural that he was not briefed on the imminent conflict which would affect his 
jurisdiction.270 If he had been briefed about the conflict and the plan to separate the Chinese, 
he presumably would not have ordered the return of the Chinese farmers. Also, it seems 
that no important military personnel in the conflict areas were aware of the impending 
Dayak attacks. A military priest, who had toured some of the areas before the conflict and 
had chatted with local military and civil leaders, found them unaware of the incoming 
violence. This priest had close relations with the regional military commander, who was 
also a Catholic (Doera 2003:110). 
The response of local military officers was also inconsistent, further suggesting a 
lack of coordination, another indication that the conflict was not "planned". Davidson 
portrays the failure of the army to stop the marauding Dayak mobs as intentional so that the 
conflict would spread (see Davidson 2002). However, the failure of the military to perform 
a more active role to stop the conflict spreading in some instances has other explanations. 
In the case of massacres in Senakin and Anjungan, eyewitnesses recalled that the small 
number of military personnel had been powerless to stop the mob (van Hulten 1992:294; 
Doera 2003:118-20). The lack of resolute action could also have been due to the military 
reluctance to antagonise the Dayaks. FEER explained that the military authority feared that 
antagonising the Dayaks backlash against the military (FEER 3/9-12-1967). In other 
270Usman Idris was a local military officer, who held the district head position continuously for two periods 
(1967-1977). His re-election shows government confidence in him. 
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circumstances, the military did intervene to prevent further conflict and to restrain the 
movements of the marauding Dayaks. One eyewitness gives an example of military officers 
intercepting Dayak mobs and ordering them not to proceed further with their plan to attack 
the Chinese (Peterson 1968:19). In Anjungan, mobs themselves acknowledged that the 
military presence had prevented wholesale looting and bloodshed (Peterson 1968:28). 
The military certainly wanted to see the end of communist activities in the province, 
and welcomed Dayaks moves against the Chinese who lived in the interior who were 
known to sympathise with communist rebels. However, the lack of coordination and 
confusion among top government officials and military suggests that the conflict was not as 
planned as some scholars were first led to believe. The conflict involved a substantial 
element of spontaneous and traditional warfare. 
5.4.3.2 The Role of the Rebels 
The argument that the military had provoked Dayaks to attack Chinese who were 
seen as supporters of the rebels seems to have assumed that Dayaks had no grievances 
against the rebels and would therefore not attack unless provoked by outside intervention. 
In some areas, such as Sungkung and Kapuas Hulu, the rebels were indeed reported to be 
friendly and helpful to the local Dayaks in order to secure cooperation and support from 
them (Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970). However, the rebels' relations with the local Dayaks 
were not always amicable as they were also known to have made threats to local Dayaks 
who did not cooperate with them (Laskar Pangsuma 1967a; Peterson 1968: 10). Newspapers 
reported that rebels had victimised Dayaks, who lived on both sides of the border, if they 
did not cooperate with them (van der Kroef 1968a:250). The Uduk incident, which was 
often cited as the trigger of the conflict, was a rebel attack on Dayak villagers who had 
refused to supply food to rebels (Pembangunan 9-11-1967). Some rebel activities were 
reported to affect negatively the daily activities of the Dayaks (see Pembangunan 7-11-
1967, Laskar Pangsuma 1967a; Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970:274). 
Several weeks before the pogrom in mid-October 1967, Dayaks were killed 
allegedly by the rebels. These incidents were believed to have triggered the conflict. On 3 
September, the communist rebels kidnapped and killed nine Dayaks in Tamu village 
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(Bengkayang). 271 The rebels also killed a Dayak adat leader, Temenggung Garanese, 
around that time (Merdeka 21-09-1967, Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970:274; Davidson 
2002:149-50). Davidson was suspicious that those killings could have been the work of the 
military (Davidson 2002:149-50), and had discounted the fact that the rebels also had 
reasons for the killings (as argued above). Two months immediately after the incident, a 
military priest, concluded that the victims were kidnapped to carry rebel supplies, and then 
were killed so they could not disclose the location of the rebels' hideout (Doera 
2003: 130).272 
There were several explanations given for rebel threats against the Dayaks. While 
they may have needed the help of the Dayaks, Dayak assistance was not indispensable. The 
rebels might have found it easier to seek help from "similar" Chinese, who were highly 
sympathetic to rebels and who were still living in rebel strongholds in interior areas in the 
Bengkayang and Landak districts.273 Their high confidence as a result of their successful 
attacks and lack of effective counter-attacks from the Indonesia army (Peterson 1968: 1 O; 
Rachman, Mansjur et al. 1970:274) may have made them careless with locals.274 One high 
profile attack was the successful raid on the military depot in Sanggau Ledo in July 1967, 
mentioned above. 
271 Davidson was confused between Tamu and Taum (Davidson 2002:155). Tamu (or Temu) is a village in 
southern part of Bengkayang sub-district located near the border with Landak, while Taum village is located 
in Sanggau Ledo, northern part ofBengkayang sub-district. 
272This was in line with the story from the military source that the Dayaks were kidnapped (Rachman, 
Mansjur et al. 1970). Howe.ver, the truth will remain a mystery unless hard evidence be found, or those who 
were directly involved in the kidnapping, either the army or the rebel, speak out. 
273Relations of many Chinese and Dayaks were also not harmonious in Sarawak. The core of the rebels was 
among the Sarawakian Chinese who had different political views to those of the Dayaks in ethnically-divided 
Sarawak. The rebels were fighting against the incorporation of Sarawak into the Malaysian Federation, but 
many Sarawakian Dayaks supported the federation (van der Kroef 1968a:248). Leaders of the Sarawakian 
Dayaks were initially reluctant to support the Federation but were persuaded by the Malayan Prime Minister, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman. Abdul Rahman played on the fear of rising communism and domination of the 
Chinese (Said 1985:Chap. 5, particularly pp. 88-90). 
274The success of the rebel attacks in the fi rst years was also the result of communist sympathisers within the 
army who supplied operational information for the rebels (interview Djg). Even into the early 1970s, there 
were still reports of arrests of communist sympathisers within military ranks in the province (Rachman, 
Mansjur et al. 1970:274). 
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5.4.3.3 The Role of Dayak Elites and Laskar Pangs um a 
The last issue to be addressed is the role of Dayak elites in the Pangsuma Militia 
(Laskar Pangsuma) in the attacks. 275 The Militia was formed on 3 November 1967, 
following a meeting of Dayak elites in Pontianak with Dayak leaders from Sambas and 
Pontianak districts at the end of October 1967 (Laskar Pangsuma 1967a; Laskar Pangsuma 
1967b).276 According to a member of the Sambas Dayak delegation, they were flown to 
Pontianak by a military helicopter on 31 October 1967 to clarify some accusations against 
the Dayaks, such as that Dayaks in Bengkayang and surrounding areas had joined the rebels 
to kill the Chinese (interview Smo). The delegation first saw Military Commander A.J. 
Witono, then - because Governor Soemadi was not in his office- met Oevaang Oeray. 
Oeray then organised a meeting in Pontianak in the Pangsuma Building between 
this Sambas delegation and more than a dozen Dayak leaders (interview Smo).277 The 
document produced after the meeting explained that the rebels had destabilised the security 
of West Kalimantan and had disturbed the livelihood of the Dayaks and had used the Dayak 
region as the rebel base; and that the Dayaks had actively helped the military against the 
rebels by embarking on their own operation against the rebels. The Dayak leaders declared 
their help to the military to fight the rebels and welcomed the Dayak willingness to wage 
war against the rebels (Laskar Pangsuma 1967a).278 As a follow-up, Laskar Pangsuma was 
established with its headquarters in Pontianak city. Leaders in its headquarters urged 
Dayaks to form branches in their region. The first to be set up were in the Sambas and 
Pontianak districts, while eastern district branches were formed later (Davidson 2002: 165). 
275Pangsuma was a Dayak war-leader who was killed during the revolt against the Japanese in 1944 (more 
about Pangsuma in L(ayang) 1981). 
276The timing of the meeting with leaders from Pontianak district was unclear, but it was probably held before 
the meeting with leaders from Sambas. 
277 Oeray was absent from this meeting (interview Smo ), although his name was included in a formal 
statement produced later. 
278They were J.C. Oevaang Oeray, A. Djelani, V. Oendoen, I. Kaping, P. Anjiem, E.D. Tundang, J.A.M. 
Linggie, H Tajib, A. Sawa, Joh. Lamid Niga, Asam Djarak, M. Tamzah, Herman Imang Ngo, M. Idris, Atan 
Pale!, D. Nungkad, Nicodemus, David Doengo, Hugo Mungok, M. Kapat, Sotorman, Ch. E. Jacobus Frans L., 
L.H. Kadir, St. Ngo Lahay (Laskar Pangsuma 1967a). It became clear that the members of Laskar Pangsuma 
were not merely Partindo sympathisers, but also included members of Partai Katolik, such as Herman Imang 
Ngo, Atan Pale!, M. Kapat, Sotorman, Jacobus Layang. Imang Ngo and Jacobus Layang were also dispatched 
on a peace mission after the conflict (interview Lyg). Of all Partai Katolik branches in the province, only the 
Sambas branch issued a formal statement against the formation of the militia. It was only issued on 18 
November 1967, at the winding-up stage of the conflict, perhaps at the direction of the Palaunsoeka who 
visited the province (Pembangunan 18-11-1967, Doera 2003:1 16). 
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In Sanggau the militia was less successful because, according to one former Partindo leader 
in Sanggau, they did not like the idea of "attacking" the Chinese (interview Omr). 
Oeray believed that most Chinese were helping the communists, supplying material 
aid, information and manpower. In his eyes, the Chinese were common farmers by day but 
guerrillas by night (FEER 21/27-1-1968). In an interview conducted some time after the 
conflict, he blamed the Chinese for the conflict (Alexander 1973:4). Because of his 
influence, Oeray's belligerent attitude was followed by militia leaders as shown by the 
language used in its pamphlets. In its declaration on 31 October 1967, it blamed the rebels 
for the instability in the Dayak regions, emphasised the Chinese link to the rebels, and 
urged the Dayaks to attack. It argued that the Dayaks were merely responding to the 
Chinese, who were the members or logistic suppliers to the rebels (Laskar Pangsuma 
1967a). Another pamphlet on 3 November 1967 used provocative language to urge Dayaks 
to crush the "PGRS/Communist Chinese" (Laskar Pangsuma 1967b).279 
It was not difficult to mobilise Dayaks to support militia initiatives as its leaders 
were charismatic former leaders of PD and Partindo. At provincial level, former leaders of 
Partindo, such as Ngo Lahay and Hugo Mungok, had become leading figures in the militia. 
Similarly, at the district level a close political connection was found. The chairman of the 
Sambas Pangsuma Militia was M. Idris, and the chairman of the Pontianak district militia 
was Rachmad Sahuddin, both of whom were former Partindo officials in their respective 
districts. 
The three bloodiest attacks in Senakin, Darit and Sebadu occurred after the 
formation of the militia in November 1967. Newspapers blamed the Militia for the 
atrocities, and accused the communists, such as members of ex-BTI, Partindo, and PKI, of 
having infiltrated and diverted the popular movement against rebels into racist killings 
(Pembangunan 10-11, 28-11-1967).280 According to the newspaper, it was not possible that 
the Dayaks, who had good relations with the Chinese, would commit such atrocities against 
279For example, a witness account accused H.G. Mihing, ex-leader of Partindo, of being a provocateur during 
the conflict (Doera 2003:124-5). 
280Palaunsoeka, who returned briefly to West Kalimantan, praised the Dayaks for helping the military crush 
the rebels, but at the same time denounced the killings as racist and indiscriminate (Pembangunan 10-11, 28-
11-1967). This accusation was made apparently after the reports of the capture of a few members of the PK! 
involved in the raids on the Chinese villages. The governor also reported the involvement of a few members 
of banned leftist organisations (Gubernur Kai bar 1967a). 
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them without a mastermind (Pembangunan 28-11-1967). The newspaper also accused the 
Partindo governor, Oevaang Oeray, of wanting to use the chaos so that he could make a 
"come-back" into politics (FEER 3/9-12-1967, Davidson 2002:161).281 If there had been 
such a plan, then it had failed miserably because the militia did not earn any respect for 
their role in crushing the "rebels" but, on the contrary, were blamed for the atrocities. 
As a result of mounting public pressure, within days of the deadly attacks, the 
military claimed to have "secured (mengamankan) some masterminds" of the attacks 
(Pembangunan 17-11-1967). 282 The military commander finally put Laskar Pangsuma 
under the control of the local military on 18 November 1967 (Pembangunan 28-11-1967). 
A week after that, its leaders were dispatched on a peace mission to the interior regions to 
calm the Dayaks. The instruction was direct and clear: to tour the district and to help the 
military defuse the situation (Kodim 1202 1967). 
It is quite apparent that the militia had some role in the killings in November 1967. 
At the very least, its provocative pamphlets and the behaviour of its leaders contributed to 
the atrocities. However, the militia could not have been instigators of the other earlier 
clashes in October, as it had only been formed in November. It was formed two weeks after 
the victims had fallen and the refugees had flocked to towns. Some individuals who had 
been involved in leading the earlier conflicts might have joined the militia at a later time. In 
this case, it was these individuals rather than the militia who were responsible for the 
attacks.283 
This section has shown that the 1967 conflict was not as "planned" as some scholars 
have claimed, although the military welcomed Dayaks' move against the rebels. Military 
confusion at the local level, as well as the lack of coordination at the top bureaucratic level, 
indicated a lack of planning. Besides some support from the military, some elite Dayaks 
mvan Hulten also mentioned several goals Oeray wanted to reach from the movements: to free the Dayaks 
from the economic domination of the Chinese, and to establish a Dayak "centre" in Anjungan (van Hulten 
1992:283). 
282Unfortunately there were no details on the masterminds, but probably only on some local leaders who 
participated in the attacks. None of the main militia leaders at provincial or district level were arrested 
because they were soon sent by the military to interior region to calm down the angry Dayaks. 
283The late formation of the militia rendered invalid arguments which considered it as the initial instigator of 
the conflict and massive evacuation that had occurred from the mid to end of October 1967 (see for example 
Davidson 2002:164-5). 
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and rebels played a part in the conflict. Some elite Dayaks, who wanted to make a come-
back into politics, tried to use this opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the new 
regime by fighting rebels and forming a militia. It had been blamed as the perpetrators of 
some atrocities at the end of the conflict. The resisting rebels and their successful 
counterattacks against the Indonesian military created a justification for the army to launch 
more serious campaigns. Another contributor to conflict was the rising anti-Chinese 
sentiment as a result of political change at national level. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusion 
Changes in the political system at national level had affected Dayak politics. PD 
was forced to dissolve after it failed to fulfil one of the new requirement for a political 
parties. Many party members chose to merge with Partindo, a growing nationalist party 
closely attached to President Soekarno, while a smaller group chose to merge with Partai 
Katolik. West Kalimantan Partindo emulated the leftist leanings of the party headquarters 
and the President. Ethnic (i.e. Dayak) politics within Partindo had weakened due to the 
party's open and nationalist platform. 
When the New Order came to power, Dayak politics was once more under threat. 
Dayaks who held high posts, such as governor and district heads, lost their jobs. They were 
members or sympathisers of Partindo, which had become the new enemy of the regime 
because of its leftist orientation. For its own safety, West Kalimantan Partindo merged with 
IPKI, preferred by both the military and the Partindo leaders. However, internal friction 
within IPKI between Dayak and Malay members soon arose, which resulted in the 
sidelining of many Dayak leaders in the party. Many Dayaks were pressured by the military 
to join Golkar before the 1971 election. Unfortunately, the election in 1971 only gave 
Dayaks a few seats in the provincial and local parliaments which was a great set back for 
them. Many Dayak bureaucrats would soon find that they would not be occupying higher 
positions in the government until the end of the New Order. 
An opportunity for Dayak leaders to make a political comeback arose when the 
regime intensified its campaign to crush the communist rebels from 1967 onward. During 
ethnic conflict in 1967, the Dayak leaders openly supported the military campaign against 
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the communist rebels. They had hoped that it would make a break with their unfavourable 
political past and enable them to regain government trust. Unfortunately, the Dayaks' 
political position did not improve, as their contribution in the military campaign was 
blamed for having caused indiscriminate killings of Chinese. 
In short it can be concluded, therefore, that the fate of Dayak politics not only 
depended on its local strength but also on other factors beyond its control at the national 
level. In particular this chapter has shown that the new policies governing political parties 
had forced Dayaks to look for an ally at the national level. When the fortunes of their 
national ally waned as the regime changed, Dayak politicians at the local level also suffered. 
The next chapter will show that not only did the Dayaks suffer politically under the 
repressive New Order regime, but also economically and culturally. 
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CHAPTER 6 
NEW ORDER AND DAY AK MARGINALISATION (1966-1998) 
In the previous chapter I discussed the decline of Dayak politics up until the mid-
l 960s. A series of regional revolts at the end of the 1950s had made Soekarno monitor 
regional politics closely, but he kept loyal local leadership. Locals who had been previously 
appointed to top positions at the district or provincial level kept their positions, so long as 
they did not link to the rebel groups. All four Dayak district heads and a Dayak governor 
continued to hold their positions until 1966, when the New Order came to power. There 
was a slight reduction of the Dayaks' representation in government bodies and the 
legislature as a result of changing national policies. Steep decline of Dayak progress 
especially in the political arena started soon after the New Order took power. 
This chapter discusses the political, economic, and cultural marginalisation of 
Dayaks which occurred during the New Order. The first section covers Dayak political 
marginalisation. In politics, the Dayak bureaucratic elite faced obstacles to promotion to 
strategic positions. In fact, Dayaks did not occupy any strategic positions in the government. 
The economic viewpoint is discussed in section two. Their living conditions did not 
improve as rapid as the introduction of the development projects into their regions. Instead, 
their economic activities in rural areas were negatively affected by logging, plantation and 
transmigration projects. Access to economic opportunities in urban areas was also quite 
limited for the Dayaks.. From the social and cultural point-of-view, Dayak culture 
continued to be undermined by external and internal pressures as are discussed in detail in 
section three of this chapter. To establish what the roots of such marginalisations were, 
some parts of this chapter provide some historical background. 
6.1 Political Marginalisation 
6.1.1 Marginalisation in the Executive 
After the coming of the New Order, Dayak leadership at the provincial and district 
levels disappeared. The Dayak governor and four district heads were replaced when 
Soeharto came to power. They were not replaced by other Dayaks as the new regime 
seemed not to have full confidence in them. As explained in the previous chapter, many 
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Dayaks in government offices were members of the former Partindo, whose leftist attitude 
made the new regime doubt their loyalty. The regime wanted trustworthy people to fill 
high-level positions. There were high-ranking Dayak bureaucrats from non-leftist 
backgrounds, but they did not have the "qualities" required by the regime.284 In 1967 PK 
(the Catholic Party) nominated Palaunsoeka as governor (interview Mgn, Doera 2003:122), 
but the central government did not support him. Other high-ranking officials sympathetic to 
the PK, such as H.S. Massoeka Djanting, were also not promoted to higher posts. Although 
Djanting had held important positions as member of the DPD and BPH in the late 1950s 
and the early 1960s, and had reached a very senior ranking, he was appointed only as a staff 
member at the provincial printing company until his retirement in the 1980s (Balunus:51-2). 
During the New Order reign, the absence of Dayaks in high office was apparent at 
the provincial level. No Dayak ever served as governor or assistant governor. Prior to the 
New Order, for instance, the governor was a Dayak. Dayaks had also become members of 
councils, such as DPD and BPH, which had functions similar to those of assistant governor. 
From the late 1950s to the mid-l 960s, Dayaks always had at least two members in the 
executive council to assist or even represent the governor. Most districts also had two 
Dayak executive members.285 The situation soon changed after the mid-1960s. According 
to provincial government documents from 1977 to 1988, the percentage of high-ranking 
Dayak officials had never been more than 8% (Table 6-1). This contrasted sharply with the 
number of high-ranking Malay officials, which was always well above 30%. 
Table 6-1 Dayak High-ranking Officials (1977-1988) 
Year Total Positions Dayaks % Dayaks 
1977 48 1 2.1 
1979 62 2 3.2 
1983 69 3 4.4 
1988 79 6 7.6 
Source: Pemda Kalimantan Baral (1978; 1980; 1983; 1989). 
284Positions regarded as high-ranking are: executive heads and their deputies, assistant governor, regional 
secretary, head of departments and bureaus. 
285The last Dayaks in the BPH at provincial level were H.G. Mihing and Sotorman Benteng. Mihing was 
arrested in the early 1971 because of his ties with Baperki, while Benteng resigned on 1 December I 972, after 
the BPH ceased to function (Abdulsalam 1997:97-8). 
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Dayaks were scarce in strategic bureaus or departments such as governance and 
human resources. In 1983 the governance bureau, which was probably the most influential 
body within the provincial secretariat, only had one Dayak out of 35 officials (Ibrahim 
1983:14-6). The Human Resources Office, which had the authority to specify training 
requirements for promotion, remained almost free of Dayaks up to the mid-1990s.286 One 
Dayak was briefly appointed to head the employee development section at the Human 
Resources Office in April 1994. Simon Djalil, the officer concerned, was promoted away 
from the Human Resources Office in less than a year. Almost a decade later, one Malay 
high-ranking official accused Djalil of giving preferential treatment to Dayak civil servants 
to attend training required for promotion (interview Djp). The possible threat to the non-
Dayak bureaucrats could be the reason why Djalil was moved away from human resources 
not long afterwards. In June 1996 only one of 19 positions at the Human Resources Office 
was given to a Dayak, Ignatius Lyong (Biro Kepegawaian Kalbar 1996). 
Dayaks were similarly marginalised at the district and sub-district levels. Some 
Dayaks retained their relatively high positions during the early New Order, although their 
numbers were small. A.R. Sampe and Iman Kalis, the first two senior high school graduates, 
served as district secretary (sekda) in Sambas and Sanggau districts respectively. Sekda is 
the third highest-ranking official after the district head and the deputy. P.J. Denggol, a 
former mission worker who had risen to a higher position in the bureaucracy of Ketapang 
district, was appointed caretaker district head of Ketapang on 2 July 1971 after the sudden 
death of the incumbent district head. However, he only held that position for a year, and 
soon was replaced by the local Kodim commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Zainal Arifin, who 
was elected as a district head on 6 July 1972. 
A local investigation in 1999 showed that Sintang, Kapuas Hulu, and Ketapang districts 
only had four Dayaks in high-ranking positions in each district; while Pontianak and 
Sanggau districts had only two each. There were no Dayak high-ranking officials in 
2860ne Dayak source even claimed that Dayaks who were given opportunities to study further at the Institute 
of Public Administration (IIP) were placed in "non-essential" programs. The graduates from these non-
essential programs would be put at a disadvantage if they had to compete with graduates from "essential" 
programs for important positions (interview Djn). 
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Sambas district and Pontianak municipality (KR 1999/43:33). The nwnber of Dayak sub-
district heads in the 1970s was smaller than in the 1960s (Table 6-2). Prior to 1966, a 
former sub-district head in Kapuas Hulu counted eight Dayak sub-district heads in fifteen 
sub-districts, or around 53% of the total sub-district head positions (interview Syk). This 
number was reduced to six in 1978 or 40% of the total sub-district head positions. In 
Sanggau district in 1970, Dayaks still headed nine out of twenty sub-districts (45%) but 
only six in 1978 (30%). In Sintang district, Dayaks comprised six of the eighteen sub-
district heads (33%) in 1970 but only three in 1978 (17%). Up until the end of the New 
Order, the proportion of Dayak sub-district heads in the province never exceeded the 1971 
level of 33%.287 This was despite the fact that Dayaks constituted the majority in more than 
61 % of sub-districts in the province (Table 6-3). 
Table 6-2 Dayak Sub-district Heads (1998-1999) 
Number of % of Sub- Number of %Dayak 
Sub-districts districts with Dayak Sub- Sub-district % ofDayak 
District* (A) Dayak district Heads Sub-district 
Majority (B) Heads (C) (CIA) Heads 
Pontianak City - - - -
-
Pontianak 19 56.5 5 26.3 42.1 
Sambas 17 42.l 4 23.5 35.3 
Sanggau 20 90.9 4 20.0 40.0 
Sin tang 18 85.7 3 16.7 22.2 
Kapuas Hulu 16 56.5 3 18.8 18.8 
Ketapang 14 40.0 2 14.3 7.1 
Source: Setwilda Tmgkat I Kalbar (1998), KR 1999/43, p. 33. 
Various employee databases at the provincial and district levels showed that the 
number of Dayak civil servants was either very small or not proportional with the Dayak 
population. Of 728 provincial mid-to top-level civil servants in 1999, 85.6% were Muslim, 
while only 10.3% were Christian (Pemda Kalimantan Barat 1999). A closer examination 
found that Dayaks made up no more than 8%, while Malays were estimated to represent at 
least 50%. In Sanggau district, a study by a former Dayak official in 2003 found that the 
287The calculation in 1971 excluded Kapuas Hulu, for which data was not available. 
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Dayaks constituted only 12.3% of the total 1, 146 civil servants in the district (Oemar 
2003).288 This was despite the fact that Sanggau had a Dayak population of 62%. The 
percentage of Dayaks in the bureaucracy was even lower in coastal districts. The following 
will examine the reasons behind the small number of Dayaks in the executive. 
Table 6-3 Number of Sub-Districts with a Dayak or Malay Majority (2000) 
Total Number Sub-district with 
District Sub- Malays> Dayaks > Dayaks > Malays> 
districts 50% 50% Malays Davaks 
Pontianak 
City 4 0 0 0 1 
Sambas 9 8 1 l 8 
Bengkayang 7 0 5 6 1 
Singkawang 3 0 0 1 2 
Pontianak 13 I 1 3 10 
Landak 10 0 9 10 0 
Sane:e:au 15 0 12 14 1 
Sekadau 7 0 4 7 0 
Sintang 14 0 9 13 1 
Melawi 7 3 I 4 3 
Kapuas Hulu 23 9 11 13 10 
Ketapang 15 7 4 6 9 
Total 127 28 57 78 46 
Percentage 22 44.9 61.4 36.2 
Source: Census 2000. 
6.1.1.1 The Origins of Marginalisation of the Dayaks in the Executive 
The section above has mentioned the influence of the 1965 coup on the declining 
role of Dayaks in the executive. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the role of 
Dayaks in government (i.e., bureaucracy) had been very small if not non-existent in the past. 
The Dayaks were generally excluded from the sultanate administrations because 
recruitment was determined by social class, family ties, and religion. Opportunities for 
Dayaks to work in the Dutch administration offices were also limited. The Dutch 
288The same person conducted a similar survey in September 1998. He found that at the district level, Dayaks 
represented 13 .8% of the 617 employees. The percentage was better at the sub-district level where the Dayaks 
were 57.3% of 367 civil servants (KR 2000/53:10). While neither study indicated the ethnic background of 
the remaining civil servants, it was quite safe to assume that the majority of them were Malays, because 
Malays had worked in the civil service since colonial times. 
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government did not want to upset its relations with the sultanates unnecessarily by 
appointing individuals (i.e. the infidel Dayaks) whom the sultanates might have found 
unsuitable. Furthermore, the educational level of Dayaks was still too low to allow them to 
work in a good position in the colonial administration. Generally, civil service candidates 
would be at least a graduate from an HIS, a Dutch-language or first-class elementary school 
reserved for aristocratic and wealthy families (Vandenbosch 1941 :200; Syahzaman and 
Hasanuddin 2003: 127).289 Given the Dayaks' initial cursory attention to education (see § 
3.3.1), the discouraging pressures from the non-Dayak community in the town and the cost 
and time needed to attend schools in town, it was unlikely that any Dayaks had ever 
enrolled at an HIS.290 In fact, none of my senior Dayak informants graduated from HIS nor 
did they know any of their colleagues who had graduated from the school prior to WWII. 
Following the end of World War II, Dayaks began to have access to the bureaucracy 
by means of government support. After the elections in 1955 and 1958, when the PD 
outperformed most of the other political parties, Dayaks began to assume some important 
political posts, including governor and four district head positions. This was followed by 
the appointment of a number of Dayak sub-district heads in predominantly Dayak regions 
in the late 1950s to mid-1960s.291 
More Dayaks in top positions meant they could facilitate more Dayak recruitment. 
A former Dayak head of several sub-districts in Sanggau from 1960 to 1964 remarked that 
until mid-1965, sub-district heads could recruit employees with approval from just district 
heads. The source gave examples: 
-since May 1960, as the sub-district head of Belitang, he had recruited six new staff 
members, five of whom were Dayaks. The existing five staff members were all Malays. 
2890ne author claimed that the schools in West Kalimantan were likely not based on social class because entry 
requirements were looser (Ahok, Ismail et al. 1983:49-50). This flexibility in entry requirements, although 
possibly true to the Malays, was unlikely to have been applicable to the Dayaks due to the prohiting social 
condition explained in Chapter 3. 
290Tbe HIS in West Kalimantan was known as Sekolah Melayu (or Malay School) as the teaching was 
conducted in Malay. This reference to "Melayu" also signified the ethnic nature of the school. According to a 
newspaper, by 1924 the whole province only had three HIS, one each in Pontianak, Sintang, and Sambas 
(Halilintar 2-2-1924). 
291The appointments of sub-district heads at the end of 1950s were influenced by the political strength of each 
party at that time. If PD performed well in a certain sub-district, it could nominate the candidate for the sub-
district head (interview Bin, Mgk). 
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-since July 1963 as the sub-district head of Jangkang, he had recruited three new 
Dayak employees. The existing five employees comprised four Malays and only one Dayak. 
-in May 1964, he became the head of the newly formed Parindu sub-district. There, 
he recruited ten staff members: eight Dayaks and two Malays (interview Omr).292 
There were also efforts to boost the number of Dayak civil servants through other 
channels of recruitment, such as the Civil Service Institute (KDC, Kursus Dinas CJ. The 
institute, established in October 1961, recruited around 28-30 students each year from its 
inception up until 1964.293 The first recruitment round in 1961 included only one Dayak, 
but their number increased in subsequent enrolments. In 1963 there were six Dayaks, and in 
1964 there were ten (interviews Gye, Fhd, APDN 1997: 135-9). According to one Malay 
source, who was also a student at KDC during those years, one way to improve recruitment 
was to "bend" the admission rules in a way that enabled more Dayaks to be accepted into 
the institute (interview Djp). The source claimed that the enrolment rule was bent to 
accommodate those who graduated from teacher training schools, such as SGB and SGA. 
The regime knew that most Dayaks attended these schools, rather than general high schools 
(interview Djp).294 The original rule was only to accept graduates from general high schools 
or graduates from junior high schools with two years' working experience in the 
bureaucracy (Ibrahim 1970:9). 
When KDC was upgraded to become a three-year Civil Service Institute (APDN, 
Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri) in September 1965, Tanting Ngo, a Dayak, was 
appointed to run the Institute.295 His appointment was without controversy. Recruited in 
October 1964 just after graduating from university, he was appointed as deputy head of the 
political bureau and, most importantly, as a private secretary to Oevaang Oeray (Ngo 
1970).296 For Oeray this Dayak appointment Dayak to a critical position was very likely a 
292The Dayak head of the Human Resources Office in Sanggau district also supported affirmative action in the 
recruitment of the Dayaks (interview Amt). 
293The total number ofKDC graduates until its closure in 1965 was 119 (Ahok, Ismail et al. 1983:85). 
2941 was able to trace only a few SGA or SGB graduates in KDC. Since I was not able to confirm the 
background of all Dayak graduates, l was not able to substantiate the claim. 
295The first director of Pontianak APDN was actually Raden Kusno. However, it was the deputy director, 
Tanting Ngo, who ran the institute because Kusno was only a "symbol" (interview Ttg, Ibrahim 1970:11; 
Abdulsalam 1997:77). 
2960eray knew Tanting Ngo, an East Kalimantan Dayak, who studied at the same school in Yogyakarta as his 
adopted son (interview Ttg). He was the first Dayak law graduate in West Kalimantan, and probably the first 
Dayak with a full bachelor degree in West Kalimantan. 
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strategy to increase Dayak enrolments at the Institute. However, most of his seven-month 
tenure was ineffective because of the political chaos after the coup in 1965. Nevertheless, 
Ngo still claimed to have helped a few Dayaks gain entry to the institute with only an 
approval from the governor. Probably because of this practice, during the demonstration 
against Oeray's leadership APDN was dubbed the "APDN of Oevaang Oeray and Tanting 
Ngo" (interview Ttg). Oeray was pressured to remove Ngo in May 1966 (Abdulsalam 
1997:79). 
Despite efforts from the end of the 1950s to the mid-1960s to recruit Dayaks, the 
number of Dayak civil servants remained small. It was the Malays who still dominated the 
bureaucracy. It was only after WWII and particularly after the elections in 1955 and 1958 
that the Dayaks started to have opportunities to enter the civil service. Prior to that most 
positions in the bureaucracy in sultanate offices, and to some extent the Dutch government 
offices, were in the hands of the Malays. This dominance continued despite the changes in 
the regime and political systems. Each time a regime collapsed, the majority of the civil 
service from the previous regime would continue to serve the new regime. 
The Dayaks were excluded from the bureaucracy because their past political and 
social systems, as well as limited access to education, had restricted their access to it. 
Almost all Dayak civil servants who entered the bureaucracy after independence had only 
basic schooling - three to six years' elementary education, which they obtained through 
mission schools. Those educated from the end of 1940s, because of the expansion of 
primary education for the Dayaks, only started to graduate from the early to mid-1950s. 
These Dayaks were ready to enter the civil service from that time on. During the period of 
the vacuum, many vacancies were filled by the Malay middle-class who had better and 
earlier access to education than the Dayaks. 
Educational requirements to enter the bureaucracy continued to rise as more higher 
educated candidates became available. Again, Dayaks were rather slow to catch up because 
of their late start. In 1953, West Kalimantan Dayaks only had two senior high school 
graduates, Iman Kalis and A.R. Sampe. They became teachers and did not join the 
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bureaucracy until early 1960s (interview Kls).297 Those who were already employed in the 
bureaucracy but only had primary education missed out on promotion opportunities. 
The limited number of high schools and the often inaccessible locations of schools 
were among the reasons why there were only a small number of Dayak graduates. 
Pontianak had its first junior high school in 1946, and first senior high school in 1952 
(interviews Kls, Bln, Syk, Panitia Peringatan 75 MTB 1996:16). Between 1946 and 1948 
only about a dozen Dayaks enrolled at the first junior high school in the provincial 
capital. 298 The worst situation was in interior districts (i.e. the Dayak regions), where 
secondary schools were not established until the early 1950s. For example, Sintang only 
had its first junior high school in 1951 and first senior high school in 1959 (Syahzaman and 
Hasanuddin 2003: 166). Nyarumkop, the centre for Dayak education, had its first general 
junior high school also in 1951 (Panitia Peringatan 75 MTB 1996:14) 
Another reason for the small numbers of Dayak civil servants was their lack of 
interest in joining the bureaucracy. From the time of the Malay sultanates, Dayaks 
associated civil service with the Malays because of their overwhelming presence and 
influence in the bureaucracy. Civil service positions were the privilege of Malays and were 
closed to Dayaks (van Hulten 1992; van Loon 1999). Furthermore, the civil service had a 
bad reputation among Dayaks. For Dayaks who lived under oppression, the civil servants 
(or those who worked for the sultanates) were symbols of oppression. Therefore, working 
in the civil service was not desired by Dayaks who had educational qualifications. Instead, 
they would choose to work for the Catholic missions as teachers, religious workers, or 
nurses, as these were the only "white collar" jobs open to them at the time. It was not 
surprising that Dayaks who assumed important posts after independence were previously 
teachers, catechists, or nurses. These job preferences among the Dayaks continued well into 
the 1960s, particularly those for the teaching profession. Some sources observed that 
generally in the 1960s the educated Dayaks still preferred teaching over positions in the 
297They would become the only two high-ranking Dayak officials in the early 1980s. 
298Enrolled in 1946 were H.S. Massoeka Djanting and Antonius Buan; in 1947 there were Keladan, Iman 
Kalis and A.R. Sampe; in 1948 there were Syahdan Sahuddin, Sabinus, I. Andi, I. Kepu, and Daniel 
Soeryamassoeka. They all stayed in a church complex or stayed in the homes belonging to about 20 Dayak 
officials or civil servants in Pontianak (interviews Kls, Syk). 
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civil service (interviews Kdr, Kls). 299 The Dayaks who returned to the province after 
obtaining a university degree in Java in the mid- I 960s chose to continue their teaching 
careers and not join the bureaucracy.300 The sizeable number of Dayaks who finally joined 
the bureaucracy in the early 1960s, such as those who attended the KDC, were mainly 
active teachers who had been persuaded by Dayak bureaucrats to join the civil service. 
6.1.1.2 Civil Servant Recruitment and Promotion during the New Order 
The small number of Dayaks being recruited into the civil service and low level of 
promotion for those in the bureaucracy were two further reasons for Dayak marginalisation 
in the executive. This section will examine two major routes of civil servant recruitment: 
specific bonded recruitment and general annual recruitment. 
Bonded recruitment referred to students who enrolled at designated institutions and 
agreed to become civil servants upon graduation. There were at least 68 institutes managed 
by government offices, part of whose function was to educate the "bonded" students (cf. 
http://www.pdat.co.id/pertiti/?called=pt, accessed 8-7-2004). Apart from these institutions, 
government offices also had agreements with certain universities for the same purpose. The 
government had also established Civil Service Institutes to select and educate its future 
civil servants. 
Civil servants recruited via this avenue were highly regarded and normally had 
better career prospects, because of their specific training. Graduates of Civil Service 
Institutes, for example, had better opportunities for promotion to top-level positions. Until 
quite recently, graduates of these institutes were usually expected to take on elite roles in 
the bureaucracy. Many graduates would at least occupy the position of sub-district heads 
within a few years after graduation. Their numbers in the bureaucracy had become a 
barometer for the quality of the bureaucracy. The West Kalimantan governor's 
299The passion to become teachers was also a result of an education campaign aimed at Dayaks after 
independence. The government, PD, and churches established hundreds of elementary schools in the 1940s 
and 1950s. These schools required many teachers. Becoming a teacher was not only desirable in terms of 
prestige, but also in terms of financial reward. Most students in the teacher schools received government 
scholarships. The scholarships covered Dayak tuition fees and living costs. Sources claimed that the salaries 
of teachers was even better than those of civil servants (interviews Kdr, Kls ). 
300In 1963, the West Kalimantan government had sent 17 students to attend teacher institutes in Java. Among 
them at least six were Dayaks (Gubemur Kalbar 1964:31). 
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accountability reports since the New Order always highlight the numbers and the utilisation 
of graduates of the institutes 
As explained previously, the first Civil Service Institute in West Kalimantan was 
KDC. Prior to that, the provincial government sent their students to KDC in Banjarmasin, 
South Kalimantan. A "course-level" KDC was replaced by a three year university-level 
APDN, when the latter was established in Pontianak in 1965. Starting from the mid-1960s, 
many of the graduates were appointed as sub-district heads. In 1970, 24 of 106 sub-district 
heads (or 23%) were APDN graduates. The percentage increased to 63% in 1977, and to 
79% in 1983 (Gubemur Kalbar 1970:5; Gubernur Kalbar 1977:70; Gubernur Kalbar 
1983:54-55). 
Annual general recruitment at the provincial and district level was another 
important recruitment channel. Usually it was carried out usually at the same time for both 
locations. Some departments which had a large intake of recruits, such as the Department 
for Religious Affairs recruiting teachers of religion, also carried out their own annual 
recruitment. All candidates would be screened against the general requirements, such as age, 
education, and health. Those who satisfied the requirements would need to pass a written 
examination and interview. The majority of civil servants recruited by this method would 
be appointed to clerical positions. The number of civil servants recruited this way was 
much larger than the recruitment from APDN. General recruitment could admit several 
hundred to a few thousand civil servants per year, compared to no more than sixty from 
Pontianak APDN. 
According to one Dayak official, who was briefly stationed at the provincial Human 
Resources Office, the process of civil servant recruitment was not transparent. The written 
test and interviews were mere formalities, because the office would only select a fraction of 
candidates who had genuinely passed the test. Many other candidates were selected based 
on financial payments and personal connections (interview Kts). As a result, candidates 
without the requisite financial resources and internal connections would very seldom be 
recruited. The public had been aware of these corrupt practices but did not openly challenge 
until 2002. Between October and November that year, candidates who failed the 
recruitment test protested in almost all districts. In Pontianak district, the recruitment results 
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were annulled by the district head, and the written tests were re-administered. In Sintang, 
the Human Resources Office was attacked, and its Dayak head was brought to court for 
unfair practices (Kapuas Post 13-11-2002, 25-3-2005). In both cases, the heads of the 
Human Resources Office were replaced some time after the protests. 
Recruitment of Dayak civil servants through both channels was low throughout the 
New Order. Dayaks made up between 15% and 20% of APDN graduates from 1968 until 
1992, while the Malays outnumbered the Dayaks by at least a factor of two (see APDN 
1997: 135-69). This condition worsened from 1992 when all local APDNs were abolished to 
be replaced by a national STPDN (Sekolah Tinggi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri) located in 
Jatinangor, West Java.301 Between 1992 and 1997 West Kalimantan only sent about twelve 
students a year to STPDN, a big drop from about fifty students a year between 1965 and 
1992. Of these twelve students even fewer were Dayak (see APDN 1997:127-69). 
Recruitment of Dayaks into the civil service through general annual recruitment was 
estimated at only 2% each year (KR 1999/43:33). This estimation might be too low. 
However, if there had been a consistently significant recruitment of Dayaks into the 
bureaucracy over the years, their proportion in the bureaucracy should have increased, but 
this has not been the case. Civil servants in the lower to middle ranks were overwhelmingly 
Malays. They occupied most posts that were not held by Javanese or the military. 
The causes of the low recruitment of Dayaks into the bureaucracy during the New 
Order differed slightly from those of the previous regime. The main factors for low 
recruitment in the 1950s had become less relevant by the time Soeharto came to power. By 
the 1970s, the Dayaks' interest in joining the civil service had grown, as evidenced by the 
decision of many Dayak high school teachers to join the bureaucracy. The ascent of several 
Dayaks into the province and district top jobs prior to the New Order inspired young and 
educated Dayaks to join the civil service. They no longer viewed the civil service as 
intimidating and unattainable. Low levels of education, which had been an obstacle to 
Dayaks joining the civil service in the past, were no longer an issue. The number of Dayak 
301The establishment of a central civil institute was important for the government's efforts to train high-
quality and "uniform" future leaders. In 2005, STPDN became TPDN (Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri) 
after it merged with another similar institute, IIP (Institut Ilmu Pemerintahan) in Jakarta, to avoid duplication 
(Kompas 6-1-2005). 
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high school graduates was adequate at the beginning of the 1980s, and by the 1990s there 
should have been a sufficient supply of Dayak university graduates. What restricted Dayaks 
from entering the bureaucracy during the New Order? 
The changing political system was another reason why Dayaks had limited 
opportunities in government administration. Before the ascent of the New Order the 
political system was relatively favourable to Dayaks. The national government respected 
natives' role in local government, as reflected in the appointment of many natives to 
governor and district head positions. These Dayak officials tried to encourage more Dayaks 
to join the bureaucracy. Many Dayak teachers were persuaded and those with higher 
educational backgrounds were recruited directly to good positions. Take the case of Iman 
Kalis, one of the first two Dayak high school graduates. He graduated from senior high 
school in 1953 and became the headmaster of a junior high school in Sintang (1954-7), and 
then Sanggau (1957-8). He attended university in Yogyakarta from 1958 to 1963. When he 
returned to West Kalimantan in 1963, he accepted an offer to become a district secretary in 
Sanggau. Quite similar was the case for A.R. Sampe who was recruited as secretary of 
Sambas district (interview Kls ). Many Dayaks were appointed as sub-district heads 
although they might not have been the best qualified candidates for the position. The New 
Order was rather suspicious of them, especially at the beginning of the regime. All Dayak 
executive heads were removed and when in the late 1960s many others in the upper 
echelons started to retire, these positions were not filled with Dayaks. 
The regime' s centralistic and anti-ethnic approach prevented any preferential 
treatment of underprivileged Dayaks in the bureaucracy. No Dayak was appointed again as 
governor or district head until the end of the New Order, with only one exception in 1995 
(this will be discussed in §6.1.3.2). At lower levels, such as the appointment of sub-district 
heads, the regime was also not bound to appoint persons with the same ethnic or religious 
background as the majority population. Dayak elites in the bureaucracy were aware of the 
continuing prejudice against their own, but they were not in a position to antagonise the 
regime. The repression of all political parties, including those with an interest in the Dayaks 
such as PK, ensured that issues of marginalisation were never raised. 
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Some Dayak bureaucrats and politicians also believed that ethnic discrimination 
was a factor underlying their small representation in the bureaucracy. Some retired Dayak 
politicians believed that their stagnant political standing in the bureaucracy, particularly at 
the beginning of the New Order regime, was a result of Malay reprisals (interviews Lyg, 
Mgk). The two ethnic groups had had a hard time getting along in the past due to 
differences in their political histories, religion, and culture. From the not so distant past, at 
the end of the 1940s, elites from both ethnic groups opposed each other as to whether to 
support the unitary state or not. Malay and Dayak relations deteriorated when the Dayaks 
were able to gain certain top executive positions at the end of 1950s. Dayaks won the 
district head election in four districts, while the Malays won in only three districts. The 
governor was a Dayak. The Dayaks also started to fill up many sub-district head positions 
in interior Dayak regions. The sudden rise of Dayaks in the bureaucracy created resentment 
from the other ethnic groups who felt they were more capable and entitled to the work. In 
1962 Oevaang Oeray was accused of practising ethnic partiality in employee recruitment 
and promotion (Gubemur Kalbar 1962). Early in the year 1965, Oeray's political opponents 
accused him of creating ethnic fissures and demanded he step down (Surat Resolusi 1965). 
It is also quite common for ethnic groups to limit the entry of the "other" ethnic 
groups in order to maintain their domination. 302 It was not difficult for the Malay 
bureaucrats to block the Dayaks' entry or promotion because they dominated the 
bureaucracy. The Malays did not necessarily occupy the highest positions, which were 
often reserved for the Javanese or non-native military officers, but they were well 
represented in both district and provincial second-tier leadership, including heads of 
important departments and bureaus responsible for recruitment, such as the Civil Service 
Institute. 303 Malay staff who dominated the lower level echelons could have played a 
significant role in limiting the Dayaks' entry because they prepared reports on which 
recruitment decisions were based. 
3020ne Malay high-ranking official even mentioned the inter-Malay competition between the coastal and 
inland Malays in the bureaucracy in the 1980s (interview Djp ). 
303For example, all APDN teachers in 1973 were non-Dayaks (APDN 1973). Only later were some Dayaks 
appointed to teach at the institute (APDN 1997). 
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As a consequence of the limited recruitment of Dayaks over the years, there was 
only a small pool of them eligible for promotion. Promotion became much more 
complicated and difficult for Dayaks if discrimination came into play. Some inside sources 
remarked that discrimination or personal bias over promotions was quite common 
(interviews Lyg, Ttg, Abdulsalam 1997). The Promotion Board (Baperjakat), which 
handled high level promotion, tended to promote the interests of their own group. Because 
of the lack of Dayak representation on the board, it could be inferred that the Dayak 
interests would receive little support within the council. The board usually consisted of the 
executive heads and their deputies or assistants, the human resources head, and 
representatives of related departments or bureaus. As explained before, these strategic 
bureaus usually employed only a few Dayaks, and, until the mid-1990s had never been 
headed by Dayaks. 
6.1.2 Marginalisation in the DPRD 
The small numbers of Dayaks m the DPRD was another source of political 
marginalisation. This was quite obvious during the first decade of the New Order. Before 
the coming of the New Order, Dayaks were quite well represented in the legislature. In 
1958, the percentage of Dayaks in the West Kalimantan provincial DPRD reached almost 
37% of the total DPRD members, the highest percentage ever. In interior districts such as 
Sanggau, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu the proportion of Dayaks in the DPRD reached more 
than 50%. The proportion declined slightly at the provincial level after 1961 (Table 6-4).304 
Between 1966 and the 1977 election, the proportion of Dayaks in the provincial DPRD was 
very low, only between 11 % and 13%. The Dayaks were also poorly represented at the 
district level. 
The big decline in Dayak representation in the legislature at the provincial and 
district levels occurred after 1966 as a result of the new regime's blanket hostility and 
distrust of political parties, particularly the former leftist parties or parties with ties to 
304The main reason was the split of PD into two political parties - Partindo and PK. Although the majority of 
members in Partindo and PK were still Dayaks, non-Dayaks had started to assume some leadership roles in 
the parties, particularly at the provincial level. In the case of Partindo, some of these leaders became members 
of the provincial DPRD. To illustrate this case, three of seven Partindo representatives in the provincial 
DPRD in 1961 were non-Dayaks. The same was the case for PK. 
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Soekamo (Table 6-5). After 11 March 1966, the regime started to purge the national and 
regional assemblies of communists. At the same time, the regime put more pro-regime 
members into the DPRD in order to balance the existing DPRD members. In West 
Kalimantan, the regime increased the total numbers in the DPRD but without increasing the 
number of Dayaks. In fact, in some regions the number of Dayak legislators decreased after 
the Partindo merger with IPKI. As a result, their proportion in the DPRD fell. 
Table 6-4 Dayak Legislators in the Provincial DPRD (1957-2004) 
Year Total Number of %of Seats Davaks Dayaks 
1957 30 9 30.0 
1958 30 11 36.7 
1961 31 7 22.6 
1967 48 6 12.5 
1970 52 6 11.5 
1971 40 5 12.5 
1977 40 7 17.5 
1982 40 10 25.0 
1987 45 12 26.7 
1992 45 15 33.3 
1999 55 16 29.1 
2004 55 12 21.8 
Source: DPRD Kalbar (1992:119-30), Gubernur Kalbar (1964), and others sources. 
Table 6-5 Dayak Legislators in the DPRD (1963-1977) 
Province or 1963 1969 1971 
Districts 
Total Dayak % Total Dayak % Total Dayak 
Province 31 7 22.6 46 6 13.0 40 5 
Pontianak City 15 1 6.7 27 1 3.7 20 0 
Pontianak 30 8 26.7 40 10 25.0 40 12 
Sambas 28 7 25.0 40 5 12.5 40 2 
Sanggau 19 10 52.6 30 9 30.0 25 6 
Sintang 16 8 50.0 26 7 26.9 21 6 
Kapuas Hulu 15 8 53.3 25 9 36.0 20 5 
Ketapang 15 5 33.3 25 4 16.0 20 2 
Source: Gubemur Kalimantan Barat (1964), Soemadi (1970), Varia 1971/19-20. 
Note: *Total number includes the initial members and replacement members. 
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1977 
% Total Davak % 
12.5 40 7 17.5 
0 20 0 0 
30.0 40 12 30.0 
5.0 40 4 10.0 
24.0 33* 14 42.4 
28.6 22* 8 36.4 
25.0 20 7 35.0 
10.0 21* 3 14.3 
The number ofDayak DPRD members reached its nadir after the 1971 election. The 
only district in which the share of Dayak legislators had increased in 1971 compared to the 
situation before 1965 was the coastal Pontianak. This was possible because Golkar, PK, 
and IP.KI all sent significant numbers of Dayaks to the DPRD of the district. Golkar 
contributed seven seats, while PK and IPKI contributed five seats. Elsewhere, PK and IP.KI 
gained only a few seats, while Golkar, the election "winner'', only sent a small number of 
Dayaks as their members of parliament. This occurred because all political parties 
including IPK.l and PK, the two political parties with the largest Dayak representation, were 
under pressure from the regime even before the election campaign began. IPKI became the 
main target because it was one of the largest political parties and therefore posed the most 
serious threat to Golkar. Security-wise, IPKI was also of particular interest to the local 
authority because it had many members from former leftist Partindo. Several legislature 
candidates from IPK.l from the former Partindo were eliminated by the military authority 
team during the selection process of provisional candidate lists (DCS) for the 1971 election. 
The greatest IPK.l losses occurred in Sambas, Sanggau, Sintang, and Ketapang districts 
(Gubemur Kalbar 1971 b ). 
During the 1971 election, the regime faced a dilemma with regard to several high 
profile candidates whose loyalties and political background were in question. These 
candidates were nominated by other political parties and therefore might undermine the 
regime's goal of a win for Golkar. The regime made a decision on 14 March 1971 to retain 
them in the list, but in low, non-electable positions under the closed-list proportional-
representative system (Lembaga Pemilihan Umum 1973:239-40). In West Kalimantan, the 
military authority lowered some Dayak figures within IPKI to non-electable positions in the 
preliminary candidate list (DCS). Some affected figures were Oevaang Oeray, Petrus 
Anjiem, and Stephanus Thomba at the provincial level, and Paitijadi, Djohan Marpong, 
Sabran Simprong, and Rachrnad Sahuddin in Pontianak district (Gubernur Kalbar 1971 b ). 
Many of these names had disappeared when the official list (DCT) was announced. In the 
provincial DCT Oeray, Anjiem, and Thomba disappeared from the list of IPKI candidates 
(DPRD Kalbar 1973:6). In some other cases, the candidates were pressed by the military to 
withdraw their candidacies. In one extreme case in Sintang district, none of the nine IPK.l 
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candidates on the provisional list appeared on the final list (Gubemur Kalbar 1971b; Panitia 
Pemilihan Indonesia 1971 ). Prior to the election in Ketapang, the head of the local branch 
of the IPKI declared the party to be no longer active (interview Smj). 
Under such threats, no political parties could campaign properly. 305 With a few 
exceptions, there was almost no election monitoring in interior regions. One political party 
leader in Sintang reported that no political parties, except Golkar campaigners, could 
campaign freely. Most political parties did not monitor the voting process, either, because 
of the threats (interview Mjg). IPKI and PK in particular lost many votes because they 
depended mainly on voters in interior districts, where election-rigging was most rampant. 
In coastal cities, pressure on the political parties was less severe. One observer linked to the 
Catholic Church, observed that the process in several polling stations (TPS) in Pontianak 
city, the provincial capital, was relatively free and according to the regulations (Doera 
2003:299-319). The different level of threat between coastal and interior regions was 
evident when the poll result came out. In interior districts and Ketapang where threat and 
election rigging were more obvious, Golkar won an average of 77% of the votes, while in 
coastal district capitals and provincial capitals, Golkar obtained fewer votes, with an 
average of 58%. At the end, IPKI and PK, two political parties with significant Dayak votes, 
only obtained a few seats in the 1971 election. 
Another reason for the fall in the number of Dayak legislators in the DPRD was that 
the Dayaks did not benefit from Golkar's landslide win.306 Only a few of them appeared in 
the Golkar candidate lists because the majority still supported PK and IPKI. Some top 
Dayak leaders of the former Partindo publicly announced their switch to Golkar only on 17 
April 1971. lt was too late for them to be included in the Golkar lists, because the DCT was 
fixed days before the switch was announced.307 Only those who had joined Golkar earlier 
305Such political threat was not unique to West Kalimantan. Ward (1974:166) observed the similar trend in 
Java during the 1971 election. 
306Election statistics from 1971 to 1987 showed Golkar gaining about 69% of the vote in each election at 
provincial level. Golkar performance in interior districts (i.e. Sanggau, Sintang, Kapuas Hulu, Ketapang) was 
very high, at about 81 % of total votes in the districts. It obtained fewer votes in coastal districts, at about 60%. 
307The DCT was signed in Jakarta on 20 April 1971. All nominations in the DCT must have been fixed at the 
provincial level at least a few weeks before the official signing. 
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were included in the DCT.308 As a result, their number in the Golkar DCT was very low at 
the provincial level. There were 58 candidates in the Golkar DCT, but only four were 
Dayaks. None of the Dayak candidates was considered "well-known" in the province. They 
were placed outside the first sixteen candidates of the provincial Golkar DCT (DPRD 
Kalbar 1973) to show their less important status in Golkar. None of them had signed the 
declaration in April 1971. In the interior districts, more Dayaks were placed on the Golkar 
candidate list, although their numbers were still far from proportional. In Sanggau district, 
for example, of the 36 candidates on the provisional list, only twelve were Dayaks. Of these 
twelve Dayaks, only four were in the top ten. 
Probably realising the poor and inappropriate representation of Dayaks among its 
legislators, Golkar appointed (rather than elected) several Dayaks to become members of 
the DPRD.309 At the provincial DPRD, Golkar added G.P. Djaoeng, in Pontianak district 
Rachmad Sahuddin and Sadjali Usman, in Sanggau Willem Amat, and in Kapuas Hulu 
Aloysius Kahendi.310 In the end Golkar had only three Dayaks among its 21 members of 
the provincial DPRD, one legislator in Sambas district and none in the Pontianak 
municipality. In interior districts, such as Sanggau, Sintang, Kapuas Hulu and Ketapang, 
less than a third of Golkar DPRD members were Dayaks (Table 6-6). 
After the 1977 election, Dayak numbers in the provincial DPRD and in some 
district DPRD started to rise, although they had not reached the 1958 level. Their number in 
the provincial DPRD was generally more than 25%. Similar trends also appeared in the 
interior districts (Table 6-5). One reason for the growth was the increase in the number of 
Dayaks who had switched to Golkar for better political opportunities. The switch was also 
encouraged by the loosening of their ties with political parties, particularly after PK and 
IPKI, together with other political parties, were merged into the PDI in 1973. As a result of 
308Some of such individuals were Lengson Angking and F .X. Matjok for the Sintang district, and Amin Amer 
and As pan Tiong for the Pontianak district, Petrus Anj ioe Nyangun, Anggang Kabay, Heronimus Godang, 
and Akien A lief for the provincial level (DPRD Kalbar 1973). 
309 According to regulation PP 2/1970 there were two types of appointed members to the regional DPRD: 
members with a military background and those with none (Article 10). In the case of candidates from non-
military background, the final decision would be made by the interior minister based on the recommendation 
by the regional Sekber Golkar (Article 11 ). 
310Rachmad Sahuddin was appointed eventhough he was officially listed representing IPK.l. At lea~t four of 
the five Dayaks appointed as additional Golkar Dayak legislators were civilian and former members of 
Partin do. 
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the mergmg of five nationalist and Christian political parties, PDI could exert less 
emotional influence on the Dayaks than the PK and IPKI (i.e. Partindo) had done in the 
past.311 
Table 6-6 Number of PK, Golkar and IPKI Seats from West Kalimantan after the 
1971 Election 
!National/ Legislators Total Lei islators by Political Parties 
Provincial/ Dayaks % 
District Level Total Elected Appointed PK Golkar IPKI Others 
!National DPR 1 5 (1) 0 
Provincial 40 32 (5) 8 (1) 15.0 2 21 (3) 2 7 
Pontianak Citv 20 16 4 0.0 0 10 0 6 
Pontianak 40 32 (12) 8 (2) 30.0 3 17 (6) 2 (2) 10 (1) 
Sambas 40 32 (2) 8 5.0 1 19 (1) 3 (1) 9 
Sanggau 25 20 (6) 5 (1) 24.0 3 13 (3) 0 4 
Sintang 21 17 (6) 4 28.6 1 14 (5) 0 2 
Kapuas Hulu 20 16 (5) 4 (1) 25.0 1 11 (3) 1 (1) 3 
Ketapang 20 16 (2) 4 10.0 0 13 (2) 0 3 
Source: Various sources, Varia 1971/19-20. 
Note: PK all Dayaks, for Golkar and IPKI Dayaks are between bracket ( ). 
The switch was quite obvious in the 1977 election when many Dayaks who had run 
for PK and IPKI in the 1971 election had since then become candidates for Golkar. 
Oevaang Oeray joined Golkar and campaigned for the party in 1977 (Akcaya March-April 
1977, Davidson 2002:251). The switch was also reflected in the Golkar candidate lists in 
the 1977 election, and later in the actual number of Dayaks elected into the DPRD. Three of 
the first four Golkar candidates for the national DPR were Dayaks: Oevaang Oeray (no 1), 
Aloysious Aloy (no 2), and Mozes Nyawath Elmoswath (no 4). At the provincial level, 
Golkar listed two in its first ten candidates. In interior districts such as Sanggau, Sintang, 
and Kapuas Hulu, about half of the first ten Golkar candidates were Dayaks. 
Larger Dayak representation in the DPRD since the end of 1970s, unfortunately, 
could not guarantee that their interests would be looked after. On the contrary, as already 
discussed, Dayak interests remained largely neglected throughout the New Order. The 
members of DPRD, like anywhere else in Indonesia, were a mere "rubber stamp" for the 
311 Fivc political parties, PK, IPKI, PNI, Parkindo, and Murba, merged into PDI in 1973. 
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executive. Furthermore, under the repressive regime, the Dayak legislators did not want to 
risk their political careers by insisting on playing the "ethnic card", a taboo subject under 
the New Order regime.312 
Despite Dayak marginalisation under the authoritarian regime, they were not 
completely silenced, as the next section will illustrate. 
6.1.3 Dayak Voices: District Head Elections in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu 
Although ethnic politics was considered taboo during the New Order regime, Dayak 
political voices were not completely muted. These voices demanded the government give 
more leadership positions in the executive and legislative branches to the Dayaks. In 
August 1971, a month after the general election, a newspaper sympathetic to the Dayaks 
and with ties to the Catholic Church criticised the government for not bringing more 
Dayaks into the parliament. The author of the article believed that Dayaks (and Chinese) 
had contributed significantly, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the Golkar victory. He 
suggested that Golkar should have twelve Dayak members in the provincial DPRD. The 
author, who was a military priest, was put under house arrest for almost a month as a result 
of the publication (Doera 2003:301-3). This was followed by another more covert statement 
two months later by G.P. Djaoeng, a former Dayak district head of Sintang, who was 
appointed a Golkar legislator to the provincial DPRD. He raised the issue of how unfair 
practices had isolated some elements of the society (i.e. the Dayaks) and demanded fairer 
policies in recruiting them to the civil service (Varia 1971/ 19-20: 6-7).313 
In 1981, some Dayak leaders from Golkar in Sanggau demanded the appointment of 
more Dayaks to important positions in the executive and legislature. According to a report 
on the issue, a group of eleven Dayak politicians warned the government that if those 
demands were not met, Golkar would Jose the 1982 election in Sanggau. The report 
accused them of trying to play on ethnic sentiments and urged the government to punish 
them (Golkar Sanggau 1981). In a confidential report in 1982, the governor claimed that 
there were people who wanted to use the ethnic issue to affect the selection of 
312It was not surprising that after Reformasi some Dayak activists often referred to these Dayak legislators as 
"tools" of the New Order regime, and refused to cooperate with them. 
313The statement did not specifically mention Dayaks but it quite obviously addressed the lack of political 
opportunities they had. 
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parliamentary candidates (Pemda Kalimantan Barat 1982:4). It is very likely that the 
governor was referring to the same event. 
In June 1993, several months after a national seminar on Dayaks held by the Institut 
Dayakologi, three Dayak politicians wrote a letter to the governor and copied it to the 
president and all related institutions in Jakarta and West Kalimantan. In the letter, dated 21 
June, G.P. Djaoeng, Rachmad Sahuddin and A.R. Mecer314 claimed that Dayaks had been 
neglected by the government (i.e. Golkar) despite their contribution to Golkar's election 
wins. They demanded at least three district head positions for Dayaks, and asked that they 
be given more opportunities to work in government offices, and for promotion (Djaoeng, 
Syahudin et al. 1993). The government realised that the lack of Dayak figures at the local 
leadership was not desirable and began preparing them to take on some more strategic jobs. 
Its attempts to install Dayak district heads in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu in 1994 and 1995 
illustrates this.315 
6.1.3.1 Sintang District Head Election 1994 
District head elections during the New Order held almost no surprises. Who would 
be the next district head usually had been "decided" jointly by the governor, the local 
military leader, and the local Golkar leader in consultation with the central government 
several months before the elections. Golkar proposed the final list of three candidates after 
deliberation with the other two smaller political parties, which would usually concur with 
the decision. The other two candidates were only "accompanying" candidates to make the 
election appear democratic and would not pose threats to the regime's candidate. The 
election process would go as planned with the regime's favourite obtaining the majority of 
the votes and being sworn as the next district head. A comparable election process was also 
administered for the governor's seat (for further elaboration see Malley 1999:85-7). 
314Djaoeng was the first Dayak district head in Sintang. He later represented Golkar in the provincial DPRD 
and served as an advisor to the party. Sahuddin was the leader of Pontianak IPKI, but later joined Golkar. He 
had served as a Golkar legislator for Pontianak district and later for several terms in the provincial DPRD .. He 
was one of the party deputy chairmen until 1989. A.R. Mecer was a member of Golkar and head of the 
expanding Dayak NGO, Pancur Kasih. 
315Davidson was the first to highlight the importance of these two elections in Dayak politics (2002:268-9), 
although he did not elaborate on the intensity of the inter-ethnic political feuds. 
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In the early 1990s a few election surprises did occur, where the government's 
favoured candidate was defeated. The causes were either that the members of the DPRD 
"resisted" the pressure to vote for the regime' s candidate or the local population demanded 
that the government appoint the other "popular" candidate. In December 1993, the election 
for the Central Kalimantan governor reached deadlock after the government' s candidate 
obtained 24 votes, three votes more than the Dayak candidate. Local people demanded that 
the central government appoint the Dayak candidate. Eventually, both candidates were 
asked to resign, and the central government appointed another person as caretaker (Malley 
1999:90-3). Media Indonesia (8-3-1994) listed similar cases in the district head elections. 
In the Kutai district head election in March 1994, more than half of the members of DPRD 
refused to participate in the voting because their "local" candidate was not short-listed 
(Media Indonesia, 8-3-1994). There were other election cases in Deli Serdang (North 
Sumatra), East Sumba and East Flores (NTT), and Viqueque (East Timor) almost at the 
same time. In West Kalimantan during the election in Sintang in 1994, the unexpected 
happened when the governor's candidate, L.H. Kadir, was defeated. 
L.H. Kadir was one of the two highest-ranking Dayak bureaucrats in the provincial 
office in 1994.316 From 1982 to 1998, he had served as head in several bureaus in the 
provincial office. He began his career as the first Dayak to enrol at the government Civil 
Service Institute, the KDC, and the first to enrol at the APDN. Earlier in his career, before 
he was nominated as district candidate, he had headed a few bureaus and departments 
within the provincial bureaucracy (KR 1999/43:33). Career-wise, Kadir had held the 
highest possible position attainable to Dayaks during the New Order; the upper positions, 
such as assistant and deputy governor, were not attainable by the Dayaks until the end of 
the New Order. Kadir was a favoured candidate in the Sintang district head election in 1994 
(see Abdulsalam 1997:157). The governor continued to show his support for Kadir through 
a series of consultations with members of the district DPRD (interview Mlg). District and 
provincial Golkar offices also officially nominated him (Jayakarta 8-4-1994). The other 
"accompanying" candidates, Abdillah Kamarullah and Abdul Hadi Karsoem, were Malay 
bureaucrats in Sintang district. Kadir should not have had any difficulties winning the race 
316The other was Sotorman Benteng, a former BPH member in the 1960s. 
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because Golkar and military factions, which had supported his candidacy, occupied almost 
80% of the seats in the DPRD. However, the result of the vote in February 1994 turned out 
to be different from the usual scenario. Kamarullah won the election with 21 votes, while 
Kadir only gained 16 votes and Karsoem just one.317 Unfortunately for the Dayaks, the 
regime did not try to reverse the result, but instead, immediately applauded the election as 
democratic and genuinly without interference (Kompas 12-2, 2-3-1994, Akcaya 1-3, 3-3-
1994). It was quite unusual for the regime to celebrate the defeat of its own candidate. 
For many Dayaks, Kadir's failure heightened their conviction that there had been 
concerted efforts to marginalise them in the bureaucracy. The Dayak elite blamed the 
regime for allowing systemic prejudice against Dayaks. Tammar Abdulsalam, a Malay 
deputy governor region II, who was given responsibility to oversee the election, was 
believed to have abetted the plot to sway votes from Kadir to Kamarullah (various 
interviews, see Abdulsalam 1997). The Dayak head of the Golkar faction calculated that the 
defeat was caused by the defection of almost half Golkar members. He was also convinced 
that the defectors were Muslims and non-Dayaks (interview Mlg). Offensive slogans aimed 
at Dayaks during the election supported further this "ethnic" explanation of Kadir's failure 
(Davidson 2002:268).318 The Malays saw Kamarullah's victory differently. For them, it 
was fair for a Muslim Malay to win because two previous district heads, Daniel Toding 
(Torajanese) and Bonar Sianturi (Bataknese), had been Christians. The Malays were very 
proud because the members of the DPRD had followed their "heart" and chosen a popular 
candidate, rather simply support the pre-determined candidate. 
The Dayak elite tried to repeal the result by sending delegations to Jakarta to ask for 
justice (Kompas 1-3-1994 ). Demonstrations were also staged, in both Sintang and 
Pontianak (Abdulsalam 1997:161-2). Some of their politicians even threatened to quit 
Golkar if Kadir was not installed as the district head (Akcaya 1-3-1994, Kompas 2-3-1994). 
The provincial Golkar secretariat, which had shown its approval of the election result, did 
not escape the protests. On one occasion, chairman of the provincial Golkar, Soemardji, 
317Kadir himself was not present during the election. One source mentioned that Kadir was not interested in 
the position because of family considerations. His Jack of interest might have encouraged the maneuver not to 
elect him (interview Kdr). 
318Davidson noted that following Kadir' s defeat, leaflets were distributed claiming that during the vote count 
people shouted "Dayaks are infidels" (Davidson 2002:268). 
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was forced to issue a statement that the organisation would sack disloyal members of the 
Sintang DPRD who failed to follow the party line. He even urged a higher authority (i.e. 
the president or interior minister) to use his prerogative to elect Kadir. The GoJkar 
headquarters responded by sending a delegation to investigate the matter (Akcaya 2-3-
1994). 319 Unfortunately, the central government signalled that it would not reverse the 
election decision (Akcaya 3-3, 23-3-1994). 
After some delays which allowed tensions to dissipate, Kamarullah was sworn in as 
Sintang district head on 5 April 1994 (Akcaya 6-4-1994, Davidson 2002:268). The 
inauguration inside the building was tense from the beginning, with a tight security 
presence. The heads of Golkar and PDI factions in the DPRD, both of whom were Dayaks, 
failed to stop the inauguration process. In Sengah Temila, hundreds of kilometres from 
Sintang, hundreds of Dayaks vented their anger by blocking the main road connecting 
Pontianak and Sintang, waylaying and damaging official cars (Abdulsalam 1997:163; 
Davidson 2002:268). G.P. Djaoeng and several Dayak leaders who attended the 
inauguration warned the government that denying Dayak interests would only push them to 
be more exclusive (Jayakarta 8-4-1994). 
Although Kadir was not appointed, the saga sent ripples through Dayak politics for 
years into future. It brought to the surface Dayak-Malay political rivalries and set a 
precedent for overt ethnic politics in the next district head elections. The event which Jed to 
the victory of a non-favoured candidate - in this case a Malay over a Dayak - showed that 
the authoritarian regime could relent in some cases. Ethnic politics in the district head 
election was again in play a year later in the Kapuas Hulu district. 
6.1.3.2 Kapuas Hulu District Head Election 1995 
The election of the district head in Kapuas Hulu m 1995 can be viewed as a 
continuation of the unfinished saga of the election in Sintang the previous year. In order to 
assuage Dayaks' anger, the governor reserved this post for a Dayak (Davidson 2002:268). 
The governor's choice was Jacobus Layang, a middle-ranked bureaucrat in the governor's 
3 19In the end, three members of Golkar were "recalled": H. Mesir, Zulkamaen, Zulaeda (interview Mlg). 
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office. 320 To boost his profile Layang initiated the formation of the provincial Dayak 
Customary Board (Majelis Adat Dayak) on 12 August 1994 and was elected as its chairman 
(KR 2003/89, Davidson 2002). His close relations with the military also benefited his 
nomination. He also had credentials in Dayak customary law (hukum adat) as indicated by 
his articles and research in this field.321 
The governor's determination to appoint a Dayak district head is shown in several 
political manoeuvres. He disregarded some Dayaks opinion that the governor should 
appoint an able Malay bureaucrat, Setiman Sud in, as district head instead of the more junior 
Jacobus Layang (interview Kls). The governor took extra steps to prevent a repeat of the 
Dayak's failure during election in Sintang. Tammar Abdulsalam, who was responsible for 
the elections in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu, was temporarily relieved from duty. He was 
partly blamed for failing to deliver Kadir as Sintang district head. The regime believed that 
his ardent Islamic beliefs could endanger the nomination of the Catholic Layang 
(interviews Abs, Awn). Replacing him was the incumbent district head of Kapuas Hulu, 
A.M. Djapari, who was known as a close confidant of Governor Aspar Aswin. To eliminate 
ethnic complications in the election and to ensure that the position would go to a Dayak, the 
interior minister was advised to exclude both Malay candidates, Abang Ramli and Rusny 
Usha, from the final list. The remaining three final candidates were all Dayaks: Jacobus 
Frans Layang, S.S. Sonan, and Stephanus Kupon (Akcaya 18-3-1995). Finally, a senior 
Dayak politician, Iman Kalis, was dispatched as the governor's envoy to Kapuas Hulu prior 
to the election to ensure the victory of Layang (interviews Kls, Djp). 
In the initial selection period, the Malay candidates, who realised that the post 
would go to a Dayak, claimed that they too were Dayaks (interview Lyg, see Abdulsalam 
1997:165). When all Malay candidates were finally dropped from the lists, they 
manoeuvred to elect the "best" Dayak district head for the Malays' interests. They were 
scheming to elect Stephanus Kupon, who was known to be quite ill at that time. Their 
calculation was that if Kupon won the election he would not be serving in his position for 
32
°The governor did not choose the other more senior Dayaks in the bureaucracy such as Sotorman Benteng 
and L.H. Kadir. One inside source said that the governor regarded Benteng as weak, and could not back Kadir 
after he had failed to win in the election in Sintang the previous year (interview Awn). 
321Layang was the author of a book on Dayak rebellions against the Japanese (1981) and of several research 
articles on Dayak customary laws and customary land published by Universitas Tanjungpura. 
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Jong because of his poor health.322If that happened, a Malay deputy district head would 
take over his position (various interviews, Djp, Abs, Lyg, Kls).323 In order to succeed, the 
schemers held a meeting one day before the election and suggested a narrow win for 
Layang. With this strategy Kupon could win the election with only a small swing in the 
voting, and the schemers could avoid being blamed for insubordination, because in an 
election small vote swings are possible. To this end, they also encouraged sub-ethnic 
divisions among the Dayak members of parliament. Sensing the manoeuvres, Iman Kalis, 
the governor's envoy, objected to the marginal winning strategy advanced by the Malay 
legislature during that meeting. He insisted Layang be given a decisive win with 18 votes, 
while Kupon should be left with only one.324 He also worked behind the scenes to unify the 
Dayak vote behind Layang. Even after these efforts Layang still won by only a narrow 
margin of three. Without Kalis' persistence, Kupon, who was favoured by the Malays, 
would have won the election. Layang was elected as the first Dayak district head in the 
New Order. 
During the New Order Dayak' access to the bureaucracy was limited, even in 
districts where Dayaks were the majority population. They were also barred from 
occupying strategic positions in the executive, at least until 1995. Their share in the 
legislatures since 1977 had gradually improved although they never achieved a majority in 
the council. Unfortunately, the legislative council during the New Order was known to be 
subservient and subordinate to the executive. This experience of marginalisation was not 
limited to political access, but also affected economic and cultural aspects, as will be 
discussed below. 
6.2 Economic Marginalisation 
The New Order had brought economic stability and prosperity to many Indonesians. 
Before the crisis at the end of 1990s, general indicators had shown a significant increase in 
income level, life expectancy, and educational attainment. However, it was widely 
322He was known to suffer from cancer and died not long afterward (interviews Lyg, Kls, Djp). 
3230ne high-ranking official of Malay origin mentioned the scheme as a wicked plot or rencana busuk 
(interview Djp ). 
324Kalis ' insistence was also recalled by the high-ranking Malay bureaucrat who presided at the meeting 
(interview Djp). 
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acknowledged that development had not been even during this time and many peripheral 
regions, particularly those in the Eastern part of the country, had enjoyed far fewer fruits of 
development (see for example, Akita and Lukman 1995; Sjafrizal 1997; Garcia and 
Soelistianingsih 1998; Akita and Alisjahbana 2002; Soenandar 2005). West Kalimantan 
was one such province because welfare levels were lowest compared to those of other 
provinces, despite its abundant natural resources. This section will examine how uneven 
development has affected Dayaks. First, it will look at the influence of logging and 
plantation activities and transmigration projects on rural Dayaks, two of issues which have 
attracted most attention in recent times. After that it discuss opportunities open to Dayaks 
in urban areas. 
6.2.1 Logging and Plantation Activities and Local Development 
Kalimantan forests have been exploited since the late 1960s. With the Forestry Act 
of 1967 the government started to grant timber harvesting rights to many logging 
concessionaries (HPH). The export of unprocessed logs rose sharply in the 1970s and 
became an important source of foreign exchange. Since the mid-1980s, because of the need 
for industrial wood, the government introduced timber plantations (HT!) especially in 
Sumatra and Kalimantan (Okamoto 1999:3-4; Triwibowo and Haryanto 2001:3,7; 
FWI/GFW 2002:24,36). As a result, the country's forest cover depleted from 93% in 1950 
to 75% in 1985, and 60% in 1997. West Kalimantan endured a similar deforestation trend 
with forest cover falling from 66.5% prior to 1968 to 46.1 % in 1997 (FWI/GFW 
2002:8, 12, 14). 
Logging operations contributed most to West Kalimantan 's forest loss. Prior to 
1968, the province's "production forest", an area where large-scale logging activities could 
take place, was the smallest among the Kalimantan provinces. It only designated 0.4% of 
its total forest area of almost 10 million hectares as production forest. At the same time 
Central Kalimantan set aside designated 1.2%, East Kalimantan 7.4%, and South 
Kalimantan 18.8%. By 1970, West Kalimantan had "caught up" with the other Kalimantan 
provinces, with the proportion of production forest soaring to 37% of the total forest areas 
in the province. In 1997 the share of production forest had climbed to 56.9% (for the 
statistics refers to Sekretariat Direktorat Djendral Kehutanan 1968; Gubernur Kalbar 1970; 
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Departemen Kehutanan 2002). 325 Added to further deforestation was the slow rate of 
replanting of trees (in some cases even the complete failure to replant) in logged areas. In 
2002 almost half of the logged areas in the province had been abandoned (Departemen 
Kehutanan 2002). 
The activities of industrial timber (HTI) and oil palm plantations caused 
deforestation too. Most of HTI sites were located in forest areas326 because they received 
generous financial subsidies and revenue from clear-felling the forest (FWI/GFW 2002:37). 
After forests were cleared, replantation was very slow. The replanting rate in West 
Kalimantan was at 11 % of the total allocated HTI forest, less than half of the national rate 
(FWI/GFW 2002:38-9). By 2002, the total forest allocated for HTI was about 1.1 million 
hectare, about 21 % of the province's production forest, or about 11.3% of its total forest. In 
2002 the area occupied by oil palm estate crops was about 6.7% of total areas occupied by 
forests (Table 6-7). 327 
Traditional shifting cultivation and transmigration were not major contributors to 
deforestation. Traditional shifting or 'slash-and-bum' cultivation, which the government 
blamed for forest depletion and devastating forest fires, had little impact on forest depletion 
compared to large-scale logging and plantation projects. According to J. Dick, traditional 
farmers were responsible for no more than 21 % of total forest Joss (Dick in FWI/GFW 
2002:47). Transmigration, too, contributed a small amount to forest loss. Up to 1998, 
seventeen transmigration sites had taken over 43,434 hectares, or less than 1 % of West 
Kalimantan forests (FWI/GFW 2002:50). 
Most plantation and logging projects were in rural and interior regions, which were 
thickly forested and sparsely inhabited (Figure 6-1 ). In the case of palm oil, Table 6-7 
325 Local NGO even claimed that 94% forest in the district such as Ketapang was allocated to logging 
activities (Andasputra 1999: 1). 
3260ne study found that 72% of the total area of seven HT! was forest (FW1/GFW 2002:41 ). 
327 The rapid growth of plantation, particularly palm-oil, in the province could also be tied with the 
government's enthusiastic support for plantations. For example, since 1986 every new oil palm estate was 
required to be linked to transmigration, which itself helped plantation growth. Another contributor was the 
accessible road to inland region. The road construction to northern and northeastern of the province had 
started in the 1970s with the help of the Australian government (for the aid see Badan Koordinasi Penanaman 
Modal Daerah Propinsi Kalimantan Barat 1982:17). One aim of the road construction was to develop the 
interior areas and most importantly to enable rapid mobilisation of security forces if there were security 
threats in the region. Remember that these areas were the domain of the communist rebels at the end of the 
1960s. 
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shows that interior districts such as Sanggau, Ketapang, Sintang, and Landak had the 
largest areas under cultivation. The Dayaks are known to be the majority populations in 
these districts, and therefore would experience the most harshly consequences of plantation 
and logging activities. 
Table 6-7 Area and Production of Palm Oil in West Kalimantan (2002) 
New Old Total Numbers Production/ 
Plants Productive Plants Area of Production Year 
Districts (ha) Plants (ha) (ha) (ha) Farmers (tonnage) (tonnage) 
Pontianak 3.02 2.371 0 5.391 0 5.029 2,12 
Landak 5.449 16.186 800 22.435 4.589 33.079 2,04 
Sambas 5.799 9.369 0 15.168 3.144 15.684 1,67 
Bengkayang 3.164 5.857 0 9.021 1.675 12.115 2,07 
Singkawang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 
Sanggau 47.42 106.968 200 154.588 33.311 245.572 2,29 
Sin tang 14.42 31.55 0 45.79 7.017 70.607 2,23 
Kapuas 
Hulu 8 0 126 8.126 1.51 0 0,00 
Ketapang 13.807 72.941 1.834 88.582 14.916 135 4 1,85 
Total 100.899 245.242 2.96 349.101 66.153 517.09 2,11 
Source: http://www.disbun-kalbar.go.id/index-image.php?table=6 (accessed 6-8-2005). 
Logging and plantation operations could stimulate the local economy and improve 
standards of living. The construction of the road in some interior areas was closely tied to 
the establishment of logging concessions and plantations. New roads open isolated regions 
and give opportunities to the population. Health and education facilities were also often 
established in large plantations, particularly those linked to the transmigration program 
(known as FIR-Trans). Large logging companies were usually required to build social and 
health facilities for local populations. In short, these operations would open up previously 
isolated areas, attract labourers and stimulate the local economy. However, negative effects 
loomed from plantation companies and government officials mismanagement and 
corruption. The following will examine the negative effects brought by these operations. 
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Figure 6-1 Logging and Plantation Areas (2002) 
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Researchers have shown that plantation and logging operations reduced the living 
standards for many Dayaks (Mubyarto, Soetrisno et al. 1991 :23,31 ; Alqadrie 2002b:23). 
Large-scale logging and plantation operations shrank shifting cultivation areas so farmers 
were forced to re-cultivate the same plots of land more frequently. Frequent cultivation in 
shorter cycles left the soil with no time to recover, and it therefore became less fertile and 
unlikely to yield good harvests. In the past when "free" forests were still abundant, the land 
could be left fallow for up to twenty years so that it could recover its fertility before re-
culti vation (Mubyarto, Soetrisno et al. 199l:xxiii-iv). The dwindling forest sizes also 
correlated with a decline in the population of wild animals - a source of protein for the 
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villagers - as well as the reduction of forest produce, such as rubber, dry wood, fruits, 
honey, and rattan. On top of that, Kalimantan Review reported cases where locals had been 
barred from collecting produce from the forest after the plantation. Logging and plantation 
activities were also linked to reports of outbreak of agricultural pests, increasing water and 
air pollution, and rivers used for transportation becoming shallower (cf. Florus and 
Petebang 1999:12). 
Farmers who participated in plantation work did not experience any immediate 
improvement of their living conditions. They had to wait six years after planting before 
they could reap the first harvest. In most cases, whilst awaiting the harvest, they were 
required to work at the plantation, usually on low wages. For eleven years after the first 
harvest, a third of their monthly income was deducted to cover the cost of running and 
maintaining their plots (Florus and Petebang 1999:37; Okamoto 1999:5). The whole 
process involved a sophisticated calculations foreign to many farmers. Unfortunately, estate 
and plantation companies did not provide financial coaching. Researchers found some 
farmers were left with heavy debts resulting from a lack of financial planning (Awang 
1992:250-1; Djuweng 1996:86; Okamoto 1999:5). 
Plantations did not always provide better long-term employment opportunities for 
the local population. Some studies on the plantation in West Kalimantan reported a 
majority of ski I led employees in the plantation were not locals (Alqadrie 1990: 173-4, 186-7; 
Awang 1992; Djuweng 1996:63). In Parindu Plantation (Sanggau), about 559 (77.2%) of 
724 employees were from outside West Kalimantan (see also Alqadrie 1990:269; 
Haryaningsih, Ngusmanto et al. 2000:84). Among all logging companies, only 1.7% of the 
total number of employees were local, while the rest were outsiders (Djuweng 1996:xvi). 
Apart from maintaining their plots, jobs available to them on the plantation were in 
cheap contract labour. Finding alternative jobs for the locals was not easy because not 
many had the specific skills required for plantation operations. Also, some employers 
preferred to employ migrants rather than local people, who were considered poorly 
educated and unskilled, and were perceived as more difficult to deal with. In Jogging areas, 
with no alternative skills, less arable land and the need for quick cash, many Dayaks were 
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eventually lured into logging activities, working independently or hired by the logging 
companies (Djuweng 1996:63). 
The majority (70%) of respondents in Alqadrie' s study at the end of the 1980s 
disliked the plantation or logging activities in their region, and about half of them believed 
that such activities did not benefit the local population (Alqadrie 1990: 182, 185). Anti-
plantation protests started at the beginning of the 1980s, although they went unreported (see 
§7.2.2). Aware of the negative aspects of plantation work for locals, NGOs under Pancur 
Kasih and elements of the Catholic Church urged the local population to reject palm oil 
plantation in their areas. 
6.2.2 Transmigration and Increased Economic Competition 
If we consider the Dayaks and Malays as natives, there are four main migrant 
groups in West Kalimantan: the Bugis, Chinese, Javanese and Madurese. The significant 
influx of Bugis and Chinese stopped before Indonesian independence. The numbers of 
Javanese and Madurese started to grow after the 1970s. The majority of the Javanese came 
as participants in official transmigration schemes, while the majority of the Madurese were 
believed to have arrived as independent (swakarsa) migrants. 
The first formal transmigration project in West Kalimantan began in 1955. There 
were a few transmigration projects to West Kalimantan up until 1965, but generally the 
number of migrants over this period was small. They were only 1.9% of total migrant 
households in the 1990s. Transmigration grew rapidly during the New Order regime, and 
reached its peak in the 1980s (Table 6-8). Most of these migrants went to districts of 
Sintang (22.5%), Ketapang (18.2%), Pontianak (13.8%), Sekadau (13.4%), Bengkayang 
(11.1%) and Sanggau (10.4%) (Table 6-9). 
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Table 6-8 Transmigration to West Kalimantan (1950s-1990s) 
Numbers 
Periods of 
Household % of Total 
1950-60s 1,551 1.9 
1970s 2,197 2.7 
1980s 47,932 59.5 
1990s 28 908 35.9 
Total 80,588 
Source: http://www.nakertrans.go.id/statistik _trans/DAT A %20UPT/UPT%20SERAH/prov _ KALBAR 1.php 
(accessed 9-10-2005). 
Table 6-9 Transmigration to West Kalimantan (1955-2000) 
No Location Start From Transmigrant Sites Transmigrant Households Numbers % of Total Numbers % of Total 
1 Sambas 1982 10 4.7 3,810 4.7 
2 Bengkayang 1980 19 8.9 8,961 11.1 
3 Pontianak 1955 27 12.7 11,098 13.8 
4 Landak 1982 1 0.5 100 0.1 
5 Sanggau 1980 21 9.9 8,408 10.4 
6 Sekadau 1982 27 12.7 10,778 13.4 
7 Sintang 1980 53 24.9 18,127 22.5 
8 Melawi 1980 5 2.3 2,250 2.8 
9 Kapuas Hulu 1984 8 3.8 2,421 3.0 
10 Ketapang 1983 42 19.7 14,635 18.2 
Total 213 80,588 
Source: http://www.nakertrans.go.id/statistik _ trans/DA TA %20UPT /UPT%20SERAH/prov _ KALBARl .php 
(accessed on 25-3-2006) 
In principle, transmigration is meant to benefit the region, to both migrants and 
locals. Through transmigration, the government wanted to balance the distribution of 
population and labour force, to utilise natural resources, to raise the standard of living, to 
support regional development and reduce inter-regional disparities. Transmigration could 
also foster nation-building and strengthen national defence and security (Fasbender and 
Erbe 1990:30-1). Dayaks, and other local people, who lived near the transmigration sites 
would benefit from the new roads, education and health facilities brought about by 
transmigration in their areas. Those who became " local transmigrants" (known also as 
APPDT) would also receive allowances from the government (KR 2004/106). Despite this, 
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problems and tension related to transmigration are common because of cultural differences, 
land disputes, economic competition, and other issues (Otten 1986: 144-184). The following 
paragraphs will focus on the effect of transmigration on local people, in this case, the 
Dayaks. 
Generally, the natives of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi did not welcome the 
Javanese and Balinese migrants, particularly if the migrants threathened to become a 
majority in the local region (Drake 1989:132).328 This threat was very real because a 
transmigration project/site will usually accommodate several hundreds of migrant 
households, may "overwhelm" relatively small and sparse local populations in the interior. 
Many locals were sceptical of transmigration because the government supported the 
migrants but seemed to neglect the equally poor locals. As a general rule, the government 
provided sponsored migrants with housing, free land (two hectare or more), food for up to 
eighteen months, and various resources for production, such as seed fertiliser, livestock, 
necessary tools and equipment (Fasbender and Erbe 1990:52-3). Migrants who participated 
in the plantation program (i.e. PIR-Trans) from the 1980s also received plots of plantation 
land.329 Local people did not receive such government support, and as a result resentment 
and jealousy toward the migrants inevitably grew. 
The government tried to alleviate some of these problems, for example, by allowing 
some locals to be part of transmigration projects from the late 1970s (regulation Keppres 
1/1978). Local people who participated in the project would receive the same entitlements 
as the migrants. The number of such local "migrants" was nationally set at 10% of the total 
site population, although in West Kalimantan the cap could reach 50%, and even more than 
81% in some sites (see Table 6-10; Fasbender 1990:54-5; Kepala Kantor Wilayah 
328ln the case oflrian Jaya, by the early 1980s over 250,000 transmigrants had been added to the province's 
750,000 population. The regime had planned to bring in a further one million through the rest of the 1980s, 
which would reduce the native Papuans to a minority (Drake 1989:57). As previously explained, population 
resettlement for political purposes was not uncommon in countries with many ethnic groups. 
329From 1989 to 1995, there were 28,749 households participating in PIR-Trans (KR 2004/106). Local people 
were allowed to participate in the PlR-Trans project, however, they had to repay similar debt to that of 
migrants. Locals were unhappy and argued that since they had given part of their land, they should not pay the 
same amount as migrants (Dove 1985b; Dove 1986). 
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Departemen Transmigrasi dan Pemukiman Perambah Rutan Kalimantan Barat 1998: 56).330 
Unfortunately, these measures did not solve the problem for all local migrants. Many left 
and went back to their original dwellings because they did not settle well into different 
lifestyles and cultures or because they had exhausted government-provided resources (KR 
various issues, see also Otten 1986: 164-6). 
Table 6-10 Transmigration Household to Sambas District (1994-1995) 
Transmigration Number ofTransmigrant Households %of 
Type Sites Local Non-Local Total Local 
Sensibo Baru 1,112 256 1,368 81.3 
Seluang 305 828 1,133 26.9 
PIR-Sus Kinan de 190 169 359 52.9 Godang Damar 391 205 596 65.6 
Pavan Tembawang 201 289 490 41.0 
Pombav 213 223 436 48.9 
TIR-Trans Jawai 164 212 376 43.6 
Tebuah Marong 77 183 260 29.6 
PIR-Trans Sabung 145 285 430 33.7 
Banan Laik 80 120 200 40.0 
Tanaman Saparan III 40 160 200 20.0 
Pangan Pa um 26 103 129 20.2 
Total 2,944 3,033 5,977 49.3 
Source: BPS Sambas (1996:50-53). 
Dayak resentment of migrants was also because of land disputes. In most cases, the 
regime appropriated land and handed it over to migrants without properly compensating the 
local landowners. One study found that majority of local people in Sanggau Ledo 
(Bengkayang) in 1986 received no compensation when the government converted their land 
to a transmigration site (in Djuweng 1996:93). In 1984, some Dayaks from Nobal (Sintang) 
complained to a local bishop and to the district head about the lack of financial 
compensation for their land which had been converted to transmigration sites (Roekaerts 
1985:29). After locals objected strongly, a plantation in Parindu (Sanggau), which was 
originally designated for migrants, was returned to local ownership (Sapardi 1992: 130). 
330In a more recent example in 2004, the local population in Seberuang sub-district, Kapuas Hulu protested 
against the district government policy to open a new transmigration site where the local people would only get 
a 40% allocation. The protest succeeded in pressuring the government to change the allocation to 50% (KR 
20041110). 
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People were dissatisfied with the compensation although formal complaints were few or not 
well documented because of the authoritarian nature of the regime at that time. 
Dayaks and some segments of other local populations also believed that the 
migrants had taken away their jobs, particularly jobs in low-paid sectors, such as in mining 
and logging. When illegal mining riots broke out in Samalantan (Sambas) in March 1996, a 
majority of illegal gold miners (PETI) in West Kalimantan were outsiders (Andasputra 
1999:14-16).331 It was quite common for many migrants to look for jobs other than farming 
their allocated land (Suhadak, Daliyo et al. 1977:20,45; Usop 1992:103). Common reasons 
were the need for immediate cash to support their families, the unsuitability of the land for 
farming, and difficulties in marketing produce due to lack of infrastructure (Suhadak, 
Daliyo et al. 1977:20,45). These migrants were more likely to secure jobs than were locals, 
because they were usually more flexible and less demanding but more aggressive in 
looking for jobs. 
6.2.3 Limited Urban Opportunities 
In developing countries like Indonesia, the establishment of important infrastructure 
and offices in the regions usually takes place initially in the provincial capitals before 
district and lower level administrations. These development priorities mean that those who 
live far from cities and towns will naturally be disadvantaged. Many Dayaks would be 
disadvantaged as they live in rural areas, a demographic trend which has changed only 
slightly since the colonial times. Population census in 1930 recorded very few Dayak living 
in cities: no Dayaks in Pemangkat and Sintang cities, and only 42 in Singkawang (3.6%), 
40 in Pontianak (0.3%), and 76 in Ketapang (2.3%). Recent censuses showed that Dayak 
populations in the cities remain small. In the provincial capital, the proportion of Dayaks 
was only 2.9% in 1980 and 3.3% in the 2000 census. Even in districts with a significant 
Dayak population, their capital usually had fewer Dayaks, except in Bengkayang (Table 
6-11). 
331Similar phenomena could be found elsewhere. In the mining sites in Talangah village, Central Kal imantan, 
there were only 35 people, or around 0.9% locals, working in the mines, while outsiders numbered around 
5,000. Before the police sweep against the illegal mining, the number ofoutsiders had reached 10,000 (Usop 
1992:101). 
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Table 6-11 Dayaks as a Percentage of the Total Population Living in the Capital and 
the District (2000) 
Districts % of Dayaks who lived in 
District Capital Total District 
Bengkavang 75.2 52.4 
Landak 62.4 79 
With Samrn:au 34.4 61.2 
significant Sekadau 36 56.8 
number of Sintang 17.8 55.9 
Dayaks Melawi 27.3 42.4 
Kapuas Hutu 35.4 39.7 
Ketapang 4.7 23.2 
Average 36.7 51.3 
Pontianak City 4.3 3.3 
Others Sambas 7.7 3.4 
Singkawang 3 7.5 
Pontianak 1.3 7.8 
Average 4.1 5.5 
Source: Census 2000. 
The number of Dayaks in the cities continued to be small because many of them 
could not afford the cost of urban migration. For those whose livelihood depended on 
farming in the outlying villages, moving into urban areas was not possible without 
jeopardising their incomes. Once they left their farms they would lose their only source of 
funding. Finding a new job in the city for those who had no other skills but farming would 
be extremely difficult. It was no longer possible for them to move and farm the lands near 
the cities because there were no "free" lands. Only Dayaks who worked as civil servants, in 
business, or Dayak farmers who owned farms in nearby areas, could live in the cities. A 
significant number of younger generation Dayaks who lived in the cities were actually 
students who were pursuing higher education. Upon graduation these students would 
struggle to find jobs in both the bureaucracy and the private sector, so that they could stay 
in urban areas. However, as mentioned previously, entry into these sectors was not easy 
because they had been dominated by other ethnic groups. In more detail, lower and middle 
levels of the bureaucracy were dominated by Malays, while business and private sectors 
were in the hands of the Chinese. 
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In addition to the previous two kinds of marginalisation the Dayaks endured as 
discussed above, there is another type, cultural marginalisation, described in the next 
section. 
6.3 Cultural Marginalisation 
Recent discussions among the Dayak NGOs and scholars centred around the 
political and economic marginalisation of the Dayaks and on the decline of Dayak culture. 
Most cited examples are the disappearance of longhouses, declining role of the traditional 
leaders, and low appreciation among the younger generation of Dayaks of their culture. 
This section will focus on factors outside Dayaks, such as the introduction of modern 
religions and some government policies, as well as the lack of a cultural cringe among the 
Dayaks as the main contributors to cultural decline. 
6.3.1 The Role of Modern Religion 
The introduction of foreign religions, especially Islam and Christianity, was 
"destructive" of Dayak cultural practices. As previously explained, in the past, after 
conversion to Islam the Dayaks usually abandoned their traditional practices and beliefs, 
and became Malays. Serious converts would often leave their community to settle in Malay 
communities because there were basic disagreements between Islam and many Dayak 
habits, such as drinking liquor and eating pork. The number of converted Dayaks was 
significant, as has been discussed in §3.1.3. Islam changed the culture, habits, and identity 
of many Dayaks who became Muslims. 
As with the introduction oflslam, Protestantism and Catholicism also contributed to 
the changing of Dayak culture and tradition. Unlike Islam and Protestantism which usually 
are rigid in their approach to the Dayak culture, Catholicism is generally more flexible and 
acceptable to Dayak culture. 332 Generally, Dayaks who convert to Catholicism could 
continue to live in their community and practice their traditional customs. For example, 
traditional performances that used magical chanting were replaced by Christian prayers, 
332Within Christianity, Protestantism is perceived as more stringent than Catholicism. John Bamba claimed 
that Protestantism was the most incompatible religion with Dayak culture (Urano 2002:23). Having said that, 
there were also reports of strict Catholic priests in the past who demanded the new converts to destroy all 
idols (van Hulten 1992:133). 
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and sacrifices were changed to align with Christian practices and principles (King 1985:72-
3; Maunati 2004:84-5). Research conducted on Dayak Ribun in Parindu (Sanggau) in 1980 
also reached the same conclusion about the flexibility of Catholicism (Ahok, RAM et al. 
1980:5). This flexibility has enabled Catholicism to change many elements of Dayak 
culture, without having to completely abandon the tradition itself. For this, one Dayak 
scholar believed that Catholicism is adopting a more sophisticated and diplomatic approach 
to destroy Dayak culture (Urano 2002:23). The negative effects of Christianity on the 
eroding of local culture can be observed in other part of Kalimantan. In Central Kalimantan, 
a Dayak scholar, Fridolin Ukur, found that Christianity has resulted in Dayak being 
uprooted from their culture. They did not have enough knowledge of their own culture, and 
the new generation was completely ignorant about it (Ukur 1971 :242-3). 
After the coming of the New Order, conversion to modern religions increased due to 
anti-communist campaigns (Davidson 2002: 198-200). A Protestant missionary who was 
working in the Bengkayang area observed that after the 1965 coup, and particularly after 
the 1967 conflict, both Christian and Muslim officers in the army encouraged the local 
Dayaks to convert. He subsequently reported that the number of converts to Protestantism 
in Bengkayang had increased dramatically from an average of 94 converts per year in the 
1960s to 729 converts per year in the 1970s (Humble 1982:45,142). One ex-military priest 
recalled that a military commander backed the full-scale Islamisation of the Dayaks, even 
by allowing new converts to continue their habit of consuming pork and alcohol. In some 
cases, Muslim preachers and informal leaders were forced to give sanctions to those 
Dayaks who failed to convert to Islam (Doera 2003: 166-74). The Catholic Churches that 
were initially methodical and slow to converting Dayaks decided to make conversions 
much easier, for example by lifting the requirement to study the Bible before converting 
(Doera 2003:190-1). The Church authority even agreed to "blanket" convert Dayaks 
through distribution of yellow cards (Davidson 2002:200). Local press joined the effort by 
reporting the news of conversion (Akcaya 12-1, 28-11, 24-12-1979). 
These efforts to convert the Dayaks were very successful. Although data on the 
religion of each ethnic group was not available in 1971, it was assumed that between 75-
85% of the 277,456 Catholic in the province in 1971 were Dayaks, and about the same 
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percentage of the province's 84,372 Protestants. By 1980, the number of Catholic Dayaks 
had already reached 474,362; and in 2000 792,748. Numbers of Protestant Dayaks had 
increased from 167,096 in 1980 to 307,335 in 2000. Excluding small percentage of Muslim 
Dayaks who were included in the Malay category for consistency in this thesis, almost 98% 
of Dayaks were either Catholic or Protestant. While the number of "religious" Dayaks 
increased, the number of animist Dayaks fell. According to census 1971, the number of 
"other" religions in West Kalimantan was 655,097, the majority (70-80%) of whom were 
very likely Dayak animists.333 In 1980, the number of Dayak animists had declined to only 
116,665, and further reduced to 16,059 in 2000 (see also Djuweng 2001:458-9; Davidson 
2002:199). 
6.3.2 A Cultural Approach 
After independence, Indonesia embarked on a nation-building process aiming to 
strengthen the country's unity. One way was through the creation of national symbols to be 
shared by all Indonesians. In the early days of the nation, the Indonesian leaders had 
decided on the national flag, anthem, language, and some other essential symbols. In more 
recent time Javanese batik dress was elevated to become an official national dress. 
These symbols were accompanied by the construction of national identity or values 
to mould the different and diverse ethnic groups together. The rapid introduction of streets 
named after national heroes since the 1970s and 1980s was one example. In West 
Kalimantan, many Dayak villages which had local names were renamed into more 
"common" names which mostly adopt the naming convention of villages in Java. Some 
Iban villages were renamed as Toba, Pulau Manak and Rantau Prapat by a Batak sub-
district head in the early 1980s.334 Undoubtedly, government-sponsored transmigration was 
also geared to foster the national integration. 
As a part of nation building, national pride, and a way to improve the standard of 
living and "civilisation'', the government decided to transform the cultures of certain 
3330ther possible animists, the Chinese, were mostly registered as Confucianists in the 1971 census. There 
were 132,974 Confucianists in West Kalimantan. The number ofConfucianists dropped to 65,857 in the 1990 
census. In the 1990 census, 173,609 or 60% of West Kalimantan Chinese professed to be Buddhists as 
Confucianism had been deregistered as an official religion. 
334They later reverted to their original names after the Reform (cf. Soemardjan, Jatiman et al. 1992:Chapter Vl; 
Lumenta 2001:1 l3). 
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indigenous minorities which were thought primitive or too different from the normal 
Indonesian citizen. These communities were usually termed masyarakat terasing or 
isolated communities (see above discussion in Li 1999; Duncan 2004c).335 Sections of the 
Dayak community were labelled masyarakat terasing. The decision to include Dayaks as a 
primitive ethnic group most likely was influenced by the memory of their past practices of 
nomadic life, shifting cultivation, exotic culture, and headhunting which had been 
exaggerated with stories of their primitive life and cannibalism. A publication in 1975 
noted that West Kalimantan had 66 isolated groups, all of whom were Dayaks, with 
481,368 people (Departemen Sosial 1975:19-22). This was almost a half (42%) of all 
Dayaks of West Kalimantan (based on the 1971 census).336 In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
number of isolated groups in West Kalimantan had decreased as a result of the 
advancement of transportation and communication. Contributing to the decrease was the 
better understanding of Dayaks and an end to the "blanket" assumption that all Dayaks 
were backward and therefore isolated. A government source published in 1990 mentioned 
only four isolated ethnic groups in West Kalimantan: the Bekatan in Kapuas Hulu, Dayyu 
in Sambas, Baweng in Landak, and Miskin in Ketapang, all were undoubtedly Dayak (see 
Bale and Suprapti 1990:5). 
Ethnic stereotyping of Dayaks as backward and primitive did not disappear quickly. 
Although the practice of headhunting among the Dayaks had been largely stamped out by 
the beginning of the twentieth century, their association with headhunting continued as 
results of conflicts in 1967, 1997 and 1999 in which "headhunting" was performed. Many 
Dayaks still practice traditional shifting cultivation, government officials blamed as the 
cause of recurring forest fires. This further fomented a false perception of Dayak culture as 
a whole. 
One solution was to resettle these isolated ethnic groups so their "development" 
could be monitored and that they could live like the other common Indonesian. By 1994 the 
government had resettled 160,000 people who fell into that category, and estimated over 
3350ther terms are also used for example suku /erasing, masyarakat adat terpencil or more recently adopted 
komunitas adat terpencil which all have the inherent meaning of an isolated and backward group (for example 
Duncan 2004b:90). 
336 According to the census 1971 West Kalimantan Dayaks were 41%. Since the total population was 
2,019,924, the number ofDayaks was estimated at about 828,169. 
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one million people who need the attention of the government (see above discussion in Li 
1999). The government also systemically tried to phase out such culture and practices by 
labelling them backward and primitive. To discourage the Dayak traditional agriculture, the 
government called farmer who practised shifting cultication "wild" cultivator (peladang 
liar) or forest cutter (perambah hutan), all of which are associated with a lack of civility. 
The disappearance of longhouses in the province is another example of the state 
cultural campaign to sideline elements considered primitive. The New Order government 
was concerned about the security risk associated with longhouses. The regime worried that 
communal living in longhouses could be a breeding ground for communism. The 
communist revival was a serious issue because of this region' s previous experience with 
communist rebellion and also due to the close relations of some Dayaks with communist 
rebels. Besides political considerations, the government also thought that living in 
longhouses was unhealthy and dangerous because they were prone to fire (see Dove l 985a; 
Roekaerts 1985; Putra in van Hutten 1992:xvi-xvii; Djuweng 1996:17). 
In the past, keeping longhouses was not difficult as they were an inherent part of 
Dayak life. The longhouses were built to protect Dayaks against headhunters. The 
longhouse was a place where Dayaks coordinated their economic activities, such as farming 
and hunting. It also became a venue for social and cultural activities, such as harvest 
festivities. The Malay sultanates and the Dutch colonials had no problems with the 
longhouses. In fact, the Dayaks living in longhouses were desirable as it enabled tax 
collection and manpower mobilisation in times of war. The Dayaks who wanted to leave 
longhouses permanently were required to pay cash fines and would often receive social 
punishment. 337 Individual houses for the Dayaks were very rare before the turn of 201h 
century. 
However, the trend to resettle outside longhouses has grown stronger over the time. 
Conversion to Islam was one of the first reasons. Serious Dayak converts moved out from 
the longhouses as their new faith was incompatible with longhouse living. The increase in 
337Until recently (1997) similar practices were still strictly observed in a longhouse in Melawi. The Jonghouse 
chief wished to take his family to live in the government houses near the road, but he could not afford to pay 
the fine. He would be fined if he left the community more than three days. He said that this rule can be 
abandoned only when the whole community agreed to shut down the longhouse (Sydney Morning Herald, 8-
2-1997). 
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Dayak demographic movements after independence also contributed to the trend away from 
longhouses. Opportunities to pursue higher education and office work in urban areas led 
many Dayaks to abandon living in longhouses. The cessation of headhunting, a reason for 
Dayaks staying in longhouses, is another factor.338 New values brought by education and 
religion tended to question traditional leadership and customary practices, the very 
foundation of longhouses. These factors made the function of longhouses less relevant 
(King 1985:73; Coomans 1987: 112-3; Mudiyono 1994:215-6). The support of post-war 
Dayak leaders, such as Oevaang Oeray, for Dayaks to live in individual houses (in 
Davidson 2002:97) assisted this trend. However, despite the trend of abandoning 
longhouses increasing after WWII, many Dayaks in rural areas still lived in them. The 
government did little to eliminate longhouses during the first few decades after 
independence as it was not the government priority. 
New Order policies contributed to the rapid disappearance of longhouses. The head 
of the Dayak Customary Council of Sanggau district, Donatus Djaman, noted that at the 
end of the 1960s, the government instructed the Dayaks to destroy their longhouses. The 
military was reported to come to Dayak villages and force them to destroy their traditional 
houses. Some longhouses were burnt-down as a result (Forest Peoples Programme 2005:8-
9). 
There are no the statistics on the number of large and fully functioning longhouses 
in West Kalimantan. 339 However, longhouses apparently had completely disappeared in 
"coastal" districts, except one in Saham village (Landak) which was preserved for tourism. 
Researchers have reported the existence of several longhouses in the interior, although their 
numbers are declining. In the early 1990s, Layang and Kayan reported three longhouses in 
Embaloh (Kapuas Hulu), and almost all the inhabitants of Batang Lupar (Kapuas Hulu) still 
lived in longhouses (Layang and Kanyan 1994:201). During her research in mid-1986, 
Harwell (2001) found two longhouses in Gerai village (Ketapang). 
338Helping its disappearance was the suppression by the European colonisers, the spread of modem religions, 
and peace meetings among the Dayaks (see Alqadrie 1990: 117). Colombijn wrote that in the ritual, the human 
heads were replaced by old skulls, fresh animal skulls, or coconut, and later they disappeared altogether 
(Colombijn 2001:27). 
339In 1995, the provincial government of East Kalimantan claimed the area had about 92 longhouses, fifteen 
of which were still functioning or in good condition (Maunati 2004:71). 
195 
The disappearance of longhouses, one of the mam pillars of Dayak culture, 
exacerbated the decline of Dayak culture. With their disappearance went the oral traditions, 
customs and performances, and sense of communal living among Dayaks (Freeman 
1970:125-6; Drake 1982:49-52; Djuweng 1996: 17,124). The new "communal centre" built 
by government which was usually attached to the village office was not able to replace the 
longhouses. 
Through its patronising cultural approach, the government also wanted to ensure 
higher levels of homogeneity in the society for easier control. In 1979 the government 
introduced the Village Governance Law (UU 5/1979) that standardised all villages in the 
country. The regime abolished various local names for villages, and introduced a uniform 
term desa, term for a village in Java.340 The name of the village head was also uniformly 
changed to kepala desa. The size of the village should have a population of at least 2,500 or 
500 households (regulation Permendagri 4/1981). This requirement might be suitable for 
the more concentrated and overpopulated villages in Java and Bali, but not suitable for 
conditions in many other regions. This cap was not suitable for West Kalimantan where the 
population in the interior area was sparsely spread into small-size villages. About 59% of 
all villages in the province had 50 or fewer households, and about 23.2% had between 51 
and 100 households (Table 6-12). The government later lowered the minimum standard to 
200 households per village, (Gubemur Kalbar 1988:56) but still many villages did not fit 
the criteria. As a result more than 80% of 4,632 mostly Dayak villages were regrouped in 
the early 1980s (Table 6-13 and Table 6-14). Village reorganisation required adjustments 
which in some cases have resulted in some tension among the former village leaders as well 
as among the villagers.341 
340Prior to that many local communities had their own name for a village, for example banjar in Bali, nagari 
in West Sumatra, and kampung in parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan. These terms were revived again after the 
fall of the New Order. 
341Village reorganisation caused dissatisfaction among former village chiefs who had lost their leadership 
positions. Many villagers also complained. For example, some villagers needed to travel further to see the 
village chiefs, as the new village now covered a much larger area. The population of former villages might 
were disgruntled because the development concentrated on the centre of the new village (i.e. place 
surrounding the new village chief otlice). As the new village comprised of several smaller villages which 
might have different sub-cultures, misunderstandings arose among villagers. 
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Table 6-12 Number of Villages According to Size before Village Reorganisation 
Number of Number of % of Total 
Households Villages Villages 
< 50 2,732 59.0 
51 - 100 1,076 23.2 
101-300 565 12.2 
301 - 500 124 2.7 
501 - 1000 92 2.0 
> 1001 43 0.9 
Total 4,632 100.0 
Source: Pemda Kalimantan Barat (1988:55). 
Table 6-13 Number of Villages before and after Reorganisation by District (1953-1985) 
Change 
District 1953 1977 1985 1977-1985 
Pontianak 677 939 285 -70% 
Sambas 539 600 259 -57% 
Sanggau 917 1, 174 224 -81% 
Sintang 1,039 1, 145 237 -79% 
Kaouas Hutu 508 496 141 -72% 
Ketapang 310 309 120 -61% 
Pontianak Citv 21 22 -100% 
Total 4,011 4 685 1.266 -73% 
Source: Dinas Kesehatan (1953:5); Gubemur Kalbar {1977:18); Pemda Kalimantan Barat ( 1988:2). 
Table 6-14 Villages before and after Villages Regrouping (Sambas) 
Sub-district Before After Decrease (%) 
IPemangkat 29 15 48.3 
Te bas 45 30 33.3 
~ Jawai 26 20 23.l 
~ Sambas 78 35 55. l ~ 
>-. .s Seiangkung 26 14 146.2 ~ E 
~ 8 Teluk Keramat 79 39 50.6 
Samalantan 52 15 71.2 
~ IBengkavang 71 17 76.1 Q) 
..... Ledo 66 17 74.2 ~ ~ .s Sanggau Ledo 28 12 57.l ~ E 
88 Seluas 37 7 81.1 
Source: Soemardjan (1992). 
Note: Excluding sub-districts with fewer than 20 villages. 
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This new regulation affected traditional governance in many parts of Indonesia, 
including West Kalimantan. A series of workshops conducted by the Dayak NGOs in 1999 
estimated that about 70% of adat structure had been damaged. Adat structure and law still 
functioned well in Kapuas Hutu district, and also Sanggau. Adat structure in other districts 
only functioned between 30-50%. And the function of temenggung had changed as they had 
used adat for their own interest (Masiun 2000:13-4). The following will explain why such 
decline occurred. 
Important traditional leadership within the Dayak society, particularly the village 
chief and temenggung, soon found themselves outside the leadership circle in the village. 
The new law required a village head to be at least a graduate from junior high school and 
no older than 60. This was quite different from previous Village Governance Law in 1965 
(UU 19/1965) which only required a basic education (i.e. primary school or equivalent) and 
did not restrict the age. This new regulation required qualities that the existing traditional 
leaders could not fulfil. Research in Bengkayang area published in 1975, for example, 
found only one of 29 village chiefs had 6-years primary education (Departemen Sosial 
1975:38-40). Even after 20 years these criteria are still difficult to fulfilled. A statistics in 
1996 showed that of 1,402 village chiefs only 55% of them had education above 
elementary school. About 39% of them only had elementary school education, 6% did not 
finish elementary school, and 0.4% did not go to school. Similar sources noted that the 
"older" generation of village chiefs, who had held the position for more than 15 years, was 
less than 7% of the total numbers of village chiefs (BPS Kalimantan Barat 1997:67). These 
new criteria were never strictly enforced due to lack of personnel. However, the trend was 
towards more and more traditional village chiefs being replaced by a younger, better 
educated but less respected cohort of public servants. As a result, emotional ties which once 
existed between the village chiefs and villagers diminished. 
The new regulation made the village chiefs position dependent on the bureaucracy, 
in this case, sub-district head. The sub-district head had the authority to influence the 
reappointment or even promotion of the incumbent village chiefs. Antlov noted that the 
New Order was able to transform the village chiefs from a relatively independent position 
to part of the machinery of bureaucracy. Prior to that, higher authorities did not have much 
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contact with the village level governance (Antlov:35, 135). These chiefs only carried out 
the official tasks requested by the government and they reported back to the villagers, not to 
the sub-district heads. 
The role of customary leaders or temenggung whose main role was to manage the 
customary laws has declined quite rapidly. By 1982, West Kalimantan still had 849 
temenggung, with the largest concentrations in Sanggau (215), followed by Ketapang (198), 
Sintang (139), Pontianak (104), Kapuas Hulu (102), but none in Pontianak city (Gubemur 
Kalbar 1983:26-7). In 1987, number of temenggung was further reduced to 801 (Gubemur 
Kalbar 1988:59). 
Many factors have contributed to the decline. The financial support which was 
given to the temenggung at the end of 1970s (Gubernur Kalbar 1977:18), 342 was 
discontinued later in an apparent effort to make the position unattractive. It was also 
decided not to fill the vacant position when temenggung passed away or retired (cf. 
Soemardjan, Jatiman et al. 1992:Chapter VI). Unlike the village chiefs, the temenggung 
was not part of the bureaucracy, and was therefore dispensable. The government saw the 
customary leaders' role as increasingly irrelevant as it promoted the extensive use of 
positive or state laws and discouraged the application of customary laws.343 
It is true that these customary leaders had strong influence in the past and still do in 
some remote places. In these places, Dayaks listened more to informal traditional leaders 
than to formal officials (Departemen Sosial 1975:43; Lontaan 1975:414-5; Soemardjan, 
Jatiman et al. 1992). However, it is difficult to refute that they are less respected than their 
predecessors. Many of these traditional leaders, have repositioned themselves as tools of 
the regime and to serve the interests of the regime (and themselves). NGOs in the province 
342The government had initially agreed to give some financial support for the temenggung at the end of 1970s. 
343The state feared that customary laws would undermine state laws. Firstly, many aspects of customary laws 
were incompatible with state laws. Customary laws, for example, had different concepts of penalty and 
ownership. The penalty in Dayak customary law lacked the "punishment" aspects of the modern penal system. 
Under Dayak customary law, the penalty for misconduct was intended to restore the balance of nature which 
was affected by the misconduct. A traditional ceremony, animal sacrifices with a few pieces of stoneware and 
accessories would satisfy as a penalty, even for serious crimes such as murder (cf. Lontaan 1975). The 
concept of ownership, a main source of dispute in many modern societies, also differed greatly from that of 
state laws. To confirm ownership, customary laws only needed confirmation or guarantee from the customary 
leaders. The customary laws did not need the paper proof that the modem legal system would require. The 
second reason for the government to discourage the application of the customary laws was the variety and 
non-codification of the laws, which could become sources of instability and potential problems. 
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have raised the role of these traditional leaders in land appropriation. Some traditional 
leaders have been persuaded to sign traditional lands away to the government-approved 
projects after having been promised financial rewards or jobs (Roekaerts 1985:28).344 Some 
others were tricked or coerced into delivering the traditional lands to the government (cf. 
Djuweng 1992). A few who refused or had difficult relations with the government were 
retired or deterred from raising issues further. They were powerless before the regime and 
its security forces. Traditional leaderships across Indonesia suffered similar treatments 
during the New Order. 
6.3.3 Internal Problems 
Besides external influences explained above, Dayak's self perception contributed to 
the weakening of their culture. Some Dayaks thought that that aspects of their own culture 
were backward and incompatible with modernisation, and should therefore be abandoned. 
In 1946, Oevaang Oeray rejected the role of traditional leaders because he believed that 
they were a source of Dayak backwardness (DAO l 946c). He and other Dayak leaders 
blamed superstitious practices and lavish ceremonies as causes of Dayak backwardness 
(Oeray 1946; Davidson 2002:97). Thirty years before the New Order introduced the village 
regrouping, Oeray had initiated a move to reorganise several villages into a centrally 
located community so that they could be made more economically viable and so that 
critical infrastructure, especially educational facilities, could be made more accessible and 
thereby benefit a greater number of people (Roekaerts 1985:7; Davidson 2002:97). 
Many Dayaks had a lack of respect and appreciation for their own culture. Research 
on self-perception showed that the Dayaks rated themselves consistently low in almost all 
aspects of life compared to other ethnic groups (Roekaerts 1985; AJqadrie 1990). Many 
young Dayaks in the cities did not speak their own language because they considered 
Indonesian or Malay to be more prestigious than their own languages (Julipin and Pius 
344The government also sometimes sent these leaders on a "propaganda" tour of plantations elsewhere to see 
their benefits (Dove 1986:16; Forest Peoples Programme 2005:7-8). In 1978, Donatus Djaman, a Dayak sub-
district head of Meliau (Sanggau), was sent to North Sumatra to see the benefits of plantations. Upon 
returning he was ordered to identify 32 traditional leaders to be sent on the same "propaganda" tour. These 
leaders were sent to see the benefit of the plantations during the tour so that they would welcome the palm oil 
operations in their areas. Donatus Djaman, who showed reluctant support, was "transferred" from his post in 
Meliau (Forest Peoples Programme 2005:7-8). In 1982, 25 village chiefs from Sambas and 26 from Sintang 
were sent to view the plantation in South Kalimantan (Akcaya 23-9-1982). 
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1987).345 The identity change to Malay after converting to Islam was another indication that 
these Dayaks viewed other ethnic groups as better than themselves. A recent observation on 
religious conversion in Nangapinoh (Sintang), Mulia Baru, Teluk Melano and 
Kendawangan (Ketapang) showed that the process of becoming Malay after conversion to 
Islam still continues. As soon as they professed Islam, Dayaks associated themselves with 
Malays (Julipin and Pius 1987:8). The Dayaks also have had relatively high rates of cross-
cultural and cross-religious marriage compared to other ethnic groups. In many of these 
marriages, the Dayaks tend to embrace their partner's cultural and religious identity. 346 
Their inferiority complex could have been a result of centuries of neglect and repression. 
The New Order government' s "second-class" treatment of Dayak culture, as explained 
above, exacerbated this negative slef perception. 
6.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the less advantageous condition of the Dayaks during the 
New Order regime. In the executive, Dayak bureaucrats were denied top positions. Prior to 
the New Order regime, Dayaks held the positions of governor and head of four districts. 
After they were removed from power in 1966, no Dayaks were to reach these positions 
again for almost thirty years. In the legislature, the Dayaks also suffered a sudden setback 
after the coup in 1965. However, unlike their position in the executive, their representation 
in the legislature had recovered after the 1977 election. Unfortunately, the higher 
proportion of Dayaks in the DPRD did not mean that they could use it to redress their 
general marginalisation. Discussion of ethnic issues was still considered taboo by the 
regime. Furthermore, the DPRD rarely used its power and initiative to monitor the 
executive or change government policies. It was only a rubber stamp for the executive (see 
for example an interview of the former head of Sanggau DPRD in Forest Peoples 
Programme 2005:10). 
34 5 Assimilation into the more powerful and prestigious culture continued to take place. In Norway, for 
example, the "inferior" Sarni were incorporated into the mainstream Norwegian group (Eriksen 1993 :29). 
Other examples of the absorption of minorities into Malay in Southeast Asia have been mentioned in chapter 
two. 
346From Julipin's observation, Dayak women regarded more favourably males of other ethnic groups (Julipin 
and Pius 1987). 
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In economic terms, living conditions of many Dayaks in rural areas had not 
improved much. Modem projects such as transmigration, logging, and plantation had 
promised benefits to local people. While they might have offered some help to the Dayaks, 
they also brought problems. Transmigration was blamed for increasing unemployment 
among the local populations. It was also blamed for taking away the traditional farming 
lands of many Dayaks. Logging and plantation operations did little to improve the 
livelihood of Dayak farmers. Younger higher-educated Dayaks faced obstacles to entering 
public and private sectors, as those sectors had been dominated by other ethnic groups. 
From the social and cultural points-of-view, Dayak culture continued to be 
undermined by external and internal pressures. The introduction of modern religion had 
been one major factor in cultural and identity change for Dayaks. The regime' s cultural 
approach which viewed Dayaks as "isolated", primitive and backward, contributed to the 
Dayak cultural change. Many Dayaks, unfortunately, suffered inferiority complexes due to 
a long history of being second class citizens and New Order treatment. Some Dayaks 
believed that their culture was not on par with others, and that parts of it were primitive and 
detrimental to the Dayak development. The New Order regime neglected Dayak culture. 
To conclude, elements which caused the marginalisation of Dayaks go back to the 
sultanate and colonial eras. Unfortunately, marginalisation persisted even after several 
decades of independence. The New Order did very little to rectify the problems. The 
Dayaks found it hard to express these concerns without being accused of encouraging 
ethnic discord. Dayaks' marginalisation is linked to Dayak political activism immediately 
after the collapse of the New Order. Scholars and local Dayaks linked grievances created 
by the marginalisation to ethnic conflicts in the province, the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICS 
Several significant ethnic conflicts have occurred in West Kalimantan since 
independence. The first took place in 1967, when hundreds or even thousands of Chinese 
were murdered and more than 50,000 forced to flee from the interior areas now known as 
Landak and Bengkayang districts (this had been discussed in Chapter 5). The second much 
smaller scale conflict between Dayaks and Madurese occurred in 1979 in Samalantan 
(Bengkayang). In this conflict, members of both ethnic groups from about ten villages were 
involved and it lasted for about a week, from 8-12 November. Officials recorded 20 
casualties and 50 houses burnt down. Almost all Madurese evacuees were able to return to 
their homes after the conflict (Akcaya 16-11-1979, Tempo 8-12-1979). The third and fourth 
conflicts occurred in 1997 and 1999, both involving the Madurese. The conflict in 1997 
was between Madurese and Dayaks, while the 1999 conflict was initially between 
Madurese and Malays, but the Dayaks joined the Malays against the Madurese. Human 
casualties were high in both conflicts, estimated to be above four hundred in each case. 
Tens of thousands of Madurese took refuge, and there were untold material losses. Other 
than these four conflicts, there have been about a dozen smaller clashes between Dayaks 
and Madurese since 1950s, mostly occurring in or around the Bengkayang and Landak 
districts (see Table 7-1). 
This chapter has two objectives: to analyse the causes of conflict involving the 
Dayak and Madurese and to analyse the links between the ethnic conflict and ethnic politics, 
particularly those ofDayaks. This chapter will examine only the 1997 and 1999 conflicts. It 
will first outline the chronology of the conflicts, then examine the possible causes and 
relationship between conflict and ethnic politics. 
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7.1 A Chronology of the 1997 and 1999 Conflicts347 
7.1.1 Dayak and Madurese Conflict in 1997 
This conflict started with a street fight between Dayak and Madurese youths during 
a pop concert in the town of Ledo (Bengkayang) on 6 December 1996. A Dayak, Yukundus, 
was reported to have approached Madurese youths and requested them to stop bothering a 
Dayak girl. The Dayak hit some Madurese after they ignored his warnings. One of the 
Madurese was Bakrie. More serious fighting did not develop that night, but about three 
weeks later when they encountered each other again at a band concert in Tanjung village 
(Ledo) on the night of 29 December. Yukundus and another Dayak were attacked by Bakrie 
and friends in the early hours of 30 December. The Dayaks were injured and were rushed to 
a nearby hospital where they were treated and later discharged.348 
The same morning, a Dayak crowd started to gather at the Ledo police station to 
demand the arrest of the perpetrators. The police had made some arrests that morning but 
did not announce them for fear the crowd would lynch the suspects. The gathering crowd 
grew larger as they did not obtain a satisfactory answer from the police. Later in the 
afternoon the crowd marched all the way up to Sanggau Ledo sub-district to look for Bakrie, 
who lived in Lembang village (Sanggau Ledo). They burnt several Madurese houses and 
injured one Madurese on the way. In the evening of the same day, the army in Bengkayang 
fired shots at the Dayaks, who tried to attack the military post, a place believed to be 
sheltering the Madurese. The Dayaks acted on false rumours that the Madurese were 
preparing for retaliatory attacks. 
On 31 December the military shot at Dayaks who tried to attack a Bengkayang 
military compound, where the Madurese had taken refuge. Three Dayaks were injured. 
Rumours that they had been killed spread to surrounding areas. Madurese homes in villages 
347The chronology of the 1997 conflict is based primarily on a report by HRW produced in 1997 (Human 
Rights Watch 1997). The other sources were theses by Davidson (2002), Arafat (1998), and Giring (2003), 
books by Patebang (1998) and a team of UGM researchers (Soetrisno, Mas'oed et al. 1998). The majority of 
media reports on the conflict can be found in an edited book by Andasputra (1999). The sources for the 1999 
Conflict are Purwana (2003), Davidson (2002), Petebang (2000) and newspapers. 
348These accounts, which were widely quoted in the media, were most likely from the Dayak side. I was not 
able to find Madurese accounts of this incident. However, judging from their accounts of the 1999 conflict, 
the Madurese would give an account favourable to themselves (see footnote 352). 
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in Samalantan and Tujuh Belas sub-districts were burnt. Meanwhile, the security forces 
started to evacuate Madurese who lived in Sanggau Ledo to a nearby air-force base. 
Learning from past experiences, Dayaks knew that the Madurese retaliation was 
only a matter of time. 349 On one occasion, a large Madurese crowd in Lembang village had 
already prepared to attack the Dayaks in Sanggau Ledo before they were persuaded by the 
head of Sanggau Ledo Customary Council and security forces to withdraw to Singkawang 
(Soetrisno, Mas'oed et al. 1998:34). It was the Madurese from nearby Singkawang, who 
finally took the initiative to hit back. On 31December1996 and then 1 January 1997, the 
Madurese burnt at least two houses belonging to prominent Dayaks (i.e. Paulus Lopon 
Piling, a Dayak entrepreneur, and Antonius Alim, a Dayak official) in Singkawang, and 
seriously injured one Dayak. 
These Madurese retaliations triggered further Dayak attacks on the Madurese and 
their properties. Evacuation of the Madurese out of the affected area continued. The 
burning ofMadurese houses did not stop at least until the first week of January 1997, when 
there were no more houses left to bum. The military dropped leaflets from aircraft over the 
affected areas, including the sub-districts of Tujuh Belas, Bengkayang, Ledo, Sanggau 
Ledo, Seluas, Sambas, Pemangkat and Tebas. The leaflet attempted to assure all concerned 
that everything was under control and urged people not to believe rumours, carry weapons 
or engage in criminal activities. It was reported that on 6 January 1997 the situation had 
returned to normal (Soetrisno, Mas'oed et al. 1998:34). From 5 to at least 8 January, the 
government sponsored peace ceremonies between the Dayaks and Madurese in several 
conflict-affected sub-districts. By this time, 6,075 Madurese had taken refuge, more than 
1,000 houses had been torched, and about 20 Madurese were reported killed. 
The relatively calm but tense second and third weeks in January were broken by an 
attack on buildings associated with Dayak interests by a group of Madurese in the early 
morning of 29 January 1997 in Pontianak. The buildings of the credit union and the student 
dormitory both belonging to Pancur Kasih Foundation, an influential Dayak institution, 
were slightly damaged. A motorcycle and a truck belonging to the Foundation were also 
3491n several conflicts with the Dayaks prior to 1997, the Madurese always struck back or at least planned to 
retaliate (Tempo 8-12-1979, van Hutten 1992:296; Sudagung 2001:129,141-2). 
205 
burnt. Two female Dayaks, who boarded in the next house, were wounded during the 
attacks. The HR W report linked the attack to an incident in a village in Tujuh Belas sub-
district the day before, when a crowd of Dayaks burnt down houses and a prayer hall 
(surau). 350 An unfounded and absurd rumour that Habib Ali, a Madurese religious leader, 
had been killed in the outskirts of Pontianak by Dayaks might also have contributed to the 
attack.351 Meantime, the Madurese in Mempawah 67 kilometre from Pontianak, set ablaze 
three Dayak houses and damaged another. On 30 January, the Madurese set up a roadblock 
operation in Peniraman, a small town 32 kilometres north of Pontianak. During the two-day 
operation, five Dayaks were killed. On 1 February, in Singkawang, Madurese killed a 
Dayak and burnt down four houses and damaged six Dayak houses. 
The Dayaks retaliated by setting up similar roadblocks between Mempawah and 
Ngabang which resulted in Madurese deaths. Raids on the Madurese and their property 
intensified and became more vicious. The deadliest attacks occurred in the present Landak 
district: in Pahauman with 148 Madurese deaths and in Salatiga where 131 Madurese were 
killed, both of which are located in the present Landak district. The military started to take 
harsh measures to stop further conflict escalation including shooting on several occasions: 
on 2 February in Samalantan (Bengkayang district) and on 3 and 5 February in Anjungan 
(Pontianak district). Soetrisno estimated more than 125 Dayaks were shot dead by the 
security forces in several incidents (Soetrisno, Mas'oed et al. 1998:41-4). 
This "second" episode started at the end of January and caused more damage, with 
death tolls estimated at between 500 and 1, 700, with the majority of fatalities on the 
Madurese side (Davidson 2002:231 ). It also spread to larger areas and included areas which 
had been untouched by previous conflicts, such as Sanggau. At least 142 Madurese were 
killed on Sanggau district in Sosok (47), Tayan (54), and Karangan (41). The spread of the 
attacks right across to other districts was a sign of the growing idea of a shared "destiny" 
350The HRW report mentioned the attack was in Sakek [most possibly Sakok, a part of Sedau village, south 
Singkawang sub-district] (Human Rights Watch 1997). If this attack on Pancur Kasih was truly linked to the 
previous attack in Sakok, then the second episode was started by the Dayaks, not the Madurese as has been 
reported. 
351 Absurd, because it was very unlikely for the minority Dayaks in Pontianak city to provoke conflict with the 
Madurese. The Dayaks in Pontianak city were always on the defensive in the conflict. 
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among the Dayaks because they had all suffered similar marginalisation and oppression (in 
Davidson 2002:244-5). 
7.1.2 The Malay/Dayak and Madurese Conflict in 1999 
The conflict in 1999 could be traced back to the assault of a Madurese, Hasan bin 
Niyam, on 17 January 1999. He was accused of breaking and entering a Malay house in 
Parit Setia village, Jawai (Sambas).352 Two days later, on the Muslim !du/ Fitri festival, 
around 200 Madurese from the nearby Rambayan village, where Hasan lived, took revenge. 
They killed three Malays and fatally wounded two others.353 The incidents did not spread 
further because Muslims were still celebrating the !du/ Fitri. Quick responses by 
government and security forces also calmed conflicting parties. They arranged a peace 
meeting on 23 January in Jawai between ethnic leaders from the two affected villages. The 
leaders from both communities were persuaded to surrender the perpetrators from both 
sides. The Malays surrendered eight people involved in the bashing of Hasan, while the 
Madurese surrendered one who was involved in the killing of the three Malays (Akcaya 23-
1-1999, Purwana 2003:59). A week after the incident, conditions in Jawai had reportedly 
returned to normal (Akcaya 27-1-1999). However, both communities continued to be 
vigilant and conducted night watches for fear of possible counter-attacks from the other 
side. 
On the afternoon of 21 February 1999, in Mensere, Tebas sub-district (Sambas), 
Bujang Labik bin Idris, a Malay, was injured by a Madurese, Rudi bin Muharrap. A short 
time before the attack, Bujang was in the same mini-bus with Rudi. Rudi felt offended by 
Bujang's stare when Rudi got off the bus without paying the fare. He wanted to take 
revenge and was able to stop the same bus on its way back and wounded Bujang (see the 
interview with Bujang in Kapuas 15 April 1999).354 
3520ne Madurese source claimed that the man with his two friends was looking for a place to sleep. They 
knocked at the door and then flashed their sickles. The owner of the house suspected they wanted to rob, and 
cried for help. The neighbour was able to capture one Madurese, while the others escaped (Purwana 2003:58). 
353Davidson explained that Rambayan was a village but was reduced to a dusun (sub-village) status during the 
village reorganisation at the beginning of the 1980s. Rambayan dusun became a part of Sari Makmur village 
(Davidson 2002:294). 
354 A source mentioned another incident on the same day in Sungai Nyirih village, Jawai (Sambas), where a 
Madurese wounded a Malay. The Malay was taken to Matang Suri health clinic, Jawai (Purwana 2003:61). 
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News of wounded Bujang spread to surrounding areas. The next morning, around 
300 Malay youths surrounded the perpetrator's house in Sempadung, Tebas (Sambas), 
demanding he surrender to the police. The conflict broke out when a Malay demonstrator 
was shot during the siege. Riots ensued in some nearby villages such as Semparuk and 
Sungai Kelambu where many Madurese houses were burnt down. Three deaths were 
recorded by the morning of 22 February (Davidson 2002:299). On the night of 23 February, 
bands of Malays tried unsuccessfully to attack Tebas police station where 200 Madurese 
had taken refuge (Davidson 2002:299). 
The government arranged peace talks between the Madurese, Malay, and Dayak 
leaders in Tebas and then in Pemangkat sub-districts on 23 and 24 February. Despite these 
peace talks, conflicts spread to the adjacent Pemangkat, Jawai, and Sambas sub-districts. 
The riots between 23 to 25 February 1999 witnessed 17 deaths, 65 houses burnt down, and 
around 200 Madurese took refuge in the Sambas police station (Purwana 2003:62-3). 
On 14 March 1999, a Madurese who refused to take advice to disarm himself in 
Pemangkat triggered another wave of conflict that spread to Sungai Duri, Telok Keramat, 
and Paloh (Akcaya 16-3-1999). Malays in Sambas sub-district, who had not been involved 
in the conflict, joined the assault after Malay villages there were attacked by Madurese 
(Akcaya 21-3-1999, Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:12). Because of the most recent escalation 
of the conflict many Madurese who had not taken refuge were urged by local leaders to 
evacuate (Akcaya 21-3-1999). From this point on, the evacuation continued until virtually 
all Madurese were evacuated from Sambas (Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:8). 
The Dayaks joined the attack against the Madurese in Bengkayang district after a 
Dayak of Samalantan was killed on 17 March 1999 by a group of people speaking 
Madurese.355 The Dayaks started to bum houses in Sanggau Ledo and Samalantan sub-
districts. Conflict spread further inland, which prompted the Madurese evacuation out of 
355Martinus Amat, the victim, was travelling back from work with the group of 23 passengers, the majority of 
whom were Dayaks, only one Malay and one Batak driver. The packed open truck was fired on by a mob who 
were speaking in Madurese (Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:8; Purwana 2003 :66). The Madurese attack on the 
Dayaks, which dragged the Dayaks into the conflict, was a natural consequence of the Madurese strong belief 
that the Dayaks were helping the Malays in the conflict (see Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:30). In a recent 
survey in Madura Island, the Sambas refugees still talk about Dayak hostility rather than Malay hostility, and 
that the conflict was a "religious" conflict (Wiyata 2003). Davidson (2002:308), however, treated the killing 
of Amat as suspicious and suspected the involvement of the security forces. 
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Bengkayang, Ledo, and Sanggau Ledo. The Dayaks tried to get into Singkawang City but 
were prevented by the military. Some Dayaks were shot by the military. 
As the conflict grew to uncontrollable proportions, military and police commanders 
allowed soldiers to open fire on the masses who did not comply with their instructions 
(Akcaya 19-3-1999). Two units from East Kalimantan and one unit from South Kalimantan 
arrived to help secure the standoff (Akcaya 21 -3-1999). On 22 March, security forces 
guarding the refugee evacuation shot at the approaching Malay mobs in Tebas (Akcaya 23-
3-1999). Another shooting aimed at a Malay crowd occurred on 7 April and resulted in 
some casualties (Akcaya 8-4-1999). 
On 24 March, newspapers reported that some semblance of normality had been 
restored, with shops in Singkawang, Pemangkat, Tebas, and Sambas re-opening for 
business (Akcaya 25-3-1999). There were reports of attacks or failed attacks in Singkawang 
and Sungai Raya (south of Singkawang) in April (Akcaya 8-4, 23-4-1999). The attacks in 
Sambas district had subsided by the end of March, because most of the Madurese in the 
district had taken refuge or were under the protection of security forces for evacuation to 
either Singkawang or Pontianak. 
By 13 April 1999, official data from the Sambas government quoted 416 deaths 
(401 Madurese, 14 Malays, and 1 Dayak); 4367 Madurese houses, 22 Malay, and 21 others 
were burnt down; 345 houses - the majority belonging to the Madurese - were damaged 
(Purwana 2003:68,70). By 3 August, official statistics noted that Pontianak refugee camps 
had around 15,907 refugees (Purwana 2003:72). 
7.2 Historical, Marginalisation and Cultural Arguments 
A peculiarity of many ethnic conflicts in West Kalirnantan up to 1997 was that they 
always involved Dayaks and Madurese. Conflicts between them had occurred more than 
ten times since the 1950s (van Hulten 1992:296-7; Patebang 1998:79-80; Davidson 
2002:219-22; Giring 2003: 128-9). There were still other important ethnic groups such as 
Chinese, Javanese or Malays whose relations were certainly not without incident, but the 
open conflicts seem to be only between the Dayaks and the Madurese (Davidson 2002:244). 
This suggests that there must be some specific causes on both sides, which has made 
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conflict easier to develop and deepen between them. The following will examine the causes 
of conflicts from historical point of view, as well as marginalisation and cultural causes. 
7.2.1 Headhunting and History of Conflict 
The Dayaks' past traditions of headhunting and traditional war mobilisation were 
sometimes used to explain the reasons behind many conflicts occurring in Dayak territory. 
The argument that conflict is derived from Dayak traditions is, however, unconvincing as 
there were fundamental differences between the headhunting practices in the past and 
during the recent conflicts (Peluso and Harwell 2001: 85). Past headhunting aimed at 
protecting tribes and their villages from disaster and misfortune, to avenge their fallen 
victims or to increase one's spiritual power and pride (see for example Ukur 1971:59-60; 
Bamba 2004:138). The heads they obtained were valued highly and were treated with 
respect. There were ceremonies to take care of the heads, so that spiritual aims could be 
reached (Patebang 1998: 1-36). Traditional headhunting had strong spiritual and cultural 
content, much more than to killing or eliminating enemies. 
Modem headhunting lacks the spiritual or cultural content of headhunting of the 
past. Dayak mobs in recent conflicts were not constrained by traditions and customs, which 
were used to guide the past headhunting expeditions (Patebang 1998). Traditional symbols 
were ignored or even damaged during the conflict by the angry Dayak mobs. As the mobs 
had no faith in the traditional systems, it was not correct to claim that the decapitation of 
the victims during the more recent conflict was a revival of the headhunting tradition 
(Colombijn 2001 :27). This rejection of the role of the headhunting in the conflict was 
reinforced by the J 999 conflict when the Malays, who did not have this tradition, 
"headhunted" many Madurese. Modern headhunting is a form of mutilation, a means to 
dehumanise the victim as a result of hatred and animosity.356 
The traditional war mobilisation was also often associated with previous ethnic 
conflicts involving the Dayaks. The Kanayatn Dayak for example distributed 
356For various meanings and reasons behind the mutilation of the victim' s body, see Horowitz (2001: 111-23). 
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(mengedarkan) red bowls in times of war and emergency.357 Villages which received the 
bowl were required to send help and to pass the bowl to other villages without delay 
(Patebang 1998:69-78). The last significant use of the red bowl was during the 1967 
conflict, between the Dayaks and the Chinese. Although people believed that the red bowl 
was in circulation in some areas during the 1997 conflict, the red bowl could not have been 
responsible for the spread of conflict. The advancement of communication technology 
(such as telephone, mobile phone), better roads and modem faster transportation had taken 
over the function of the red bowl. In ethnic conflicts, the use of such ethnic symbols, in this 
case the red bowl, has a powerful emotional appeal to the members of the ethnic group, and 
therefore potential to intensify conflicts (Kaufman 2001 :29). 
Rather than ancient Dayak warfare traditions, the recent history of ethnic relations 
between Dayaks and Madurese offers better explanations for the conflict between the two. 
For Dayaks, the series of conflicts between them confirmed their view that the Madurese 
were problematic, and would always re-offend.358 The perception that the Madurese were 
violent was widespread among the Dayaks. A survey of 100 Dayak informants found that 
86% of them believed the Madurese were evil-doers. However, most of them had only 
heard of the negative behaviour of the Madurese and only 16% of them had seen or 
experienced directly the Madurese misdeeds (Abas 2002:84). When they were questioned, 
the Dayaks would give a list of conflicts with the Madurese to substantiate their claims (see 
Table 7-1). 
357Red bowl was a means of communication among the Kanayatn Dayaks which usually consists of four 
elements: the blood of an animal, feathers, a match stick, and a piece of roof thatch. The blood signifies the 
critical conditions/war. The other elements symbolically tell that word of the war must be passed quickly (the 
feather) from one village to another, even in darkness (the match) or bad weather (the thatch). Further on the 
red bowl see Patebang (1998). For Dayak Desa a quite similar practice was called Damak/Patuong and for 
Iban it was Bungae Jarao (Arafat 1998: 139). 
358 In the past, Madurese blamed Dayaks for the "problem". The Madurese argument was weakened 
considerably when the Malays also "decided" that the Madurese were the problem. ln the 1999 conflict, the 
Malays ejected all Madurese from Sambas and killed those who refused to leave. 
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Table 7-1 Dayak- Madurese Conflicts in West Kalimantan (1950-1999) 
No Year Location Initial causes 
1 1950 Samalantan ffiengkavang) Fight between a Davak and Madurese. 
2 1952 (no location is given) The theft of bubu (fish trap) belonging to a Dayak 
by a Madurese. 
3 1967 Toho (Pontianak) Killing of a parent of a Dayak sub-district head of 
Toho. 
4 1968 Anjungan (Pontianak) Killing of a Dayak sub-district head of Sungai 
Pinyuh. The Dayak had refused to handle the 
Madurese request to process a land-ownership 
aoolication. 
5 1976 Sungai Pinyuh (Pontianak) Killing of a Dayak by a Madurese. The Madurese 
was cutting the grass on the Dayak's land. 
6 1977 Singkawang Killing of a Dayak policeman by a Madurese. The 
Dayak cautioned his sister not to go out at night 
with the Madurese. 
7 1979 Samalantan (Sambas) Killing of a Dayak by a Madurese. The Dayak 
asked the Madurese to be cautious when cutting 
the grass so as not to disturb the paddy. 
8 1982 Pakucing (Samalantan, Killing of a Dayak by a Madurese. The Dayak 
Bengkayang) cautioned the Madurse because he did not ask for 
pennission to cut grass on the Dayak' s land. 
9 1983 Sungai Enau (Sungai Killing of a Dayak by a Madurese because of a 
Ambawang, Pontianak) land issue. 
10 1992 Pakucing (Samalantan, Rape of a Dayak woman by a Madurese. 
Bengkayang) 
11 1993 Pontianak city Fight between Dayak and Madurese youths. A 
church and Christian school were damaged. 
12 1994 Tumbang Titi (Ketapang) Stabbing of a Dayak by a Madurese who was 
working on a road construction. 
13 1996 Started in Sanggau Ledo Fight between Dayak and Madurese youths. 
(Bengkayang) and spread 
to other districts 
14 1997 Started in Pontianak City Attack on the Pancur Kasih complex by Madurese 
and spread to other district youths. 
15 1999 Started in Jawai (Sambas) Started as a conflict between Malays and 
and spread to other districts Madurese. The Dayaks joined the conflict after a 
Dayak was killed. 
Source: Girmg (2003:128-9), Abas (2002:3-4), Davidson (2002:220-2). 
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7.2.2 Marginalisation Arguments 
Chapter 6 examined the marginalisation of the Dayaks. Transmigration, logging and 
plantation operations have brought improvement to the infrastructure and more social 
facilities to Dayak communities. However, these operations have also brought negative 
impacts as they did not necessarily improve income and employment opportunities. 
Furthermore, land disputes often accompanied these projects. Conditions of educated 
Dayaks were not much better as they found civil service entry highly competitive and 
discriminatory. The economic frustration of the Dayaks at the grassroots level was matched 
closely with the political frustration of the Dayak elite. The Dayak traditional elite were 
discontent as they had been gradually eased out of power from the end of 1970s. The few 
members of the "modern" Dayak elite, who worked at the higher level in the government 
offices, also felt marginalised. 
Dayaks were relatively silent on political marginalisation and would not generally 
directly oppose government projects because that would only invite retribution from the 
government officials and security forces (for example, Forest Peoples Programme 
2005:3,8). The tension and dissatisfaction among local Dayak farmers as a result of 
"development" projects certainly existed back in the 1980s when large plantation 
operations started to have an effect. 359 Several sources, for instance, mentioned the 
objection of some Dayak figures, including the former Governor Oeray, to the unfair 
financial compensation for the converted land in Meliau at the beginning of 1980s. The 
results were that eleven local Dayak leaders were suspected of defiance and the local Dayak 
sub-district head, Donatus Djaman, was removed from his position (Golkar Sanggau 1981; 
Forest Peoples Programme 2005:8). In 1981, five Dayak village chiefs from Sayan (Sintang) 
met with the local DPRD members to demand compensation for their tengkawang trees that 
had been felled by a logging company (Davidson 2002:265). 
The 1990s started to witness more confrontational protests by Dayak farmers, as a 
result of unresolved grievances; awareness-raising activities from the Dayak NGOs (this 
role will be discussed in Chapter 8); and the loosening grip of the Soeharto regime. 
359It seems that local opposition to logging activities was less that its discontent with plantations mainly 
because logging offered quick cash to the local population. As in other parts ofKalimantan, illegal logging by 
the "local" population in West Kalimantan was very difficult to stamp out because of direct financial benefit 
to locals. 
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Davidson (2002:266-7) and Andasputra (1999) have given several examples of these 
demonstrations. In September 1993, in Mukok (Sanggau), fourteen Dayaks burnt employee 
lodgings belonging to a plantation company because the company failed to compensate 
local people. In August 1994 in Sandai (Ketapang), around 1,600 Dayaks burnt down ten 
base camps, some vehicles and other materials, as well as ten hectares of land belong to a 
plantation company. In November 1995, 300 Dayaks destroyed the seedlings of a plantation 
company in Ledo (Sambas). 
Davidson rightly questions the link between marginalisation and open conflicts 
between Dayaks and Madurese, because the conflicts did not occur in areas of 
transmigration or in areas with a high level of logging and plantation operation (2002:246-
7). Peluso and Harwell also argue that organised transmigration cannot be blamed 
automatically for the conflict (Peluso 2006: 117). Also the Madurese were not the main or 
primary cause for Dayak political and economic marginalisation. Whilst, there might be no 
direct link between these activities and Dayak-Madurese conflicts, however, the 
marginalisation produced a feeling of being oppressed and neglected among many Dayaks 
across the board. Better solution to these problems which had never arrived amidst 
promises from the regime and related parties, produced further disappointment and 
frustration. This shared marginalisation among the Dayaks strengthened ethnic solidarity 
that can contribute to the spreading or intensification of conflicts (see Olzak 1992:21; Eklof 
1999:66). 
7.2.3 Ethnic Stereotypes 
The Madurese have been negatively stereotyped by the other natives of Indonesia as 
a rough, aggressive, and violent ethnic group since colonial times (de Jonge 1995:9-13; 
Smith 2004:207). One scholar who has undertaken extensive study on the Madurese even 
remarked that this ethnic group has a "plenitude" of negative characteristics (de Jonge 
1995 :7). This section will not attempt to assess the truth of such stereotypes, but will show 
that these negative perceptions have been widely subscribed to by the local population and 
have influenced their daily interaction with the Madurese for many years. 
A Madurese scholar concluded that one reason underpinning the Madurese violent 
character was a social system that respected and rewarded violence - particularly if it was 
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carried out in order to protect one' s dignity (Wiyata 2002: 1,73, 226-7).36° Crime statistics 
suggested that the Madurese community was generally more violent than other ethnic 
groups in Indonesia because of the higher incidence of serious crimes in Madura Island. 
Serious criminal cases in Madura in 1994 were double the rate of East Java, and one-and-a-
half times higher than the national average (Wiyata 2002:6). 
The negative stereotype of Madurese were widely perceived by many ethnic groups 
in West Kalimantan. One survey found that the Dayaks stereotyped the Madurese as being 
fond of fighting, emotional, untrustworthy, and cowardly (Arafat 1998:273). Other research 
summarised broadly three stereotypes of the Madurese by the Dayaks and Malays. Firstly, 
the Madurese tended to start conflict with others. The Madurese regarded attack as 
necessary to protect their dignity. Secondly, the Madurese had the custom of carrying the 
sickle (clurit) in social functions or upon entering someone's house. 361 Thirdly, the 
Madurese were inclined to encroach on their neighbour' s land (Suparlan, Achadiyat et al. 
1989:65-6; Soetrisno, Mas'oed et al. 1998; Ahas 2002:81-5; Davidson 2002:238-9; also 
Purwana 2003). The Madurese were also often associated with unscrupulous economic 
practices and petty crimes (Soetrisno, Mas'oed et al. 1998:61-2). These stereotypes were 
enlivened by cynical sayings that mocked the Madurese unacceptable behaviour.362 
Negative perceptions of other ethnic groups are common but are not as violent as 
the Madurese stereotype. Other ethnic groups perceived the Dayaks as backward and lazy, 
and sometimes violent because of their past headhunting. The Chinese were known for their 
greediness and dishonesty in doing business, while for the Malays it was their laziness and 
untruthfulness (on the stereotypes of these ethnic groups refer to Lontaan 1975:39; Alqadrie 
1990:98-9; Ahas 2002:86-7; Tohardi 2003:40-4). 
3600ne example of such a system is the carok, a duel to the death between Madurese men to protect the 
dignity of oneselfor family. This practice is still found within the Madurese community (Wiyata 2002:1,73, 
226-7). 
361The Madurese used clurit to collect grass for their cattle. The Madurese farmers were known for their skill 
in raising cattle. Census 1990 showed that the Madurese were prominent in the livestock sector in Sambas and 
Ketapang (see §7.4). 
362 According to one saying, "the land boundary could walk", referring to the practice of the Madurese 
enlarging their land by altering boundaries. According to another saying, "young chickens belong to us, when 
they grow up they belong to them" referring to the Madurese thieving habit. These sayings have been in 
existence for decades. A quite similar references could be found in a newspaper article in 1978 (Akcaya 13-2-
1978). It referred to an unsafe condition in Rambayan A, a village within close range of Madurese quarters, 
which was also a site for the 1999 conflict. 
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The majority of Dayak informants believed that the particularly easily provoked, 
violent and insensitive dispositions of the Madurese were the main factors behind many 
conflicts between them. Several conflicts started with Madurese "unjustified" attacks on 
Dayaks and resulted in a Dayak death or injury (see Table 7-1).363 During recent conflicts, 
the media reports and the government statements reinforced the image of Madurese as 
trouble makers. The tone of the media was usually vindictive towards the Madurese and 
blamed them for causing the conflicts in 1997 and 1999. The government officials were 
reported as indentifying the Madurese "culture" as the source of conflict.364 
The perception that Madurese were violent and hot-tempered produced a growing 
fear of the Madurese among local communities. The growing fear made existing 
communities move away from Madurese settlements, such as what had happened to the 
Dayaks in Salatiga village (Giring 2003:31) or the Malays in Sari Makmur village (Abas 
2002:82). While the original inhabitants gradually retreated and the influx of Madurese 
migrants did not stop, these villages had eventually become Madurese. Local populations 
might also decide to limit social contact with the Madurese out of fear or to avoid trouble. 
A local researcher gave an example of Malays in Sambas who made the Madurese village a 
no-go zone for them, especially after dark (Purwana 2003:46). 365 Another researcher 
mentioned that the fear of the Madurese also had helped their taking over the domination of 
the Pontianak bus terminal which previously had been controlled by Batak thugs (Suparlan 
in Petebang and Sutrisno 2000: 145). Even the police was reported to be reluctant to handle 
crimes committed by the Madurese, and that they would release the Madurese criminals 
once they had been approached by the Madurese family or friends.366 
363Unfortunately all explanations seem to favour the Daya.ks as there are no alternative explanations that 
"favour" the Madurese. 
364Davidson (2002:311) even asserted that not a single politician or government official that he encountered 
defended the Madurese during the 1999 conflict. Prior to 1997, the government had never endorsed ethnic 
factors as causes of conflicts out of fear that such views might complicate ethnic relations in the province. 
They usually did not mention the ethnic aspect of the conflict, and always downplayed the event by 
describing it as a common crime (kriminal biasa) or incident (kejadian or peristiwa) rather than conflict 
(konjlik or kerusuhan) (Tempo 8-12-1979, Akcaya 16-11-1979, Davidson 2002 :224 ). 
365Because of such relations between the two ethnic groups, it seems that the intennarrying between them was 
rare. In Salatiga, a village with about 1200 Madurese and 200 Daya.ks, Giring (2003:101) only found one case 
of marriage. 
366In 1993 many police stations in Pontianak city were ransacked by the Madurese after a Madurese died in 
police custody (Human Rights Watch 1997:20). 
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Such a fear of the Madurese had made them feel more "powerful" than locals. 
Being more powerful, they did not see the need to subjugate themselves to the local people 
or need to follow local customs (see Suparlan in Petebang and Sutrisno 2000: 145). Many 
Dayaks believed that the Madurese viewed them as "easy" targets, because otherwise they 
would not have started a dozen conflicts with the Dayaks. Local scholars believed that it 
was this constant fear and history of conflict that made the Madurese a concrete 
representation of threat in the Dayaks' daily interactions with them (Soetrisno, Mas'oed et 
al. 1998:61-2; Petebang and Sutrisno 2000; Giring 2003).367 
7.3 Madurese Demography and Settlement Trends 
This section will focus on why some regions in the province, particularly the north-
west regions, were particularly prone to conflict, while others such as Ketapang, Sintang 
and Kapuas Hulu districts were spared. It will examine whether ethnic concentration and 
peculiar settlements have contributed to the conflict. In the case of the Madurese, because 
of their negative stereotypes and conflict history, their close proximity to the Dayaks 
increased fear among the Dayaks. It will also examine if the background or origin of the 
Madurese migrants and the high level of in-migration that might be to the conflicts. 
The first serious encounter of the local population with the Madurese was probably 
when the Dutch government sent 500-600 Madurese auxiliary troops to quell Chinese 
unrest in Monterado in 1854 (Heidhues 2001: 144, 148). 368 According to the 1920 census, 
West Kalimantan only had 631 Madurese. Within ten years, in the 1930 census, the 
numbers of the Madurese had jumped to 5,763 with the highest concentration in the 
divisions (afdeeling) of Pontianak, Singkawang, and Ketapang. At this stage, Madurese 
were already the sixth largest ethnic population in the province, after Dayaks, Malays, 
Chinese, Bug is, and Javanese (Table 3-1 ). Before 1999 the largest concentrations of 
Madurese were found in Pontianak city, Pontianak, Sambas and Ketapang districts, roughly 
367As stereotyping ignores individual differences within a group as noted by Cashmore (2004:414) and Yang 
(2000), the whole Madurese community had to bear the cruel consequences ofpr~judice during the conflict. 
368The Dutch had been employing the Madurese to put down revolts throughout Dutch East Indies since the 
eighteenth century (Kuntowijoyo 1988:144-7; Smith 2004:208). 
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resembling their pre-independence demographic condition. On the other hand, interior 
districts had a very small number of Madurese. According to the 2000 census Sanggau had 
only 0.29% Madurese in the district population or 1,483 persons, Sintang 0.06% or 286 
persons, Kapuas Hulu 0.03% or 52 persons (Figure 7-1 and Table 7-2).369 
Figure 7-1 Madurese Concentration in Districts and Sub-districts(%, 2000) 
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369The numbers of Madurese in the upper Kapuas districts had not changed. Although there might be some 
increases in recent years before the conflict, the conflict had made living in these interior districts not 
attractive for the Madurese. The Madurese in Sanggau, for example, was estimated at 4,800 between 1997-
1998 (Arafat 1998: 177) or about 1 % of the district population, but almost 70% of Madurese had left the 
district by 2000. 
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Table 7-2 Madurese Population in West Kalimantan (1980-2000) 
District 1980 
Numbers 
Sambas 23 435 
Pontianak 76 914 
San2'2'au 325 
Ketaoang 16,254 
Sintang -
Kaouas Hulu -
Pontianak City 26 796 
Total 143,724.0 
Source: Censuses 1980, 1990, 2000. 
Note: 
% 
3.9 
12.6 
0.1 
6.4 
-
-
8.8 
5.8 
1990 2000* 
Numbers % Numbers 
32.184 4.2 10 139* 
98,505 12.7 124,575** 
427 0.1 1 483 
9 102 2.8 19 582 
737 0.2 286 
- - 52 
23,634 6.0 47,495 
164,589 5.1 203,612 
% 
1.3 
13.7 
0.3 
4.6 
0.1 
0.0 
10.2 
5.5 
*Comprised of75 persons in districts of Sambas, 2,039 ofBengkayang, and 8,025 ofSingkawang 
municipality. 
**Comprised of 5,994 persons in districts ofLandak and 118,581 of Pontianak. 
The ethnic demography in the northern districts of the province changed 
dramatically after the conflict of 1999 with the disappearance of the Madurese. Sambas 
district was virtually "cleansed" of the Madurese, while many interior regions of the current 
Bengkayang and Landak districts also were cleared of Madurese. According to the 2000 
census, the Madurese population in Sambas was only 0.017% of the total district population 
(or only 75 persons), Bengkayang was 1.15% (or 2,039 persons), and Landak was 2.13%. 
This was in sharp contrast with the data in 1990, where the Madurese population in Sambas 
(including Bengkayang) was about 4.2% and in Pontianak district (including Landak) 
12.7%. 
Conflicts between Dayaks and Madurese have only occurred in districts with a 
significant concentration of both Madurese and Dayaks. The small Madurese population in 
the interior regions might be the reason for the virtual absence of conflict there. One 
exception was the attacks of the Madurese in Sanggau during the 1997 conflict. The 
Madurese population in the Sanggau district, although relatively small compared to other 
districts, had increased quite significantly from 427 in 1990 to 4,800 at the end of 1990s 
(see footnote 369). Given the negative image attached to the Madurese, their sudden 
population swell could be perceived as a greater threat to the local population. However, 
the attacks on the Madurese in Sanggau were quite obviously a spill over from the core 
conflict in Pontianak district, as most attacks on the Madurese in the district occurred in its 
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border region with Pontianak district, such as Tayan, Sosok, and Karangan.370 No clashes 
were recorded in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu district although the situation was quite tense 
there.371 
One anomaly was the absence of open conflict between the Dayaks and Madurese 
in Ketapang district, although this district had a large Dayak population and a quite 
significant Madurese population (this puzzle was raised by Davidson 2002:10). However, 
similar to the case of Malays-Madurese prior to 1999 and Malay-Dayak relations, the 
absence of open conflict did not mean that relations between them were without problems. 
There was a clash between the Dayaks and Madurese in Tumbang Titi in 1994, but it did 
not develop into an open conflict (Abas 2002:4; Davidson 2002:225). During the Dayak-
Madurese conflict (most probably in 1997), some Dayaks in Ketapang were "ready" to 
fight the Madurese (Pujaraharja 2004: 134-5). 372 There was a high level of tension in 
Manismata in October 2000 (KR 2001/68). Using demographic data, the following will 
suggest some possible explanations behind the absence of conflicts in Ketapang district by 
comparing it with the more conflict-prone Sambas and Pontianak districts. 
One striking difference between the two regions was the steady increase in the numbers of 
Madurese in Pontianak and Sambas districts, but only a small increase in Ketapang during 
the 1980s (Table 7-3). Better economic prospects in Pontianak and Sambas districts, their 
close proximity and ease of transportation to the provincial capital were the main 
370 The spread of conflict to non-traditional conflict areas was facilitated by the advance of 
telecommunications technology, which helped spread news and rumours, and by easy transportation, which 
helped people's movement and mobilisation. A HRW report suggested that the conflict had spread to non-
traditional conflict areas because Dayaks originally from these areas were wounded by the Madurese in the 
conflict areas. The report listed 152 Madurese casualties in Sanggau district (Human Rights Watch 1997:31). 
371Davidson recorded the presence of Dayak mobs travelling from the far west to Putussibau to look for 
Madurese (Davidson 2002:230-1). This account should be treated with suspicion since the number of 
Madurese in Kapuas Hulu was extremely small. If the mobs were travelling from the west, they should not 
have bypassed Sekadau or Sintang which had a larger Madurese population. There were no reports of such 
mobs in Sekadau and Sintang although tension was observed in these regions. 
372Ethnic tension was reported in some regions in Ketapang during the 1997 conflict. The Ketapang Dayaks 
vowed that they would attack the Madurese in Ketapang if the Madurese injured any of their children who 
were studying in Nyarumkop (Pujaraharja 2004:134-5). Nyarumkop is on the outskirts of Singkawang and 
near Samalantan, two areas with a large Madurese population. 
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attractions for independent migrants like the Madurese to move.373 These two districts also 
had better roads for easier mobility and economic activities compared to Ketapang. More 
than half of the province's roads were located in these districts, compared to Ketapang 
which only had a share of less than 11 % of road networks. 374 The existing larger Madurese 
population in Sambas and Pontianak districts also meant better community support for 
these independent migrants. These large numbers of migrants, who definitely looked for 
jobs when they arrived, brought more economic competition, a potential cause for tension 
and conflict. The swelling Madurese population also increased the local population's 
concern over security. 
Table 7-3 Madurese Migrants in West Kalimantan (1900-1990) 
Arrival Sambas Pontianak Sanggau Ketapang Sin tang Pontianak City 
1986-1990 667 1,231 0 417 262 2,994 
1981-1985 902 1.365 66 235 413 1,449 
1971-1980 2,569 3,080 65 287 0 2,111 
1961-1970 1 455 3,007 12 204 0 9,26 
1951-1960 718 2,502 0 218 0 379 
1941-1950 210 1,343 0 201 0 194 
1931-1940 90 405 0 134 0 115 
1920-1930 0 65 0 17 0 31 
Before 1920 30 16 0 0 
Total Non WK-
born Madurese 6,641 13,014 143 1,713 675 8,199 
Total Madurese 32,169 98,455 427 9,102 737 23,595 
Source: Census 1990. 
373There were some indicators which consistently supported the view that the majority of the Madurese wen: 
not participants in government transmigration projects. The settlement pattern of Madurese migrants was one 
indicator. Sudagung, the first scholar who had written about Madurese in West Kalimantan, found none of his 
400 respondents were participants of government-sponsored transmigration. Most of his respondents, who 
lived in Pontianak city, settled down in the city when they first arrived, and all of the respondents paid for 
their own journey to West Kalimantan (Sudagung 2001:91,94,110). These conditions were typical of 
independent migrants, because all government-sponsored migrants would settle in rural areas (and certainly 
not the provincial capital) and would not need to pay travel costs. A fraction of the Madurese population did 
participate in the transmigration programs. In Sanggau, for example, the majority of its small Madurese 
~pulation were participants of the plantation-linked transmigration (Arafat 1998: 177). 
74The asphalt/concrete road share of the Pontianak and Sambas districts in 1996 was 57.6% of the total road 
length in the province of 423 kilometre, while the Ketapang share was only 10.9% (BPS Kalimantan Barat 
1997:49). 
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The Madurese in these two districts can be more resistant to local culture compared 
to the Ketapang Madurese. Closer analysis of the background of the Madurese migrants 
shows that Pontianak and Sambas districts received a significantly higher number of 
Madurese migrants from outside the province, who most likely came from Madura Island 
or East Java (Table 7-3). The continuing influx of a large number of Madurese migrants 
from Madura Island who brought with them their own "original" culture would reinforce 
the Madurese culture among the local Madurese. This would stop or at least slow the 
process of adaptation of the local Madurese to local culture (Sudagung 2001: 104-6). The 
Madurese had the necessary support to maintain their culture and customs as they had a 
larger population and concentrated settlement. 
Further breakdown of the origins of Madurese migrants from outside West 
Kalimantan revealed that Pontianak city and Pontianak district received more migrants 
from Bangkalan and Sampang, the Madurese western districts. Some scholars, such as 
Sudagung and Suparlan, claim that these districts were commonly known for their rougher 
character. On the other hand, Ketapang district received more Madurese from "milder" 
regions, such as Pamekasan and Sumenep.375 Data on Madurese migration from the 2000 
Census substantiated this finding about origins. The census data indicated that Pontianak 
city received almost 73% of its Madurese migrants from Bangkalan and Sampang; 
Pontianak district received almost 78%; while Ketapang only received 37% (Table 7-4). It 
has been argued that the milder character of the Madurese in Ketapang suggests that they 
might have been less "problematic" and less likely to be involved in conflicts although 
further research is required to examine this assertion. Alternatively it could be argued that 
impressions of 'roughness' and 'mildness' are too subjective to be reliable while 
differences in behaviour between Madurese in different parts of Kalimantan might have had 
their origins in specific local experiences or conditions 
375 Sudagung (in Detektif Romantika 1-3-1997) and Suparlan (in Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:142; Saad 
2003 :82-3) have indicated differences in character among Madurese based on their origins. 
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Table 7-4 Origin of Madurese Migrants from East Java (1995-2000) 
Other East 
Java 
Pamekasan Sumenep Banqkalan Sampanq Reoions Total 
Pontianak City 4 73 238 209 92 616 
Sambas (no data) 0 
Benqkayanq 0 
Sinqkawanq 5 2 3 10 
Pontianak 7 1 61 116 43 228 
Landak 37 3 1 41 
Sanggau 2 11 7 20 
Sekadau 1 1 
Sintanq 1 3 7 11 
Melawi 1 0 1 
Kapuas Hulu 2 2 
Ketapanq 8 92 13 83 65 261 
Total 20 167 356 427 221 1191 
Source: Census 2000. 
Note: the data excludes Madurese refugees outside West Kalimantan after the 1999 conflict. 
Another difference between the two regions was the trend toward a higher 
concentration of Madurese in rural areas in Pontianak and Sambas districts, while Ketapang 
showed a different trend. The census in 1980 and 1990 showed that the proportion of 
Madurese who lived in rural areas in Sambas district had jumped from 74.6% (1980) to 
91.1 % (1990). An increase, although slight, was also recorded in Pontianak district in the 
same period, from 98% to 99.5%. Such high figures meant that more and more Madurese 
were populating rural areas. In Ketapang, the condition was quite the opposite. In 1980, all 
Madurese in Ketapang lived in rural areas. This number had declined to 96.6% in 1990 and 
dropped further to 63% in 1995. The declining number of Madurese in rural areas meant 
that fewer of them would live near the Dayaks. This is backed by a more careful population 
mapping which shows that villages with many Madurese will only have a few Dayaks, and 
vice versa. The only village in the whole of Ketapang that had significant population of 
both Madurese and Dayaks was Mulia Baru (Matan Utara sub-district), a village of 7,055 
people. The Madurese proportion in the village was 9.4%, and the Dayaks was 13.9% 
(Figure 7-2). 
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Figure 7-2 Dayak and Madurese Population of Ketapang District (2000) 
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According to the population data in 1995, Pontianak district had a much higher 
Madurese concentration at village level than Ketapang. In 45 out of 162 villages in 
Pontianak district, the Madurese were more than 20% of the village population. There were 
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21 villages with a population of more than 50% Madurese. This was in stark contrast to 
Ketapang district. Out of 159 villages in Ketapang, only seven villages had a Madurese 
population of more than 20%. In no villages were Madurese more than 50% of the 
population (Table 7-5). Sambas district was very likely to follow the trend in Pontianak, but 
unfortunately comparable data for Sambas was not available (see some discussions at the 
next section). More Madurese settling in rural areas in Pontianak (and Sambas) districts 
meant the increasing visibility of the Madurese in Dayak-predominant (i.e. rural) areas . 
Since the Madurese were perceived as a threat by the Dayaks, the higher visibility of the 
Madurese meant an increasing threat. 
Table 7-5 Madurese Population at Village Level in Pontianak and Ketapang Districts 
(1995) 
Madurese Population in Numbers of Villages 
the Village Pontianak* Ketapang 
More than 5% 82 25 
More than 10% 53 17 
More than 20% 45 7 
More than 30% 33 3 
More than 40% 27 1 
More than 50% 21 0 
More than 80% 5 0 
Total Number of 
Villages 162 159 
% Madurese of District 18.2 4.7 
Source: Census 2000. 
Note: *excludes Landak district. 
The Madurese were known to prefer to settle in a cluster close together. One 
researcher found that the new Madurese migrants tended to open up a new rural settlement 
for themselves but still within the Madurese area. In the city, the new Madurese migrants 
tended to stay within the established settlements (Sudagung 2001:104-6). Unfortunately, 
there are no specific studies of the Madurese settlement trends in the conflict regions to 
back this claim. Statistical data available at village level produced by the 2000 census was 
not able to reveal the condition of the Madurese settlement in Sambas, and in most parts of 
Bengkayang and Landak districts, because the Madurese no longer lived there after the 
1999 conflict. One way to assess the Madurese settlement trends in Sambas and 
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Bengkayang districts is by mirroring the trend of Madurese settlements in the neighbouring 
Pontianak district.376 Table 7-5 shows that almost a third of villages in Pontianak district 
had more than 20% Madurese in their population, and 21 villages with a Madurese 
population of more than 50% (see also Figure 7-3). 
Figure 7-3 Malay and Madurese Population of Pontianak District Villages (2000) 
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376Pontianak district had largely escaped the conflict so there was no significant permanent out-migration of 
Madurese. Therefore the data on the Madurese population in 1995 in the district, as captured through census 
2000, was reliable. Pontianak district is a good "mirror" because it is geographically linked to the conflict-
prone districts - Bengkayang, Landak and Sambas. It also shares some similarities with those districts, as 
discussed previously: extensive road network, large Madurese population, and the trend of the Madurese to 
settle in rural areas. 
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High Madurese population concentration could still be observed in some areas of 
Landak which were spared or lightly affected by conflict. High concentrations of Madurese 
were still found in the Sebangki sub-district, particularly in Sei Segak village (91.4%) and 
in Rantau Panjang (88.2%). On the other hand, Bengkayang district no longer had a 
Madurese concentration as high as in the mid-1990s. Samalantan and Sanggau Ledo sub-
districts, which had high concentrations of Madurese prior to conflict, had only thirteen and 
nineteen Madurese in the whole subdistricts respectively, based on the 2000 census. This 
differed greatly with the population figures prior to the conflict, when Samalantan was 
estimated to have at least 8,091 Madurese and Sanggau Ledo at least 3,102 (Arafat 
1998:15-6). Many villages in Samalantan had been estimated to have between 40% to more 
than 80% Madurese population. The only sub-district with some Madurese concentration in 
2000 was the coastal Sei Raya. There, the villages of Sungai Duri had 12.9% Madurese, 
Sungai Jaga A had 9.3% and Karimunting 8.1 %, while Sei Pangkalan II only had 2.4%. 
Unlike many Javanese villages, which were formed almost instantly through 
transmigration projects, Madurese villages were usually formed through piecemeal land 
acquisition. This piecemeal acquisition had perhaps led to land disputes which in turn 
created the persistent stereotype that the Madurese liked to encroach on land belonging to 
others (penyerobot tanah). The "Madurarisation" of the village or neighbourhood began 
with settlement of some Madurese in the area. As the number of Madurese settlers grew, 
occupants from other ethnic groups, who felt anxious living close to Madurese 
neighbourhood, sold land or property rather cheaply to other Madurese and resettled 
elsewhere. 377 An example is that of Salatiga village (Landak), a place where many 
Madurese were killed during the 1997 conflict. A Dayak researcher noted that prior to the 
1997 conflict, the Salatiga area had 1,200 Madurese and only about 200 Dayaks. Dayaks 
lived in Salatiga for a short time after the Chinese were ejected from the village following 
the 1967 conflict, but they gradually retreated from central Salatiga when the Madurese 
377The "flight" phenomena were recorded elsewhere. In the US, a "White" neighbourhood could become 
"Black", after the White population felt that the Black Africans moving into the neighbourhood would bring 
the property prices down, lift the crime rate, etc. The "White flight" could happen if there were a trend of 
Blacks continuously moving into the neighbourhood. The flight would leave behind an all-Black community 
(Seitles 1996; Laitin 1998:21). 
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started to settle in the village. One reason for this retreat was the Dayak fear of the 
Madurese and wanting to avoid dealing with them (Giring 2003:27,31,67-72). The non-
Madurese newcomers chose to live in non-Madurese quarters. As a consequence, the 
village could virtually be divided into two quarters: a quarter with a high concentration of 
Madurese, and a multi-ethnic non-Madurese quarter (see map Giring 2003:137). A Malay 
researcher found a similar trend in Sari Makmur village in Tebas sub-district (Sambas). 
Formerly, it had been a 99% Malay village, but it later became a Madurese village because 
the majority of the Malays moved out from the neighbourhood. They could not live with 
the Madurese who tended to intimidate and resort to violence, particularly when it came to 
landownership and land boundaries (Ahas 2002:82). This explained why there were many 
Madurese villages, although the majority of them did not participate in government 
transmigration. 378 
7.4 Economy and Political Factors 
7.4.1 The Economic and Political Role of the Madurese 
There has been speculation that Madurese domination might have created the 
economic jealousy which became the underlying factor in the conflict. So far there have 
been no studies on the role of the Madurese in the economy. Indications provided through 
the census do not show a high level of Madurese dominance in the economy. The 1990 
census showed that the majority of the Madurese in Sambas, Pontianak, and Ketapang 
worked in agricultural-related sectors, but their share in the total workforce in these sectors 
was lower than that of other major ethnic groups. In Sambas district, 48. 7% of all Madurese 
workers worked in agricultural-related occupations, but their share in these occupations was 
less than 8%, insignificant compared to the share of the Malays, Dayaks, and Chinese 
(Table 7-6). In Pontianak district, the proportion of Madurese who worked in agriculture-
related employment was generally two to three times higher than the share of the Madurese 
378Saad (2003 :51) mentions several Madurese concentrations in Sambas: Sei Nil am, Sei Nyirih dan Matang 
Tarap (Jawai sub-district), Rambayan, Serang, Sempadung, dan Puting Beliung (Tebas sub-district), Rambi, 
dan Senangi (Sambas sub-district), Kota lama (Teluk Keramat sub-district), Sebubus (Paloh sub-district). In 
Bengkayang district the large Madurese concentration was in Samalantan sub-districts, particularly in villages 
of Marga Mulia, Sendoreng, Jirak, Mendung Terusan, Monterado, Sungai Petai, and Kincir. Some 
concentration ofMadurese also could be found in villages ofMerabu, Jawa, Sanggau Kota, and Kandasan in 
Sanggau Ledo sub-district (Arafat 1998:15-6). 
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in Sambas, but still relatively low compared to the share of other ethnic groups. It was also 
widely believed locally that Madurese were quite dominant in difficult job sectors, such as 
road construction and logging transportation. The statistics, however, showed that the share 
of other ethnic groups in these sectors was not small either. In Sambas, for example, the 
Madurese had a 35% share of bricklaying, stonemasonry and tiling, while the Malays and 
Chinese had 34% and 22% share respectively. Madurese did not dominate the local 
economy, and certainly were not the main focus of native economic jealousy. 
The Madurese, however, had significant shares in specific occupations in certain 
districts. According to the 1990 census, the Madurese employment as tricycle (becak) 
drivers in Pontianak city, with an 83% share of the city's total of 2,913 tricycle drivers. 
They also had a 29% share of "other" transport operators (very likely to be sampan or boat 
operators), and 15% of motor vehicle drivers (most likely to be op/et or mini-bus drivers). 
In Sambas district, about 54% of 1,033 livestock workers were Madurese. There, their 
share in the tricycle drivers was smaller at about 31 %. In Ketapang, about 66% of the total 
645 livestock workers were Madurese. In Pontianak district, the main occupations of the 
Madurese were as timber gatherers (42%), and as "orchard and related tree and shrub crop" 
workers (37%). Their domination could be also found in more specific areas, such as 
traders in traditional markets. Davidson found that the Madurese had significant share as 
traders in traditional markets in Pontianak city. From four traditional markets in the city, 
the share of the Madurese was 47%, competing closely with the Malays at 53% (Davidson 
2002:386-7). Although recent statistics are not available, the Madurese share in these 
sectors seemed to have increased in recent years prior to conflict due to their persistence 
and aggressive approach and the reluctance of their competitors to block the Madurese 
entrance into these fields (related issues were discussed in §7.2.3 and 7.3). 
Although this domination was sectoral and relatively small, it was still a potential 
source of conflict. Some sectoral domination was secured by the Madurese at the expense 
of other ethnic groups. Involuntary retreat could stir up ill feeling toward to the 
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Madurese.379 Sudagung's research showed that in Pontianak city, the growing numbers of 
Madurese tricycle drivers and boat operators was at the expense of the Malays, who had 
been dominant in these two areas (Sudagung 2001 :84-6).380 The potential for conflict was 
higher if it involved direct marketing to the customer, as the Madurese were known to be 
insensitive and rough in their business dealings with the customers and competitors.381 
Table 7-6 Occupations/Professions of Sambas Population (1990) 
Occupations Madurese Share of Ethnic Groups in the Occuoation % 
%within Total 
Madurese Madur Dayak Malay Chine Javan Workforc 
Madurese Workforce ese s s se ese Others e* 
Specialised farmers 7194 51.6 7.4 19.8 59.6 6.9 1.3 5.0 96,939 
Field crop and 
veqetable farm workers 5,995 43.0 5.9 15.7 65.7 6.2 2.8 3.6 100,989 
General farmers 1 335 9.6 5.7 15.1 57.4 15.5 4.6 1.8 23,346 
Orchard and related 
trees and shrub crop 
workers 971 7.0 4 27.6 37.9 19.9 4.2 6.4 24,158 
Livestock workers 555 4.0 53.7 16.4 7.6 13.3 0.0 9.1 1,033 
Kiosk vendors 395 2.8 1.9 3.6 31 .8 52.2 1.5 9.0 21,349 
Bricklayers, 
stonemasons, tilers 211 1.5 34.6 2.5 33.9 22.0 0.0 7.0 610 
Construction workers 188 1.3 8.2 2.6 51.6 34.3 0.7 2.6 2,290 
"Other" farmers 168 1.2 27.7 12.5 19.8 25.2 2.3 12.5 607 
Tricycle and other pedal 
vehicle workers 143 1.0 30.6 3.2 59.7 0.0 0.0 6.4 467 
Timber Qatherers 108 0.8 1.4 6.2 87.4 2.0 0.0 3.0 7,576 
Miners and Quarrymen 103 0.7 4.3 28.1 49.6 15.0 0.6 2.5 2,414 
Motor vehicle drivers 86 0.6 2.5 4.4 45.0 31.1 0.4 16.6 3,394 
Primary education 
teacher 60 0.4 1.1 6.4 71 .2 0.0 3.7 17.5 5,306 
Other occuoations 737 1.5 1.5 2.7 57.3 22.2 1.5 14.8 50, 139 
Total Workforce 32184 655,779 
Source: Census 1990. 
Note: *Only occupations with total workforce more than 450 workers 
379This sectoral domination was not necessarily problematic. Madurese domination in livestock raising, for 
example, was not a threat to the Dayaks, as they raised different stock. The Dayaks were mainly raising pigs, 
while the Madurese were raising cattle. These stocks were transported along different trade routes, to different 
abattoirs and outlets, and to quite separate consumers. 
380In his research on the Madurese economic role, Sudagung found that their share as tricycle drivers and boat 
operators had increased and had overtaken the Malays'. In 1982, the Madurese had a 71 % share of all tricycle 
drivers in Pontianak. The share of Madurese working as boat operators also had increased to 69% in 1980, 
while the Malays' share was reduced to only 31 %. He observed the new trend of an increasing number of 
Madurese mini-bus drivers from 1978-1980 in Pontianak, and envisaged that one day the Madurese could 
dominate this occupation too (Sudagung 2001 :84-6, 96). 
381 In the past, direct competition between the Madurese and the Dayaks or the Malays in marketing 
agricultural produce had been slim because it was handled mostly by Chinese middlemen. Farmers selling 
their produce directly to the consumers in the market is a rather new trend, beginning at the end of 1990s. 
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The wealth of the Madurese in Sambas and other conflict-affected areas is 
undocumented. If landownership is a good indication, as the majority of them worked in the 
agricultural sector, then the Madurese could be considered to have had good economic 
standing, but still could not have been considered very wealthy. According to the 1980 
census, about 48% of the Madurese in Sambas owned less than two hectares of land. In the 
same period, about 46% of the Dayaks owned between two and three hectares of farmland. 
Based on data supplied by 4,098 Sambas refugees in 1999, on average Sambas Madurese 
landowners owned about 1.1 hectares of land (Aminah 2002: Appendix 10).382 This size of 
land ownership was not considered high as it was less than the minimum two hectares of 
land owned by transmigration participations. As in other places, there were always a few 
Madurese who had become extremely successful and wealthy, but this was not normally the 
case. 
Based on evidence and indications above, I suspect that it was not the Madurese 
domination or wealth which had become the problem for the locals. Compared to the 
Madurese, Chinese economic domination was significantly more visible and a natural 
source of economic jealousy for the Dayaks or Malays. The Javanese transmigrants who 
had received much support from the government, also certainly become the object of local 
jealousy. In line with the ethnic argument above (§7.2.3), it was their rough conduct in their 
economic interaction that increased the distrust and even hatred of the Madurese. Sudagung 
gave the example of Madurese boat operators in Pontianak city. He observed that when 
clients agreed to take a boat from a Madurese boat operator they would not usually change 
their decision. If they did, they would receive verbal abuse from the operator (Sudagung 
2001:126). Locals will readily give more examples of Madurese economic wrong-doing 
and misconduct. This issue has been discussed in the previous section on ethnic stereotype. 
The contribution and influence of the Madurese to local politics was small. Most 
Madurese were sympathisers of the PPP, a party which secured only a few seats in the 
382 Although similar land data for Bengkayang district was not available, the trend was very likely similar to 
that in Sambas because of their geographical proximity. 
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district and provincial level.383 PPP continued to lose votes since the 1977, 1982, and 1987 
elections in the province. PPP only experienced a slight increase at the provincial level and 
in Sintang, Kapuas Hulu and Ketapang districts in 1992 election (Table 7-7). The 
decreasing PPP share in the district or provincial DPRD meant that opportunities for 
Madurese politicians to become PPP legislators declined. I did not conduct detailed 
research on ethnic background of the legislators from PPP, but observed that most 
important leaders of PPP at the provincial level as well as its legislative representatives 
were Malays. If there were Madurese representatives of PPP at district level, their numbers 
were most likely to be insignificant. 
Table 7-7 PPP Performance in the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997 Elections 
District 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 
Pontianak City 38.9 29.8 24.8 21.9 28.9 
Pontianak 27.4 26.8 21.7 20.6 19.6 
Sambas 33.l 28.4 18.2 15.5 17.2 
Sanggau 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.2 5.2 
Sintang 6.3 9.1 6.4 8.8 7.2 
Kapuas Hulu 12.1 10 6.2 7.9 10.5 
Ketapang 16.3 20.4 15.9 16.5 15.5 
Province 21.9 20.7 15.5 14.7 15.3 
Source: various government reports. 
There was also no evidence of a significant Madurese rise in the bureaucracy which 
might concern the Malays or the Dayaks. Their low educational attainment made the 
Madurese chances to work for the bureaucracy small. The census in 2000 noted that about 
65% of Madurese in the province did not attend or did not finish elementary school, and 
only 0.4% of them had obtained a university degree. Their educational achievement was 
worse than those of the other major ethnic groups in the province (Table 7-8). As has been 
discussed previously, for the Dayaks, the main obstacles were the Malays or the Javanese 
who had dominated the bureaucracy, and not the Madurese. The main obstacle for the 
Malays to climb the bureaucratic ladder was the Javanese and, to a lesser extent, the 
Dayaks. 
383Roekaerts estimated that the West Kalimantan Madurese support for PPP was 100% (1985:22). Their 
strong association to PPP was easy to verify if one checked the voting behaviour of the Madurese in Madura 
Island. All districts in Madura were strongholds of PPP. In Sampang district for example, PPP even won in 
the 1982 and 1987 elections. In 1982, PPP won 23 seats, while Golkar won only 9; in 1987 PPP had 20 seats 
while Golkar had 16 seats (Soetrisno, Mas'oed et al. 1998:209). 
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Table 7-8 Ethnic Education Levels in West Kalimantan (2000) 
Education Level Chinese Malays Javanese Madurese Bugis Dayaks Others Total 
No Schooling 43.8 45.0 32.9 65.2 46.8 56.3 40.0 47.8 
Elementary School 29.3 29.5 30.4 23.7 27.8 27.4 27.5 28.5 
Junior High School 14.2 12.1 14.9 6.8 12. l 9.6 12.5 11.6 
Senior High School 11.2 11.7 18.2 3.8 11.6 5.9 16.0 10.5 
Academy/University 1.4 1.7 3.6 0.4 1.6 0.7 3.9 1.6 
Others 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Census 2000. 
7.4.2 Economic and Political Crisis 
The sections above have examined the factors within ethnic groups and their 
relations that could have contributed to the conflicts. Whilst the ethnic-related factors 
played an important part in the conflicts, the unstable political and economic condition 
faced by the nation at the end of 1990s also contributed to the 1997 and 1999 conflicts. 
Below follows a discussion of the contribution of the economic and political crisis or 
transition to the conflict. 
The economic crisis which hit Indonesia in 1997 significantly increased the level of 
poverty in Indonesia. Prior to the crisis, the poverty level in Indonesia had been in decline. 
UNDP reported that the Indonesian poverty rate was reduced to 11.8% of the total 
population by 1996. The economic crisis had reversed the trend and bounced the poverty 
rate back to 23.5% in 1998/1999 (http://www.undp.or.id/general/ accessed 25-6-2005). The 
poverty rate in West Kalimantan in 1996 before the crisis hit was almost 22%, the worst in 
the nation only after Irian Jaya and East Timor. Numbers of the poor in the province 
multiplied because of the crisis, and in 2000 poverty in West Kalimantan still hovered 
around 29%, the fifth poorest in the nation (http://bankdata.depkes.go.id/Profil/ accessed 
12-5-2005). Only a small population that lived near the border with Malaysia benefited 
from the economic crisis because of their cross-border businesses and higher exchange 
rates (Akcaya 22-3-1999). The economic crisis had created a larger number of desperate 
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and impoverished people proned to conflict.384 Economic difficulties give rise to growing 
social problems and crimes. 
The economic crisis had considerably weakened the New Order regime 's legitimacy 
and its ability to control the country. The crisis had given opportunities for political 
opponents and university students to intensify their criticism of the regime. Street 
demonstrations led by university students had become more frequent after the forced 
takeover of PDI headquarters in 1996. Social violence also had increased dramatically from 
eight and fifteen incidents for 1996 and 1997 to 124 in 1998. The deaths associated with the 
incidents which indicated the severity of the conflicts had jumped from 117 deaths in 1996 
and 131 in 1997 to 1,343 in 1998 (Tadjoeddin 2002:35).385 
When Soeharto finally resigned as president on 21 May 1998, Jakarta and some 
other parts in the country had fallen into chaos. The demise of the authoritarian regime and 
the installation of democratic regime encouraged more street protests. At local levels, 
political reforms and decentralisation initiatives stirred up political dynamics, some of 
which included mass mobilisation that resulted in violence.386 Violent conflicts flared up in 
several places, some of which took several years to die down. One source recorded at least 
29 violent conflicts between the fall of the New Order until the conflict in Sambas in 1999 
(Agustino 2005:83-92). Conditions in West Kalimantan were similar, indeed two large 
conflicts occurred in the province in 1997 and 1999. 
The news of violent conflicts, the almost daily student demonstrations, and the tense 
political situation at the national level, reached the West Kalimantan population without 
much filtering as in the past. The freer press and private television stations had brought 
384Poverty and conflict are closely related although poverty does not necessarily result in conflict (Lichbach 
1989:465). When poverty gives rise to frustration and despair, it could be a cause of conflict (Grandvoinnet 
and Schneider 1998:20). 
385In drafting the table, the author realised that "freedom" of information before 1998 could influence the 
number of reported incidents. Therefore the number of incidents before 1998 could be underestimated 
(Tadjoeddin 2002:35). 
386Mansfield and Synder argues that sudden democratisation is linked to increasing conflict (Mansfield and 
Synder 1995). 
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these conflicts closer to home and "radicalised" some in the community. 387 Repeated 
conflicts can be accepted as common or normal occurrences or even the right thing to do, 
particularly if the conflict is perceived being justified, for example, when ones defending 
their religion, fighting the oppression or aggression, and seeking independence. 
These crisis factors are important and can intensify conflicts but are not m 
themselves enough for conflict to take place. Ethnic conflicts between the Dayaks and the 
Madurese in West Kalimantan, although on a smaller scale, had occurred many times 
before in periods of high political and economic stability in the 1970s and 1980s. The crisis 
and radicalisation in the community would in itself have Jed to ethnic conflict. Many other 
regions had experienced the same crisis and similarly watched the rapid succession of 
conflicts elsewhere but only a few experienced the same level of conflict as in West 
Kalimantan. Large conflict needs underlying or structural factors, which in the case of 
conflicts in West Kalimantan, was the problematic ethnic relations between the conflicting 
parties. It was these issues that had created a high level of hostility and distrust, which 
could easily transform any small fracas or common crimes into open ethnic conflicts. 
Belligerent attitudes had been repressed by the previous strong authoritarian regime. The 
weakening regime and the subsequent collapse of the New Order, as well as rapid 
democratisation afterward release such aggressive protests. The free interplay of such 
forces as well as the adjustment of players in the new political environment can lead to 
conflicts. 
7.4.3 Political Motives 
Ethnic conflicts in West Kalimantan were often linked to the wider national political 
agenda. I did not find that political motives were behind the conflicts in 1997 and 1999, at 
least the motives were not present during the initial conflict. The conflict in 1997 was not 
387Watching violent TV shows, for example, has been confirmed to be linked with the increased violent 
behaviour of the viewers (Huesmann, Moise et al . 1997:184; Siegel 2003:159). By this time Indonesia already 
had at least five private television stations in operation. The first private television station, RCTI, was 
established in 1987, followed by SCTV (1989), TPI ( 1990), ANTV (1993), and Indosiar (1995). On their 
history and also role in the democratisation in Indonesia, see Sen (2002:82-4). Although they were required to 
broadcast heavily filtered news produced by TVRI, the state television station, they were allowed to produce 
their own "soft" news, which usually gave more information to the audience (Jakarta Post 13-2-2000). After 
the reform in 1998, private broadcasting stations had slowly evaded the requirement to relay the news 
produced by TVRI. The new law on broadcasting in 2002 (Law 32/2002, particularly article 40) no longer 
mentioned the requirement of private stations to relay the news produced by TVRI. 
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catalysed by political events as it started from the street fights between some individuals, 
whether Dayaks or Madurese. The 1999 conflict, similarly, started from arguments between 
members of the Madurese and Malay community. These two conflicts had a very different 
nature from the other "political" conflicts that had been triggered by political events, such 
as election related conflicts in Banjarmasin or in Sampang in May 1997, or clashes between 
PDI supporters and government-backed attackers during the take-over of the PDI 
headquarters in July 1996.388 
Political events, such as the election of a governor or a district head, or a general 
election have potential as conflict triggers, as has been mentioned above. The political 
rivalries between the candidates, for example, can trigger street fighting among their 
supporters. The disappointed candidates who lost the contest can stir up trouble through 
their supporters. However, such events between 1996 and 1998 in the province ended up 
peacefully with no indication that they can be linked to the 1997 conflict. The district head 
election in Sambas was concluded in June 1996, at least six months before the conflict. 
Another district head election in Ketapang, the tranquil southernmost district in the 
province, concluded in February 1998 without any incidents. 389 Other district elections 
were not due until the middle of 1998. The general election in mid-1997 in the province 
also ended without major incidents. PDI which had become a potential source of instability 
(or conflict) due to popular opposition to its pro-regime leadership did not face significant 
opposition in the province. While it obtained 6% fewer votes compared to the previous 
election, its performance in the province was exceptionally good compared to its result at 
388Soetrisno grouped these two clashes together with the other four as political conflicts, while conflict in 
1997 in West Kalimantan was treated as ethnic conflict (Soetrisno, Mas'oed et al. 1998:319). 
389In the election in Sambas, the strongest contenders were the incumbent district head Syafei Djamil and 
local military chief Tarya Aryanto, who were both active military officers. Despite strong local support, 
Djamil did not take part in the competition apparently after he failed to obtain the required approval from the 
military. Aryanto finally won the election, while Djamil returned to army headquarters in Jakarta. There was 
some tension during the nomination of the candidates but post-election was peaceful as in most election 
during the New Order regime (see Akcaya January-March 1996). In election in Ketapang, civilian Morkes 
Effendi, who was projected by the regime to head the district, was elected as district head on 17 February 
1998 without any election troubles (Akcaya 18-2-1998). 
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the national level. Votes for PPP, another party, had slightly increased. Golkar won quite 
comfortably in the province, gaining about 70% of the votes (Table 7-9).390 
Table 7-9 Political Parties and Elections in West Kalimantan (%, 1971-1997) 
Election Year PPP Golkar POI 
1971 18.5 66.6 14.7 
1977 21.9 68.8 9.3 
1982 21.0 70.7 8.3 
1987 15.5 68.7 15.7 
1992 14.7 63.6 21 .6 
1997 15.3 69.4 15.4 
Source: various government reports. 
Unlike conflict in 1997, the 1999 one was surrounded by several national and local 
political events which made it a strong candidate for a politically-driven conflict. The fall 
of the New Order regime, the installation of democratic regime, the introduction of 
decentralisation policies certainly had given new manoeuvring ground for local political 
elite and commoners. In particular, the rise of Dayak political lobbies and their success in 
securing two district head positions at the expense of the Malays might have drawn 
"retaliation" from the Malays in the form of conflict. One scholar even claimed that the 
intended target of the Malays in the 1999 conflict were the Dayaks (Davidson 2002:321), 
although this thesis found that the connection between ethnic politics and ethnic conflict 
(which involved the Madurese) was weak. 
In search of possible political motives behind the conflict, one needs to examine 
several elements regarding who might want conflict to occur. The first to be examined is 
the role of the military, as its involvement in conflicts is not new to Indonesian politics. In 
the past, the military has been known to instigate conflicts to crush their political opponents, 
for example, the massacre of the communists in Java and Bali between 1965 and 1966. 
They also have been accused of being behind the massacre of the Chinese in West 
390 At provincial level PDI gained 15.4% of votes in 1997, compared to 21.6% in the previous election. This 
was still much better than to its national perfonnance. At national level, POI obtained only 3% votes in 1997 
election, a significant drop from the previous election of 14.9% votes. For the result of these three political 
parties at national election from 1971 to 1997, see Haris (2004#3 1 ). 
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Kalimantan in 1967. The rivalries between the top-ranking officials at the national level 
might also result in proxy-conflict at the grass-roots level.391 
The new rationale for military involvement in the conflicts in the 1990s was related 
to their declining political role at the national and regional level. Those who envisaged the 
military involvement in the conflict argued that the conflicts would make the government to 
reinstate or even increase the military role to keep order in the country. The state would 
also allocate more financial support to the army's increased activities (cf. Arafat 1998:267-
8; van Dijk 2001:394-5; Davidson 2002:237-8).392 One indication of their weakening role 
was the decline in the number of military officers appointed to certain important positions. 
One source found that between 1977 and early 1990 the proportion of ministers with 
military background had reduced from 42.5% to 24%, the military ambassadors also had 
declined from 41% to 17%, and the military governors from 70.3% to 40% (Rinakit 
2005:45). The percentage of military governors further dropped from 54% (1992-1996) to 
39% (1997-2001). At the district head level, the percentage dropped from 47% to 12% for 
the same period (Malley 2003:113-4). The trend continued after the fall of the New Order 
as the military was pressured to withdraw from its political role. The military was allocated 
fewer seats in the DPR after 1999 election, and accepted that their representation in the 
legislature would be abolished by 2004. It agreed to disclose and make transparent all 
appointments of retired military officers to civilian posts, and agreed that no active military 
officers would be able to assume any civilian positions in government (Lee 2000:699-700). 
Following the trend at national level, military control over the politics and bureaucracy of 
West Kalimantan also declined. The position of governor which had been reserved for a 
military person since 1966 was returned to a civilian in 2003. Some district head positions 
had been gradually returned to civilians since the 1980s (Table 7-10). All military district 
391Rinakit (2005:52) for example concluded that several important incidents during the New Order Indonesia 
were result of competition of top army general. 
392There were still other arguments for the military involvement in the conflict. For example, from the 
financial side the conflicts could generate significant side income for the military, which were important for 
financing its large structure and underpaid personnel. In conflict-torn areas where peace had not been fully 
restored, the military would keep receiving orders to protect business and industrial complexes or to escort 
businessmen or individuals who needed to travel through conflict-affected areas. All of these security services 
were highly prized and became sources of income for the military (Azca, Noor et al. 2004:35-6). 
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heads who were elected during the New Order were replaced by civilians after their term 
ended at the end of 1990s or the early 2000s. 
Table 7-10 Military and Civilian District Heads in West Kalimantan 
Status 1967/8 1973/4 1978/9 1983/4 1987/8 1993/4 1997/8 
Military 5 5 6 5 4 3 3 
Civilian 2 2 1 2 3 4 4 
Pontianak Pontianak Pontianak Pontianak Pontianak Pontianak Pontianak 
City City City City City City City 
Military Sambas 
Sambas Sambas Sambas Sambas Sambas Sambas 
Sanggau Sanggau Sanggau Sanggau Sanggau Sanggau Sanggau District 
Heads Pontianak Pontianak Pontianak Sin tang Sin tang 
Ketapang Ketapang Ketapang Ketapang 
Sintang Kapuas 
Hulu 
Source: various government reports. 
The easiest and most common indications employed by proponents of this argument 
is the slow or "wrong" responses of the security forces during the conflict (see such 
suspicions in Human Rights Watch 1997; Davidson 2002). However, the slow response 
could be due to other legitimate reasons such as understaffing, fear of the large Dayak mobs, 
concern about human rights violation, and other reasons (Human Rights Watch 1997). Van 
Dijk reasoned that the slow anticipation of conflict on the part of the security forces can be 
due to the collapse of the intelligence network (2001 :393-4).393 In reality, the military was 
not totally immobile and passive. The HRW report noted the efforts of the military to 
evacuate refugees, and that on some occasions they had to shoot at the Dayak mobs who 
defied orders or who tried to attack the Madurese under military protection (Human Rights 
Watch 1997).394 In order to prevent the spread of conflict, the military had issued a night-
time curfew on 2 January 1997, and blocked road access to Sanggau Ledo (Patebang 
1998:85). The 1999 conflict chronology above also showed that the military had taken 
393The military defended their "careful" handling of the conflict because they did not want to be accused of 
violating human rights (van Dijk 2001 :393-4). 
394The National Human Rights Commission (Kornnas HAM) set up by the government considered these 
repressive acts (i.e. shootings) necessary as the security officers needed to defend their lives and to safeguard 
order and peace (Akcaya 16-2-1997). 
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similar preventive and repressive actions, including shooting at the Malays crowds who 
were suspected of planning attacks to the Madurese refugees. 
Another possible indication was the military intention to restore kodam or Regional 
Military Command (see also Davidson 2002:315). The plan to restore kodam had been 
proposed in May 1998, a few days before the fall of the New Order regime, and the 
eruption of conflicts should have given more justification for such restoration.395 The 1999 
conflict in West Kalimantan sparked the restoration debate in the province between March 
and December 1999. No less than a member of the National Human Rights Commission 
(Komnas HAM), had to deal with the misconduct of military personnel, supported the 
restoration of the kodam in West Kalimantan. It believed that the establishment of kodam in 
the province would result in quicker security responses if conflicts occurred in this region 
(Akcaya 30-3-1999). However, the argument that the military used the conflicts to speed up 
restoration in the province was less cogent in West Kalimantan as the highest military 
commander in the province himself rejected the idea of restoring the kodam in the province 
(KR 2003/98). And so far, there has been no kodam in West Kalimantan, although at least 
two had been restored elsewhere.396 
The next focus is the conspiracy theories said that the conflicts were part of a grand 
scheme to destabilise the country in order to achieve certain political agendas and goals. 
Some, such as the leader of the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organisation in 
the country) Abdurrachman Wahid, believed that many conflicts in the regions were 
triggered by elements who were still loyal to former President Soeharto.397 He also believed 
that there was a "Green Dragon Operation", a conspiracy to destabilise NU, as many initial 
395The Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto authorised the re-establishment of seven kodams, which were 
dissolved in the mid- l 980s. The plan was to restore four kodams in conflict-affected provinces during the 
period 1999 to 2004: one each for Aceh and Maluku provinces, and t\.vo for provinces in Kalimantan. The 
other three kodams were to be restored between 2004 and 2009: Kodam III/Imam Bonjol, Kodam XII/Sam 
Ratulangi, and Kodam XV/Nusa Tenggara (Rinakit 2005:145). Kodam is the highest regional military 
command. It usually oversees one or more provinces. Below kodam is korem, whose authority is mostly at the 
district level. There are also korems which oversee the whole province, such as Korem 121 in West 
Kalimantan. Structure below korem is kodim, then koramil and babinsa. Babinsa at village level is staffed by 
non-commissioned officers. 
396 Kodam was re-established in Aceh (20 May 1999) and Maluku (5 February 2002). The latest news reported 
that kodam in West Kalimantan would be restored in 2009 (Kaltim Post 4-10-2005). 
397 Abdurrachman Wahid or Gus Dur believed that Soeharto, the former president, was still influential in 
national politics although he had resigned. He visited Soeharto several times to persuade him to ask his 
supporters to stop instigating conflict (van Dijk 2001:393). 
240 
conflicts occurred in Java, in NU strongholds (on these conspiracy theories refer to Eklof 
1999:63-74; van Dijk 2001 :392-8). However, there was a lack of evidence of such political 
provocateurs in the conflict in West Kalimantan. In fact, the government which in the past 
tried to look for the mastermind (usually dubbed as aktor intelektual) to blame, believed 
that there were no such masterminds behind the conflict and the conflict was purely 
communal (Akcaya 26-3-1999). The existence of provocateurs was normal in communal 
conflicts. These individuals make agitating remarks to fuel crowd anger or deliberately 
spread inflammatory rumours. They could be local people who might have put up with the 
Madurese and wanted to settle old scores. No one, including the government, was able to 
show that the conflicts in the province in the 1990s were politically motivated in the first 
place.398 
There were also questions about the level of support the mobs received during the 
conflict. HRW, for instance, reported that a Madurese informant was astonished by the 
possession of semi-automatic rifles by Dayak attackers in the Sanggau area during the 1997 
conflict. According to the informant, those rifles were quite expensive and only could be 
obtained in Malaysia. The informant also questioned the source of gasoline which the 
attackers used to burn targets (Human Rights Watch 1997:26-7). There was also other 
support such as food, drinking water, other logistics, and transportation. This support was 
not necessarily an indicator of the presence of a greater and well planned political agenda. 
Such support was not uncommon in the conflict as a contributor wanted to protect 
themselves against the common enemy or to show solidarity. Some contributed to the mobs 
for their own future benefit, for example a better political position or economic benefit if 
certain parties "win" the conflict. Others contributed and supported to settle old scores with 
a common enemy. The rest might have no choice but to contribute for their safety as a non-
contribution could be seen as opposing the mobs. 
398 According to the Governor, the provocateurs in the 1999 conflict were the local population who had 
accumulated dislike of the Madurese and wanted them out of the village (Akcaya 27-3-1999). 
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7.5 Malay-Madurese Relations 
Sudagung's research in the early 1980s found that Malay-Madurese relations were 
quite close and noticed some degree of assimilation behveen the nvo (Sudagung 2001: 134-
7). However, the number of atrocities committed on the Madurese and the determination 
not to allow a single Madurese to return to Sambas suggested deep hostility and distrust on 
the part of the Malays, and therefore negates Sudagung's observation. The Malays were 
reported to have beheaded, mutilated and even cannibalised Madurese victims during the 
conflict. They had driven virtually all Madurese from Sambas district and rejected their 
return to the district. Those who were caught visiting the district after the conflict, were 
killed. In such a case in 2002, three years after the conflict, t\vo Madurese went back to 
Teluk Keramat (Sambas) to sell their land. Fearing for their safety, the Madurese paid 
security forces to accompany them on their journey. However, Malays in the area found out 
about their trip and killed them, after forcing the security guards to flee (Purwana 2003:76). 
In another case, Malays killed a Madurese who returned to Sambas to visit his wife 
(Davidson 2002:325). Until at least 2004, there were no reports of Madurese returning to 
settle in Sambas, although the majority of them wished to return (see Davidson 
2002:376).399 
The massive conflict and determination to reject the Madurese returning indicated a 
serious problem in their relations. While he did not see serious problems in their relations, 
Sudagung saw the potential for conflict benveen the nvo. He noted that their harmonious 
relations were partly because of the calm or restrained character of the Malays (Sudagung 
2001: 134-7), and therefore not due to amicable relations as such. In fact, Malays also 
shared the negative stereotypes of the Madurese.400 The Malays, for example, designated 
the Madurese village as a no-go zone for them, particularly after dark (Purwana 
399This was quite contrary with the Dayaks in Bengkayang and Landak districts who did not openly reject the 
Madurese. The local population in these two districts believed that some Madurese visited towns in these 
districts during the daytime but did not stay overnight (cf. Davidson 2002:324). The hastily of the Sambas 
Malays would take many years to heal, and until then Madurese would have to risk their live when they 
attempted to return to the district. Wiyata found that by November 2003, none of the Madurese refugees from 
Sambas in Bangkalan had returned to Sambas. The reason, according to the refugees, was Sambas had closed 
its doors to the Madurese and that those who returned would be killed. This was very different from the 
Madurese refugees from Central Kalimantan in Sampang. In 2003, 16,450 Madurese had returned to Central 
Kalimantan (Wiyata 2003). 
400From more than 15 years of living in West Kalimantan, I have noticed that the stereotypes on the Madurese 
have been widely shared by other ethnic groups, including the Malays. 
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2003:46).401 To show a level of victimisation, a former chief of Parit Setia village, the 
original site of the 1999 conflict, listed 22 cases of Madurese crimes against the Malays and 
Chinese in Jawai sub-district alone (Saad 2003: 103-7). Madurese sources also 
acknowledged Malay fears. A Madurese leader claimed that the small number of registered 
Madurese in the neighbourhood was due to the Malay neighbourhood head's (Ketua RT) 
fear of handling the Madurese registration, and not because the Madurese did not want to 
register (Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:23, 31 ). 
Some initial episodes in the 1999 conflict showed the arrogant attitude of the 
Madurese. After attacking Parit Setia, the Madurese attackers yelled "Malay rice-crackers" 
and "three-zero'', which meant three casualties to the Malays and none to the Madurese, to 
humiliate the Malays (Davidson 2002:323). A Madurese in Pemangkat boasted that only 
two Madurese were needed to obliterate all the Pemangkat Malays (Kapuas 15-4-1999). 
They deemed the Malays cowards and only dared to clash with the Madurese after being 
assured of help from the Dayaks. The echo of arrogance of a few hardliner Madurese 
travelled far, and incensed more Malays to fight the Madurese. 
Madurese and Malays were Muslim, a factor which according to Sudagung 
(2001: 133-7) had partly contributed to harmonious relations between the two Some 
scholars observed that Islam had facilitated some Madurese assimilation with Malays and 
intermarriage between them (Sudagung 2001: 133-5; Alqadrie 2002a: 139), although no 
studies have shown the extent of assimilation that had taken place. Looking at the trend 
toward exclusive Madurese settlement, the rapid growth of Madurese migrants, not-
assimilating Madurese culture, and strong stereotyping against the Madurese (see §7.2.3 
and 7.3), assimilation could be seen as more the exception than the norm. 
Within the Muslim community, Malay-Madurese relations seemed to be the worst 
compared to Malay relations with other Muslim migrants. Research led by Suparlan in 
1989, a decade before the Malay-Madurese conflict, noted the sharp difference between the 
Madurese and the Malays in judging each other's religiosity. Both judged the other side as 
401During fieldwork research in a Javanese transmigration site, a Javanese warned me not to travel further 
because at the end of the road was a Madurese village. This caution showed that the "stereotype" that the 
Madurese were "dangerous" was also shared by the Javanese. 
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practising impure Islam (Suparlan, Achadiyat et al. 1989:64-5, 26).402 This could be the 
result of the Madurese being the followers of tarekat (Muslim mystical brotherhoods) 
which had practices that were different to those of the Malays (Petebang and Sutrisno 
2000:37).403 Also, unlike Muslims from other ethnic groups who did not set up their own 
exclusive mosques, in regions with a significant Madurese population the Madurese usually 
had their own mosques, dubbed by outsiders as Madurese mosques or mesjid Madura. 
These mosques used the Madurese language and peculiar rituals which made non-Madurese 
uncomfortable praying there. The Madurese also usually had their own cemetery, separated 
from the general cemetery (Suparlan, Achadiyat et al. 1989:64-5, 26; Petebang and Sutrisno 
2000:36; Saad 2003:86). These differences might prevent frequent mutual participation by 
both communities in religious social occasions such as weddings, funerals and other 
engagements. 
These religious differences became pronounced during the conflict in 1999. The 
Malays, who always considered themselves pious Muslims, were extremely insulted when 
the Madurese cried "God is Great" (Allahu Akbar) when they attacked the Malays in Parit 
Setia as if the Malays were not Muslims. The Malays also saw the Madurese had a different 
standard of religion because they chose to attack on the Idul Fitri, a major festive Muslim 
day. The destruction of Madurese mosques by Malays during conflict was evidence that the 
Malays viewed the Madurese "Islam" as different from theirs (Suparlan in Petebang and 
Sutrisno 2000; Davidson 2002; Purwana 2003). 
It seems that despite the harmonious relations on the surface prior to 1999, the 
underlying relations between the Malays and Madurese were tense. And such tension 
finally transformed into open conflict in 1999. The causes seem to be not related to the 
small political and economic role of the Madurese which posed no threat to the 
mainstream.404 As in the Dayak-Madurese conflicts, this section still believes that social 
402 While Suparlan's research was based on the condition in Pontianak city, the result could be used as 
indication for the religious relations between both ethnic groups in other parts of the province. 
403The Madurese were closer to Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) practices, while most Sambas Malays were closer to 
Muhammadiyah practices (Purwana 2003: 128-30). NU is usually regarded as a ' 'traditionalist" Islam 
organisation, while Muharnmadiyah is the opposite. 
404Sudagung, however, observed there were potential conflicts between the Madurese and Malays, as the latter 
had been pushed out from certain occupations (Sudagung 200l:134-7). 
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and cultural factors were still more pertinent to Malays-Madurese conflict rather than the 
fear of the economic or political role of the Madurese. 
7.6 Conflict and the Rise of Ethnic Politics: Dayak and Malay Politics 
Ethnic conflicts are sometimes linked with ethnic politics. Such links are relatively 
clear in ethnic conflicts which had separatist goals, but sometimes less clear in other types 
of horizontal conflicts. The ethnic conflict involving the Dayaks/Malays and the Madurese 
in West Kalimantan did not appear to have a strong causal connection with ethnic politics. 
There have been almost a dozen ethnic conflicts between Dayaks and Madurese, and most 
of them did not occur at a significant political juncture or event which could be tied to 
either Dayak or Madurese politics. The last two conflicts in 1997 and 1999, however, 
occurred during the political crisis and transition as well as during the time of intensifying 
ethnic politics involving Dayaks and Malays. The conflicts were not caused by ethnic 
politics, but the conflicts had somehow benefited the ethnic interests of the Dayaks (1997 
and 1999 conflicts) and the Malays (1999 conflict). The conflict in 1997 and 1999 
benefited the Dayaks on many fronts. In politics, the urban political elite stepped up their 
pressure on the government to allow more Dayak in leadership positions in the government. 
The conflict helped to unify elements of the Dayaks and intensify their solidarity for 
stronger ethnic activities. The conflict also boosted the profile of Dayak grassroots 
activities related to the economy and social justice led by some Dayak NGOs (Davidson 
2002:275). The Malays also apparently benefited from conflict in 1999. However, was 
ethnic politics a factor behind the conflicts? 
Although the 1997 conflict did not start as a political or politically-motivated 
conflict, some Dayak elite, particularly those associated with the MAD (Dayak Customary 
Board), used it to extract some political concessions from the government. The MAD, 
which was initially established in 1994, was the only province-wide Dayak organisation 
245 
that had "branches" down to sub-district level.405 When the conflict broke out, MAD and its 
branches had helped the government to organise traditional peace ceremonies 406 and 
represented the Dayaks in a series of inter-ethnic negotiations to construct peace. It also 
established coordination-posts (posko) to help with aid distribution to conflict-affected 
people. MAD was well known for their political lobbying during and after the conflict. In 
order to make its case heard, MAD organised several intra-Dayak gatherings and submitted 
the recommendations of the meetings to the government. One gathering on 16 February 
1997 in Pontianak was attended by 250 Dayaks from various backgrounds and 
organisations, including Dayak public figures and representatives of DAD from Sambas, 
Pontianak and Sanggau districts. At the end of the meeting, the participants issued a 
seventeen-point statement to the government. One point demanded the government give 
equal opportunity to Dayaks to take part in development (mengisi pembangunan), a 
euphemism for asking for more positions and opportunities for the Dayaks in the 
bureaucracy. Another point demanded the government put Dayaks at the top of the 
legislature candidate list in the upcoming election to increase their chances of being elected. 
In a paper produced in April 1997, MAD argued that marginalisation of the Dayaks was the 
cause of conflict. As a solution, it urged the government to give greater opportunities and 
roles to the Dayaks in decision-making processes, and also to provide opportunities for the 
Dayaks to head government offices (MAD 1997). MAD also sent direct requests to 
government to appoint certain Dayaks to head certain positions. In its letter dated 4 April 
1997, MAD demanded the governor appoint Ignatius Lyong to head the provincial human 
resources office.407 On 1 May 1997, it wrote again to the governor and asked him to appoint 
L.H. Kadir as a deputy governor (MAD 1997). 
405It was first named as the Customary Board or Maje/is Adat (MA) but changed to its current name at the end 
of April 1997, partly as a result of governor's preference to have the MA had strong reference to "Dayak", 
because the organisation was indeed a Dayak organisation (interviews Jdh, Awn). At the district level there 
were Dewan Adat Dayak (Dayak Customary Council, or DAD). The first DAD to form was in Pontianak 
district in May 1985 (DAD Pontianak 1998), followed by Sambas district in June 1986 (DAD Sambas 1986). 
The official names at district level varied but mostly included "Dewan Adat ". Pontianak district, for example, 
used Dewan Adat Kanayatn, while Sambas used Dewan Adat Dayak Sambas. The DAD was independent 
from MAD, although both maintain a line of coordination. 
406The traditional peace ceremonies were not effective in preventing an escalation of conflict because the 
ceremonies only involved ethnic elites of questionable legitimacy (cf. Davidson 2002:233-4). 
407This position was highly sought by others and very strategic, especially for the Dayaks who had been 
complaining about the ceiling on their being marginalised in the bureaucracy. It had the final say on the 
number and composition of new civil servant recruits and had a role in the promotion higher level bureaucrats. 
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Some Christian organisations which used to detach themselves from the politics of 
the region also joined the political lobbying. The Association of Indonesian Christian 
Intelligentsia (PIKI) under the leadership of Mian Simanjuntak tried to promote the role of 
the Christians and the Dayaks in government offices.408 Together with other Dayak (and 
Christian) organisations, PIKI issued a political statement to urge the government to give 
more significant roles to the Dayaks. 
The government ignored most of the demands, except the appointment of Ignatius 
Lyong as the head of Human Resources Office. Despite their lack of success, the political 
lobbies of MAD and similar associations would soon see more significant results. After the 
fall of the New Order, these organisations were the first to campaign for the Dayaks as 
putra daerah (literally, sons of the soil, or indigenous people) to occupy strategic posts. 
Between 1998 and 1999, they were able to influence the government to appoint Dayaks to 
head the districts of Sanggau and Pontianak. 
The growing Dayak political lobbies had brought the undercurrents of Dayak -
Malay political polarisation into the open. The sudden rise of Dayak political leverage, 
evidenced by the election of two Dayak district heads in 1998-1999 (and later several in 
other Dayak-dominated districts), worried the Malays bureaucrats who were expecting such 
positions. Worse still was that the government seemed to bow to Dayak pressure. In the 
eyes of many Malays, the appointment of two Dayak district heads showed that the trend of 
appointments was based more on ethnic sentiment rather than on merit or achievement. The 
Malays believed that they had much more senior and capable bureaucrats who were more 
suited for those positions than the Dayaks. If "ethnic sentiment" continued to play a role in 
the appointment of high-ranking positions, the opportunities for high-ranking Malay 
bureaucrats would diminish (Davidson 2002:271, 320). 
The frustration of the Malay elite was also felt by the Malays at other levels. The 
Malay civil servants and political activists were also disappointed because the appointment 
of Dayak leadership in their districts could mean the beginning of Dayak dominance in the 
408PIKI at national level was first established on 19 December 1963 in Jakarta. Its profile was "revived" after 
the establishment of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) on 7 December 1990. In West 
Kalimantan, PIK.I was led by Ikot Rinding between 1992 and 1996. Mian Simanjuntak was elected to lead the 
organisation in April 1996 (Akcaya 18-4-1996). 
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wider bureaucracy. These fears became a reality after Bengkayang and particularly Landak 
districts were established. Soon after the establishment, the Dayaks civil servants were 
catapulted to assume leadership positions in the district bureaucracy. 
Both elites and ordinary Malays loathed the Dayak street demonstrations during the 
district head elections but so far were not able to launch similar counter-demonstrations. It 
seemed that the Malays lacked the justification to launch a counter-move against the 
Dayaks. As was examined previously, the Malays had enjoyed more privileges than the 
Dayaks in the bureaucracy during the New Order. Unlike the Dayaks, they had no 
justification to ask for affirmative policies. The Malay "demonstrations" during two district 
head elections in 1998-1999 were usually in the form of visits to local DPRD by small 
groups of individuals and not through mass demonstrations as with the Dayaks. The Malays 
had strong motives to counter the Dayaks, but they were not ready and lacked any 
justification to do so. 
It was at this juncture that the 1999 conflict between Malays and Madurese broke 
out. But still, despite their strong motives to counter the Dayaks, the 1999 conflict was not 
a result of a Malay reaction to rising Dayak political assertiveness as some have argued (see 
such arguments in Davidson 2002:320-1). This was quite obvious by the lack of reaction of 
Malays in Sambas to political events where Malay political interests had been upset by the 
Dayaks. The FKPM,409 a Malay youth organisation, which had some role in the conflict, for 
example, did not participate in the political discussion of the formation of Bengkayang 
district, where the Dayak interests were growing. Its silence on the violent Dayak protests 
during the Pontianak district head election, which contributed to the election of a Dayak 
district head, was another indication. The fact Dayaks later joined the Malays to fight the 
Madurese in the 1999 conflict did not indicate any political tensions between them, which 
would otherwise have prevented their cooperation.410 The Malays did not plan to use the 
409FKPM was established at a meeting on 26 January 1999 in Singkawang (FKPM 1999). A report prepared 
by the Fact-finding Team of Partai Keadilan Sambas on 22 March 1999 mentioned that the organisation was 
formed through the initiatives of Uray Aminuddin (a staff member of the district office) and Rosita Nengsih, a 
law graduate. Its aim was to ensure that the perpetrators of the Parit Setia incident would be brought to court. 
M. Jamras, a local contractor and also a "strongman" among the local Malays, was appointed to head the 
forum (Akcaya 5-2-1999, Partai Keadilan 1999). 
410No less than the ''victim", the Madurese, believed that the Malays and Dayaks had cooperated in the 
conflict. The Madurese claimed that the Malays were "bribed" by and received the support of the Dayaks to 
fight them (Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:30). 
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conflict to check the increasing Dayak influence in local politics. The use of conflict as a 
political bargaining chip against the Dayaks was a later product. The Malays on the street, 
who initiated group attacks in 1999, aimed simply to take revenge and to teach the 
Madurese a lesson. 
The 1999 conflict contributed positively to the Malays' political leverage as the 
conflict in 1997 had done for the Dayaks. After the conflict, Malay organisations such as 
FKPM and others started to engage in political mobilisation quite similar to that of the 
Dayaks. The Malay challenge to the Dayaks during the Regional Representative (Utusan 
Daerah) affairs in September and October 1999 had almost led to open conflict between 
them. Members of FKPM and the Malay Brotherhood Customary Council (Lembayu) 
played a role in the counter-demonstrations that contributed to holding the Dayaks demands 
in check.411 Section 8.1.2 will discuss this issue. 
7.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that historical, marginalisation and cultural factors have 
been important underlying factors in the conflicts between Madurese and Dayaks. Many 
Dayaks would readily blame the violent character and aggressive behaviour of the 
Madurese as the main cause for the ethnic conflicts. A dozen past conflicts between the 
Dayaks and Madurese had indicated the problems between the two ethnic groups. These 
conflicts not only increased distrust and hostility between the two, but had also 
strengthened the belief that both were enemies of each other. In these conditions, any 
incidents between them had the potential to develop into open conflict. The marginalisation 
of the local population increased their level of frustration which likely contributed to 
conflict. The settlement and concentrations of the Madurese, particularly in the conflict-
ridden regions, made their relations even worse. Many Dayaks and Malays who lived near 
to the aggressive Madurese felt insecure and intimidated. 
411The FKPM was still under the name of FKPM Sambas as there had been no province-wide FKPM until 
November 1999 (Akcaya 29-11-1999). Lembayu was formed in mid-1999. It had designated several Malay 
war commanders, resembling the Dayak model. Further on Lembayu and its activities refer to Davidson 
(2002:351-5). 
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This chapter has also shown that other aspects of the Madurese played a less 
significant role in the conflict. The political role of the Madurese was negligible at both 
district and provincial level to threaten the two main ethnic groups, the Malays and Dayaks. 
The Javanese were a more obvious challenge to the Malays, while to the Dayaks the 
Malays and the Javanese were the main political challenges. In the economy, at least 
according to the 1990 census, the Madurese share in the total economic workforce was 
small compared to that of the other main ethnic groups: the Dayaks, Malays, and Chinese. 
Although there were sectoral dominations of Madurese in some areas, it was not the 
domination but their rough and aggressive behaviour in such economic activities that made 
the experiences hurtful for the other ethnic group. 
The economic crisis increased the level of poverty among the local population, who 
became prone to involvement in conflict. The weakening and change of the regime as well 
as rapid democratisation also contributed to conflict as such changes required adjustment of 
all political players and opened up antagonistic forces which had been previously repressed 
by the regime. The advanced telecommunications, a freer press, better road conditions, and 
the availability of transport were significant in the escalation of conflict. 
There was no strong evidence of political motive behind the conflicts. In both cases, 
political moves only appeared at a later stage, when they became aware of the political 
opportunities. In both cases the conflicts strengthened the ethnic political movements which 
appeared during or after the conflicts. The 1997 conflict had given the Dayaks a reason to 
ask for more political concessions from the government, while the 1999 conflict had 
boosted Malay political confidence which they used to counter the Dayak political lobbies. 
The next chapter will focus on Dayak political responses since the Reform. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DAY AK POLITICS, REFORMASI AND BEYOND (1998-2005) 
The unexpected fall of the New Order regime in May 1998 drastically changed 
Indonesian politics. Democratic institutions which had been co-opted for many decades 
were restored. New political freedoms led to the blossoming of activities which had been 
previously considered seditious. Ethnic politics, which had been severely repressed found 
room for manoeuvre. In many parts of the country, the native population demanded 
political privileges, which were usually translated into their holding leadership in the local 
government. In West Kalimantan it was the Dayaks who were first to take the opportunity 
to openly organise themselves on the basis of ethnicity and pursue ethnic political 
objectives. Immediately after the fall of the New Order, Dayaks were on the streets 
demanding the installation of Dayak district heads in two districts. 
This chapter examines the role of Reformasi (or the Reform, to signify the era after 
the New Order) in Dayak politics and how Dayak politics changed after the New Order. In 
order to understand the early development of Dayak politics in West Kalimantan, this 
chapter will first discuss how West Kalimantan experienced the political transition. It will 
examine intensive Dayak political lobbies and responses from the government and the other 
ethnic group, the Malays. The next section (§8.2) will discuss the activities of a group of 
Dayak NGOs under Pancur Kasih. Although, their activities had been largely non-political 
or at least they had been avoiding political lobbying mentioned previously, they had an 
impact on Dayaks politics. From the early 2000s, some of their leaders started to join 
political parties. The last section (§8.3) will examine the decline of inter-ethnic politics and 
also the effects of some electoral changes on the politics of the Dayaks. 
8.1 Dayak Politics at the Beginning of Reformasi 
Political dynamics in Jakarta since 1996, when the regime sponsored the violent 
take over of the PDI headquarters in Jakarta, only gradually permeated West Kalimantan. 
The province did not experience large-scale student demonstrations like those in Jakarta 
until mid-1998, when the regime was approaching its final days. The secretariat of the 
provincial legislature did not record any reform-related demonstrations until April 1998. 
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Demonstrations intensified in mid-May 1998, after the Trisakti Incident412 and particularly 
after the fall of Soeharto. There were fourteen demonstrations or visits to the DPRD in May 
and fifteen in June 1998, compared to only two in April (DPRD Kalbar 1998b; DPRD 
Kalbar 1998a). Prior to the Trisakti Incident, local newspapers recorded a few small, mostly 
on-campus demonstrations in April and May 1998 (Akcaya 15-4, 22-4, 27-4, 8-5, 13-5-
1998). 
Reform activities in West Kalimantan after the fall of the New Order shared many 
similarities with those in Jakarta and other areas. The focus first turned to the executive to 
address the problems of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (termed as KKN, korupsi 
kolusi nepotisme). There were also calls for the resignation of officials accused of corrupt 
practices (Akcaya 25-6, 7-7, 5-8-1998). The main target was the incumbent Governor 
Aswin, who had faced a series of impeachment attempts by the members of DPRD 
supported by university students. Newspapers also reported calls for the district heads of 
Sanggau and Kapuas Hulu to resign (Akcaya 17-6, 10-7, 11-7-1998, Forum Warga 1998). 
Despite the calls, these executive heads managed to stay in their position until the official 
end of their terms in office. 
The next focus was the empowerment of the DPRD. During the New Order era, the 
DPRD often performed as a mere rubber stamp for the provincial or district executive. 
Since Reformasi, the members of the DPRD were under pressure to distance themselves 
from the executive and to be critical of the executive. They had shown their independence 
of the executive during the district head elections of 1998-1999. When the students called 
on the governor to resign, many legislators, particularly those from the PPP and PDI 
supported the demands (Akcaya 12-6-1998). The DPRD also became involved in other 
reform initiatives to show their new commitment. 
Many other demands were replicas of those in Jakarta, such as the demand to curb 
excessive military influence in politics, to install democratic institutions/agencies, to amend 
the outdated constitution, to implement decentralisation, and to solve a wide range of 
4120n 12 May 1998 four students from Trisakti University were killed when the police opened fire on 
protesters. The students held a demonstration calling on Soeharto to resign and demanding democratic reform. 
This incident was followed by riots from 13-15 May, the most serious riots in modem Indonesia (Aspinall 
2000:298). 
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economic problems, etc. One aspect of the political reform which had captivated the 
peripheral regions was the empowerment of the native population. In West Kalimantan 
such movements were initially led by Dayaks. They demanded more top jobs in the 
government and competed zealously against the other natives, the Malays, for those 
political positions. 413 Held in check during the authoritarian New Order, political 
polarisation between the two ethnic groups was now unavoidable. 
The polarisation between the Dayaks and Malays came from several sources. The 
Dayaks, who were relatively marginalised, were more ready to take an aggressive stance. 
Many of the Dayak elite and young people came to understand that without aggressive and 
radical political pressure they would not achieve political parity with Malays. Within the 
bureacracy Malays would certainly take most of the leadership positions because they had a 
greater supply of "qualified" bureaucrats to take on those positions. Since most promotions 
in the executive were based on echelon or rank, the opportunities for Dayak bureaucrats to 
occupy higher posts were automatically limited, as there were only a few Dayaks in the 
higher echelons. Dayak bureaucrats would be further disadvantaged if ethnic and religious 
considerations came into play. Many executive bodies responsible for processing 
promotions were dominated by Muslims and Malays, who can play the ethnic or religious 
cards to block promotion (see Chapter 6).414 Some Dayak bureaucrats believed that the lack 
ofDayaks' entering the bureaucracy and their lack of promotion were partly caused by such 
ceiling practices. Under normal circumstances, when higher positions became available to 
locals, competition for them was mostly to be dominated by Malay bureaucrats. 
The question of the political marginalisation of the Dayaks during the New Order 
started to appear as early as the 1970s. Some events indicated that the situation had started 
to improve in the mid-1990s, although rather slowly. A new governor appointed a Dayak, 
Elyakim Simon Djalil, to head the training section of the human resources office in April 
1994 (Akcaya 29-01-2000). Although this was not the top position in the office, it was a 
413In West Kalimantan such political demands were complicated by the fact that there were two quite different 
native populations: the Dayaks and the Malays. The demands for local empowerment in West Kalimantan 
went beyond the simple "native son" (putra daerah) issue, and involved questions as to which native sons 
should be empowered, the Dayaks or the Malays (Bamba 2002a:6-7). 
414 Besides Malays, Muslim ethnic groups in the bureaucracy were Javanese, Bugis, Banjarese, and 
Minangkabau. During political competition between the Malays and Dayaks, the Bugis, Banjarese, and 
Minangs would very likely support the Malays because they shared the same religious interests. 
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strategic one. This position assigned employees the training or education required for 
possible promotion.415 Two months earlier, the governor had planned to appoint a Dayak as 
district head of Sintang, although unfortunately the candidate failed to win the election. 
This failure led to waves of Dayak protests. To compensate, a Dayak, Jacobus Layang, was 
finally appointed as district head in Kapuas Hulu in March 1995 (the elections in Sintang 
and Kapuas Hulu had been discussed in Chapter 6). Overall, these few appointments did 
not change the fact that only a few Dayaks occupied high office until the end of the New 
Order Regime. The Malays, on the contrary, had been enjoying better treatment during the 
New Order. When the strategic posts, such as district head, were returned to local 
bureaucrats, the Malays were the first to benefit. They had occupied some district head 
positions since 1966, while the first Dayak district head during the New Order was not 
elected until 1995. 
The political momentum for the Dayaks came after the fall of the New Order. 
Dayaks demanded the government allow them assume high positions in the bureaucracy 
denied to them during the New Order. The following sections will discuss the first two 
district head elections after the fall of the New Order (§8.1.1 ). Then, examines intense 
ethnic political activity outside parliament (§8.1.2). Lastly, look at cases of district 
divisions which were influenced by the government's concerns over ethnic problems in the 
region (§8.1.3). 
8.1.1 District Head Elections 
All district head elections during the New Order were under the tight control of the 
governor. The governor usually had a favourite. The local DPRD would seek 
"nominations" from the public so that the election would appear democratic. Whatever the 
result of the public nominations, the governor's favourite would always make the final list, 
and in most cases would be elected as district head. The following will examine the cases 
of election of Sanggau and Pontianak district heads. 
4 15This officer was transferred from this position in March 1995 (Akcaya 29-01-2000). One senior Malay 
bureaucrat accused the officer of having assigned training opportunites to Dayak civil servants so that they 
could satisfy the requirements for promotion when the time came (interview Djp). The accusation and the fact 
that the officer only stayed in the position for a short time indicated the importance of the post. Simon Djalil 
was elected as district head of Sintang in early 2000. 
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The election process for the Sanggau district head had begun in early 1998, some 
months before the fall of the New Order. At the end of the nomination period, which 
included nominations from the public, the DPRD compiled a list of 40 nominees, the 
largest number of nominees in the history of district head elections in West Kalimantan 
(Akcaya 3-3-1998). Half of the nominees had military backgrounds - another record in the 
history of district head elections in West Kalimantan (Akcaya 5-3-1998). From this list of 
nominees, the members of the DPRD were able to shortlist about a dozen candidates. The 
governor' s favourite candidate, Colonel Soemitro, was on the list.416 
Ethnic voices in the elections had appeared from the beginning of the nomination 
process. Both communities, the Dayaks and the Malays, seem to have learnt the lesson 
from previous elections in nearby Sintang and Kapuas Hulu that ethnic factors could indeed 
influence the election process. The Malay political lobby was able to elect a Malay as the 
Sintang district head in the 1994 election, although the position was initially intended for a 
Dayak. The Dayak protests at the result in the 1994 election in Sintang, had led Governor 
Aswin to ensure that a Dayak was elected as district head in Kapuas Hulu in 1995. These 
issues were discussed in Chapter 6. 
Due to ethnic polarisation introduced in previous elections, masses from each ethnic 
group tended to rally for candidates from their own ethnic group. Most Dayaks therefore 
rallied behind the Dayak candidates: Colonel Mickael Andjioe, Lieutenant Colonel Riam 
Mapuas, L.H. Kadir, Simon Djalil, Donatus Djaman, Benedictus Ayub, Ikot Rinding, and 
Arsen Riksen. Approaching the election, Dayak support for Colonel Mickael Andjioe grew 
stronger (interview Sbd, Abk, MAD 2002). PIKI and some Christian and Dayak 
associations issued a letter on 15 April 1998 which put Andjioe as the top priority candidate, 
followed by Donatus Djaman, and Benedictus Ayub. The letter requested the government 
416Soemitro is a Javanese military officer who has served in various military posts within West Kalimantan 
since the 1960s. He was the head of the Social and Political Bureau in the provincial government (known as 
dilsospol). This office was a very influential political tool of the New Order regime and was usually headed 
by a military officer, usually a colonel at provincial level and a major at district level. Its function was to 
monitor the political development of the region under its jurisdiction, including involvement in the internal 
affairs of political parties and other organisations if necessary. It also conducted a special investigation (f itsus) 
to check the political background of civilian candidates for political positions, and candidates for election. It 
was strongly associated with the repressive New Order regime and was dissolved by President Abdulrahman 
Wahid. The office was renamed Office of National Unity and Society Protection (Kantor Badan Kesatuan 
Bangsa dan Per!indungan Masyarakat). 
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to shortlist only them as the final three candidates (PII<I 1998b). Andjioe was the only 
candidate with a military background. Donatus Djaman, the son of the first Dayak district 
head of Sanggau (i.e. M.Th. Djaman), was the head of Sanggau Dayak Customary Council 
(DAD) and a member of the Sanggau DPRD from Golkar. Later, in December 1998, he 
was elected chairman of Sanggau Golkar. Benedictus Ayub was a retired civil servant and a 
DPRD member from Golkar, but had less political influence. Among the candidates 
excluded from the letter were the governor' s candidate, Soemitro, and Setiman H. Sudin, a 
Malay who was the head of Sanggau Development Planning Agencies (Bappeda). 
The Dayaks preferred Andjioe because as a military officer his chances were better 
than those of the civil candidates. The district head position in Sanggau was always 
reserved for a military officer, and there had been no indications from the government that 
the position would be given to a civilian.417 Andjioe also had an impressive military career 
at the national level, better than that of Riam Mapuas, the other Dayak military candidate. 
At the time of his nomination, Andjioe was an active military officer serving as one of the 
directors of the Military Cadet School (Secapa) in Bandung. Those who supported Andjioe 
were optimistic that with this qualification Andjioe could overcome other candidates, 
including the governor's candidate (interview Omr). Growing Dayak support for Andjioe 
with his notable military career made him the main threat to the governor's candidate. It 
was only natural that the governor obstructed Andjioe' s opportunity to stand for election. 
Andjioe almost failed to register for the final candidacy because he only received approval 
from his military superior at the last minute. At a result he submitted only a fax version of 
the approval instead of the original. Apparently after pressure from Jakarta, Andjioe finally 
"voluntarily" withdrew from the race on 13 May 1998. The regime was rather careful in 
dealing with Andjioe's candidacy because it did not want a repetition ofDayaks' protests in 
1994 after the failure of the Dayak candidate in the Sintang district head election. The 
regime was also not prepared to confront the restless Dayaks, who had just recovered from 
a massive conflict with the Madurese in 1997. 
4170ne possible reason for Sanggau always having a military district head was its strategic location. It was the 
only district in West Kalimantan that had a direct land-link with a fully functioning international crossing to 
neighbouring Malaysia. Sambas and Sintang district which had such international borders also usually had 
military district heads. The only district with an international border that usually had a civilian district head 
was Kapuas Hulu (Table 7-10). 
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Andjioe's withdrawal was announced almost at the same time as riots broke out in 
Jakarta. A week after the riots, President Soeharto was forced to resign. The end of the New 
Order Regime immediately changed the course of the election in Sanggau. Spearheaded by 
PII<I and other Dayak and Christian institutions the Dayaks stepped up their demand for a 
Dayak district head.418 They issued a more explicitly pro-Dayak appeal to the government. 
It demanded that certain positions in the bureaucracy, including that of Sanggau district 
head, be given to Christians and Dayaks in order to maintain fairness and political justice 
(PIKI 1998a).419 The role of MAD/DAD was also important in coordinating Dayak lobbies 
at the provincial and district levels. 420 Some transient Dayak organisations were also 
formed to bolster the demand.421 At this stage, Andjioe appeared to be the only choice of 
the Dayaks. He had gained much popularity because he was victimised by the regime 
during the previous short listing period. 
The district DPRD responded to Dayak pressure. On 4 June 1998, the Sanggau 
DPRD wrote a letter to the governor and the interior minister suggesting that government 
intervention in the election was no longer proper in the reform era. The letter confirmed 
locals' opposition to Soemitro's nomination and demanded that the regime appoint Andjioe 
as the district head (Akcaya 8-6-1998). The governor, who had been cautious in handling 
Andjioe's case from the beginning, gave in. He probably feared for his own political career 
if the Dayaks rebelled. Most likely after receiving the governor's advice, the military 
headquarters retracted its support for Soemitro on 28 June 1998, and approved Andjioe's 
nomination the next day. 
In mid-August 1998, the interior minister re-opened nominations. On 24 September, 
the minister received a list of four nominees: Mickael Andjioe, Benedictus Ayub, Donatus 
Djaman, and Setiman H. Sudin. All candidates were Dayaks, except Sudin, a Malay. The 
4180ther scholars observe a similar trend in the increasing role of the ethnic elite and organisations in other 
parts ofKalimantan after the fall of the New Order regime (van Klinken 2002; Thung, Maunati et al. 2004). 
419The letter listed eight specific positions to be given to the Christians or Dayaks. They were deputy governor, 
assistant III and IV of the provincial secretariat, deputy head of provincial Bappeda, district heads of Sanggau, 
Sintang, Kapuas Hulu, and Pontianak. It also requested the same arrangements for positions in echelons II, III, 
and IV and that the sub-district heads be appointed based on religion/ethnic balance (PIKI 1998a). 
420There was coordination between MAD at the provincial level and DAD in Sanggau. The contact persons at 
the provincial level were officials of MAD such as Thadeus Yus and Piet Herman Abik. The Sanggau contact 
person was the secretary of DAD Sanggau, Lukas Subardi (interview Sbd). 
421 For example Forum Komunikasi Pemuda dan Mahasiswa Pembawa Aspirasi Masyarakat Dayak 
Kabupaten Sanggau (FKPMPAMDKS) and Forum Aksi Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Dayak (FAMD). 
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minister's decision on 22 October excluded Djaman from the final list of three. The 
government probably feared that with the quite influential Djaman in the race, the Dayak 
votes would be split.422 The split would not only endanger Andjioe's chances, but also the 
chance of a Dayak district head. This would create a new political complication that the 
government had been trying to avoid. In the absence of Djaman, Andjioe won the election 
in early November 1998 with a decisive 29 votes, while Sudin got twelve, and Ayub four 
votes. It was very likely that most votes for Andjioe came from twenty Dayaks and nine 
military members of the DPRD. On 26 November, Andjioe was sworn in as the district 
head of Sanggau only the second Dayak district head in Sanggau for more than thirty years. 
The second case is the election of the Pontianak district head. The process in 
Pontianak district came several months after the fall of the New Order, and in the middle of 
a chaotic district head election in Sanggau. The members of the DPRD and those involved 
in the election were able to observe Dayak political activities during the election in 
Sanggau and subsequently became more aware of the ethnic intricacies in their own 
election. The election committee from the DPRD tried to keep the ethnic balance between 
the Dayaks and the Malays in the nominations throughout the selection process, as a way of 
avoiding ethnic mobilisation. The committee tried to downplay polarisation between the 
competing ethnic groups, for example, by using the terms coastal (pantai), inland 
(pedalaman), and migrant (pendatang) communities instead of more sensitive ethnic terms, 
although these terms were clearly referred to Malays, Dayaks, and migrants respectively. 
The regime also denied having considered the ethnic factors in the process of nomination, 
although the way they kept the ethnic balance throughout the nomination process, as will be 
explained below, showed the contrary.423 
The election process began with the caJI for candidate nominations from the public. 
By the end of the nomination process, the DPRD had received more than one thousand 
submissions, and was able to narrow them down to forty nominees (Akcaya 21-9, 22-9-
1998). At the end of October, the official nominees were announced: Agus Salim, Henri 
422Both Andjioe and Djaman met again in the following district head election in 2003, although this time 
another candidate, Yansen Akun Effendi won the election (see footnote 473). 
423The head of the district public relations bureau, Jailani, did not acknowledge the fact that ethnic concern 
was behind the decision to keep the racial balance in the nomination (Akcaya 2-11-1998). 
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Usman, Salman Djiban, Comelis, Cornelius Kimha, Ikot Rinding, and Soegiyo. The first 
three were Malay candidates, the second three were Dayaks, and the last one was 
representing a migrant community (Akcaya 29-10-1998). This 3-3-1 combination was the 
first effort to create ethnic balance in the nominations. It was a modification from the initial 
imbalance of the unofficial nominations of four Malays, two Dayaks, and one migrant. The 
election committee replaced a Malay candidate (i.e. Lieutenant-Colonel Syafei Usman) 
with a Dayak (Cornelius Kimha) to create an ethnic balance of three Malays, three Dayaks, 
and one migrant (cf. Akcaya 20-10-1998). The ethnic balance was again maintained when 
the list of seven nominees was shrunk to five by dropping one candidate each from the 
Malays (Salman Djiban) and Dayaks (Ikot Rinding). The list consisting of five candidates 
was sent to the interior minister on 30 October 1998 (Akcaya 2-11-1998). By observing the 
ethnic balance, the DPRD had so far been able to avoid disruption to the election process. 
So far, there were only a few peaceful visits to the DPRD by small numbers of people from 
both ethnic groups. Local newspapers reported that the members of DPRD were quite 
optimistic that the election would conclude according to schedule, at the end of November 
(Akcaya 2-11-1998). 
Despite the relative calm compared to the Sanggau election, the pressure from 
Dayaks was strongly felt, especially after the positive outcome of the Dayak lobbies in the 
Sanggau district head election. Statements from the Dayak figures had started to come out 
in local newspaper, although most of them urged for a peaceful election (Akcaya 3-12, 15-
12-1998, 26-1-1999). Even though they appeared to be neutral, their appearance 
nevertheless showed the Dayak interests in the election. Reports of visits by Dayak 
organisations to the DPRD had started to feature local newspapers from September 1998. 
The two most prominent (but transient) Dayak organisations were KID AK and FMP AMO 
(Akcaya 14-9, 15-10, 13-11, 21-11-1998).424 The election committee was under pressure to 
accommodate Dayak interests. On one occasion, probably to calm the Dayak population, 
the head of the DPRD thought it necessary to mention specifically that the concerns of 
424Members ofKIDAK included Thomas Daliman, a lecturer at the state Tanjungpura University and member 
of Pancur Kasih and Irenius Kadem a member of PJKI (see Akcaya 12-4-1999). 
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KIDAK (a Dayak lobby organisation) had been taken into account in the nomination 
process (Akcaya 29-10-1998). 
The Dayak pressure on the DPRD mounted after it sent the names of five candidates 
to the interior minister. The media reported that the demonstrations and accompanying 
threats had caused stress among the members of DPRD (Akcaya 7-12, 12-12-1998). To 
reduce the tension, on 21 December 2004 all five candidates made a statement in the local 
press that they would follow the rules of the game, would accept the final election result, 
and would manage their supporters (Akcaya 23-12-1998). However, conditions deteriorated 
fast after the interior minister announced on 15 January 1999 the final three candidates: 
Cornelius Kimha, Agus Salim, and Henri Usman (Akcaya 22-1-1999). The exclusion of 
Cornelis prompted protests from many of his zealous Dayak supporters from the Landak 
areas.425 On 22 January 1999, a crowd in Pahauman harassed the MAD/DAD officials who 
were about to have a customary meeting and vandalised their cars.426 They accused the 
head of MAD, Rachmad Sahuddin, of being the person behind the exclusion of Cornelis. 
Many official cars were waylaid at the end of the day (Akcaya 23-1-1999, KR 43 1999: 31-
3). Although this incident seemed to be a result of internal rivalries among the Dayak elite, 
the ultimate target of the demonstrations was the local government. Two weeks later, on 5 
February, around 300 Dayaks from Landak burnt down the DPRD building in Mempawah, 
the district capital (Akcaya 6-2, 7-2-1999, KR 1999/43:31-3). They held the DPRD 
responsible for the failure to represent their interests (i.e. to include Comelis among the 
final three candidates). 
The DPRD-burning incident was a turning point in the election to the advantage of 
the Dayak lobby. The police summoned Comelis for his alleged involvement in the 
Pahauman and Mempawah incidents (Akcaya 7-2-1999). PIKI and some Dayak lobbyists 
representing the Landak Dayaks went to see the governor on 6 February 1999 to seek a 
425 According to one very high-ranking official, the minister's decision to exclude Cornelis was made after 
getting input from the governor. Comelis was only a III/D-rank civil servant, at least two steps lower than the 
other candidates who had rank above IV/B. The source also mentioned Comelis's recklessness as another 
cause for his exclusion (interview Awn). However, this later claim was probably influenced by Comelis' 
alleged involvement in subsequent events. There were no indications of Comelis' insubordination, otherwise 
he would not have received six promotions in seventeen years ( 1980-1997), an average of three years between 
each promotion. 
426Present at the meeting were Rahmad Sahuddin, Bahaudin Kay, J.F. Ahok, Raymondez Djimin, Albert 
Rufinus, Piet Herman Abik, and Loedis (KR 1999/43: 31-3). 
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solution to the critical situation. The governor finally agreed to drop criminal charges 
against Cornelis (interview Shr), and gave written assurance that Cornelis would be 
promoted to a position at the provincial level.427 Most importantly, according to the minutes 
of meeting, the governor would make an effort to ensure that a Dayak would be appointed 
as the district head of Pontianak district (Gubernur Kalbar 1999; PIK.I 1999). After the 
meeting, Cornelis published a letter to calm his supporters. He stated in the letter that he 
respected the minister's decision to exclude him from the candidacy and urged his 
supporters to maintain peace and unity in West Kalimantan (Akcaya 9-2-1999). Seemingly 
to have accepted the deal, the remaining Dayak demonstrations up until the voting day were 
in support of the only Dayak candidate, Cornelius Kimha (see KR 1999/44: 14). 
Voting by the members of the DPRD took place on 10 February 1999 under tight 
security. The result of the voting was indecisive, with Kimha and Salim both obtaining 
twenty votes, Usman three votes, and one vote was declared invalid (Akcaya 11-2-1999).428 
Votes for Kimha seemed to have come mainly from the Dayak legislators and from the 
military faction. The minister exercised his prerogative by appointing Kimha as the district 
head on 29 March, and swore him in on 12 April 1999 (Akcaya 13-4-1999). Without Dayak 
pressure, Salim would have had a greater chance of being appointed, as the governor 
preferred Salim to Kimha (interview Awn). 
The election of the Dayak district heads in these two cases was made possible by 
regime change in Jakarta, the mobilisation of the Dayak masses, the accommodating 
approach of the new regime and the lack of opposition from the Malays. Without regime 
change, the Dayak candidate in the Sanggau election, who had already withdrawn from the 
race, would not have been able re-enter the election. Yet, the regime change paved the way 
for his re-nomination and finally his election. The governor, who previously had the 
authority to make his favourite candidate win the election, was forced to withdraw his 
support from Soemitro in the case of the election in Sanggau. In the election in Pontianak, 
Agus Salim would have had no difficulty in getting the support of the central government, 
427Cornelis was promoted several days before Salim was appointed as caretaker district head of Landak on 12 
October 1999. Apparently the promotion was merely to smooth the appointment of Agus Salim as caretaker 
bupati, and not a reward to Cornelis. Cornelis was posted to become the sub-head of the mining office in 
Pontianak, a position that he did not enjoy. 
428This invalid vote was that of Agus Salim (A kcaya 11-2-1999). 
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if qualifications and the governor's preference were taken into account. However, in a time 
of transition and great demand for democratisation, the governor chose to follow "popular" 
demand by supporting the Dayak candidate. The interior minister made a similar choice, by 
appointing the Dayak candidate. 
The Dayak demonstrations and overt demand for the election of Dayak district 
heads were also important in the appointment of the two Dayak district heads. Without 
continuous Dayak mobilisation organised by institutions such as MAD and PUG in support 
of Dayak candidates, there would have been no Dayak "aspirations". The Dayak elite were 
also aware of the momentum to press for a Dayak district head. They had repeatedly 
warned the government that conflict was closely related to the marginalisation of the 
Dayaks. They argued that the continuing marginalisation of Dayaks, in this case by denying 
them the district head position, could trigger another conflict. The government gave in to an 
apparently justified Dayak demand to avert conflict. 
The lack of opposition from the Malays also contributed to the initial Dayak 
successes. However, from the middle to the end of 1999, the Malays started to resist the 
Dayak political lobbies, as will be shown below. 
8.1.2 Election of Regional Representatives 
Each province was allocated five Regional Representative (Utusan Daerah, UD) 
seats in the National Assembly (MPR).429 This election was one of the first tasks for the 
newly-elected provincial DPRD in 1999. The members of DPRD agreed informally to 
divide the five seats among the Dayaks, Malays, and Chinese with a 2-2-1 formula: two 
each for Dayaks and Malays, and one for the Chinese (interview Tkk, KR 51 1999: 32-3). 
With this fair allocation they wanted to avoid ethnic clashes between the Dayaks and 
Malays, whose relations had been tense since mid-1998 because of the district head 
elections. 
The DPRD Listed 46 candidates, a majority of whom were Malays, with only ten 
Dayaks, and three Chinese. The Dayak candidates were Barnabas Simin, Bambang Garang, 
Iman Kalis, Laurentius Madjun, Lenson Angking, Ikot Rinding, Piet Herman Abik, 
429Regional Representative should not be confused with Class Representative ( Utusan Golongan) of the 
National Assembly. The Dayaks of Kalimantan were given one seat as a class representative representing an 
"ethnic minority". 
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Thambun Anyang, Yakobus Kumis, and Ritih Kenyeh (DPRD Kalbar 2004:18-20). The 
regulation stated that the five candidates who received the most votes would automatically 
be elected as UD members (DPRD Kalbar 1999c:9). The candidates with the highest 
number of votes in the voting on 4 October 1999 were Oesman Sapta 34 votes, Zainuddin 
Isman 32, Budiono Tan 29, Ikot Rinding 29, and Chairil Effendi with 26 votes. The result 
was a breach of the consensus because the Dayaks were represented by only one person, 
Ikot Rinding, instead of two as agreed. 
The main cause for the Dayaks' failure to send two candidates to the UD was 
increasing competition among the Dayaks themselves. As mentioned above, there were ten 
Dayak candidates each with their own supporters. For example, MAD suggested the 
members of DPRD vote for Barnabas Simin and Piet Herman Abik, while Golkar 
supported Ikot Rinding (KR 1999/51: 32-3). Some other candidates who entered late into 
the nominations also sought support from the members of DPRD. As there were ten Dayak 
candidates and there was no consensus among the Dayaks on their preferred candidates, the 
DPRD members were free to vote for any Dayak candidate. As a result the votes were 
thinly spread among the ten candidates and in the end only one Dayak obtained enough 
votes to be among the highest five vote-getters (interview Tkk, DPRD Kalbar 1999a:3). 
One obvious contribution to the Dayak failure to have two UD members was the 
non-compliance of the DPRD members with their informal agreement. If every legislator 
followed strictly the 2-2-1 consensus, then from the total 55 DPRD members the total votes 
for all Dayak candidates should have been 110, for Malay candidates 110 votes, and for the 
Chinese 55 votes. However, ten Dayak candidates received altogether no more than 80 
votes.430 Thus, the remaining thirty votes for the Dayaks evaporated and went to other non-
Dayak candidates. One non-Dayak suspected of getting many of these "spill-over" votes 
was Zainuddin Isman, the second highest vote-getter. Dayak legislators would not have 
voted for Isman as a Dayak representative because he was not considered a Dayak. He was 
of Dayak descent but was a Muslim and a member of the PPP, an Islamic political party, 
43
°The total vote for the eight Dayak candidates was 68. Barnabas Simin (11) Piet Herman Abik (22), lkot 
Rinding (29), Lorensius Majun (10), and Thambun Anyang (9). Yakobus Kumis, Lengson Angking and Ritih 
Kenyeh did not get any votes. There were two candidates, Bambang TK Garang and Iman Kalis, whose votes 
are not known to me. Bambang Garang was a rather unknown figure while Iman Kalis was a retired politician. 
At best, the total for both of them would not have exceeded 12 votes. 
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which had almost no link to the Dayaks. Most importantly, he had never acknowledged 
himself as a Dayak.431 The Malay legislators, however, could have "played" this fact and 
still voted for Isman as a Dayak candidate. For the Malay legislators, the Muslim Zainuddin 
Isman was certainly a better choice than Christian and "radical" Dayak candidates 
supported by MAD and PIK.I. These two institutions were known to have been involved in 
several political lobbies, the results of which were contrary to the Malays' interests. The 
Malay-dominated DPRD also preferred a neutral and cooperative Dayak candidate, which 
partly explained why Ikot Rinding, a candidate from Golkar, was elected.432 
How could this possibly have happened? First of all, the 2-2-1 formula was purely 
an informal consensus and not legally binding. Therefore, it was possible for a legislator 
not to follow the consensus and give votes to five candidates from a single ethnic group 
(interview Tkk). Secondly, nomination sheets did not contain information on candidates' 
ethnicity. Hence, one could vote for Zainuddin lsman assuming he was a Dayak, as 
explained above. 
Disappointed with the result, Dayak crowds waiting outside the bui !ding protested. 
Many of them saw the result as a conspiracy to marginalise the political role of Dayaks. 
The Dayak masses pressed the DPRD to amend the decision. The leaders of the DPRD 
complied and promised that they would reconvene for a new election following the 2-2-1 
formula, and would support Barnabas Simin as another Dayak member of the UD (DPRD 
Kalbar 1999f). The working committee in the DPRD responsible for solving this problem 
issued another statement on 6 October 1999 reiterating its support for the two Dayak 
431To the Dayaks, particularly after a MAD 1999 workshop, Muslim Dayaks could be regarded as Dayaks so 
long as they acknowledged themselves to be Dayak (KR 1999/51). On 5 November 1999, the West 
Kalimantan Muslim Dayak Association, known as IKDI, was formed to show that one could be both Dayak 
and Muslim at the same time. The idea to form IKDI was originally led by recent (first generation) Dayak 
converts who wanted to retain their Dayak identity after converting to Islam (interviews Aki, Amh). 
Unfortunately, when the organisation was finally established, the leadership fell into the hands of the second 
and third generation of Muslim Dayaks who had a weaker ethnic association with the Dayaks. As a result of 
this, IKDI developed into a more religious (i.e. Islamic) rather than an ethnic (i.e. Dayak) organisation. 
Besides the first chairman of the West Kalimantan PDIP (i.e. Rudy Alamsyahrum), IKDI membership at the 
time included the ex-rector of Universitas Tanjungpura, the state university in the province. With the 
formation of IKDI, Muslim Dayaks, who had previously distanced themselves from the Dayaks, announced 
their intent to keep their Dayak identity. Its formation symbolised the rise of the Dayak "profile" after the fall 
of the New Order. 
432 Although Ikot Rinding was a founding member of MAD and still a member of the advisory board of MAD 
at the time of the election, most of the time he was supporting Golkar interests more those that of MAD (KR 
1999/51:32). 
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representatives: keeping Ikot Rinding and adding Barnabas Simin (DPRD Kalbar 1999e). 
Its stance in maintaining the 2-2-1 formula received support from the Central Election 
Committee or KPU (KPU 1999). 
However, the DPRD failed to find any solutions in the following weeks, while the 
central government deadline for regional governments to submit the names of elected UD 
members rapidly approached. The working committee in the DPRD contemplated several 
other options. The first was to add one Dayak member to the existing five members. This 
made the formula 3-2-1: three Malays, two Dayaks, and one Chinese. From a legal 
perspective this option would have been difficult to achieve because the national law only 
allocated five representatives for each province. The second option involved one of the 
members of the elected UD resigning. The committee planned to lobby the Chinese 
member to resign. This would bring the composition to 3-2: three Malays and two Dayaks. 
This option also failed because Budiono Tan, the Chinese representative, refused to resign 
(for discussion on the options see DPRD Kalbar 1999d). The problem remained unsolved 
when the "original" members of the UD were sworn in at Jakarta on 13 October 1999 
(Equator 18-10-1999). 
The Dayak masses continued to protest and send delegations to the DPRD until mid 
2000. One of the last strong warnings came from the Secretary-General of the West 
Kalimantan Indonesian Christian Communication Forum (PK.KI) on 27 October 1999. The 
speaker, who had ties with the Catholic Church, warned that the forum would not be 
responsible for the possible adverse consequences if Dayaks' demand for an additional 
member was not met (FKKI Kalbar 1999).433 The last documented communication in mid-
May 2000 suggested there would be a possibility of replacing one UD member before 2004 
(DPRD Kalbar 2000). However, there was no change until tenure of all the UD member 
was up in 2004. 
The question was why, despite constant pressure and commitment from the DPRD 
working committee, no amendment was made. One major obstacle was the lack of a 
quorum in DPRD meetings so that no legal decisions could be made. Concern for their 
433FKKI is an umbrella for Catholic and Protestant organisations in West Kalimantan. It was quite active 
during the first years after the reform to support the pro-Dayak struggle. It had been involved in Dayak 
lobbies in elections in Sanggau and Pontianak districts. 
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safety could have been one reason keeping members of the DPRD from meetings. A more 
plausible explanation was that the members of DPRD, particularly the Malays, did not have 
any interest in appointing a second Dayak. Some of them argued that the original 
composition satisfied the ethnic formula of 2-2-1. They argued that Zainuddin Isman was 
also a Dayak, although he was a Muslim (cf. KR 1999/51 :30). From the records of a series 
of meetings, the majority of those who were consistently absent, thus preventing a quorum, 
were from Islamic parties. 
The Malay legislators' confidence in going against Dayak demands might have 
been the result of growing Malay-community support. The Malays, particularly hardliner 
politicians and young people, had become increasingly irritated with the Dayaks who had 
been playing "hard ball" politics since 1997 (various interviews). Their reactions, however, 
remained largely non-confrontational, as explained above. The conclusion of the Malay-
Madurese conflict in 1999 gave the Malays confidence to confront the Dayaks (as can be 
seen in this UD case). A leader of FKPM Singkawang, M. Jamras, and some other Malays 
from the Alliance of the Malay Community (AMM), visited the provincial DPRD. The 
delegation condemned the indecisive members of DPRD and demanded that the DPRD 
uphold their initial decision (DPRD Kalbar 1999b). After a Dayak crowd vandalised the 
provincial DPRD building on 6 October 1999, AMM again restated their opposition to the 
amendment and warned that West Kalimantan could turn into a "second Ambon" (AMM-
KB 1999). The warning was unmistakably directed toward the Dayaks and the legislators. 
On 11 October 1999 in front of the DPRD building Dayak masses were involved in clashes 
with the security forces. These two incidents almost triggered conflict between the Malays 
and the Dayaks (see KR 1999/51: 32, interview Tkk).434 These were the first occasions 
Malays "resisted" the Dayaks. 
This section has discussed the "failure" of the Dayak lobbies to achieve their 
political goals because of growing Malay opposition. After two successful demonstrations 
which led to the appointment of the two Dayak district heads, Dayak political pressure to 
obtain strategic positions through shows of force had been less successful. The failure of 
434According to Davidson, these Malay youths were the underlings of Abas Fadillah, a former member of 
Lembayu (2002:355). 
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Dayak lobbies to have a Dayak elected as the caretaker district head of the newly formed 
Landak district has been noted. Another case in 2003, also in Landak district, in which 
Dayak lobbying for a Christian head of the religious affairs bureau (kakandepag) was 
unsuccessful (see Ak.caya 27-8-2003, Equator 27-8, 28-8, 29-8, 6-9-2003, DPRD Kalbar 
2003:7).435 Section 8.3.2 will discuss in more detail other factors that contributed to the 
decline of ethnic political struggle. The next section will show that government efforts to 
accommodate Dayak demands and maintain peace went beyond the political appeasement 
of appointing Dayak district heads. The government accelerated the creation of "Dayak" 
districts so that they would be able govern their own regions. 
8.1.3 Formation of New Districts 
The history of forming a new district by dividing an existing district (pemekaran) 
goes back to the end of the 1950s and early 1960s in West Kalimantan, when the proposal 
of new district formation was discussed by the provincial DPRD, and proposed to the 
central government. One source noted that before 1960 the DPRD had proposed the 
creation of twenty new districts out of the existing four in West Kalimantan province 
(Table 8-1). Another source stated that in the early 1960s, the governor had proposed to 
Jakarta that the province have 12 districts (Rahman, Achmad et al. 2001:195). At its 
congress in early August 1963 West Kalimantan Partindo suggested that the central 
government divide Sambas into two districts (Bintang Timur 3-9-1963). Due to several 
factors, none of these divisions came about. One factor was that West Kalimantan had 
become a frontier in Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia (see Rahman, Achmad et al. 
2001: 195). Changing administrative boundaries required further consolidation, which in 
turn would undermine the Konfrontasi campaigns. The other factor was volatile national 
politics, which made the district division a low priority. Between 1959 and 1965, the 
central government only formed five new districts throughout Indonesia. 
435It was a norm in West Kalimantan and most other regions in Indonesia that the kakandepag was always a 
Muslim. According to a high-ranking official at the Religious Affairs Department in Jakarta, it was possible 
for a Christian to head the Bureau if the Christians were dominant (more than 75%) in the district. The request 
required the support of the district leadership, the DPRD, as well as the Church authority. By March 2005, 
there were fifteen Christian (Protestant) kakandepag for the whole nation: five each from NIT and Papua, 
three from North Sumatra, and one each from North Sulawesi and Central Kalimantan (communication with 
Las). 
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Table 8-1 Suggested District Formation in 1957-1958 
Pontianak Sambas Sanggau 
1. Kubu and Pontianak 1. Singkawang 1. Sanggau 
2. Mempawah 2. Bengkayang 2. Tayan 
3. Landak 3. Pemangkat 3. Sekadau 
4. Sambas 4. Sekayam 
Sin tang Kapuas Hulu Ketapang 
1. Sintang 1. Kapuas Hulu 1. Matan Hilir 
2. Melawi 2. Kapuas Tengah 2. Matan Hulu 
3. Ketungau 3.Sukadana 
4. Marau 
Source: Balunus (interview 2004). 
The formation of new districts during the New Order was also rare. In more than 
thirty years of its rule, the New Order only created a total of 22 districts and 
municipalities.436 The redrawing of district boundaries was slow for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, central government wanted tighter control over the regions, and therefore preferred 
a smaller number of districts. The need for more effective coordination in its vast territory 
was met not by the forming of new districts, but by the creation of special institutions to 
assist the district and provincial executive heads. At the district level, this new institution 
was headed by the regional assistant to the district head (Pembantu Bupati Wilayah), while 
at the provincial level it was headed by the assistant to the governor (Pembantu Gubernur 
Wilayah). 437 In 1992 assistants were appointed to district heads in six districts: Sambas, 
Nanga Pinoh, Ngabang, Sekayam, Semitau, and Sukadana. There were two assistants to the 
governor, one located in Sintang, who was responsible for Sanggau, Sintang and Kapuas 
Hulu districts, and another located in Mempawah, who was responsible for Sambas, 
Pontianak, and Ketapang (Djapari 1985 :33-4; Gubemur Kalbar 1992:69-70; Abdulsalam 
1997:133; Gubernur Kalbar 1998:13). Forming a new district was not only costly but also 
risky and needed careful study. Establishing supplementary institutions, such as the 
regional assistants, was preferable because they were less costly and less risky. Lastly, the 
failure to form new districts could be also have been due to the Jack of initiative from the 
4360fthe 22, six were districts, the other 16 were municipalities. Of the six new districts, three were formed in 
1969 in Irian Jaya province. From the 16 new municipalities, five were further divisions of Jakarta, the 
national capital (this data was compiled from http://www.bps.go.id/mstkab/mfd2007.pdD. During this period, 
the nation also acquired two new provinces: Irian Jaya (1969) and East Timer (1975). 
437These two positions first appeared in the Law 511974 on regional government. For details of their functions 
and roles see Surianingrat (1980:86-91 ). 
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local government officials, who had been accustomed to the top-down approach of the New 
Order. Without a strong rationale and real urgency, most local officials would stick to the 
status quo rather than take the risk of proposing the formation of a new administrative unit. 
At the end of Governor Aspar Aswin's first term (1993-1998), he wrote that West 
Kalimantan would need eight new districts in addition to the original six districts (Gubernur 
Kalbar 1998:26-7). His plan was to divide Sambas and Pontianak into three districts each, 
while Sanggau, Sintang and Ketapang districts would be divided into two districts each. 
Some of these divisions had been realised by 2005, when the province had an additional 
four new districts (Landak, Bengkayang, Sekadau, Melawi) and one municipality, 
Singkawang. The first two cases of district divisions after the fall of the New Order are of 
interest because ethnic factors seemed to play an important role in their division. 
The formation of new districts in West Kalimantan in 1999 could be traced back to 
discussions starting in Sambas from the beginning of 1990. Movements to create new 
districts in Sambas had been intertwined with intermittent demands to return the district 
capital from Singkawang to Sambas.438 On 14 October 1994, the government set up a team 
to investigate and evaluate the prospect of dividing the Sambas district (Rahman, Achmad 
et al. 2001: 197). The proposal on the division received a boost after Sambas was selected as 
one of only 26 districts to take part in a national pilot project for greater autonomy (PP 
8/1995). Discussions in Sambas were then followed by discussions in other districts such as 
Pontianak, Sanggau and Ketapang. In the Pontianak district, a similar investigative team 
was formed on 6 November 1996 (Akcaya 24-3-1997). Although district division had 
become a hot issue, local newspapers were pessimistic about it realisation as the 
government officials were not enthusiastic. Although forming a new district was possible 
under regulation UU 5/1974 (Articles 3 and 4), the executive and legislative branches at 
both district and provincial levels were reluctant to pursue division seriously. In the case of 
Sambas, a sizeable number of members were reported absent from one meeting, a sign of 
lack of enthusiasm (Akcaya 5-11-1996). Even after the Sambas DPRD had agreed to the 
division on 29 March 1997 (Gubernur Kalbar 1998:26), the local newspaper suggested that 
438Sambas was designated the capital of Sambas district in 1953. However, since Singkawang was the 
colonial headquarters and was better equipped, the decision was reversed and the capital reverted to 
Singkawang in 1963 (Rahman, Achmad et al. 2001: 195). 
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the government was still reluctant to divide Sambas (Akcaya 28-3-1998). In Sanggau, the 
government said that the division of the Sanggau district was still at an early stage (Akcaya 
28-7-1997). In Ketapang, the district head had once mentioned that Ketapang would be 
divided into two districts, but commented that such a division was not certain because the 
process would take quite a long time (Akcaya 21-6-1997). Overall, no new districts were 
formed by mid-1998 due to slow response from the regional and central government. 
District division gained momentum only after the fall of the New Order. Between 
1998 and 1999, 50 new districts and municipalities were created. By the end of 2006, less 
than ten years after the fall of the New Order, the country had 151 new districts or 
municipalities and nine new provinces (see Table 8-2).439 In West Kalimantan, the first two 
new districts were formed in 1999. At the beginning of January 1999, the district head of 
Sambas hinted at the possibility of Bengkayang becoming a district (Akcaya 5-1-1999). Not 
long after, on 20 April 1999, the central government approved Bengkayang as a new 
district (UU 10/1999). The division of the Pontianak district had also experienced an 
acceleration after the fall of the New Order. On 1 June 1998, the district DPRD approved 
the formation of two new districts from Pontianak: Landak and Kubu (Akcaya 31-3-2005). 
This decision was supported by the provincial DPRD on 1 April 1999 (DPRD Kalbar 
l 999d: 161-2, 172). On 4 October 1999 Landak district was established (UU 55/1999). 
Table 8-2 Numbers of New Districts/Municipalities and Provinces (1998-2006) 
Year Numbers of New 
Districts/Municipalities Provinces 
1998 2 1 
1999 48 3 
2000 0 3 
2001 13 1 
2002 36 0 
2003 51 1 
2004 1 0 
2005 0 0 
2006 0 0 
Total 151 9 
Source: calculated from http://www.bps.go.id/mstkab/mfd2007.pdf (accessed 3-9-2007). 
439There have been many studies on the pemekaran in other districts (see for example Sakai 2003; Sumule 
2003; Morrell 2005; Roth 2006; Vel 2006). 
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The speedy process of district divisions in the province was not driven solely by the 
regime change but also, despite government denials, by the government's concerns over 
ethnic tensions in the region. One indication was the government's modifying of the 
original district division plan to follow ethnic lines. By doing this, the government hoped to 
reduce ethnic tensions in those areas. One obvious case was the division in Pontianak 
district. Some Dayak-predominant sub-districts, such as Mandor, Menjalin and Mempawah 
Hulu, which had been previously proposed part of the former Pontianak district, were 
reassigned to the new Landak district (see Akcaya 27-6-1997; 3-6-1998, Table 8-3). 
Between 75% and 92% of the population of these sub-districts were Dayaks, while the 
Malays were less than 6% (Table 8-4).440 In the Sambas district division, Selakau sub-
district, which was initially proposed to be part of the new Bengkayang (Gubernur Kalbar 
1998:27), was "returned" to Sambas district. Selakau was a Malay sub-district with a 84.3% 
Malay population and only a 0.3% Dayak population. 
Table 8-3 Initial Proposal for Division of Pontianak District 
Mempawah (eight sub- Landak (five sub-districts) Kubu (seven sub-districts) 
districts) 
Mempawah Hilir Menyuke Sungai Ambawang 
Sungai Kunyit Me ran ti Sungai Raya 
Sungai Pinyuh Sengah Temila Sungai Kakap 
Siantan Ngabang Telok Pakedai 
Toho Air Besar Terentang 
Mand or Kubu 
Menjalin Batu Ampar 
Mempawah Hulu 
Source: Akcaya 27-6-1997, 3-6-1998. 
Newly formed districts were divided quite clearly along ethnic lines: the Landak 
and Bengkayang districts were clearly Dayak districts because the majority of their 
populations were Dayaks. The Dayak populations in Landak and Bengkayang were 79% 
440Tuere were a few ethnic "enclaves" left after the division. Toho and Sungai Ambawang sub-districts, which 
had majority Dayak populations, remained with the Malay-dominated Pontianak district. The Malay-
dominated Sungai Raya stayed in Bengkayang district. Sajingan Besar, a Dayak sub-district at the northern tip 
of Sambas district, remained in Sambas district. Generally, these enclaves did not react adversely to the 
arrangements, except Sungai Raya sub-district. The local newspaper from 1999 to 2003 often covered 
movements from the Malays in this sub-district to demand the government incorporate the region into either 
Sambas or Singkawang (for example Akcaya 10-11-1999, 27-4-2000, 5-1-2003). 
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and 52.4% respectively. The proportion of the Malays in both districts was much smaller: 
9.7% and 18.7% respectively. After the division, Malays were left dominant in their 
respective "parent" districts, Sambas and Pontianak Districts (see Table 8-5). 
Table 8-4 Ethnic Population in Sambas and Bengkayang Districts (2000) 
District Sub-district Pooulation Davaks Malavs Chinese 
Selakau 35.640 1.0 83.3 11.5 
Pemangkat 78,200 1.3 68.5 23.4 
Te bas 69,874 4.2 80.7 12.4 
(/] Sambas 77,319 7.6 66.7 9.1 
('j Jawai 52,973 0.6 83.0 13.5 ..0 
8 Teluk Keramat 92.911 0.8 95.4 1.9 ('j 
r./'J 
Seiangkung 18.030 5.3 82.8 0.6 
Saiingan Besar 7,215 69.9 2.9 0.1 
Pal oh 21,884 0.6 87.2 8.5 
TOTAL 454,046 3.8 78.9 10.8 
Sungai Rava 41.891 11.1 34.0 31.9 
Tujuh Belas* 59.629 16.9 6.2 37.4 
Samalantan 38 457 70.6 13.9 1.1 
Bengkayang 32,849 76.5 9.8 7.1 
01) 
@ Ledo 20,507 69.0 9.7 1.2 
>-. Sanirn:au Ledo 19.152 17.9 14.4 0.8 ('j 
~ Seluas 11.794 28.8 7.0 0.3 OJ) c: 
<1) Jagoi Babarnr 12.007 70.0 10.2 0.0 co 
Pasiran* 45.777 3.3 7.5 65.4 
Ro ban* 46,216 2.5 15.9 23.8 
TOTAL 328,279 30.2 13.4 24.3 
TOT AL Without * 176,657 52.4 18.7 9.4 
Source: Census 2000. 
Note: *Tujuh Bel as, Pasiran and Ro ban sub-districts became parts of Singkawang municipality after 2003 . 
Table 8-5 Ethnic Composition of Districts Affected by Divisions (2000) 
District Population Dayaks Malays Chinese 
(%) (%) (%) 
Sambas before division 782,325 15.3 52.7 16.5 
Sambas after division 454,046 3.4 79.9 10.8 
Bengkavang 176 657 52.4 18.7 9.4 
Pontianak before division 909,619 29.9 22.5 8.5 
Pontianak after division 627,593 7.8 28.3 12.1 
Landak 282,026 79.0 9.7 0.7 
Source: Census 2000. 
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The next indication of ethnic consideration was the government's rearrangement of 
its district division priorities. It fast-tracked the process of division in conflict-prone areas, 
and dealt with the less risky areas later. In the case of Sambas, a government report drawn 
up on 30 January 1997 suggested the Sambas district be divided into three: North Sambas 
with its capital at Sambas, South Sambas with its capital at Bengkayang, and Singkawang 
municipality (Akcaya 4-2-1997, see also Gubernur Kalbar 1998:26-7).441 However, the 
government established conflict-prone Bengkayang first rather than a better-prepared but 
more peaceful Singkawang. Conflict seemed to have influenced the formation of the 
Bengkayang district, as it was a site for both the 1997 and 1999 conflicts. The formation 
itself was made shortly after the 1999 conflict. The Singkawang municipality was not 
formed until two years later, in mid-2001. Singkawang should have been created first if the 
government had valued preparedness ion as the main requirement for the division. A 
similar trend occurred in the division of the Pontianak district. A government taskforce 
recommended that the district be divided into three: Mempawah, Ngabang, and Kubu 
(Akcaya 27-6-1997). In 1998, the district DPRD supported the division into three districts 
(Akcaya 3 f-3-2005). However, the government fast-tracked the formation of the Landak 
district and ignored the Kubu district. Only one month after being elected as the district 
head of Pontianak, Kirnha Jed a team to Jakarta to lobby the Regional Autonomy Advisory 
Board (DPOD) to speed up the creation of the Landak district (Akcaya 24-5-1999). Up until 
the end of 2005, six years after the establishment of Landak, the fate of the Kubu district 
still was not clear. 
Government thought that separating conflict-prone areas and allowing the Dayaks to 
govern their own areas a solution to chronic ethnic conflicts there.442 The first caretaker of 
Bengkayang was Jacobus Luna, who was re-elected as district head in March 2000. The 
caretaker ofLandak district appointed on 19 October 1999 was, however, not a Dayak but a 
Malay, Agus Salim, a former candidate in the Pontianak district head election. This 
441North Sambas later was renamed Sambas, while South Sambas became Bengkayang. The name change was 
made on 25 March 1997 (Akcaya 26-3-1997). 
442The formation of North Maluku province out of Maluku province in June 2000 was another example of an 
attempt to reduce ethnic conflict through regional divisions along ethnic and religious lines. 
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anomaly had a history going back to the election of the head of Pontianak district. The 
governor initially wanted a Malay (i.e. Agus Salim) to head Pontianak district and a Dayak 
to head the "incoming" Landak district. However, the Dayak demonstration was able to 
influence the appointment of Kimha as the head of Pontianak district, which would soon 
become a Malay district after the formation of Landak district. Despite strong Dayak 
support for Comelis to assume the caretaker position, the governor was obliged to appoint 
Agus Salim to become the caretaker of the newly formed Landak district. Also influencing 
the governor's decision was the growth of Malay political pressure (see § 8.1.2).443 The 
argument for district division as a means of reducing ethnic conflict has been successful 
insofar as these two conflict hot-spots (i.e. Bengkayang and Landak), have since been 
peaceful. These two districts were the locations of almost all serious ethnic conflicts in the 
past. 
Apart from Bengkayang and Landak, there were many other proposals to separate 
new from existing districts, such as Sekayam from Sanggau, Kubu from Pontianak, and 
Kayong Utara from Ketapang. By the end of 2005, the province had only two additional 
new districts, Melawi and Sekadau. The absence of urgency (i.e. ethnic conflict) was one 
factor that made the formation of new districts take longer to finalise. Also, the process of 
forming new districts had become more complicated, because the new regulation 
promulgated in December 2000 (PP 129/2000) requires more rigorous research and 
feasibility studies to justify district formation. The regulation also requires intensive 
consultation with all stakeholders: the elite in the executive and the DPRD, community 
leaders, and the general population. It has not been easy to set conditions that are 
acceptable and beneficial to all stakeholders (Roth 2006: 130-45). The formation of new 
districts or provinces also requires substantial financial resources (including bribes) and 
high-level lobbying to speed up the approval processes in Jakarta (Vel 2006: 118-9). 
443 Agus Salim was in office for less than two years because in the district head election of July 2001, the 
district DPRD elected Cornelis as the definite district head. Agus Salim was one of the district head 
candidates, but failed to reach the final voting phase. The Dayak-dominated DPRD in Landak would be in big 
trouble if they elected a Malay district head. The population in this area consisted of strong supporters of 
Cornelis. 
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8.2 Dayak Grassroots Movements: Pancur Kasih Network 
Dayak grassroots movements started several years before the end of the New Order 
regime. Some of their activities were aimed at protecting and revitalising the social and 
cultural values of the Dayaks, ensuring their economic welfare, and providing financial and 
para-legal assistance to the needy local populations. These activities first appeared in the 
mid-1980s but were low key because the regime was highly suspicious of ethnic activities. 
The movements gained momentum after Reformasi. The following sections will examine 
the role ofNGOs under the umbrella of Pancur Kasih, the main player in Dayak grassroots 
movements. 
Pancur Kasih Foundation was formed in April 1981 by several Dayak intellectuals 
and a priest. 444 On 18 June 2001, in response to the changing regulations on social 
organisation, the Pancur Kasih Foundation changed its name to Pancur Kasih Union 
(hereafter Pancur Kasih). According to its statute the objectives of Pancur Kasih were to 
help the government in the area of development, to give social assistance, and to provide 
education. It was established as part of a network of Catholic institutions and related NGOs 
in Jakarta, which provided substantial financial support to enable the Pancur Kasih to grow. 
Through this network, the Pancur Kasih activists were introduced to new ideas and to some 
concerned foreigners. Its first works were in the area of education. It established a junior 
and a senior high school in Pontianak, and later facilitated the establishment of some others 
in inland areas. It had also become a coordinator for a scholarship from WVI (World Vision 
International) between 1986 and 2006 (Bamba 2001: 106-7, 112-3). 
By 2004, Pancur Kasih had created or facilitated the formation of 21 "units" and 
"programs", which were involved in various Dayak "empowerment" movements (KR 
2004/111). These units, in tum, facilitated the establishment of more "branches". As the 
number of organisations linked to Pancur Kasih expanded, some of its leaders realised the 
importance of consolidating these organisations to achieve synergy and avoid duplication. 
A consortium called Segerak (Serikat Gerakan) was formed on 18 June 1996 for that 
444Pancur Kasih's formal name was Yayasan Kesejahteraan Sosial Pancur Kasih (YKSPK). There were seven 
individuals mentioned in the Pancur Kasih Statute as founders: Anselmus Robertus Mecer, Agustinus Syaikun 
Riady, Yoseph Thomas, Firmus Kadri, Maran Marcellinus Aseng, Aloysius Milon Somak, and Heliodorus 
Herman. 
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purpose. As of 2004, Segerak had 21 members (i.e. organisations or units), most of whom, 
except for three, were based in West Kalimantan and all had ties with Pancur Kasih. 
Many elements contributed to the relatively smooth expansion of Pancur Kasih. The 
initial success of Pancur Kasih NGOs was due to the absence of obstruction from the 
regime and the dominant ethnic group, as most of their activities were low-risk and did not 
pose threats to them.445 The support of the Catholic Church establishment was important 
during their infancy. It was through the Church network that these NGOs were able to 
obtain their first overseas financial donor. It was also the "protection" from the Church that 
had helped them carry out some of their Dayak empowerment programs. The commitment 
of the NGO activists (some of them even went to "live in" with the local community), and 
the positive results experienced by the Dayaks involved, earned these NGOs respect. The 
Dayaks in return supported the NGOs and their activities. Finally, generous financial, moral 
and expertise support from NGOs and concerned institutions, both national and 
international level, were essential. 
8.2.1 Activities and Programs 
Pancur Kasih had many activities and programs, from economic, social and cultural 
to environmental activities and paralegal assistance, all of which were directed to empower 
Dayaks. Its main economic activities were organised through the credit unions (locally 
known as CU). After a lack of success, the credit union movement in the province received 
an important boost after the establishment of Pan cur Kasih CU in 1987. 446 Its growth was 
rapid with membership jumping to 27,000 by October 2004 from the initial 61 members in 
1987. Its assets also had risen from an initial Rp 617,000 to Rp 98 billion in October 2004. 
It was the largest credit union in Indonesia in the mid-2000s, and had received awards from 
the government because of its performance (KR 2004/106, KR 2004/111, Bamba 2000a:26; 
Lodo, Yusuf et al. 2005:27, 34-5). By the end of 2004 there were fifteen active credit 
445In 1986 the government sought to close the school established by Pancur Kasih. It was not because of the 
"threat" but more for economic reasons. The government planned to build a new market on the site (see, for 
example, Davidson 2002:254). 
446The history of the existing CU in the province could be traced back to 1975 when the Catholic Church 
sponsored the establishment of a Credit Union. The Church established about eighty credit unions in the 
province, but in 1980 only five srnvived due to mismanagement and a lack of understanding from the 
community (Bamba 2000a:26; Lodo, Yusuf et al. 2005:27, 34-5). 
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unions with 53,232 members in the Pancur Kasih network in the province with assets of Rp 
112 billion (information from an official CU Coordination body, BK3D). 
Credit unions and their branches in interior areas helped the development of these 
interior regions and increased the welfare level of the people who lived there. Unlike banks 
which are usually reluctant to give micro-credit (i.e. loans to poor people involved in self-
employment projects that generate income), credit unions gave such loans. They also 
granted loans to cover social needs such as education and hospitalisation. 
Credit unions in West Kalimantan not only performed financial functions, but had 
become an influential network for education (training) and other social activities, or even 
disseminating political information. It was not uncommon during the gatherings of 
members in credit union training sessions for discussion of other social and political issues 
to occur. The credit union network had become a potential source of support for activities 
or programs of all NGOs under Pancur Kasih. 
Besides its economic programs, Pancur Kasih had devoted much energy into Dayak 
social and cultural empowerment. One influential unit within Pancur Kasih which had 
concern in these areas is the Institut Dayakologi (ID). The embryo of ID started off as a 
discussion forum in 1988 of Dayak activists within Pancur Kasih. 447 In 1990 Institute 
Dayakology Research and Development (IDRD) was formed. In May 1991 IDRD officially 
became part of LP3S (Lembaga Penunjang dan Pelatihan Pembangunan Sosial), a social 
development training arm of the Bishops Conference of Indonesia (KWI). The association 
with LP3S protected IDRD, whose research on sensitive issues was risky. In 1998 IDRD-
LP3S became the Institut Dayakologi (KR 1997/24: 18-22, interview Own, Bamba 2000c; 
Saleh 2004:56). 
The work of ID concentrated on society and culture. Some of the first projects were 
to document Dayak oral traditions and research the impact of development projects on 
Dayaks' livelihoods. The documentation of oral traditions aimed to keep records of aspects 
447Davidson (2002:256-7) noted several factors which influenced its fonnation. Firstly, the popular anti-
logging campaigns in Sarawak in 1987 and a visit by some Sarawakian activists to Pontianak had motivated 
some younger Dayak activists to establish their own community-based movement. The other events were the 
participation of one activist in a workshop on customary law in Thailand and an inspiring report by a Belgian 
researcher on the adverse impacts of development projects on the Dayaks in Sintang district. 
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of Dayak culture and traditions, which had been fading rapidly (Bamba 2000c ).448 In recent 
times, the institute had also supported community-based teaching of local culture, 
providing local content material to local schools, and facilitating the establishment of 
community radio broadcasting. !D's work was recognised when it was selected as the 
national winner to represent Indonesia as a finalist in the Asia NGO Pacific Awards in 2004 
(KR 2004/111 ). 
One of the most important contributions of ID was a three-day national conference 
on Dayak society and culture in 1992, which drew national attention (Davidson 
2002:261). 449 Seminar sessions discussed a wide range of issues related to Dayaks, 
including issues related to the marginalisation of the Dayaks, which was rarely discussed 
openly.450 Another accomplishment was the decision to retain the use of the term "Dayak" 
rather than "Daya" preferred by the funding agencies. By retaining the term "Dayak" the 
organisers expected that the community, particularly the Dayaks themselves, would feel 
more comfortable using the term (interview Own, also Davidson 2002:258-9). 451 The 
seminar also served as a political vehicle for the consolidation of Dayaks because, as 
mentioned before, some months after the seminar, three Dayak politicians sent a letter to 
the governor to demand stronger political representation for Dayaks. 
448JD documented the oral traditions of many Dayak sub-ethnic groups. At least 1964 manuscripts had been 
produced from recordings, while hundreds (636 cassettes) still await for transcription. Some of the 
manuscripts were publ ished as cartoon books or folk tale books. Some were broadcast as drama series through 
radio using the local Kanayatn language. It recorded seventy videos and forty CDs on Dayak rituals, and at 
least 21,000 photos and slides mostly of the Dayak rituals. Up to 2004, ID had produced 55 books on the 
Dayaks written mostly by Dayaks. It also publishes the monthly KR magazine and a biannual 'Dayakologi' 
journal (KR 200411 11). 
449The seminar lasted for several days and was attended by Dayak representatives from other parts of 
Kalimantan. Because of its size, the seminar was dubbed by a local magazine as the second largest Dayak 
gathering after the Peace Meeting in Tumbang Anoi in Central Kalimantan in 1894 (Bebas 1999/7 in Bamba 
2000c). The papers presented at the seminar were published as an edited book (Florus, Djuweng et al. 1994). 
4500ne of the organisers boasted that the hot debates on the Dayaks took place amid the presence of 
intelligence officers and military representatives (interview Own). 
451 As discussed previously, the term "Daya" was introduced by the Dayak leaders in the 1940s to replace the 
"Dayak" which had connotations with savagery, backwardness, destitution, and stupidity. Activists within 
Pancur Kasih believed the continuing use of "Daya" showed the lack of confidence within the Dayak 
community about their own identity, and in the end would not help their efforts to empower Dayaks. They 
had helped the reintroduction of "Dayak" to the point where it became acceptable to the natives. Previously, 
the natives would have been offended if they had been called Dayaks. A few recent publications, for example, 
still used the old spelling "Daya" to avoid being offensive to the Dayaks (KR 1992/01, Coomans 1987; van 
Hulten 1992; Anyang 1998). 
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Another important contribution of ID was disseminating information concerning the 
Dayaks through its publications. These publications were important, particularly at a time 
when discussing ethnicity was considered taboo by the regime; and there was a general lack 
of interest in Dayaks. One of its best publication was the monthly magazine called the 
Kalimantan Review (KR). When it was first published in 1992, KR was an outlet for the 
research by the IDRD staff, and only reported cultural issues.452 From the mid-1990s the 
magazine started to report on the local Dayak resistance, especially to the logging and 
plantation activities. After ethnic conflict in 1997, it became more of a political magazine 
for the Dayaks, although it still exercised internal editorial censorship so that the content of 
the publication did not offend the regime (interview Ptb). It has become the main media for 
the Pancur Kasih activitists to propagate their ideas related to Dayak empowerment or their 
political views. According to Davidson (2002:262-3), KR had become an alternative news 
source for the budding Dayak resistance. 
As the first "activist" institution within Pancur Kasih, ID helped to form similar 
units within Pancur Kasih, such as LBBT and PPSDAK. LBBT was established on 10 June 
1993 at the initiative of ID, Walhi, and YLBHI. Its main role was to give legal advice and 
support to members of the community to enable them to understand their rights and be 
better prepared when problems arose. Its programs were centred around three main 
channels: to provide training and education to the community related to legal issues and 
land rights; to advocate and handle legal disputes particularly related to land rights; and to 
develop local institutions to help continue this work (Gong Borneo 200319:8). By 2003, 
LBBT had an establishment in several districts and helped the local people to identity 
problems and issues. LBBT also helped in the founding of some local community 
organisations (Masiun 2000: 15-20; LBBT 2004).453 
PPSDAK was established on 31July1995 as an initiative of ID and LBBT. Its main 
role was community mapping (Gong Borneo 2003/9:14). The program was in response to 
the increasing disputes involving the local community as a result of the introduction of 
452KR had grown from a biannual magazine to become a quarterly, bi-monthly, finally from July 1997, a 
monthly magazine (Saleh 2004:57,59). Peasants are the largest subscriber group to the magazine (Saleh 
2004:88). 
453It had seven establishments, one each in Sambas, Bengkayang, Sintang, Kapuas Hulu; and three in Sanggau. 
By 2004, it had helped found three local community organisations (LBBT 2004). 
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plantation and logging activities into West Kalimantan. As explained in Chapter 6, 
plantation and logging activities often took over community land without proper 
compensation. Through village mapping the local community had better information on 
their land boundaries and location of customary lands, to which they could refer in disputes 
with the state or plantation companies concerning their land rights (KR 2003/92). 
8.2.2 Social and Political Implications 
The main concerns of the ID, LBBT, PPSDAK, and other units under Pancur Kasih 
were grassroots need. Although their initial work was mostly non-political, political issues 
usually arose during training or sessions with the activists. These included marginalisation 
by the regime, victimisation by the plantation companies, and the importance of protecting 
the Dayak traditional and customary practices. These NGOs, in short, had raised ethnic 
consciousness and brought about solidarity among Dayaks, two important assets for 
political mobilisation after the end of the New Order. 
Some NGO activities received negative responses from the government and other 
ethnic groups. The government saw that some NGO activities were against government 
programs and policies. Their critical views on government policies heightened the discord. 
Other ethnic groups were also concerned that their interests might be negatively affected as 
these NGOs were advancing Dayak interests. 
The continuing anti-plantation campaigns of these NGOs irked the government 
which had tried to promote industrial plantations as a means of regional development. The 
NGOs were instrumental in raising Dayak opposition to plantations through training and 
discussion and through their publications, which often "exploited" ethnic concerns. They 
were even " involved" in local action against the plantations (see Davidson 2002:265-7, 
276). They critised plantations and encouraged local population opposition. 
These NGOs campaigned for the revitalisation of Dayak customs and practices. 
While sympathetic to their efforts, the government and the Malays had concerns. 
Campaigns from the end of 1999 to revive traditional village governance respecting Dayak 
traditions and based on Dayak custom were an example. The campaign in Sanggau, known 
as Gerakan Pulang Kampung (Return to Village Governance Movement) had resulted in 
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the passing of Perda Pemerintahan Kampung (Kampung Governance Bylaw) in 2002.454 
The movement in Sanggau sparked a similar movement in Landak district, where 
legislators drafted the village (binua) governance legislation (KR 2002/80, KR 2003/93, 
KR 2005/120, Akcaya 22-1, 25-1-2005). 455 The NGOs believed that traditional village 
governance would benefit villagers because of closer monitoring and clearer accountability. 
They believed that traditional village governance encouraged social participation, restored 
social harmony, and cured social problems. 
Some Malay politicians began to view the NGOs affiliated to Pancur Kasih as 
threatening, as they showed political aspirations and growing influence over the grassroots 
Dayaks.456 From 2002, some senior members of the NGOs set aside their previous non-
partisan principles by taking political positions, joining political parties and competing in 
elections.457 In September 1999 the chairman of Pancur Kasih, A.R. Mecer, was appointed 
as the only Dayak representative for the whole of Kalimantan in the National Assembly 
(MPR). At the end of 2002, Mecer and other figures within Pancur Kasih joined a political 
party, PPDKB.458 In 2004, the "unknown" and relatively young Maria Goreti was elected as 
one of only four members of the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan 
Daerah, DPD). Her ability to win the second highest number of votes, passing many 
454The idea came out at a meeting in November 1999 organised by West Kalimantan Indigenous Community 
Alliance (AMA) and Pancur Kasih. A taskforce, KKMA (Indigenous Community Working Committee), was 
formed on 19 March 2001(KKMA2003). 
455Movements to reinstate traditional governance at the village level also took place in other parts oflndonesia. 
The most significant example was West Sumatra, where all its districts, except Mentawai, had in place the 
Nagari Governance Bylaw. The first of such bylaws was passed by Solok district in January 2001 (Kompas, 
11-06-2004). 
456This was aggravated by the fact that some of their elite had quite different views on several issues. Some of 
the differences have been mentioned. Another important difference that appeared at the end of the 1990s 
concerned the form of the future state of Indonesia. The majority of Pancur Kasih activists, including the 
founding father A.R. Mecer, supported the idea of a federal state, an idea rejected by many Malay politicians. 
Down to Earth (DTE August 2000/46) reported that in October 1999 IDRD submitted a draft constitution for 
a federal system to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) session in Jakarta. 
457 Other figures such as John Bamba preferred not to join a political party. He, however, allowed ID 
employees to be involved in non-partisan politics, such as in the case of Maria Goretti when she campaigned 
for the DPD. Employees who wanted to become members of political parties were required to resign from the 
ID (interview Bmb). 
458A.R. Mecer, P. Florus, S. Masiun, M. Pilin, V. Vermi, Batara Budi were some figures of Pancur Kasih who 
held leadership positions in the provincial PPDKB. The first four were also recognised as founding members 
of PPDKB at the national level. 
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influential and more experienced Malay or Dayak figures, surprised many.459 She was only 
known as a member of Pancur Kasih because she was a staff member of ID. The Pancur 
Kasih network had contributed to her victory. In 2005, Stephanus Masiun and Petrus 
Lansang, two activists who had very close association with Pancur Kasih, paired up and 
competed in the district head election in Sekadau. Although they failed to win the election, 
the result showed that they were close to doing so -only 5,919 votes behind the winner. 
Without a bureaucratic background, and only backed by small political parties such as 
PNBK and Partai Demokrat, their involvement in Pancur Kasih was the main contributor to 
their significant "achievement".460 
8.3 Institutionalised Politics and the Decline of Ethnic Politics 
The change of regime in 1998 has not only provided political freedoms, which were 
used by the Dayaks to push their political demands by means of street demonstrations, but 
also fundamentally changed some political structures which had been in place for many 
decades. The Reform has introduced new requirements for political parties and new 
arrangements for general elections. These two changes would have a significant impact on 
the composition of the DPRD, whose role has been improved drastically after the fall of the 
New Order. How institutionalised politics461 influenced Dayaks politics is the subject of the 
next section. The final discussion is on the trend of inter-ethnic political strife. 
8.3.1 Elections, Political Parties and the Legislature 
Forty-eight political parties participated in the 1999 election. The six largest 
political parties obtaining most votes during the election at national level were PDIP, 
459Goreti received 138,901 votes. The highest vote went to another Dayak, Dr. Piet Herman Abik, with 
172,563 votes. The third position went to Sri Kadarwati, wife of former governor Aspar Aswin, with 136,687 
votes. The last position was occupied by Aspar with 133,260 votes. 
460Masiun was the head of LBBT and founder of a credit union in Sekadau. Lansang was the head of DAD 
Sekadau, credit union activist, and a former teacher in Sekadau. For such direct elections, there were still 
other factors which influenced the election result, for example the level of support for other candidates, their 
profile and their financial backers, to mention some. 
461 For Goldstone (2003:3) normal institutionalised politics occurrs through voting, lobbying, political parties, 
legislatures, courts, and elected leaders. This is to differentiate it from non-institutionalised politics which 
occurrs through mass mobilisation, conflict and violence, social movements, revolution and terrorism (Long 
1981:3). 
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Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN, and PBB. 462 In West Kalimantan, the line-up was slightly 
different: Golkar, PDIP, PPP, PDI, PBI, and PDKB emerged as the most significant 
political parties (see Table 8-6). The appearance of PDI, PBI, and PDKB in the province 
was mainly due to Dayak votes (although PBI also received significant votes from the 
Chinese). The following will examine the link between Dayaks and the top six political 
parties. PPP will not be discussed because it was an Islamic political party, and therefore 
unlikely to get Dayak support. 
Table 8-6 Result of the 1999 Election in West Kalimantan (Provincial DPRD) 
Rank in Rank at 
West [National Political Total 
Kalimantan Level Partv Votes Seats 
1 2 Golkar 509,042 14 (3' 
2 1 PDIP-P 377,593 11 (4' 
3 3 PPP 209 431 6 
4 12 PDI 144,763 4 (4' 
5 11 PBI 139,261 4 (3' 
6 10 PDKB 59,691 2 (2' 
7 4 PKB 48,230 2 
8 5 PAN 46 816 1 
9 6 PBB 23 688 1 
10 8 PKP 17,885 1 
11 13 pp 15,763 1 
12 7 PK 11 ,416 1 
13 9 PNU 11, 186 1 
49 (16' 
Source: DPRD Kalbar (1999d:l03-4). 
Note: Number in brackets indicates number of Dayaks. 
Golkar and PDIP generally had strong Dayak leadership in inland districts and had 
more Dayak legislators from those areas. Based on data on ethnic background of the elected 
legislators obtained from those DPRDs, it could be established that 88% of Golkar 
legislators in Bengkayang were Dayaks, while in Landak the proportion was 83%, in 
Sintang 75%, and in Sanggau 57%. Similarly, PDIP also had more Dayak legislators in 
Landak (100%), Sanggau (71%), Bengkayang (70%), and Ketapang (63%). At the 
462The first two parties were nationalist parties, while the other four were Islamic parties. PKB and PAN 
relied heavily on their respective Islamic organisations (NU and Muhamrnadiyah, respectively), but declared 
they were nationalist parties. 
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provincial level, however, both Golkar and PDIP only had a few Dayak legislators: three of 
fourteen legislators for Golkar, and four of eleven legislators for PDIP. The influence of the 
Dayaks in the PDIP became more pronounced when Comelis, the Dayak district head of 
Landak, was elected as the party chairman. In the lead-up to the 2004 election, the majority 
of Dayak executive heads had joined PDIP including the deputy governor, five district 
heads and one deputy mayor (Sinar Harapan 10-4-2003). Dayaks had little political 
influence over Golkar leadership at provincial level. 
Unlike the flexible association of both Golkar and PDIP with the Dayaks, the PDI's 
association with the Dayaks was firmer. The link dated back to 1973 when IPKI and PK, 
the two major political parties supported by the Dayaks, were merged into the PDI at the 
national level. 463 The PDI's stronger association with Dayaks is shown in the Dayak 
leaderships in the province and most of the districts (see Table 8-7). PDI was the only 
political party which had a consistently high proportion of Dayak legislators representing it, 
even in coastal districts. The "Dayak factor" was definitely behind the party's "good" 
performance in the 1997 and 1999 elections in the province. In the 1997 election, after the 
regime removed Megawati from the PDI leadership, PDI votes at national level fell badly 
from 14.9% in the previous election to 3.1 %. PDI votes in West Kalimantan experienced 
only a "lighter" drop from 21.6% to 15.1%, the best achievement compared to other 
provinces (Kristiadi, Legowo et al. 1997: 168). Its campaigns in Sambas and Pontianak 
went well and attracted many supporters, unlike in other cities where supporters of 
Megawati ruined the campaign (van Dijk 2001:28). In the 1999 election, the PDI claimed 
that almost 90% of its DPRD candidates were Dayaks (KR 1999/4 7:6). Only because of the 
strong support from the Dayaks was the West Kalimantan PDI able to obtain more than 
7 .6% of the provincial votes in the election, of which the best performance of all PDI 
463PDI exploited its ties with the Dayaks during elections. A government report mentioned that PDI had 
described itself as Eartai Qayak Indonesia, or Indonesian Dayak Party, during the 1982 general election (see 
Pemda Kalimantan Barat 1982:4). 
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branches. 464 PDI ranked fourth in West Kalimantan, while at the national level it was 
ranked twelfth. 
Table 8-7 Golkar and PDI Leadership (1980s) 
Golkar 1986 
Province Soemadi 
Pontianak Citv M. Tahal 
Pontianak A.K. Mahmud 
Sambas Sardiiio 
Sanggau H. Achmad Arif 
Sintang MashurM.S. 
Kapuas Hulu Abang Ramli 
Ketapang Sunardi Basnu 
Source: Soepardal (1986), POI (1994). 
Note: • Dayaks. 
PDI 1989 
S.M. Kaphat* 
M. Yusuf Syukur 
A.B. Kinyo* 
Namazi Noor 
Agustinus Benedi* 
L. Mitjang* 
Laurens Thomba* 
Yohanes Diaiah* 
PB! and PDKB were the other political parties which had close association with 
Dayaks. The PBI chairman was Hubertus Tekuwaan, the son of the late Dayak governor, 
Oevaang Oeray. While the party's main support came from Dayaks and Chinese, the party 
leadership in the province and many districts was dominated by Dayaks. Dayaks also 
dominated as PBI legislators at district level, except in the Pontianak and Singkawang 
Municipalities. 
PDKB mainly received support from the Dayaks because it was a Christian party. 
Almost all its legislators and party officials at both provincial and district level were 
Dayaks. The link to the Dayaks became more obvious when elements of Pancur Kasih 
joined the party (the PPDKB) at the end of 2002. 
Worth mentioning here are the attempts to form Persatuan Dayak (PD) after the 
Reform. On 21 September 1998 Yan Y.B. Iman Kalis, the son of a former PD official, 
Iman Kalis, announced the establishment of PD with the aim of participating in the 1999 
election. It was declared an open political party with a nationalist outlook (PD 1998). 
However, with its headquarters in West Kalimantan, and its usage of the old PD logo, as 
464The second highest share was obtained by the lrian Jaya chapter with 3.4% of the total provincial votes, 
followed by East Timor with 3.3%. Other provinces on average secured less than l % of provincial votes. In 
terms of the absolute number of votes, West Kalimantan PDI also received the highest with 131,909 votes, 
followed by PDI of West Java with 79,169 votes, and PDI of Central Java with 57,512 votes. For the 
complete PDI votes for each province refer to Suryadinata (2002:218-23). 
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well as the use of odd term "Daya" (which referred to Dayak), the party could not attract 
followers outside the province. The party registered with the provincial election board in 
December 1998 (Sekretariat Panitia Pemilihan Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Barat 
1999:34), and had appeared a few times in local newspapers (Akcaya 8-1, 1-2-1999), but 
then vanished. 
Approaching the 2004 election, another effort to establish the Persatuan Dayak was 
attempted (Akcaya 9-2-2003). The initiators were mostly young Dayaks in their twenties or 
early thirties. The general chairman, Michael Injeck Baruyugn, was a son of Ikot 
Rinding.465 The association initially received strong support from the local government and 
officials.466 Its extreme attitudes and lack of planning might have contributed to its quick 
demise.467 
Only 24 political parties participated in the 2004 general election, half the number 
of parties that participated in the 1999 election. The declining participation was due to the 
tougher requirements expected of political parties. Political parties that did not reach the 
electoral threshold (2% of national legislature seats) in the 1999 election were not allowed 
to take part in the 2004 election. To be able to participate they were required to reorganise 
into "new" political parties, such as by changing the party name and logo. Parties would 
need to be re-registered and undergo "verification" by the electoral body. Of 48 parties 
participating in the 1999 election, only six political parties had reached the electoral 
threshold: PDIP, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN, and PBB. 
All parties that had a firmer association with the Dayaks (PDI, PBI, and PDKB) 
performed well in West Kalimantan but did not reach the electoral threshold at national 
465 Another figure was Petrus Sindong Ajan, the head of DPRD Bengkayang. He was forced to resign from his 
post in disgrace on 7 May 2003. He was accused of corruption and of blackmailing the Bengkayang district 
head (KR 2003/94). 
466The governments of Sanggau, Ketapang, Sintang, and Bengkayang districts gave financial contributions for 
its first congress in 2003. Financial contributions were also made by a few Dayak officials, such as district 
head and deputy district head of Landak, and deputy district heads of Ketapang and Singkawang. In all they 
contributed 76% of the total fund ofRpl34 million or roughly US$15,000 for its congress (PD 2003:20-1). 
467For example, in advertising its first congress it used provocative wordings, such as "Independence of 
Greater Borneo" and "the Dayaks are still being colonised" (Equator 23-7-2003). Officials who were 
supportive at the beginning withdrew their support because they did not want to be implicated in the unlawful 
"independence" movements. For similar reasons, several Dayak figures also showed their disapproval of the 
activities. The district head of Landak, who had previously given financial support, accused the conference 
congress of being illegal (KR 2003/97, PD 2003). 
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level, and therefore were disqualified from participating in the 2004 election. In order to 
participate they needed to form "new" parties. 
The PDI, whose reputation had drastically diminished after the 1997 election, was 
reorganised into the new PPDI. However, the majority of West Kalimantan PDI officials 
under S.M. Kaphat chose to become part of PDB (Partai Demokrat Bersatu). This was a 
new political party led by Bambang W. Suharto, a politician and an official of the 
Indonesian National Human Rights Commission (see Akcaya 6-3-2003 and also PDB 
2003). 
The PDKB experienced a leadership split, and was divided into two political parties: 
PDKB of Manase Malo and PPDKB of Seto Harianto. In West Kalimantan PPDKB had a 
stronger foundation because it was supported by several Dayak figures associated with 
Pancur Kasih. A.R. Mecer, one of the founders of Pancur Kasih, was made a member of the 
national party advisory board (badan penasihat partai) in Jakarta. The Pancur Kasih 
network had helped PPDKB to become one of the first political parties to pass the 
mandatory verification process in the province. 
PBI was split into two because of leadership strife: PBI was led by Nurdin Purnomo 
and PPBTI by Frans Tshai. The West Kalimantan PBI suffered a serious setback in 2004 
after the death of its Dayak chairman, Hubertus Tekuwaan. Many party officials at the 
district level switched their allegiance to other political parties because of the continual 
internal power struggles in the party at the national level. 
Unfortunately for PDB, PPDKB, and PBI, they were disqualified at the national 
level because they did not have a sufficient number of branches. According to a regulation 
from the National Elections Commission (Keputusan KPU 2003/105), in order to 
participate in the election a political party must have branches functioning in two-thirds of 
the provinces. In each of these provinces, a party should have functioning branches in at 
least two-thirds of the total number of districts. Each branch in each district should have at 
least 1,000 members or l/lOOOth of the district' s population. These parties therefore could 
not participate in the 2004 election. The disqualification particularly shocked PDB and 
PPDKB, which had built a strong network in West Kalimantan. The disqualification dashed 
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the hopes of many well-known Dayak figures associated with these parties to be elected to 
the DPRD/DPR.468 
The failure of these important "Dayak" parties to contest the election did not have a 
significant effect on the overall proportion of Dayak legislators at the district level. In fact, 
the proportion of Dayak legislators in the 2004 election was better than that of the 1999 
election. This was because almost all non-Islamic political parties took into account the 
ethnic considerations in selecting their legislative candidates. Normally, these parties would 
nominate more Dayak candidates in a district that had a greater Dayak population. The 
increase in the proportion of Dayak legislators at district level was also helped by the 
abolition of the military faction in the DPRD. The military faction was usually represented 
by non-Dayak legislators. After 2004, the DPRD in Sanggau, Sintang, Melawi, and 
Sekadau districts had more than 50% Dayak legislators. In extreme cases, such as in 
Landak district, more than 90% of DPRD members were Dayaks. In contrast, the number 
ofDayak legislators was small or even non-existent in Malay-dominated districts. 
At provincial level, the disappearance of those parties did in fact result in the 
decline of the Dayak proportion, from 32.7% in 1999 to only 21.8% in 2004 (Table 8-6, 
Table 8-8). The fall was expected because the disqualified parties were those which had 
consistently sent more Dayak legislators. Other nationalist parties, such as Golkar and 
PDIP, as evidenced in the 1999 election, had a low percentage of Dayak legislators in the 
provincial DPRD, although they might have had a significant number of Dayak legislators 
in the district DPRDs. 
The changing ethnic composition of the DPRD affected decision-making processes 
on issues related to ethnic interest. The new DPRD influenced the district head elections 
between 2001 and mid-2005, before the direct election of district heads started. All election 
results conformed to the district ethnic proportions. For example, Dayaks were elected as 
district heads in districts dominated by their own ethnic group (§8.3.2). The Dayak-
468S.M. Kaphat, a senior Dayak politician and former chairman of West Kalimantan PDI, together with other 
senior politicians, were some of the casualties. In the case of members of PPDKB from Pan cur Kasih, some of 
them found refuge in PNBK, PDS, Merdeka Party, PD, or PIB. Fortunately a few of them were elected during 
the election itself, for example, Albertus Batara Budi was elected as a member of provincial DPRD 
representing Partai Demokrat. 
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dominant DPRD also had a role in passing "pro-Dayak" regulations, such as the Village 
Governance regulation in Sanggau and discussed a similar law in Landak (§8.2.2). 
Table 8-8 Election Result in 2004 in West Kalimantan 
Political [Provincial 
Position National Parties Votes* Seats 
l 1 GOLKAR 459.252 14 (2' 
2 2 PDIP 330.226 lO (3 
3 4 PPP 157.351 8 
4 5 DEMOKRAT 114.95 7 (4' 
5 7 PAN 79.455 4 
6 10 PDS 77.436 3 
7 14 PNBK 72.639 1 
8 9 PBR 68.943 2 
9 6 PKS 66.608 2 
10 3 PKB 52.662 1 
11 23 PPD 50.163 
12 13 PDK 49.287 1 (1 
13 11 PKPB 44.518 1 
14 8 PBB 38.554 
15 12 PKPI 31.982 
16 18 PELOPOR 28.558 
17 19 PPDI 28.364 
18 21 PSI 25.453 
19 22 PIB 21.451 
20 20 MERDEKA 18.783 1 (1' 
21 24 PBSD 18.455 
22 16 PNI 14.812 
23 15 PANCASILA 14.358 
24 17 PNUI 13.149 
55 (12 
Source: www.kpu.or.id (accessed 11-9-2005).and other sources. 
Note: Numbers inside brackets indicated number ofDayaks. 
Another case demonstrating the importance of ethnic composition in the DPRD was 
to do with the recruitment of Christian religious education teachers (guru agama 
Kristen!Katolik) in 2004. It was common knowledge among Dayaks that public schools 
were lacking teachers of the Christian religion, even in Christian areas. But the numbers of 
teachers of Islam (guru agama Islam) were much higher. In 1984 a government report 
showed that the allocation of teachers of Islam was more than triple that of teachers of 
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Catholicism and Protestantism, while the Muslim population in West Kalimantan in 1980 
was only about 1.5 times more than the Catholics and Protestants (Table 8-9). An 
investigation by Kalimantan Review in 2000 showed that, of the 107 places allocated for 
Catholic religion teachers in Sanggau, only sixteen teachers had been recruited. In Sintang, 
of the 248 places allocated for Catholic teachers, only fifty had been recruited (KR 
200l/67:13). The recruitment trend in 2004 was no different. From a total of 745 new 
teaching positions, 671 were allocated for Islam (90.1%), 34 for Catholic (4.6%), 28 for 
Protestant (3.8%), 11 for Buddhism (1.5%), and 1 for Hinduism (0.2%) (KR 2004/ 112). 
Table 8-9 Allocation and Actual Religious Teacher Recruitments (by 1984) 
Teachers of Allocation Realisation Discrepancy 
Islam 3,041 2,281 760 
Catholic 542 542 0 
Protestant 374 343 31 
Hinduism 12 3 9 
Buddhism 50 2 48 
Source: Pemda Kalimantan Barat (1988:132). 
In 2004, the smaller number of Christian teacher recruits resulted in protests in 
several predominantly Dayak districts. In Bengkayang and Sintang districts, Dayak 
demonstrators seized the local Religious Affairs Bureaus. The Dayak district head and 
Dayak-dominated DPRD sent negotiating teams to Jakarta. The central government finally 
adjusted the allocations of Christian teachers for these districts. For Bengkayang, the 
number of Christian teachers was doubled from six to thirteen, while Sintang district 
received 23 more Christian teachers (data from KR 2004/ 112, various newspaper articles 
from October-November 2004). This swift action was possible because of the support of 
the DPRD which had significant Dayak legislators. 
8.3.2 Decline of Inter-ethnic Political Strife 
As explained previously, the Malays enjoyed higher political status than the Dayaks. 
Apart from top leadership positions, which were usually reserved for the Javanese and 
military personnel, the Malays always dominated the lower to middle-level bureaucracy. 
Because of their long and continuous domination in the bureaucracy, the Malays always 
had a significant pool of high-ranking officials, who were ready to assume leadership 
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positions as soon as the posts became available to the locals. Eligible Dayak bureaucrats 
were always smaller in number and less influential than the Malays. When certain district 
head positions became available to the local bureaucrats, the Malays naturally had top 
priority for the appointments. Competition for positions, therefore, tended to be confined to 
the Malay bureaucrats and their supporters. 
Malays were quite energetic when the Sanggau DPRD started the process of district 
head elections at the beginning of 1998, some months before the resignation of President 
Soeharto. Some Malays staged quite aggressive demonstrations in front of the local Golkar 
office to urge Golkar to support Colonel Tahir Herita' s nomination (Akcaya 5-3, 9-3, 10-3-
1998). However, the Malays' were ecliped by the Dayaks after the fall of the New Order 
regime. The issue of Dayak marginalisation and the demand for native rule, which had 
become sources of Dayak political movements, had suddenly rendered the Malay 
aggressive lobbies "inappropriate". 
The Malay responses in both Sanggau and Pontianak district head elections were 
less ethnic compare to the Dayaks' . They did not overtly press for Malay district heads, 
although their desire to have Malays as district heads was obvious from the candidates they 
supported. This was very different from the Dayak demonstrations which clearly demanded 
district heads be Dayaks. Unlike the Dayaks who demonstrated readily, the Malays' 
approach were more peaceful and confmed to small group visits to the local DPRD. In the 
Sanggau district head election in 1998, Malay leaders visited the DPRD, two days after the 
DPRD had issued a letter supporting Andjioe's re-nomination (4 June). They asked the 
DPRD to remain neutral and not to be influenced either by the Dayak masses or by 
Jakarta's preference. They also wanted the DPRD to consider only candidates who had no 
"complications" during the nomination process (Akcaya 8-6-1998). This was a conscious 
move to eliminate not only the governor' s favourite, Soemitro, from the list, but also, most 
importantly, the Dayaks' Andjioe, who had become the strongest candidate after the reform. 
On the same occasion, they deliberately praised Andjioe' s decision to withdraw from the 
contest, in the hope that it would deter Andjioe from accepting re-nomination. The reaction 
of the Malays of Pontianak district was stronger during their election. Unlike the Dayak-
surrounded Sanggau City, Mempawah, the district capital of Pontianak where the election 
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took place, is located in a Malay-dominated region. This means, more Malays had 
immediate access to the capital. A local newspaper recorded several visits to the DPRD by 
Malay delegations.469 
Why were the initial Malay responses less energetic than those of the Dayaks? As 
argued before, the issue of Dayak marginalisation and the demand for native rule had made 
Malay aggressive lobbying unjustifiable. It was the Dayaks who were politically 
marginalised, not the Malays, so the latter were not compelled to compete against the 
Dayaks. The relative silence of the Malays in the election of Dayak district heads in almost 
all Dayak-predominant districts could be a sign of their recognition of the Dayak rights to 
rule their own regions. 
Another possibility was the Malays' lack of confidence about their indigenous 
status. Although the Malays regarded themselves as natives of West Kalimantan, the 
Dayaks' native status was more grounded. There were no polemics over native status 
during the New Order, because it would have been against the anti-SARA policy. Regime 
policy not giving any benefits to those of "native" status was another deterrent. The sudden 
emergence of the claim to native rights by the Dayaks after 1998 was not anticipated by the 
Malays. It was not until indigenous status had become a powerful political bargaining tool 
(i.e. after the end of the New Order), that the Malay elite started to reassert their own 
indigeneity. One of the arguments was that many Malays were descendants of Dayaks who 
had converted to Islam. The Malays were, therefore, as indigenous as the Dayaks 
(Davidson 2002:347-8) 
The Malays had never been subject to serious threats which could emotionally bind 
them together. In terms of religion, almost all Malays were Muslims and therefore enjoyed 
religious privileges. The government, for example, prioritised the establishment of mosques, 
the recruitment of teachers oflslam and the appointment of Muslims to head the Religious 
469The delegates were from Forum Komunikasi Kerukunan Pribumi Ka/bar or FKKP (Akcaya 11-11-1998), 
Komite Pemuda Pembawa Aspirasi Masyarakat Pantai or KPPAMP (Akcaya 21-11-1998), and Pemuda 
Me!ayu Ka/bar or PMKB (Akcaya 12-12-1998). The Malays' non-confrontational approaches had partly 
contributed to their losses in the elections. One high-ranking official claimed that the governor was very 
disappointed with the Malays' lack opposition towards the Dayaks. According to the same source, in the case 
of the election in Pontianak district, the governor would have appointed Agus Salim as the district head if 
there had been direct opposition from the Malays. The governor was known to prefer the well-rounded and 
more experienced Agus Salim to Cornelius Kimha (interview Awn). 
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Affairs Department, even in those areas where Muslims were not a majority. Their presence 
in the bureaucracy and local politics was much higher than those of the Dayaks. A 
significant portion of educated Malays found jobs in the bureaucracy, so they were 
economically more secure. As a part of a majority and without any real threat, there was no 
need to build distinct ethnic institutions for lobbying. Most Malay ethnic institutions were 
embedded in the religious (Islamic) institutions. In contrast, the Dayaks were always in 
inferior positions and their identity and culture suffered constant threats. They tended to 
have stronger ethnic consciousness, and therefore, to have stronger ethnic bonds. Strong 
Dayak ethnic consciousness was first evidenced when the ethnic party was formed after the 
end of WWII. 
The frustration of the Malay elite grew when they realised that the indigenous rights 
campaign had begun to restrict Malay political opportunities. By the end of 1999, as 
previously discussed, the governor had appointed two Dayak district heads. Almost at the 
same time, the government had created two "Dayak" districts to appease the Dayaks, in 
order to reduce the possibility of ethnic conflicts in these regions. Although there were no 
clashes with the Dayaks at this time, the Malays dislike of the Dayak demonstrations was 
natural. 
Some segments of the Malay community finally decided to confront the Dayaks. 
The role of the Malay-Madurese conflict in 1999 was a particularly important part of this 
confrontation. Although the conflict was not politically motivated, the Malay "victory" in 
the conflict was psychologically important for Malay politics, particularly in facing the rise 
of the Dayak political lobby. The Malays started "normal" competition against the Dayaks 
in a series of subsequent district head elections. The Malays even won the district head 
elections in Kapuas Hulu and Ketapang, both districts having a significant Dayak 
population. These two positions might have gone to Dayaks if the Dayak movements had 
continued to have an influence and no opposition from the Malays.470 
However inter-ethnic strife to obtain political positions has declined since 2000. 
One indication was the relative calm of district head elections. Another factor contributing 
470This section only discusses a small aspect of Malay politics in the province that had links to the Dayak 
political lobbying. Expansive discussion of the politics of the Malays is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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to the relative peacefulness was dimunition of Dayak political grievances. In the first two 
years after the end of the New Order, the regime had accommodated some Dayak political 
demands. As had been discussed above, the Dayaks now had two district heads and had two 
new districts. Many Dayaks were given leadership positions in the new districts. 
Aggressive demonstrations that had been a feature of the Dayak political lobbies at the 
beginning of the Reformasi, as a result of intense grievances, had become less relevant. 
Another factor behind the shift discussed previously was the "balance of power" 
between the Dayaks and the Malays after the conflict with the Madurese in 1999. The 
Dayak leaders realised that continuing aggressive demonstrations would provoke a heated 
response from the Malays, who had gained confidence after their conflict with the 
Madurese. With this new apprehension, Dayak leaders did not carry out the threat to wage 
"war" over their demand for regional representatives was ignored (see §8.1.2). Other 
factors behind the decline in aggressive lobbying which will be discussed below are power-
sharing between Dayaks and Malays, new political parties and electoral laws, and the rise 
of intra-ethnic rivalries. 
The district head elections became less of a source of ethnic tension because the 
Dayaks and Malays had acknowledged each other's rights to lead districts where they were 
dominant.471 Ethnic domination was not only determined by population size of each ethnic 
group in the districts, but also by strength of ethnic influence on the political parties, which 
was usually reflected in the ethnic composition of the local legislators. 
This informal sharing of power between the Dayaks and Malays was quite obvious 
during the district head elections after 1999. The free election in 1999 elected legislatures 
who were no longer dominated by Golkar and TNI. These legislators were more 
independent to nominate and select district heads.472 These legislators were under pressure 
to elect candidates who conformed to the ethnic majority in the district. A Dayak district 
head was elected in all predominantly Dayak districts, such as Bengkayang, Landak, 
471The issue of power-sharing between the Dayak and Malay elite was first brought forward by Davidson 
(2002:351 ). 
472Some other regulations enhanced the role of the legislature. The new Law 22/1999, for example, transferred 
a wide range of public service delivery functions to the regions (in this case the district government) and 
strengthened the role of the local legislatures vis-a-vis the power of the regional administration. 
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Sanggau, 473 and Sintang. Similarly, a Malay district head was elected in all Malay-
predominant districts, such as Pontianak, Sambas, Kapuas Hulu, and Ketapang districts and 
Pontianak and Singkawang Municipalities (see Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2). The positions of 
the less significant deputy district heads could be occupied by either an individual from the 
dominant ethnic group or from another ethnic group. In Bengkayang and Landak, both 
district heads and their deputies were Dayaks, and vice versa for Malays in Sambas and 
Pontianak districts. Some district head candidates looked for deputy candidates from other 
ethnic groups in order to attract wider political support during the nominations and, most 
importantly, during the election. 
Figure 8-1 Dayak Concentration in Districts and Sub-districts (2000, %) 
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473Yansen Akun Effendy, the district head of Sanggau elected in 2003, was half Dayak and half Chinese. 
Although he was known as more Chinese than Dayak, he campaigned hard to claim his Dayak origins during 
the election campaign. His opponent accused him of money politics during the final voting stage against 
Mickael Andjioe, the incumbent district head. Another popular candidate from Golkar, Donatus Djaman, was 
eliminated earlier for too few votes. 
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Figure 8-2 Malay Concentration in Districts and Sub-districts (2000, %) 
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The ethnic support for this "power-sharing" idea could be seen from the lack of 
inter-ethnic protests at the result of the elections; and from the cross-ethnic support for the 
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candidates. Malay associations, such as MABM,474 were not reluctant to give support to the 
Dayak candidates for the district head post in Dayak-predominant districts (see Table 8-10). 
In the case of the Sanggau election in 2003, the district MABM recognised the right of the 
Dayaks to occupy the district head position. Instead of contesting the position of district 
head, the Malays concentrated on the position of deputy head (MABM Sanggau 2003). The 
Malay leaders realised that with their minority position they could not possibly aim for the 
district head position. This ethnic arrangement worked out quite well. Of the thirteen pairs 
of candidates during the preliminary nomination stage, eight deputy head candidates were 
Malays. Only one Malay district head candidate entered the final election stage (KR 
2003/97). In Bengkayang, the Malays did not react strongly when both a Dayak district 
head and a Dayak deputy were elected. Jacobus Luna, the elected district head, secured 
wide support from the non-Malay Muslims and the Malays. The Malays also realised their 
minority status and accepted that both the district head and his deputy were Dayaks. 
Likewise, the Dayaks did not oppose when the Sambas and Pontianak districts elected 
Malays to become district heads and deputy district heads. 
Besides informal power sharing between the Malays and Dayaks, three electoral 
laws promulgated after the Reform eliminated some specific sources of inter-ethnic 
474MABM (Maje/is Adat Budaya Melayu), established on 19 April 1997, was the Malay equivalent of the 
Dayak MAD. One source, who knew the background of its fonnation, remarked that it was difficult to find a 
Malay organisation that could represent the Malays of the province in events at regional and national level. 
This had become the main problem since the early 1990s when events requiring such participation became 
more common (Interview Ism). At that time, the Malays only had two such organisations but at the district 
level (Davidson 2002:346). The MABM was not established to oppose Dayak political bargaining as some 
have argued (see such arguments in Davidson 2002:346-50). Its initial performance was far from opposing the 
Dayaks. MABM was rather slow in forming branches and did not challenge Dayak political lobbies. MABM 
even rejected a suggestion from the governor that it bid for leadership positions for the Malays (interview 
Awn, Ism). It kept a low profile during the period of transition from 1997 to 1998, and was relatively silent 
during the height of Dayak political lobbying after the fall of the New Order regime. MABM had been 
friendly towards its counterpart (MAD) since its inception, for example by continuously attending provincial 
Dayak Gawai (harvest) festivals. Its leaders usually participated in various peace-making forums organised by 
the Dayaks after the 1997 conflict. Despite its reconciliatory stance, MABM could not prevent tensions from 
growing between the Malay and Dayak elite. MABM started to build Malay Traditional Houses (Rumah 
Melayu) at the provincial and district levels, and encouraged Malays to wear telok belanga, a traditional 
Malay dress, at festivals and religious events. The MABM elite lobbied the government to incorporate more 
Malay symbols, such as the colour yellow and lancang kuning (a traditional boat) in the government premises, 
for instance at the entrance gate (interview Aid). These approaches were non-confrontational yet resulted in 
increasing polarisation between the Dayaks and the Malays. The enhancement of Malay customs, some of 
which were inherently incompatible with Dayak customs, tended to undermine Dayak customs. MABM at 
district level also became more active in airing Malay interests in subsequent district head elections after 1999. 
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political tensions. The laws are the political party law (UU 2/1999), the electoral law (UU 
3/1999), and the direct election for the provincial and district head law (UU 32/2004). 
Table 8-10 Ethnic Population in West Kalimantan (%, 2000) 
District Chinese Malays Javanese Madurese Buois Daya ks Others Total 
Pontianak Citv 23.01 31.80 13.62 10.22 7.69 3.33 10.32 
Sambas 10.81 79.90 2.91 0.02 0.36 3.41 2.59 
Benakavana 9.37 18.71 12.30 1.15 0.53 52.42 5.52 
Sinokawana 41.71 10.80 27.42 5.29 1.26 7.51 6.01 
Pontianak 12.05 28.32 14.16 18.89 11 .63 7.85 7.10 
Landak 0.67 9.66 2.09 2.13 0.15 78.99 6.30 
Sanaaau 3.05 20.44 9.07 0.40 0.22 61 .17 5.65 
Sekadau 3.14 27.05 8.19 0.07 0.06 56.84 4.65 
Sintang 1.91 17.33 15.44 0.09 0.21 55.86 9.17 
Melawi 2.68 43.38 4.38 0.01 0.12 42.37 7.06 
Kapuas Hulu 1.10 51 .88 3.05 0.03 0.05 39.72 4.17 
Ketapang 2.83 47.61 9.59 4 .61 1.27 23.23 10.86 
Total 9.45 34.70 10.18 5.45 3.24 29.98 6.99 
Source: Census 2000. 
Note: for consistency in this thesis, Muslim Dayaks were excluded from the Dayak category. If they were 
included the percentage of the Dayaks was 32. l % of the province population. 
The electoral and political party law have changed the process of selecting 
legislators. In order to attract more votes in the election, political parties recruited locally 
known figures and put them at the head of their legislative candidate lists. Most political 
parties would consider the ethnic factors when nominating the party candidate lists for the 
legislative election. In a Dayak-predominant district, political parties would usually put 
Dayak candidates at the top of their lists in order to attract more votes from the Dayaks. 
There were exceptions for religious political parties. Christian political parties, for example, 
would have more Dayak candidates, while Islamic political parties would not normally 
have (Christian) Dayak candidates. This was very different from the nominating process in 
the past where ethnic factors did not play such an important role. In the past, the dominant 
Golkar often appointed its local legislators without paying much attention to the ethnic 
balance in the region. As a result of this new practice, new legislators elected after 1999 
were ethnically more representative. The number of Dayak legislators reached an all time 
high in majority districts since the installation of the New Order. In Sanggau, for the first 
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time, Dayaks had more than 53% of the total number of legislators. In previous elections 
during the New Order the average proportion of the Dayak legislators was 40%. Sintang 
also experienced the same surge, from 25% in 1992, 35% in 1997, to 48% in 1999. 
The more proportionate ethnic representation in the local DPRD ensured that ethnic 
concerns or interests would be observed, at least in the election of some strategic and 
prestigious positions, such as the district head. As explained above, all district head 
elections by the DPRD between 2000 and 2005 conformed to the ethnic composition in the 
districts. 
Direct elections for district head and governor starting from mid-2005 in certain 
aspects further defused sources of ethnic tension. Nominations for district heads and their 
deputies were made through political parties. Candidates for district head or governor often 
had to pay parties to nominate them as the party' s candidates. However, the direct votes 
from the population rather than members of DPRD, would decide who would be elected. 
The result of this direct election was less predictable but it had stronger legitimacy and 
brought fewer inter-ethnic disputes. 475 When Dayaks won in the Sekadau and Melawi 
district head elections, the Malays, who had a strong influence in the district capitals, were 
very disappointed but had to accept the results. At the same time when the Malays won the 
election in Kapuas Hutu and Ketapang, where the population of Dayaks was quite 
significant, the Dayaks accepted the results. 
The last factor that contributed to the decline of the inter-ethnic strife was the rise of 
elite rivalries within one ethnic group. The intra-ethnic tension was not surprising since the 
Dayaks and Malays were not homogenous. Within the Malay elite, for example, there were 
rivalries between the inland and coastal Malays. Even among the coastal Malays, there 
were often frictions between the Sambas and non-Sambas elite. Among the Malays, the 
influence of the elite of Sambas origin was well-known because they held many important 
positions in the provincial government. Because of these differences, there were no 
homogenous "Malay elite" (or "Dayak elite") although diverse elements of the Malay elite 
might bond together in cases where there were threats from outside or if there were 
475The result is less predictable as it involves votes of the whole district population rather than votes of a 
handful of members of DPRD (see footnote 460). 
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common interests. When the threats or common interests disappeared, the internal rivalries 
within one ethnic group would reappear. 
Following the same pattern, the Dayaks too had internal ethnic divisions, as it had 
hundreds of sub-ethnic groups. Reasons for the divisions could have been the result of 
"traditional" enmity due to past headhunting, although this had become less relevant. 
Political opportunities could have become more valid reasons for sub-ethnic rivalries, such 
as reportedly in Sanggau in the 1980s, in Kapuas Hulu during the district head election in 
1995, and most recently during the election for the head of the Dayak Customary Board 
(MAD) in September 2002.476 
The internal friction did not necessarily follow sub-ethnic lines, but occurred 
because of different political beliefs. The rivalry between Oevaang Oeray and Palaunsoeka 
and their followers from the 1960s to the 1980s had created internal friction during that 
period. The friction between leaders of the Dayak Customary Councils and Pancur Kasih 
NGOs also made them unable to build an alliance for better influence. The leaders of the 
NGOs often accused Council members of helping the regime and private companies to take 
away Dayak lands, misusing the customary law for personal financial gain, and only 
interested in short-term political gains for their own benefit (for example Bamba 2000b:41). 
The Council members retaliated by accusing the NGOs of exploiting Dayak poverty in 
order to gain overseas funds (Davidson 2002:264). The leaders of these NGOs often did not 
attend events organised by the Council, particularly at the provincial level where the clash 
of interests was more obvious. 
In district head elections, the competition in districts dominated by single ethnic 
communities was primarily between candidates of that dominant group. The elections in 
Landak, Bengkayang, Sanggau, Sintang, and Sekadau were mainly contested among the 
Dayak candidates. In Sambas and Pontianak districts, Pontianak municipality, and to some 
extent in Kapuas Hulu and Ketapang districts, the contest was between the Malay 
candidates. If there were any tensions during the district head election, they were more 
likely to be due to intra-ethnic tension rather than to inter-ethnic tension, i.e. tension 
476Jn the event in 2002, there were indications from the beginning of the meeting that the Kanayatn Dayaks 
under Rachmad Sahuddin wanted the leadership (interview Rdg). The events in the 1980s and in 1995 had 
been discussed in the chapter on marginalisation. 
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between candidates and supporters from the same ethnic group. The clashes during the 
Kapuas Hulu district head election in 2000 and in Sanggau in 2003 were intra-ethnic 
conflicts. 
8.4 Summary and Conclusion 
Reformasi gave opportunities for Dayaks to address their grievances. The Dayaks 
were the first to pursue ethnic political activities vigorously after the fall of the New Order 
because of their political marginalisation. The influence of Dayak political mobilisation at 
the beginning of the reform was significant and resulted in two Dayak district heads being 
elected. The government fast-tracked the formation of two "Dayak" districts, Bengkayang 
and Landak, so that the Dayaks would have a region to govern for themselves. A series of 
Dayak demonstrations to demand an additional Dayak Regional Representative, however, 
was unsuccessful because of the growing resistance of the Malays. 
Activities related to the Dayaks were not constrained in the competition for political 
positions. NGOs under Pancur Kasih had been working with the Dayaks at the grassroots 
level. They provided financial assistance, social education and training, and paralegal 
assistance. Among the highlights of their activities were the establishment of a credit union, 
raising opposition to the plantation project, revitalisation of customary laws and practices. 
Some of these activities at some stage had implications which worried the government and 
were perceived as threats by other ethnic groups. In recent years, some ctivists had started 
to be involved directly in the political process to further their cause. Some had gained 
political positions and others decided to join political parties. The strong grassroots support 
as a result of these NGOs commitment was a potential political base for these NGOs when 
needed. 
The reform also brought several structural changes, including changes to party and 
electoral politics. The new regulations allow more political parties to participate in the 
elections, although regional parties still had almost no chance to participate due to stringent 
regulations. The electoral reform had contributed to fairer ethnic representation in the 
DPRD. The 1999 and 2004 general elections resulted in more Dayak legislators than any 
elections during the New Order period. The higher number of Dayak legislators in the 
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DPRD had political consequences. The DPRD in all Dayak-predominant districts were able 
to elect Dayak district heads. Issues which closely concerned the Dayak interests were dealt 
with more favourably. The Dayak-dominated legislature would at least guarantee that 
practices which would do a disservice to their ethnic interests would not be passed. 
After 2000, the inter-ethnic competition for political positions had dissipated. One 
cause for the dissipation was that the Dayak political "success" had lessened their level of 
political grievance. Another was that the "balance of power" between the Dayaks and the 
Malays after the conflict with the Madurese in 1999 had made conflict between Dayaks and 
Malays costly. Other causes were the understanding between the Dayaks and Malays to 
share political power, new electoral laws which made possible fairer ethnic representation 
in the DPRD, and the rise of intra-ethnic rivalries. 
To conclude, this chapter has shown once again the effect of regime change on the 
course of Dayak politics. The fall of the New Order had opened up room for ethnic politics 
and other ethnic-related activities which had been repressed. Without the regime change it 
would be difficult to foresee the rapid ascent of the Dayak community in politics. Activities 
related to their grassroots empowerment would not also progress so smoothly and speedily 
if the regime had not changed. Understandably, the change was not only affecting Dayaks, 
but also other ethnic groups, including the politically influential Malays. The Malay elite 
was first caught unprepared to deal with the initial intense Dayak political lobbies, but they 
had adjusted to new "rules" in the new political system. The regime change had given 
opportunities for both ethnic groups to adjust to each other' s political domain to find a new 
political equilibrium, which fortunately, resulted in a series of peaceful political events. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has shown that drastic political change at the national level, particularly 
regime change, can have a decisive impact on ethnic politics at the regional level. The 
policies of successive regimes at the national level were not formulated to deal primarily 
with political conditions in West Kalimantan, but they deeply affected politics in that 
province and, at times, were perilous for Dayak politics. This does not mean, however, that 
provincial political dynamics were irrelevant but local politics were constrained by a 
framework determined by the centre. 
It has been demonstrated how such political change had impacted on the politics of 
the West Kalimantan Dayaks from 1945. The Dayaks who had little or no political role 
prior to 1945 suddenly were given an important political role in the West Kalimantan 
government after WWII. The Dutch government invited Dayak leaders to sit on the 
government executive board and participate for the first time in the decision-making 
processes of the government. It also implemented some affirmative policies to emancipate 
the Dayaks. Such favourable conditions ended when that government was dissolved at the 
same time as the dissolution of the federal state oflndonesia (RJS) in 1950. Their previous 
strong support for a federal system made the Dayaks' status difficult under the new unitary 
government. Fortunately, despite rumours of possible punishment, Dayak civil servants 
who had been recruited into the bureaucracy after WWII continued to serve the civil service. 
Some former members of the executive council of DIKB assumed less significant positions 
in the inland districts. PD, the only political party of the Dayaks, continued to exist, but 
kept a low profile. 
Opportunities for Dayaks reopened after the liberal democratic government carried 
out national and local elections, where PD secured a significant number of seats in the local 
parliament. At the end of 1950s, four Dayaks were elected as district heads and one as a 
governor. More Dayaks were appointed to head sub-districts as well as officials in district 
government. The political changes from liberal democracy to guided democracy at the end 
of 1950s, affected the unity of Dayak politics and slightly reduced their political 
representation, but the Dayak leaders in the government kept their positions. 
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A sudden regime change in 1966 altered Dayaks' political fortunes. Almost all 
Dayak leaders in the bureaucracy and legislature were members or sympathisers of Partindo, 
a party which at national level was close to the Communist Party and Soekarno. Governor 
Oeray was removed from his position in 1966, followed by the removal of four Dayak 
district heads soon after. No Dayaks were ever appointed to the position of district head 
until 1995. The number of Dayaks in sub-district head positions was reduced gradually. 
With their disappearance, the process to help the Dayaks into the civil service, which had 
occurred under these Dayak leaders, also ceased. The Dayak share in the legislature had 
also declined since 1966, and dropped sharply after the 1971 election. 
The fall of the New Order which was followed by rapid democratisation, gave 
Dayaks the opportunity to reclaim leadership in the region. They were able to pressure the 
government to appoint Dayaks as district heads in Sanggau and Pontianak between 1998 
and 1999. The influence of the Dayak political manoeuvres did not stop at the election of 
executive heads, but extended to other strategic positions, such as regional representatives 
(utusan daerah) in the National Assembly, executive caretakers of newly-formed districts, 
and heads of local religious affairs departments. In every election of a district head in 
predominantly Dayak districts after 2000 until May 2006, Dayak candidates were 
successful. The proportion of Dayak legislators at the district level had reached a thirty-year 
record high after the 1999 election. 
The main finding of this research is that the level of political activism of the Dayaks 
is constrained by the nature of the regime. Intense Dayak political activity between 1945 
and 1950 was encouraged and accommodated by the Dutch. The government under the 
liberal democracy period (1950-1957) allowed PD to continue its activities although it was 
well known as a strong supporter of the federal system favoured by the Dutch. The Guided 
Democracy from the end of 1950s started to restrict ethnic politics through increasing 
nationalisation of local politics. Regional political parties were curbed from 1959. 
Intensification of political campaigns emanating from Jakarta into the region had co-opted 
local politics. As a result, local politics started to lose its characteristics as they became 
more like national politics. The New Order government intensified its control over regional 
and ethnic politics. The regime tightly restricted regional or ethnic politics, as it feared they 
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could threaten national unity and undermine the regime. Most ethnic activities were 
constrained to the social and philanthropic sphere, and very rarely would they venture into 
the political arena. The more democratic government after 1998 has been quite relaxed 
about the resurgence of ethnic politics as long as they did not challenge national unity. In 
West Kalimantan the fall of the New Order regime was quickly followed by the resurgence 
of ethnic politics, particularly those of the Dayaks. 
Some historical particulars and issues of marginalisation have also shaped Dayak 
politics. Dayak politics in the 1940s and 1950s, for example, was influenced by past 
conditions. Many Dayaks, for example, had little feeling of belonging when the new nation 
was created in 1945. On the contrary, they were supportive of the Dutch and the federal 
system. The thesis has shown that this was partly caused by the lack of incorporation of the 
Dayaks into the nation-creation journey during colonial times, as well as the efforts of the 
Dutch to emancipate the Dayaks after WWII. 
Marginalisation had contributed to high Dayak political unity during their political 
(re)awakening. From the mid-1940s until its dissolution, PD was the only political party for 
the majority of the Dayaks of the province. Again, immediately after the fall of the New 
Order in 1998, despite different social and political affiliations of Dayaks, they were 
relatively united behind the drive to demand more political positions and representation for 
the Dayaks. The level of political cohesion tends to decline when the level of 
marginalisation is reduced, the perception of a common enemy has changed, and internal 
competition starts to take its toll. The fracture of Dayak politics into Partindo and Partai 
Katolik after the dissolution of PD was not only because of policies from the central 
government, but also because of the disagreement between the elite within the PD as well 
as the improvement of the political status of the Dayaks from the end of the 1950s. The 
temporary political cohesion after the fall of the New Order demanding Dayak leadership 
soon disappeared and was replaced by intra-ethnic competition for the top positions in the 
Dayak-dominant districts. 
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Exclusive ethnic politics was a risky strategy and had contributed to the Dayak 
political decline in the early 1950s and after 1966.477 Through its life Persatuan Dayak was 
identical to the Dayaks. Its political views were generally treated as the views of the 
Dayaks. So when the federal government supported by the Dutch collapsed in 1950, the 
Dayaks as a whole were treated as political pariahs because PD was one of the strongest 
supporters of such government. The rapid decline of Dayak politics after the fall of 
Soekamo in 1966 was also a result of Jack of political pluralism of the Dayaks. After the 
dissolution of PD at the end of 1950s, Dayak politics was channelled mostly into Partindo 
and Partai Katholik. However, most Dayak bureaucrats and politicians were members or 
sympathisers of Partindo which was incriminated at the national level by the new anti-
communist regime. The new regime doubted the loyalty of such bureaucrats, and as a result 
no Dayaks were able to assume senior jobs in the bureaucracy, while the other locals, the 
Malays, had assumed such roles from the beginning of the New Order regime. 
On ethnic conflicts, which have occurred in the region a number of times since the 
1950s, this thesis has discussed several possible causes. It fmds that historical, 
marginalisation and cultural factors are crucial underlying causes for the ethnic conflicts 
between the Dayaks and Madurese. The experiences of a dozen conflicts between them 
have strained their relations and increased the hostility between them. The negative 
stereotypes of the Madurese and their population concentration near the Dayak home region 
only added to the feeling of insecurity among the Dayaks. Marginalisation of the Dayaks, 
although not necessarily created by the Madurese, has made them prone to conflict. With 
such conditions, any trivial incidents involving both communities have the potential to 
develop into a deadly and widespread conflict. Economic and political crisis contributed to 
the conflicts in 1997 and 1999, but was not relevant in some other previous conflicts. 
This study does not see a strong case of political motive behind the latest conflicts, 
and the majority of past conflicts in West Kalimantan. There was very little evidence 
showing that (ethnic) politics had led to such conflicts in the province, except in the case of 
477 A comparable example was exclusive Chinese politics represented by Baperki in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Baperki was incriminated after the abortive coup in 1965 because of its leaders' close relations with 
communists. Chinese politics disappeared from the Indonesian political scene together with the fall of Baperki 
after 1965. For a detailed examination of Chinese politics in the 1950s and 1960s see, for example, Coppel 
(1983). 
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1967. However, ethnic elites can take advantage of conflicts to pursue ethnic political goals. 
The ethnic conflict in 1997 enabled some of the Dayak political elite to push the 
government to improve the Dayak political position. The ethnic conflict in 1999 gave 
opportunities to the Malays to "challenge" the growing Dayak political influence. The 
conflicts did in some instances help to bring together members of the ethnic groups who 
could be critical of each other under normal circumstances. The conflict could intensify 
ethnic solidarity for stronger ethnic activities. 
Despite the progress of decentralisation, many aspects of local politics, including 
those of West Kalimantan, will continue to be affected by the national government and its 
policies. Issues of marginalisation will remain central for Dayak politics. However, political 
marginalisation has become a Jess relevant driving force. Some reforms after the fall of the 
New Order improved the Dayaks' political standing and these will not be easily reversed. 
In some Dayak-dominated districts, numbers of Dayak civil servants have increased. 
Numbers of Dayaks elected district heads, occupying position in the higher echelons, as 
well as in legislatures have increased significantly.478 Instead of political marginalisation, 
economic or socio-religious marginalisations have become central issues for future Dayak 
ethnic mobilisation.479 
Formal ethnic politics, such as the establishment of exclusive Dayak political parties 
are not viable due to government regulations. Even if the government changes policy, such 
an ethnic party is not feasible because of the lack of support from the Dayak politicians 
who prefer to stick with the broad-based national political parties. They probably have 
realised the lack of opportunity or even danger of being associated with an ethinically 
exclusive party, as their predecessors experienced in the past. As a result, the few attempts 
to revive a Dayak political party in the province since 1999, failed. 
Ethnic conflicts, between the Dayaks and the Madurese which usually occurr in 
rural areas in the north-west of the province, would be minimal in the future. This is mostly 
478The latest achievement was the election of Cornelis, the former bupati of Landak, to the position of 
governor of the province in November 2007 (Sinar Harapan 27-11-2007). 
4790ne recent case was against the implementation of national education reform (known as UU sisdiknas) 
which was perceived as disadvantageous to the Christian education institutions. This campaign received broad 
support from the Dayaks across political and religious lines (see Sinar Harapan 17-05-2003, Pontianak Post 
10-06-2003). 
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due to the change of ethnic geography of the Madurese. These regions no longer have a 
population concentration of Madurese. On the contrary, there was a surge of Madurese 
population in urban areas, mainly because of the refugees from the conflicts in 1997 and 
1999. Some conflicts involving the Madurese and Malays in 2000 and 2001 in Pontianak 
city480 is an indication that there has been a shift from mostly rural to urban conflicts. 
480For discussion of urban riots after the 1999 conflict, see Davidson (2002:Chaptcr 6). 
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